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*'No man, who hath tasted learning, but will confess the many ways of profiting by those, who, not contented with stale receipts, are able to manage and set forth new positions to the world: and, were they but as the dust and cinders of our feet, so long as in that notion, they may yet serve to polish and brighten the armoury of truth, even for that respect, "They were not utterly to be cast away."—MILTON.*

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“ WITH deference to those from whose views I dissent, I have  
“ to express a decided opinion that the construction of  
“ the works by a Railway Company, under the supervision and  
“ control of the Government, is the best system which is open  
“ for the adoption of the Hon’ble Court. \* \* \* It does not  
“ necessarily follow that, because the Government has become  
“ a party to the undertaking, by guaranteeing a certain interest  
“ upon the capital expended, and has thus gained a right to  
“ closer interference with the operation of the Railway Company  
“ than usually or properly is allowed to a Government, that it  
“ will therefore interfere vexatiously or obstructively. It is  
“ not difficult to conceive that the Government by its officers

" may exercise a close and vigilant check upon the proceedings of the Company, without giving any just cause of complaint." Thus wrote in 1853 that great statesman, Lord Dalhousie, in the celebrated Minute, which may be said to have inaugurated the vast system of Indian guaranteed railways, and we propose to consider how far the opinion here expressed has been justified by the experience of the past. The question of Government interference in the management and control of Indian railways, after being for many years so uncertain that it could not be raised without provoking controversy, has of late assumed a more definite, and so far a more satisfactory character. But the very principles upon which it is based still seem at times to be so imperfectly understood, that it may not be altogether a waste of labour, if we attempt to place before our readers an impartial statement of the case. If we can scarcely hope to achieve a complete solution of the question, we may at least succeed in removing some of the many difficulties which appear to surround it.

In order that we may be the better able to take a comprehensive view of the operation of the guarantee system, it will be useful to cast a preliminary glance at its general features. The history of railway enterprise in this country is of so recent date, that it must still be fresh in the memory of all. It will be remembered that when the necessity for railways arose, and when at the same time was demonstrated the futility of expecting that their construction would be effected, as in England, by purely private agency unaided by the Government of the country, there remained but two courses open for adoption. Either the Government might borrow the requisite funds from the public and execute the works itself, or by making certain concessions to private capitalists, and guaranteeing them against all possible risk of failure, it might induce them to undertake the construction and management of the various lines. Much was said and written at the time in favour of the direct agency of Government, and this method of construction had no doubt much to recommend it in the greater economy of time and expenditure. Indeed, we understand that a Royal Commission is now sitting in England to consider the expediency and the practicability of buying up the English Railway Companies, and working the undertakings by Government. But, mainly perhaps for the reasons detailed in Lord Dalhousie's Minute, the guarantee system was ultimately resolved on for this country, and it then became necessary to ascertain and fix the terms on which the agency of private Companies might be invited and encouraged. It was seen from the first that there

were two conditions, without which the required capital would not be forthcoming. In the first place, it would be necessary to guarantee a fixed minimum rate of interest upon the amount invested, and it would further be requisite to provide for the surrender of the works by the Companies, and a refund of the actual outlay in case of failure. To these conditions was added a third, by which the Government guaranteed the peaceable possession of the land required, and the undertaking was thus presented for the support and co-operation of the public as one free from risk, with the market-rate of interest guaranteed, and with a prospect of handsome dividends in the event of ultimate success.

In return, however, for such valuable concessions, there were certain claims, which the Government, acting in the interests of the public, was fairly entitled to advance. Such, for instance, was the privilege of having its mails and troops conveyed free of cost or at reduced rates. Such was the right of determining the direction which a line of railway should take,—a right which, though originally claimed for political considerations, has served to prevent that competition of conflicting interests, which might otherwise have resulted, had not the great trunk lines of the Empire been finally determined by the Government. It may be supposed too that the Railway Companies duly appreciated the advantages of securing a valid title to their land, while they were enabled to avoid the litigation connected with it, on which such enormous sums have been thrown away in England. A further stipulation provided for the repayment, out of surplus profits, of the various sums advanced from time to time on account of guaranteed interest. And as the Government, by thus entitling itself to a share of the profits, became, as Lord Dalhousie puts it, a party to the undertaking, it thereby gained the right to a more intimate supervision and control of the railway, than is usually or properly exercised by the Government in other countries; while, as the *ultima ratio*, it was vested with the right of purchase and summary possession of the entire works, in the event of failure by the Railway Companies to perform their part of the engagement.

Such was the broad basis upon which the terms were in each case more particularly defined by legal contract. It will be observed that while the investment is that of the Companies, the whole of the risks and liabilities attending the undertaking have been assumed by the Government, which not only guarantees a dividend of five per cent. upon the capital invested, but binds itself to take over the works and refund the original outlay, whenever the Companies may require it to do so.

Nor does the liability of Government cease with the realization of such profits, as will suffice to pay the five per cent. dividend without recourse being had to imperial funds. It is important to bear this in mind, for in the certain prospect of the railways being shortly in a position to defray the dividend without further aid from Government, it is quite possible that the pecuniary assistance received at earlier stages may be overlooked. But the fact is that the Railway Companies will still stand indebted to Government for the accumulated dividends advanced in former years, a debt moreover bearing simple interest at five per cent. Over and above this debt too, Government is under the liability of having to purchase the entire works at prime cost, if owing to mismanagement or other cause the undertaking proves a failure.

It was therefore in consideration of these risks and liabilities, that the Government was vested with certain powers of supervision and control. While making concessions sufficiently liberal to induce private capitalists to invest in what might be regarded as a great national undertaking, it was at the same time bound, in the interests of the public at large, to provide such stipulations as should effect the object in view. While guaranteeing the success of the enterprise so far as the private speculation was concerned, it was also incumbent upon the Government to ensure ~~its~~ success as a national convenience to the satisfaction of the public. The people of India have purchased as it were the investment of certain capital, in certain public works; they have voluntarily paid taxes for the loan of such capital; they undertake, if necessary, to refund the whole amount originally subscribed. But they demand in return that the undertaking, for which they have made these concessions, shall, to the utmost, be conducted with a due regard to their interests and convenience. That the concerns of the railway be managed with prudence and economy—that its capabilities for traffic be equal to the demands made upon it—that the working arrangements be satisfactory and convenient for purposes of trade,—these are conditions on which they have purchased the right to insist. Having once received public support, the railways cease to be mere private undertakings; they assume the character of national works, and must be made to conduce to the national welfare. And thus it is that the Government, as representing the nation, is furnished with such powers as may enable it to provide that the interests of the people of India are not sacrificed to considerations of private gain.

And that our argument may be seen not to be based on a mere theoretical hypothesis, it may be well to estimate the

pecuniary interest which Government actually has at stake. Colonel Strachey, who prepared an elaborate note on this subject in 1864, thus summed up the financial prospects of the Government in relation to the Railway Companies: "On the whole it must be considered highly probable that the final interest debt, remaining unpaid at the end of the term of ninety-nine years, will exceed twenty-five millions, and the debt may be considerably more. This sum will be the virtual contribution on the part of Government to the undertakings, which we have supposed to cost seventy millions. In short, the Government subsidy in the end will very probably be as much as fifty per cent. on the paid up capital, and it readily may be much more."

If to this we add the loss by exchange, which, though not anticipated, has not the less been a Government contribution, and may be estimated at upwards of five millions and a half, and a further sum of two millions as the cost of land, it will be seen that Government is seriously interested even in a financial point of view in the ultimate success of Indian railways. "It may be admitted," writes Mr. G. N. Taylor, "that the social and political advantages of these great lines of railway have been cheaply purchased by Government at the cost of the pecuniary liability which the guarantee system involves, but it must always be kept in mind that it concerns the Government, even more than the Railway Companies, that the undertakings should become remunerative at the earliest possible date."

But though the right of interference is primarily based upon the terms of the contract, to which in all cases of doubt or controversy the final appeal must lie, there exist two other arguments which present themselves to our mind, why a somewhat closer supervision and control should be exercised by the Government in this country, than would be properly allowed to the Board of Trade at home. We shall again quote from Lord Dalhousie's minute. "The enlistment of private enterprise for the formation of these great works, directly but not vexatiously controlled by the Government of the country acting for the interests of the public, was a principle for which I contended several years ago, when closely connected with that branch of Public Works. I may venture, without arrogance, to say that if that principle had been then more fully recognized, the proprietors of railway property in England and the suffering public would have been in a better condition now than they appear to be." If then this principle would, as declared by such high authority, have proved beneficial

in the case of English railways, constructed and in operation under the very eyes of the shareholders, with what greater force will Lord Dalhousie's remarks apply to the enormous works undertaken with English capital in this country, where the vast majority of subscribers never set foot. "Of the total number of possessors of stock," writes Mr. Danvers, "those in India, taking Europeans and natives together, amount to only about two per cent., and taking natives alone to scarcely more than one per cent." The fact is that, even supposing the Government to have no pecuniary interest whatever in Indian railways, its supervision would, in this of all countries in the world, be most desirable in the interests of the shareholders themselves. As remarked by Mr. G. N. Taylor in his first Report on the affairs of the East Indian Railway, "the principal guarantee of the shareholders, as well as to the Government, for the integrity and accuracy of the transactions of the railway in India, must be the control and final audit of the local Government. Without such control no railway audit, however constituted, could be entirely satisfactory, performed as it must be by a stipendiary agency, at this distance from the shareholders and the Board, whose presence cannot fail to exercise a salutary check upon such transactions in England." It may indeed be questioned whether, in other branches of industry in which British capital has been embarked in this country, a more direct supervision by Government over the operations carried on in India might not be productive of beneficial results.

Again, the intimate connection which has from the first existed between the Government and the Railway in this country, has already sufficed to identify them in the eyes of the natives, by whom the latter is purely regarded as a State institution. Accustomed to see provision made in the Budget year after year for the payment of guaranteed interest, brought perhaps into personal contact with the Government officers employed to take up the land required for the line, it is not surprising if the native over-estimates the encouragement which Government has afforded to these vast undertakings. If there is any defect in railway management, it is the Government that is in fault; if there is any cause for complaint, it is from the Government that redress is sought. In proof of our assertion, we have only to instance the petition which has lately been presented to the Viceroy by the British Indian Association of the North-West Provinces, and which we shall further notice hereafter. We are greatly mistaken indeed if the ordinary native of this country does not regard the railway as

a part of the machinery of Government, without which its functions would cease, or be very seriously impeded.

The action of Government in its interference with the Railway Companies having, however, been defined by certain contracts, according to the terms of which it must always be regulated in future, our next step leads us to examine the powers thereby conferred upon the Government. We shall then be in a position to consider in what respects and to what extent its interference is expedient.

Clause 10 of the contract with the East Indian Railway Company, which for our present purpose may be taken as the representative of all such contracts, runs thus :—" That the said Railway Company and their officers, servants, and agents as also their accounts and affairs shall in all things be subject to the superintendence and control of the East India Company as well in England as elsewhere, and in particular that no bye-laws, contracts, orders, directions, proceedings, works or undertakings, acts, matters, or things whatsoever shall be made, done, entered into, commenced, or prosecuted, by or on the part of the said Railway Company, unless previously sanctioned in writing by the East India Company or in some other manner to be prescribed by them ; \* \* \* \* and that for better enabling the East India Company to exercise the control and direction intended to be hereby secured, the said Railway Company shall record and keep in proper books for that purpose full and particular accounts of all their transactions and proceedings including full and true minutes of all their meetings, meetings of Directors, communications with India, and correspondence, so as at all times to exhibit thereby fully and truly the state of their affairs and proceedings, and that the East India Company and any person or persons appointed by them in their behalf shall, at all reasonable times, have free access to all the books, accounts, papers, and documents of the said Railway Company, except communications between the said Railway Company and their legal advisers, with power to make copies of or extracts from the same. \* \* \* "

Another Section requires that so soon as any portion of the line is opened, the " Railway Company shall and will forthwith commence and carry on the business of common carriers of goods and passengers upon the said railway, and for that purpose shall cause to be run on the said railway so many trains at such times and at such rates of speed and between such places and with such conveniences and accommodations as the East India Company shall from time to time require, and the



“ said Railway Company shall and will allow the use of the  
 “ said railway to the public on such terms as shall be approved  
 “ by the East India Company, and the said Railway Com-  
 “ pany shall be authorised and empowered to charge such  
 “ fares for the carriage of passengers and goods and such  
 “ tolls for the use of the said railway as shall have been  
 “ approved by the East India Company, and shall not  
 “ in any case charge any higher or different fares or tolls  
 “ whatsoever without such approval being first obtained, but  
 “ such fares or tolls shall, when such net receipts as are herein-  
 “ after mentioned shall in any year have exceeded ten per cent.  
 “ upon the outlay, be reduced in accordance with any requisition  
 “ of the East India Company in that behalf, but only with a  
 “ view of limiting the said fares and tolls so far that the net  
 “ receipts shall not exceed ten per cent. as aforesaid.”

The Government, it will be observed, is here armed with plenary powers. It may be said that such stringent provisions were unnecessary, but cases have already arisen which has justified the wise forethought to which they owe their insertion. At the same time we do not for one moment assert that the strict supervision herein contemplated is by any means either possible or expedient; indeed in some instances it could not but prove extremely mischievous. Our readers will remember a case of gross negligence of late occurrence in which the accused was acquitted on trial before the High Court, on the technical plea that some petty order had not received the sanction of the Governor-General in Council. The Government of India and the local Government have in fact far too much upon their hands at present to be able, even if it were desirable, to undertake the direct management of five thousand miles of railway. And, unless the entire management is assumed by Government, their interference with details must, with certain exceptions, be attended with pernicious results. The proper province of Government consists in exercising a general control, only so far stringent as to secure the convenience and safety of the public, while consulting the financial interests of the State.

Unfortunately this principle has not always been kept in view. It cannot be denied that the Government officials, more particularly during the construction of these railways, have laid themselves open to the charge of needless and vexatious interference. Not only has the official routine of red-tapism been productive, in frequent instances, of uncertainty and gross delay, but by insisting on the discussion of engineering and other special questions, these officers have shown that they have not fully comprehended the spirit of the guarantee system. For, it will

be remembered that one of the main reasons for introducing that system into this country, was the advantage of utilizing the experience which had been gained in England in the construction of similar works. There a whole host of railway engineers and contractors had suddenly sprung into existence, created by the necessities of the times. Railway engineering, in fact, had become almost a distinct branch of the profession. And it was with a view to the employment of such special agency, that the Government wisely, as we maintain, resolved to entrust the construction and management of Indian railways to private companies. Had the Royal or Bengal Engineers been thought equal to the task, half the argument in favour of such a decision would at once have fallen to the ground. It can scarcely, therefore, have been intended that the very same officials should be constantly hampering the action of those men, to whom, owing to their larger and more special experience, it had been rightly determined to entrust the construction of the railways. If every petty detail of construction or management requires to be discussed by the engineers both of the Government and of the railway, it is obvious that the work is done twice over, and the public has to pay for it. And, what is perhaps of greater consequence, under such a double government all individual responsibility is lost. The railway authorities cannot be expected to answer for the consequences, if their plans and specifications are continually being altered without their consent, and the result can only end in mutual recrimination, when anything does go wrong. This view of the case appears to us so patent, that we wonder it has not yet been fully recognized by the Government. Is it that Consulting Engineers and their superiors cannot forego the pleasure of displaying their power in disallowing and modifying the proposals of the railway authorities? Or, do they really imagine that, without any previous experience in railway matters, they have been born with natural talents and a professional reputation superior to those of such men as Messrs. Power and Turnbull? However this may be, there can be no doubt that one of the first principles of the guarantee system has been lost sight of. As Mr. Danvers recommends, the Government should once for all "be relieved from interference with details, the responsibility of working out the arrangements decided upon being left to those who are selected on account of their peculiar qualifications to direct the affairs of the various departments."

It may be laid down, therefore, as a general proposition, that the action of Government in the supervision of guaranteed railways is most advantageously exercised in the audit of

expenditure, and in such a general control over the working arrangements of the line as may be absolutely necessary in the interests of the public at large. It will accordingly be under these two heads that we shall treat this portion of our subject.

The nature of the guarantee renders it important that the Government should possess the means of checking lavish waste and misappropriation in the construction of the railway, which not only swell the aggregate capital on which interest has to be paid, but diminish the chances of those large profits, to which Government can alone look for the ultimate repayment of the guarantee debt. The necessity for such a check was fully demonstrated by the facts disclosed in the reports of Mr. George Noble Taylor, who was appointed by Government in 1863-64 as Special Commissioner to enquire into the affairs of the East Indian and Bombay Railways. Previous to Mr. Taylor's deputation, the management of most of the Railway Companies in India had been marked by gross carelessness and inefficiency. On the East Indian Railway, for instance, nearly four and a half millions, or more than one-fourth of the whole expenditure which had been incurred up to the time of Mr. Taylor's commission, remained unaudited in the accounts; and this was the case, notwithstanding that the Government officers had adopted the very questionable expedient of passing summarily all bills up to the sanctioned amount of the estimate. "This fact alone," as remarked by Mr. Taylor, sufficed to throw "all the affairs of the Company into confusion, rendering it difficult to check correct expenditure, and encouraging waste and extravagance in every department." Mr. Taylor's sagacity enabled him at once to perceive that the chief cause of this maladministration was the divided responsibility, which the double government, so long as it was not conducted upon correct principles, could not but necessarily entail. The Railway Companies, secure in the enjoyment of guaranteed interest upon the whole of the capital expended, looked to the Government as the party more immediately concerned in controlling extravagant expenditure. The Government officer, on the other hand, while fully aware of the necessity which existed for a strict audit on his part, yet from not being in possession of the necessary details, was powerless to pass the final accounts. It was quite possible, under these circumstances, that the Government interference should be at times regarded as vexatious and obstructive.

The true remedy which suggested itself to Mr. Taylor is described by him as follows:—"What is primarily wanted is that the Railway Agent and the Heads of the Departments

“ acting under him, should fully realize their direct and personal responsibility to the Company, as well as to the Government, for the economical and efficient management of the concerns of the railway; that they should not indolently look to the Government as the ultimate controlling authority to check waste and misappropriation of the Company’s funds, for which they alone are accountable, but that they should, on the contrary, in the interests of their employers, make a determined stand against profuse and unnecessary expenditure of every kind. \* \* \* In proportion to the care and honesty of purpose with which the railway officers discharge their responsible duties will be the measure of Government interference; it rests with them to reduce it to a minimum.”

But while seeking to impress on the railway authorities a due sense of their own responsibility, and disclaiming on the part of his Government all connection with matters for which they were solely accountable, Mr. Taylor’s experience showed him at the same time that the Government control even in such matters could not altogether be dispensed with. So far from fettering the Agent by useless and vexatious interference with details, he saw how his authority might in reality be strengthened by the countenance and co-operation of the Government. Instead of the lax supervision of a double and divided Government, which had hitherto characterised the connection between the Agent and Consulting Engineer, their combined authority was, he felt, necessary for the effectual control of the subordinate railway officials. In this view, in place of the voluminous and often irritating correspondence between them, he suggested periodical meetings, at which all matters might be satisfactorily discussed in the presence of the heads of departments. The duty of the Government officer at these meetings was thus defined: “ While assisting the Agent with his counsel and with such suggestions as are prompted by his professional knowledge and administrative experience, he will leave him totally unfettered in his action; not himself subsiding into inaction, but trusting to the moral influence of his presence and advice, closely watching the administration in all its details, and exercising his veto, wherever extravagance or mismanagement is apprehended.” The wise and liberal tone of these remarks could not fail to secure the cordial approval of every Railway Company in India.

As regards the actual expenditure, Mr. Taylor recognized in the very terms of the contract the necessity for a separate Government audit, and his endeavours were accordingly aimed at rendering it as comprehensive and as little obstructive as possible. The procedure, which he recommended and which is now in

consequence being introduced in regard to all the railways in India, was in general terms a system of authorization, followed by a prompt audit by a Government officer in the railway office itself. "In such an audit," writes Mr. Taylor, "the minute arithmetical processes and examination of vouchers may be safely dispensed with, as having been satisfactorily performed by the railway audit, while that of the Government should proceed upon a consideration of the propriety of the various charges with which alone the Government is really concerned."

It is unnecessary in a brief review like the present to consider more minutely the details of Mr. Taylor's recommendations, with reference to the Government audit. We are not of those who hold it to be the province of Government to exercise so close a supervision over the railway accounts, as may be sufficient to protect the shareholders from misappropriation and extravagant expenditure. On the contrary, we consider that the agency employed in this country must be held solely responsible to the Directors, no less than to Government, for the faithful and economical disbursement of the capital placed at its disposal. We believe moreover, that the professional accountants paid and sent out to this country by the Companies in England, are far more competent to deal with the accounts than the military officers who are generally selected for this purpose in India. At the same time we can fully see the necessity for such an audit on the part of Government, as shall suffice to protect it from unauthorized and improper charges. It is important, for instance, that the Government should be satisfied that the various sums have actually been expended for the purposes for which they were sanctioned. It is further important that the expenditure should be correctly distributed between revenue and capital, as any error in such cases cannot be otherwise than prejudicial to the interests of Government. But beyond this general control, we are of opinion that the interference of Government is only mischievous as weakening responsibility in the proper quarter, and embittering the relations in which the Government and railway officials stand to each other. The mere existence of a Government audit, enabled as it is at any time to expose misappropriation or extravagance, is a powerful and perhaps sufficient check upon the Companies' agency in this country; but it is quite possible that the very virtue of the Government's power may consist in its being kept in reserve, instead of being uselessly and ineffectually paraded.

The control exercised by the Indian Government over a guaranteed railway is not however confined to the audit of accounts: it claims moreover to exercise a general supervision

over the management and working arrangements of the line. And the reason for this, as in the other case, is based on the peculiar nature of the guarantee system. The large pecuniary interest, which the Government has at stake in these railways, entitles it, as we have seen, to a proportionate share in the general control and management. And though, no doubt, the interests of the Government and the Companies being identical, it might be argued that the former would be sufficiently consulted, if the Railway Companies were allowed free and independent action in the matter, yet, for what we consider valid and sufficient reasons, the Government has not yet thought it expedient to transfer its controlling powers to the Companies' Board of Directors. It is quite true that the Government is even more intimately concerned than the Railway Companies in the financial success of these undertakings. It is no doubt an important consideration to Mr. Massey, that the Indian finances should be relieved from the payment of guaranteed interest at the earliest possible date. It will be an equally important consideration to his successors to recover as much as possible of the interest which has been paid in former years. But it is perhaps excusable if at the same time the Government subordinates these considerations to that of making the railway more useful and convenient to the public which it represents. If the Government conscientiously believes that the right of interference which it has purchased may be more advantageously exercised in the interests of the public, in insisting upon certain improvements rather than in seeking to secure a handsome dividend, (and in this belief we are not sure that it has not the cordial support of the public) we are not disposed to quarrel with it, because it chooses to exercise an undoubted right. On the contrary, we are ready to assert that the view taken by the present Government in this matter is both wise and just. The shareholders, after all, are but a small body of men, actuated by merely private, or, in other words, selfish motives. The Government, as being above personal considerations, may be supposed to contemplate the undertakings in a more liberal and comprehensive spirit. It would, in our opinion, vastly abuse the great powers entrusted to it, were it to overlook the claims of the public at large, or make them subservient to its pecuniary interest as a private shareholder.

The fact is, there would seem to be great misapprehension abroad on this matter, and it is right that the case should be fairly stated. At the last half-yearly meeting of the East Indian Railway Company, the opinion was pretty clearly expressed that the Indian public, and as its representative the

Indian Government, had manifestly overstepped their proper functions in suggesting certain remedies for the block which annually occurs upon the line in the cold season. On that occasion the chairman, Mr. Crawford, is reported to have spoken as follows :—" Let the proprietors bear this fact in mind that, compared with the large amount of capital embarked in our railway by the people of England, the merchants at Calcutta have subscribed what may be set down as nothing—(a laugh). On the last occasion when I investigated the relative contributions of capital to our great work, by ourselves in England and gentlemen in India, I found that you had contributed 99 per cent. and a fraction, and the gentlemen in India the very small fractional sum, to make up the 100. Therefore I do not think it quite reasonable that merchants or any body else in India should expect other people to find an unlimited amount of capital for the purpose of enabling our railway, upon an emergency, to meet every possible demand made upon it." Now the plain meaning of these words is this, that the Indian public holding, as it does, so fractional a share in the railway, cannot fairly claim to have a voice in the management, or expect that its complaints and suggestions should meet with attention. Indeed, we are not sure that Mr. Crawford's argument does not go so far as to say, that gentlemen in India have no business to complain about the railway at all. But surely one very important fact is overlooked in this view of the case. It may be true that all or nearly all the capital required for this great undertaking has been subscribed in England, but it is the Indian public which has attracted that capital to this country by its guarantee of five per cent., and which has actually been paying interest now for some time to the English shareholders at the rate of about three millions a year. It is a mistake to suppose that it is by the number of Indian shareholders that the interest of the Indian public in the guaranteed railways is to be measured. Every tax-payer in India, who has contributed his quota to the imperial revenues, from which the guaranteed interest is paid, has thereby gained, if not the full privileges of a shareholder, at least a right to some consideration in return for his investment. And the Indian public is therefore, as we conceive, at full liberty to discuss either at public meetings, or in print, or otherwise, the mode in which it shall enjoy the advantages for which it has paid, and to criticise the management of a railway which has been guaranteed by its Government, as freely as it might criticise any other public question.

For our own part we fully believe that the Government of the present day is not only consulting the best interests of the public, but is doing no more than carrying out its real wishes in introducing those wise measures of improvement and reform, by which the railway may be made to contribute more satisfactorily to the comfort and convenience of the public. That it should be necessary for Government to interfere at all is perhaps the most surprising feature of the case, but the necessity is unfortunately but too glaring, and we can only congratulate ourselves that the Government does not shrink from performing its duty. Indeed, if in any one respect more than another, Sir John Lawrence's administration may be pronounced successful, we think it has been in his dealings with the railway system of the country. If we carefully examine the annals of late years, we shall find the record of many grievous abuses corrected, many grievous defects supplied. The circular of the 29th October last, published in the *Supplement to the Gazette of India* of 1st December, 1866, briefly reviews the results which have already been accomplished towards providing for the greater convenience of passengers, more especially natives who form the great bulk of railway travellers, and we agree that "some instalment of reform" in this respect has already been introduced. More strict attention is now paid to the cleanliness of stations and necessities, the due provision of lamps in the carriages and on the platforms at night, and the prevention of the overcrowding of third class carriages. "Much, however, remains to be done before it can be said that the paying portion of the passenger traffic on Indian railways has had justice done to it."

Now we are quite ready to make allowances for the many disadvantages under which the Indian Railway Companies have to work, and the numerous difficulties with which they have to contend. We never for one moment anticipated that the traffic arrangements on a single line of rails, a thousand miles perhaps in length, and a great portion of which is but newly opened, should all at once be perfect. We admit that in the necessary employment of so many natives of all classes, the management have a very different material to deal with than in Europe. And we are therefore willing to overlook many shortcomings, so long as we see the germs of future improvement. But when, on the contrary, we find the Directors in England not only starving the lines, but poohpooing the suggestions made to them from without, we think that the time has arrived for the Indian public to make itself heard and to insist on such improvements as shall effectually secure its safety and convenience. We shall not stay to enquire where the fault lies between the Board



### *Indian Guaranteed Railways.*

at home and the stipendiary agency in this country. It is quite possible that the very existence of many of the abuses complained of may not be known to the Directors; some of them, which are peculiar to this country, could not probably, unless specially brought to their notice, be even imagined by them. But if this be adopted as their line of defence, it carries with it the admission of our position, that it is a most fortunate circumstance for the people of this country that the Government is willing to use the large powers it possesses under the contract to compel the Railway Companies to provide for their convenience and comfort. We are not, of course, in the position to say that the agencies in India *never* make suggestions to their respective Boards, or call their attention to particular abuses of which they might be supposed to be ignorant. But it is at the same time the fact, that in the great majority of cases in which remedial measures have been introduced of late years, the pressure has had to be applied from without. Nay, it is not unfrequently the case that the task of devising the proper remedy for the abuse complained of has been left entirely to the Government. Perhaps it is no more than natural if the agents, seeing the eager expectation of both Directors and shareholders for an increase of profits, do shrink from suggesting any proposal, which, by involving additional expenditure, could not but be unpalatable to their superiors. However that may be, and whether or not there are abuses to which the Directors in England may be naturally blind, they have certainly no excuse to plead for voluntarily shutting their eyes to such as are carefully and deliberately brought to their notice. At the meeting to which we have referred, Mr. Crawford was pleased to characterise the block in last season's traffic on the East Indian Railway as due to an "adventitious demand," and he proceeded to argue that the line as at present conducted was fully equal to its ordinary requirements. And yet we are bound to say that the Board could not be ignorant of the loud reiterated complaints of the delays attending passenger trains no less than goods. It is a fact that at the present day even, a train can scarcely travel 300 miles on the East Indian Railway without being from two to three hours late. And it is no slight inconvenience that passengers should be kept waiting for hours often at road-side stations which may be totally unprovided with accommodation, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, or the danger of a tropical sun.

Nor is a want of punctuality the only defect in railway management of which the European may complain. Our

object however being rather to discuss the principles of the guarantee system than to point out particular abuses, we shall not dilate upon them here. It will be sufficient if we draw attention to the want of cleanliness in the carriages, the want of railway porters—paid servants of the Companies—at the principal stations, and the want of protection from the rain or the sun's rays on the platforms. These and other defects have been repeatedly pointed out, though little or nothing has yet been done towards providing a remedy. "In all the distance between Calcutta and Delhi," wrote the *Friend of India* a few weeks ago, "the railway traveller is only reminded of travelling at home by the absence of every pleasure he has been accustomed to associate with that species of progression. If he has not suffered personally or not excessively, he has witnessed the sufferings of others more poor and humble, and to a right-thinking Englishman the difference will not appear very material; he will also have witnessed an amount of neglect and contempt for the public, such as we venture to assert was never before exhibited either in England or abroad." So long as this is the unanimous voice of the press in this country, it cannot be surprising if the Government, while fully alive to the importance of the railway yielding a speedy return, should be still more impressed with the necessity of guarding against that policy which would seek to amass large profits at the sacrifice of the convenience and perhaps the safety of the public. In the early prospect of dividends exceeding that guaranteed under the terms of the contract, this consideration is perhaps not ill-timed. The Government can afford to wait for its moiety of the surplus profits, and the tone of the press, as quoted above, is ample evidence of the feelings of the public on this question. We believe then we are not mistaken in asserting that the Government will only satisfy the reasonable expectation of Europeans in this country, by insisting that the railways shall be made more useful for purposes of trade, and as a cheap and speedy mean of communication.\*

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\* At the same time it must be admitted that there are some few comforts conceded to railway travellers in this country, which are not met with at home. Such are the provision of sleeping carriages, the possibility of securing a reserved compartment by payment of four fares only, and (though not generally known) the privilege allowed to ladies and invalids of taking native servants in the same first-class carriage on payment of second-class fare only. But after all, these are concessions demanded by the nature of the climate, and the very high rate charged for first-class fares.

Regarding the control of their subordinates by the Companies' officials, the Government, we think, has been wanting in its duty. Although the railways have been the cause of introducing numbers of non-official Europeans into the country, and in some places of thus creating large

And if, on the other hand, we contemplate the position of the natives with regard to these great undertakings, we shall find that the present policy of Government has not only been productive of the most successful results, but is no more than in accordance with the wishes of the community. We have already seen how naturally the native of India comes to regard a great institution, like the East Indian Railway Company, as a powerful instrument of Government, and in this view we ventured to express our conviction that the general powers of supervision and control reserved by the Government under the contract would, in their case, be found not beneficial merely, but absolutely necessary. The natives, when travelling, have wants and requirements peculiar to their habits and country. Such requirements do not for the moment enter into the calculations of the Directors in England, while the agency in this country, if not equally ignorant, may be powerless to supply them. The suffering and inconvenience, which have thus been entailed upon the native public, have, we venture to say, been barely compensated by the increased facilities of locomotion. It was fortunate that the Government retained the right of interference, and has been enabled to protect the weak from what may not unnaturally appear the somewhat grasping policy of the English capitalist.

Now we are not going to write any maudlin sentiment regarding the likes and dislikes of the native of India. We will commence by admitting that in many respects, we think him very ignorant, very superstitious, and very foolish. We believe that the railway itself has been the means of effecting great good in loosening the bonds of caste, and in the general diffusion of knowledge. But we cannot shut our eyes to the plain fact, that there are notable grievances connected with railway travelling in India, to which the natives, whether Mahomedan or Hindoo, are peculiarly subjected. The *Supplement to the Gazette of India* of 1st December last contained a petition on this subject, which was lately presented to the Viceroy by the British Indian Association of the North-West Provinces, signed by no less than 3,251 names. The

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towns, there has not been, so far as we are aware, the slightest extension of the judicial machinery for the purpose of repressing violence and fraud. A large town, like Jamalpore, for instance, containing upwards of a thousand Europeans, ought to have its resident Magistrate. So long as the parties and witnesses have to travel six miles to the nearest court, it is impossible to say what number of cases are not hushed up in the workshops. At smaller stations, where Europeans are congregated, as at Dinapore, the resident Engineer might, with advantage, be appointed an Honorary Magistrate and Justice of the Peace.

petition in question treats of certain specific grievances to which the natives are subjected, and the remedies by which it is proposed to meet them. Such an expression of public opinion cannot be disregarded by a Government which has, in an especial manner, taken upon itself to be the guardian of the public interest in these great undertakings. As remarked by the petitioners, "in such a momentous matter as involves daily the health, comfort, and even life of tens of thousands of the very poor, ignorant, and quite helpless, the Government" ought to be "more ready to hear than we are to pray, and" to be even "beforehand with us in its care and solicitude for our welfare."

Though unable to acquiesce in all that is stated by the petitioners, and failing to see the necessity for some of the measures proposed, we must admit that there is unfortunately too much truth in the complaints of the neglect with which the wants of native passengers are treated. From the moment a native passenger enters a railway station to the time of arriving at his destination, his life is felt to be a burden to him. The delay in waiting for the train and the want of proper shelter and accommodation at the stations is the first subject noticed in the petition. "What does this waiting involve?" ask the petitioners. "There is no shelter from the fierce continuous rays of the burning sun. There is no shelter from the heavy and drenching showers of rain lasting for hours. There is no shelter from the hot winds and clouds of dust. There is no shelter from the cold cutting blast. In winter, and in summer, and in the rains, at all times alike, these masses of weak, ill-clad human beings are left exposed to all the inclemencies of the wind and weather, and suffer and contract diseases, and die like brute beasts. Many a poor native's illness or death is traceable to sufferings at a railway station while waiting for the train." Who indeed has not witnessed the crowds of natives clustering around the entrance to the station waiting till the hour of admission shall arrive? And yet the remedy is "simple and inexpensive." So long ago as 1864 Mr. Taylor urged the erection of light, suitable sheds within the station compounds. At the larger stations they should be supplied with restaurants,—another want which has made itself heard in the petition we are considering.

Nor, even when admitted into the station, are the sufferings of native passengers at an end? If they are sufficiently fortunate to escape being cheated in the purchase of their tickets, they have nevertheless to submit to the grossest abuse and ill-usage from the lowest of the railway officials. Huddled and crowded like cattle into carriages often unprovided even

with seats,\* the doors are shut and locked upon them, and there they must remain till they arrive at their journey's end. And here we must notice that remarkable species of casualty pointed out by Mr. Danvers, *Found Dead*. "It appears," writes that gentleman, "that the number of persons so found are considerable, death, it is supposed, being caused by the effects of the great heat upon those who undertake journeys and religious pilgrimages when they are physically unfit for the exertion." This may be to some extent correct, but are none of these numerous deaths to be attributed simply to overcrowding? We have ourselves seen some third-class carriages in transit, which suggested to us unpleasantly enough the miseries of the Black Hole.

And this leads us to say a word regarding the safety of railway travelling in India. We observe from Captain William's Note on Railway Accidents, published as an appendix to Mr. Danver's Report, that the number of passengers killed and injured from causes beyond their control, was, in 1864, 3.77 per million, against a proportion of 2.62 in Great Britain, and although the very serious increase of that year over previous years is explained as having been occasioned by two fatal accidents on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, the broad fact must not be overlooked that whereas, if accidents in England are not in many cases attributable to excessive speed, their fatality is certainly thereby affected, yet this element has scarcely entered into the calculation on the Indian lines. Considering the number of accidents on the railway in this country, the number of persons actually injured is comparatively small, but this fact does not diminish either the apprehension of danger or the risk of detention. It would appear that there were no less than 345 accidents during 1864, 85 of which arose from the action of pointsmen. Of these 85 again, no less than 59 occurred on the East Indian Railway, and 14 cases of collision are attributable to the same cause. "These accidents arise at facing-points, and many of them in shunting within stations." Neither do they arise from the same causes, as in England, of mistaken or neglected signals. On the contrary, they are generally the result of gross ignorance and incompetency. It is well known how far a native's presence of mind may be trusted in an emergency. We believe it is not at all an uncommon case for a pointsman, utterly reckless of

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\* We saw it suggested somewhere the other day that the capacity of the third class carriages on the Punjab Railway had been calculated according to the *weight* of the passengers rather than their accommodation.

the consequences, to reverse the points when half the train has passed over. Possibly he has his doubts as to the line on which the train should properly be shunted, and thinks to get over the difficulty by shunting half of it on each. Of four accidents on the lower division of the East Indian Railway, the particulars of which have reached us within the last week,\* no less than three, we are given to understand, had their origin in similar freaks which would be ludicrous, were they not attended with such destruction of life and property.

The remarkable want of civility displayed by the railway officials, and the necessity of setting aside special compartments for the use of such employées of the Company as have to travel, are points which have not been noticed now for the first time. It is believed that, were the recommendation carried out and its observance strictly enforced, the second class carriages would find far greater favour among the native population, and the traffic receipts would be proportionably increased. But we have said enough, we think, to prove the assertion with which we commenced, that there is still much which demands correction and improvement in the management of the railways, and which it is fitting should receive attention, before the declaration of a higher dividend than the five per cent. of the guarantee. And in the end, the policy recommended will prove to be the best in an economical and financial point of view. The surest way to make the railway pay must be to make it popular. As quaintly put by the petitioners of the North-West—"The more that the Government of the country will make the railways to be as really free to every one as are its own wide territories, the more will the railway prove an overwhelming success."

It remains, however, for us to notice, as another instance of the necessity which is laid upon the Government of requiring that these great undertakings, fostered as they have been at the public expense, and constructed at the public risk, shall conduce to the public convenience, the block in the traffic of the East Indian Railway during the last cold season, and the proceedings to which it gave rise. In an impartial and comprehensive Resolution, published last June, the Government of India weighed very fairly the shortcomings of the railway authorities, and the undue expectations of the public. "It is a matter of great regret," write the Government, "that the public should again have had reason to be disappointed with the facilities afforded by the railway for the transport of its merchandize. But it is not always borne sufficiently in mind that the traffic

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\* Written in November, 1866.

"that has sought the railway, especially in the bulky staple of cotton, has exceeded all anticipations which had been formed on the subject. Further, it does not seem to be remembered that the traffic in goods is compressed to a very great extent within the cold season months, and that during that period, a strain is consequently brought on the railway which a comparatively recently established means of communication can scarcely be expected to meet adequately. And, lastly, the difficulties and delays that, even with the best management, are likely to attend the supply from distant Europe of the *materiel* required to stock such an undertaking as the East Indian Railway, are too readily put out of consideration by the public in its anxiety and impatience to see the railway become a perfect and unfailing means of communication.

"The Governor-General in Council does not call attention to these points, with any desire to gloss over defects in the administration of the railway, or excuse want of foresight on the part of those responsible for, as well as interested in, making it thoroughly efficient. But they should in justice receive due weight; and whatever failure to meet the demands for transport there may have been, it should be remembered that the work done by the railway in the second half of 1865 was 50 per cent. in excess of that done in the corresponding period of 1864, and from the beginning of 1866 up to the 18th March 17 per cent. in excess of the similar period of 1865."

The conclusion arrived at regarding the block in the traffic goes to show that it was mainly owing to a deficiency of engines and rolling stock for which the Directors in England were solely responsible. It would appear that so far back as 1864, the Government perceived the necessity for a large addition to the existing stock of engines in this country, and pressed the matter upon the attention of the Agent and the Home Board. The Directors, however, unable to realize the emergency, refused to comply with the requisition, and it is stated that engines, indented for in 1862, were still due. The Directors, in fact, would appear to have adopted the view of the case expressed by one of the shareholders at the meeting above referred to, that every thousand pounds added to capital places them further off their increase on the five per cent. "In looking at these things we, as Directors, (thus spoke the chairman,) are in the habit of regarding the interests of our shareholders; and with our stock during the year at a very little above par, I apprehend that, if policy had suggested it, our means of carrying it out would have been circumscribed by the difficulty of finding the money." We do not for one moment blame the

Directors for looking after the interests of the shareholders in any manner in which they and the shareholders shall agree in approving. But at the same time we cannot but draw their attention to that clause of the contract, under which their dividends are secured, requiring the Railway Company to "provide to the satisfaction of the East India Company a good and sufficient working stock of engines, carriages, and other plant and machinery for working the said railway and carrying on the business and traffic of the same." And we might perhaps be disposed to dispute the position, that every further outlay diminishes the reproductiveness of the undertaking. So long as the line is manifestly understocked, the traffic receipts cannot possibly attain their maximum, even though they reach £45 per mile per week, while the working expenses must be necessarily disproportionately high. Well indeed does the Government remark:—"What is now required is that the Directors shall appreciate their position, and no longer pursue the suicidal policy of starving the line in respect of locomotive and rolling stock. Whatever may be the future of the cotton trade, the growth of other traffic is so promising that the Directors may accept it as certain that the workshops in India, if supplied to the full with material, will not be able to stock the line adequately before the opening of through communication with Bombay, and the completion of the double line to Allahabad."

We have endeavoured in the foregoing to determine how far the railways of India under the guarantee system may be worked successfully in the interests of both parties to the contract. We have seen that the shareholders, who have found the capital required for these vast undertakings, are naturally desirous of securing as speedy and as remunerative a return as possible. The Government, on the other hand, while equally concerned in their financial success, considers it of prior importance that the railways should really be made to subserve the true interests of the public, as the most perfect means of communication in the country; and it therefore feels itself not only justified, but actually called upon to use those powers which it possesses under the guarantee in insisting upon such improvements as shall render the undertakings more useful for purposes of trade, and more conducive to the comfort and convenience of passengers. But while thus subordinating the prospect of immediate and handsome dividends to the necessity of extending and improving the facilities secured to the public by the railway, the Government does not lose sight of the fact that, in making the institution popular in the broadest sense of the word, it is taking the surest steps towards placing its



remunerativeness beyond the shadow of a doubt. And even if, as would seem to be anticipated by some of the shareholders, each present increase of capital diminishes the extent to which the whole will ultimately be reproductive, still judging from the complaints of individuals and the general tone of the press, we believe that the public would vastly rather see the guaranteed railways conducted with a stricter regard to its safety and convenience, than benefit from some small reduction of taxation, which would only be so insignificant as to be scarcely appreciable. And we have further endeavoured to point out how, owing to the absence of the Directors from the country and other causes, there was not only an *a priori* fitness in the nature of things that the interests of the public in these great undertakings should be adequately protected by the Government, but that past management has actually demonstrated the necessity which exists for such interference.

Whether or not the guarantee system be theoretically the best, is of course a matter of opinion ; that it has proved the best for India, we ourselves entertain no doubt. We are quite aware that a different opinion has found favour with some, whose influence and intelligence entitle their views to considerable weight. Mr. Robert Knight of the *Times of India* lately addressed Lord Cranborne to this effect :—

“The drawbacks to the guarantee system are patent to the world. We have divided responsibility ; and incessant clashing, delays, and ruinous expense, as the result. The guarantee deadens the interest of the shareholders in the economic construction and profitable working of the lines, while the interference of the Government disgusts their executive. There is room, moreover, for looking with jealousy upon a system which leads to our borrowing capital in England upon much less favourable terms than the Government might command if it chose ; I think that ‘the guarantee system’ should be made to give place, as far as possible, to one not so calculated to weaken private interests in the results.”

Mr. Knight proposes that Government shall either borrow money from the public to lend again to the Railway Companies, or float the Companies’ debentures on the Stock Exchange with a Government endorsement. But it is very doubtful whether the first condition of this proposal would succeed. Looking at the small percentage of railway shareholders in this country, even in guaranteed railways, we are inclined to doubt whether the projectors could raise the required capital even in India, *without* a guarantee. And even if the system recommended by Mr. Knight be feasible, there are grave objections to its

introduction. The *Economist* of the 17th November last points out some of these. The writer regards both the borrowing and lending as equally undesirable. "The Government would live in the danger of a vast floating debt which may become due at a panic, which will be growing in annual interest, because the original lenders at low interest are going out and no new ones coming in, which in time of war or any real collapse of public credit might perchance be ruinous."

"It was, indeed, formerly suggested that Government might buy up the peculiar privileges of Railway Companies and work the railways themselves. A Royal Commission is now sitting on this idea, for which there is very much to be said, though it is opposed to English notions and English habits, and is possibly beyond the strength of our imperfect system of administration. But at any rate it promises much. It promises a clean sweep of the present divided and costly management; it promises uniformity of tolls and rates; it promises a regard to the convenience of the public; it promises a complete disregard of local selfishness; it promises (rightly or wrongly) a vast fund which the nation might earn by managing locomotion cheaper and more profitably than now, and which it might apply in aid of its finance as it liked. For these great objects it might be right to incur some financial risk; we do not say it would be right, but it *might*. But none of these advantages are offered by mere loans to the present Companies. These loans will not abolish the present Companies, but will aid them; will not destroy the present divided management, but will perpetuate it; will not root out the sectional pettiness of little railways, for these are the Companies which want the Government money most, and without some aid can hardly get loans of their own. The scheme for lending the Government credit to the railways without obtaining an entire control of their management has the inherent characteristics of a bad middle course; it incurs the evils of a bold and tempting proposal, but nevertheless misses its advantages."

On the whole, we may perhaps agree in the following conclusion extracted from Mr. G. N. Taylor's Reports. "Whatever objection may be urged against it, it is certain that the guarantee system, with the double government which it involves, has been, on the whole, the best suited to the peculiar circumstances of India. \* \* \* It is true that under the guarantee the liabilities and risks are, in reality, wholly incurred by the Government, but it must not be forgotten that in the infancy of these vast and novel undertakings, a purely Government agency in this country, without the aid and co-operation of Companies in England, practically versed in these matters, might not have attained even the present measure of success;

"on the other hand, it is equally evident that the control of Government, notwithstanding the weakened responsibility, which it has sometimes occasioned, has alone averted the signal failure which not unfrequently attends similar private undertakings in England, and the chances of which are increased tenfold when the operations are conducted at so great a distance from the presence and influence of the shareholders, and where public opinion is comparatively weak."

We shall close our notice of the railway system of India with a brief review of their position derived from Mr. Danvers' Reports for 1865-66.

One of the most remarkable features in the Budget of the present year, which attracted the notice of the public at home no less than in this country, was the enormous diminution in the sum which it was thought necessary to set aside for the payment of guaranteed interest. In place of the two or three millions of former years, against the million and a quarter of last year, only a sum of £533,000, or little over half a million, is this year estimated as sufficient to supplement from the imperial resources the amount by which the net traffic receipts fall short of the five per cent. dividend. A reduction so palpable is as satisfactory as it is extraordinary, and gives the highest promise of the future financial success of these undertakings. The plain meaning of the figures is that of about three millions of guaranteed interest, little more than half a million, or about one-sixth only, has to be contributed by the Government, while about five-sixths are contributed by the railways themselves, even in their incomplete state. What may not therefore be expected, when the lines are opened throughout? That this estimate is not over-sanguine, Mr. Danvers has proved by the actual results of the year 1865. Taking the accounts of the only five lines which had been furnished to him, "the net amount earned by these Railway Companies last year," he writes, "is thus shown to be £1,708,592. The guaranteed interest paid to the same Companies during the year was £2,260,204. But this amount applies to a capital of £45,204,080, while the sum expended on the lines earning £1,708,592 does not amount probably to more than £41,150,000, the guaranteed interest on which would be £2,057,500. The amount earned by the open lines would, therefore, fall short of the sum paid for the guarantee on the capital representing those lines by only about £349,000," or by about one-sixth of the total sum.

And the accounts of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway for the first half of 1866, published in the *Gazette* of 1st December last, afford even a more striking proof of the more than probable success of all the Indian railways. The profits of this particular

railway for the half year were at the rate of 9·39 per cent. per annum on the estimated cost of the open line, and 5·91 per cent. on the total subscribed capital. When it is remembered that little more than half the line has yet been opened, and that the profits on this portion have already attained a rate of nearly 10 per cent. per annum, it cannot but be admitted that the future of this Company is most promising. At least, it will, we believe, have the credit of being the first line, which has not only paid the guaranteed dividend without assistance from imperial funds, but has actually begun to re-imburse the Government for the previous payments of interest which have been made on its behalf.

The total expenditure of capital on Indian guaranteed railways up to the 1st May last amounted to £60,645,000 : the total sum, which it is estimated will ultimately be invested in the undertakings as at present sanctioned, is upwards of 81 millions sterling. About sixteen millions have been paid by the Government during the past fifteen years as guaranteed interest on the capital raised by them, while nearly five millions have, during the same time, been received by Government as the earnings of the opened lines. The guarantee debt, therefore, may be said to stand at eleven millions. To this sum we may perhaps add other two millions, as the amount which will be required during the next five years as the Government contribution to supplement the earnings of the railway for the payment of a five per cent. dividend, and we may assume that in 1870, the guarantee debt will amount to thirteen millions. But the various sums, paid from time to time as guaranteed dividends, carry interest at five per cent., and we may, therefore, assume that the interest due upon this accumulated debt will not fall far short of its moiety, or six and a half millions. Using these data therefore, we see that if in 1870, when the network of the grand trunk lines will be completed, these undertakings are expected to be self-supporting, if not to yield a somewhat larger dividend to the shareholders than that guaranteed under the contract, they must yield such surplus profits that the Government moiety may suffice to defray the annual interest on thirteen millions. In other words it may be said that, if the whole of the guaranteed railways realize in 1870 average net profits equal to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. upon the outlay, not only will the shareholders receive a dividend of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., but the Companies' debt to the Government will no longer be increasing. Any higher rate of profits will, of course, reduce this debt to the extent of the Government moiety of the surplus profits, less the interest due on the unliquidated portion of the guarantee

debt. Thus with average profits of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. we might expect to find the interest debt of six millions and a half paid off in about nineteen years, and the accumulated guaranteed dividend debt in a further period of twenty-two years.

As regards the rate of profits which these undertakings actually will yield, it is obviously useless to speculate at present. It will be observed that our calculations above are based on an average for the whole of the guaranteed lines, and while there can be little doubt that some of the most important lines, such as the East Indian, the Eastern Bengal, and the Great Indian Peninsular, will perhaps even exceed the figure, at which we have estimated the average profits, when the complete system is in full operation, there are other railways which may not be in a position to re-imburse to Government the annual dividends guaranteed to the shareholders under the contract. We have simply regarded the question as it concerns the Government and the tax-paying public. For the purposes of the Stock Exchange, each line must be judged upon its own merits, and with all its peculiar circumstances taken into consideration. The cost of construction, for instance, has varied on the different lines from £10,000 to £24,000 per mile; the working expenses vary from 45 to 95 per cent. of the gross receipts. In calculating the returns, these and similar considerations must be taken into account, which it would be out of our province to discuss here. At the same time we may perhaps venture to assert that experience has already proved that railway enterprise in this country will be remunerative to the shareholder, and unattended as it is with any of those risks which usually accompany speculations of this nature, it offers the most valuable opportunities for the investment of savings and private capital.

"The traffic on the principal lines during the past year," writes Mr. Danvers, "has exceeded the most sanguine expectations," and it is clear now that it "will be enormous, and that for some time to come, it will increase in proportion to the means provided for carrying it. As it is augmented, a proportionate decrease of the working expenses may be confidently expected, so that there is a fair prospect of an annual improvement in the revenues." If, at the same time, more adequate arrangements are made for facilitating the carriage of goods and for securing the safety and convenience of passengers, we may predict that the guarantee system will ere long be recognized by all as no less profitable to the private capitalist, than it is adapted for meeting the peculiar requirements of the general public.

- ART. II.—1. *The Military Operations at Cabul, with a journal of imprisonment in Affghanistan.* By Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, late Commissary of Ordnance at Cabul. John Murray, 1843.
2. *Prison Sketches.* By Lieutenant Vincent Eyre. Dickenson and Sons, 1843.
3. *Metallic Boats and Floating Waggon for Naval and Military Service, with some observations on life-preserving cars.* By Major Vincent Eyre, Bengal Artillery. London, Smith Elder and Co., 1856.
4. *The Mutinies in Oudh.* By Martin Gubbins, 3rd Edition. London, Bentley, 1858.
5. *Two Months in Arrah in 1857.* By John James Halls. Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1860.
6. *Macmillan's Magazine*, for September 1863, and March 1864. Macmillan.
7. *Parliamentary Blue Books.*

THERE are few who would deny that when, in his romantic interview with Sidonia at the roadside inn, the youthful Coningsby expressed his opinion that the age of adventures was past, he simply gave utterance to the prevailing sentiment of the age, to a conviction deeply implanted in the minds of the nation of which he was supposed to be a member. Certainly nine-hundred and ninety-nine men out of every thousand would have been prepared to endorse the remark. Not so, however, with the reply which that observation called forth from Sidonia. The apothegm that "adventures are to the adventurous," would seem to the prosaic Englishman of the nineteenth century terribly out of date. It would at once take his mind back to the more stirring periods of European history, to the times of tilt and tournament, of Cavalier and Roundhead, or to that last outburst of poetic enthusiasm,—the forty-five. Were it possible even for his mind to turn to that great Eastern land; in which for so many years the adventurers of Europe found a congenial field, it would only be to reflect, that with the suppression of European rivals, and the establishment on the ruins of the Mogul and Mahratta empires, of the order-loving and

order-enforcing British authority, the power of individual action must have been greatly compressed, and the chances of "adventure" become indeed few and far between. From the majority of our countrymen the reply of Sidonia, therefore, would have met more criticism than approval.

We are certain, nevertheless, that that reply evinced a profound knowledge of human nature. Adventures are still to the adventurous. The man, who is content to spend his energies in amassing wealth, or in purely literary labour, will probably descend to his grave without one incident in his career likely to touch the heart or to rouse the sympathies of a community. It is equally possible that the active duties of an active life may have little effect upon some natures; that, though placed among stirring scenes, a man may content himself with the bare performance of his duties, without caring to step one inch beyond them. Some may not feel the capacity, others not possess the inclination, for adventure. But there are few who have lived many years in this country who will deny, that, sooner or later, the opportunity for adventure will present itself; that, when it does come, though some may allow it to pass, there are others within whose breasts the old fire of English chivalry still burns strongly and brightly, and who spring forward eagerly to seize and to use it. The events even of the last ten years have abundantly proved that adventures are still to the adventurous.

If we were to seek a period during which more than in any other in the last few years the truth of this apothegm might be illustrated, we should take the period of the Indian mutiny. It would need but a very cursory examination of the history of that period to elicit the fact, that the men who had distinguished themselves before, who had shown themselves adventurous on former occasions, came forward to a man to increase their previous reputation and to add to their old honours. We need but mention the names of the Lawrences, of Outram, of Chamberlain, of Nicholson, of Havelock, and of the subject of this sketch—amid many others,—to show the truth of this assertion. Others again, to whom no opportunity had been granted before, eagerly seized it when it came. The exploits of all of these have never been known, probably never will be known, to the world. Deeds of great coolness and daring, performed under most trying circumstances in isolated places, have been, to a certain extent, overshadowed by the more striking achievements of the leaders of our armies. To the Government of India the credit is due that in many, we believe in most, cases, the daring and able men, who have so distinguished themselves,

have been sought out and rewarded. The history of their achievements has, however, to be sought for in the reports which lie buried in the archives of Government offices. Were these unearthed and examined, and the stories of personal adventure carefully extracted, there is more than one Government servant, now mixing quietly and unostentatiously with his fellows, whom the public would mark out as a hero.

It is scarcely possible;—at least it would require more time and leisure than we have at our command;—to seek out the services of such men. The time may, and, we hope, will come, when it may be otherwise. We need scarcely repine at the delay, inasmuch as it affords us the opportunity of presenting to the public a sketch of the career of those, whose great deeds are known and acknowledged, but with regard to whose personality,—to the promise of which the performance was the fulfilment,—the public is in utter ignorance. This is a task, which in the case of military men, is comparatively easy. Their deeds are written in the public despatches, and in the published journals of contemporaries. The Blue Book is a safe guide to a fair and impartial decision. And, supplemented, as this often is, by personal knowledge and the experience of living comrades, it becomes possible to draw up a narrative at once full, accurate, and connected, without the necessity of diving into the dusty pigeon-holes of record offices.

Of all the adventurous acts of those stirring years, 1857 and 1858, there was not one that entailed more responsibility on its projector, that was more prudently yet more daringly conducted, or the failure of which would have produced graver consequences, than the march to the relief of Arrah by Major Vincent Eyre. Its success changed at once the aspect of the campaign. To use the words of Sir Cecil Beadon, then Secretary to Government, it “virtually suppressed rebellion in Shahabad.” “If acts of devotion to one’s country,” wrote Sir James Outram to Major Eyre in 1857, “entitle to the cross, then surely the devotion “you displayed at Arrah to your country, and the advantage “that resulted to the country from that act, ought to secure “it to *you* of all men.” Yet, although this great achievement is not forgotten, the chief actor in it would seem to have been lost sight of. In the shower of rewards lately poured out, his name at least has not appeared. He himself has retired from the service; his active military career has apparently closed for ever. Still with India, with the victories of 1857, with the first great act which checked the success, and dealt a fatal blow to the machinations, of the till



then triumphant insurgents, must his name ever be connected. If he has not obtained the full meed of reward to which that victory entitled him, the fault is not his. He has still the consolation of feeling that by his bold march and prudent daring he saved the lives of thousands, and enabled the Government, assured by his conduct of the safety of Bengal and Behar, to turn every energy to the suppression of the mutiny in the North-West. We have alluded to the estimate formed of Major Eyre's conduct on that occasion by Sir James Outram. It is, however, interesting to know that this was but the crowning act of an adventurous career; that it was, if we may so speak, the consequence of his antecedents; that the Eyre of Arrah was but the development of the Eyre of Affghanistan. That our readers may see and judge of this development, that they may note the early promise, matured subsequently by mental training, till opportunity, presenting itself in 1857, was eagerly seized at and used to so great an end, we purpose devoting a few pages to a sketch of his career.

Vincent Eyre was born on the 22nd January, 1811. He was descended from the Eyres of Peak, a very old Derbyshire family, noted for its loyalty to the Crown during revolutionary periods. His direct ancestor, Colonel Thomas Eyre, commanded a body of horse at Marston Moor, and is described in the family records as having thrice encountered Oliver Cromwell in single combat, forcing his retreat, and dying of wounds then received.

Eyre was educated at the Royal Grammar School, Norwich, under the Revd. Dr. Valpy, of classic fame. Among his school contemporaries, who have since become distinguished, (though several years his senior in age) were Rajah Brooke of Borneo, Sir Archdale Wilson of Delhi, and the ill-fated Colonel Stoddart of Bokhara.

In December 1828, having completed his course in the Military College at Addiscombe, he received his commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery, and landed in Calcutta on the 21st May, 1829. Among his fellow-passengers were Dr. Marshman, the great Serampore Missionary, and Ensign Lugard, now better known as Sir Edward, the Under-Secretary of War. Lord W. Bentinck was then Governor-General of India, and rigid economy was the order of the day. The fiat had just gone forth for extensive reductions in the Artillery, whereby Eyre found himself, on arrival, a supernumerary on the regimental list, with the very dreariest prospects of promotion.

Those were, indeed, depressing times for young officers who felt an interest in their profession. From the close of the first Burmese war and capture of Bhurtpore in 1826 to the

beginning of the Affghan campaign in 1838,—a period of twelve years,—there reigned (with a few unimportant exceptions) an interregnum of profound peace, during which a cloud of despondency hung over the armies of India. Economy had, in fact, been carried to a pernicious excess, and operated, along with other causes, with evil effect on the *esprit de corps* of both officers and men. To young officers of ardent temperament a prolonged adherence to regimental duty, under such circumstances, seemed little better than an utter stagnation of existence; hence arose that almost universal longing and striving for Staff and Civil employ, whereby many regiments came soon to be deprived of their best officers, for whose scientific and general attainments a demand had been created by the necessities of the public service in the Revenue Survey and other Civil Departments of the State. But, although some such tempting opportunities of escape from regimental ennui and thralldom offered themselves to Eyre, he preferred to stick by his corps, finding a sufficiency of useful and profitable occupation in his books and professional pursuits,—as well as in watching over the welfare of his European soldiers, a sphere of duty wherein he ever continued to feel a peculiar interest.

In 1831, it was his good fortune to make the acquaintance, afterwards ripening into intimacy, of Henry Lawrence, then a captain of Artillery, and commencing that useful public career, which carried him onwards from the humble office of Revenue Surveyor to be Governor-General of India elect. They first met at the death-bed of an intimate friend and brother officer, who had been brought up with Lawrence as a foster brother, and who, had he survived, bade fair to emulate the greatness and goodness of the latter.

At the close of the same year, while cruising off the Sand-heads in a pilot schooner, Eyre had a narrow escape from foundering in a hurricane, the dismasted vessel being lifted, by a happy combination of wind and waves during the spring-tide, over a dangerous reef into deep soundings, just when its destruction had seemed inevitable.

On promotion to 1st Lieutenant in 1837, Eyre was posted to the Horse Artillery, with which he served until summoned in 1840 to proceed to Cabul as Commissary of Ordnance, for which post he had been specially recommended by the Commandant of Artillery to Lord Auckland's Government.

The Affghan war had just passed successfully through its first stage. Our victorious troops held the country they had won, in trust for the legitimate ruler, Shah Shoojah, whom

we had reinstated from his exile at Loodiana. A new force, organized by English officers, was in course of construction, wherewith to maintain the puppet king upon his throne, after the contemplated withdrawal of the British army of occupation. The dethroned usurper, Dost Mahomed, unable to keep the field against the latter, had surrendered himself to our Envoy at Cabul; and, although occasional signs of discontent and latent disaffection were still apparent among tribes and amidst localities long characterized by turbulence and misrule, sanguine hopes were entertained that the Affghan nation at large, making a virtue of necessity, would become more and more alive to the advantages of a settled government, under their lawful sovereign, and of a permanent alliance with so powerful a neighbour as British India.

As every petty chief in Affghanistan possessed his fortified stronghold, consisting usually of four lofty and substantial mud walls, flanked by strong bastions, well-pierced with loopholes for marksmen, and capable of resisting field artillery, it was deemed advisable to maintain always in readiness for immediate service, in the chief arsenal at Cabul, a small moveable siege-train of iron 9 pounder guns for breaching purposes. These, together with mortars, ammunition, and miscellaneous military stores, carried on half a hundred wheeled-carriages, a thousand camels, and eighteen elephants, constituted Eyre's charge on the line of march from Ferozepore to Cabul, his escort consisting of a regiment of native infantry, and a detachment of Her Majesty's 13th Foot. Accompanying the convoy were General Elphinstone, proceeding to take up his command of the troops in Affghanistan, and sundry officers of his staff, including the since famous Henry Havelock, just appointed Persian Interpreter.

Ferozepore was at that time our most advanced military station in the North-West, and Henry Lawrence, as political officer in the Cis-Sutlej States, made it his head quarters. He was assuredly the right man in the right place for such a crisis as was then at hand, and had recently given evidence in an admirably written tale, entitled "*The Adventurer in the Punjab*," not only of high literary ability, but also of a practical insight into the character of our Sikh neighbours, which was just then as rare as it was valuable, and which he was fortunately in a position to turn to the best account. Eyre obtained from him much useful information for future guidance, and heard him for the first time broach that great scheme for establishing an asylum in the hills for the children of British soldiers, with which the name of Lawrence has since become enduringly associated.

The Punjab territory, across which Eyre's route lay, had changed rulers five times within the past eighteen months; only one month having elapsed since the seizure of power by the existing usurper, Shere Singh, an illegitimate son of the famous old lion, Runjeet. A large and formidable disciplined army of Sikh soldiers, backed by a powerful artillery, occupied the neutral ground between the British force in Affghanistan and its basis of operations in N. W. India; but, fortunately for us, that army, although ambitious in the highest degree to try conclusions with the British, was just then too busily occupied with its own domestic quarrels to avail itself of the tempting opportunity to obstruct our line of communications.

Nevertheless, the false and hazardous nature of our military position beyond the Indus was becoming daily more and more evident to the most ordinary observers, nor was it without serious forebodings of coming disaster that men saw the command of our forces in that quarter handed over to a crippled sexagenarian officer, who had been thirty years out of employ, and whose corporeal infirmities alone, whatever might be his supposed qualifications, so palpably unfitted him for a post requiring the fulness of mental and bodily vigour. It is but fair to admit that General Elphinstone was a chivalrous and high-minded gentleman, possessed of many very excellent qualities of head and heart, which, if called prominently into play at an earlier period of his life, might have secured him a career of honour and renown. It was, however, his evil destiny to prove himself the Sabinus of the British army in Affghanistan, while it was reserved for Mahomed Akbar Khan, the fugitive son of the deposed ruler, to enact to the very life the part of Ambionix, the Gaul, as described by Cæsar "*De Bello Gallico V.*", and very recently by his Imperial biographer, Napoleon 3rd, in Book III., Chapter 8, of his "*Life of Cæsar.*"

Passing the deposed Ameer, Dost Mahomed Khan, *en route* to his place of exile in Calcutta, the convoy reached Cabul on the 28th April, without misadventure, though the difficulty attendant on the transit of heavy iron siege-guns and their *impedimenta*, through a long succession of rugged mountain passes, possessing no regular carriage road, imposed no trifling amount of exertion and fatigue on the troops, who were obliged to bring manual labour to the task wherever the narrow defiles proved so precipitous as to be insurmountable for draught cattle.

The new career upon which Eyre now entered, in a country so full of interest as Affghanistan, possessing the advantage of an European climate and peopled by races whose sturdy

independence of manner and of character offered an attractive contrast to those of India, was hailed by him as a most agreeable escape from the heat and monotony of the latter country. Many of his most cherished friends had preceded him thither, and were holding posts of trust and responsibility. Among them were d'Arcy Todd, the Envoy at Heerat; Colonel Stoddart, at Bokhara; Arthur Conolly, at Kokan; and Richard Maule, in Kohistan.

The latter was the first to welcome him at Cabul, having ridden seventy-five miles for that purpose through a wild and unsettled country, disguised as an Affghan. Maule and Eyre had been friends from early boyhood, had passed through Addiscombe together, and had been shipmates to India. When Eyre planned a house for himself at Cabul, he arranged that one select corner of it should be set apart as "Maule's room," to be ever available for his friend on the shortest notice. In building this house Eyre's chief difficulty had been to find qualified masons for the purpose; that class being monopolized by the Department of Public Works for Government purposes. One day, however, to Eyre's surprize, a common kitchen servant, who had accompanied him from India, volunteered his services as head mason, and promised to provide competent builders among the Indian camp-followers, if entrusted with the superintendence of the work. Eyre consented to give him a trial, and the arrangement turned out a perfect success. Before winter set in, the house was fit to inhabit, and was admitted to be one of the best built in Cabul. Yet, among the whole of these volunteer masons, hardly a man had been bred to that particular work, an example of the natural versatility of our Hindoo subjects when encouraged by circumstances to shake off, for the nonce, the trammels of caste and custom.

About this time, news reached Cabul from Bokhara that Eyre's old school-fellow, Colonel Stoddart, who had proceeded thither from Persia on a mission of mercy to mediate with the king for the release of Russian captives, and had, by his plain speaking, excited the anger of that capricious tyrant, had contrived to make his peace, and been restored to liberty and outward favour. Sir W. Macnaghten was anxious that he should avail himself of this favourable opportunity to escape from so hazardous a position, but Stoddart, unfortunately, felt honourable scruples about leaving his post without direct instructions from the English Foreign Office to which he owed primary allegiance. During this propitious interval, Eyre found means, through a Jewish Moollah of Cabul, to open a correspondence with his early friend, who replied in a cheerful

strain, confident that the long hoped-for letter of recall would soon arrive to enable him to depart with honour from the scene where he had already suffered so much, and where he was destined soon to yield up his life.

As chief of the Ordnance Commissariat in Afghanistan, the responsibility devolved on Eyre of providing and maintaining a sufficient supply of the material of war for the efficient equipment, on a war footing, of the British army of occupation and of the Sikh local forces. The chief arsenal was in course of erection at Cabul, on a spot which had been selected by the authorities, before Eyre's arrival, in a small fortified enclosure adjoining the entrenched cantonment; whilst dependent upon it for supplies of guns, ammunition, small arms, tools, implements, camp equipage, and miscellaneous articles of equipment, were the garrisons of Candahar, Ghuznee, Jellalabad, Kelat-i-Gilzee, and their respective outposts. The Delhi magazine, 800 miles distant, being the nearest source of supply, and itself mainly dependent on the arsenal of Fort William, 900 miles further, the expense of transport on camels of such heavy articles, as shot, shell, and small arm ammunition, was prodigious, and contributed to render war in that distant region a most ruinous pastime.

Moreover, as our forces in Afghanistan were liable at any time to find themselves cut off by the Sikhs from their base of operations in India, it was desirable to make provision for such a crisis by storing up in the Cabul arsenal a large reserve supply, calculated for, at least, two years' consumption. The country itself could be depended on to yield but little in the shape of a local supply of military stores, although Eyre's attention was, from an early period, directed to ascertaining its capabilities in that respect, urged thereto, on the score of economy, by repeated letters from the Military Board of Fort William. Eyre accordingly spared no pains to make himself acquainted with the natural resources of the country, and to render them available for the military requirements of the State, but his labours in that direction were curtailed, and all difficulties solved in a manner not less summary than unexpected.

On the 2nd November, 1841, the Cabul insurrection burst forth with the suddenness of a volcano, though not without the usual premonitory symptoms of such catastrophes; but the tale is too well known to need repetition. The delay, however, of one week, or even of one day, might have made a wonderful difference in the results which followed; for the 3rd November had been fixed for the departure of the Envoy to take up

his new appointment as Governor of Bombay, and General Elphinstone, who had tendered the resignation of his command, was to have accompanied him. In such case the chief political authority would have devolved on Sir A. Burnes, who would have immediately occupied the Residency, and have thus escaped assassination in the city where he had fixed his abode; whilst Brigadier Shelton would have succeeded, as senior officer, to the temporary command of the troops; and both men were better qualified to shine as principals than as seconds in their respective spheres of action. The youthful fervour and ambitious spirit of Burnes had chafed with ill-disguised impatience under the control to which he had so long been subjected, and it was believed by his friends that he merely bided his time to remedy much that he viewed with disapprobation both in the policy and practice recently pursued, and whereof he had been an unwilling, though necessary, agent. Shelton, with all his faults of temper, was undoubtedly a brave, skilful, and energetic officer, and would probably have acted with that promptitude and decision, the want of which in poor Elphinstone led to such disastrous results. What a field for useless conjecture is presented by the supposed contingency of just a few hours' delay in the outbreak, and the altered consequences to central Asian politics and to British Indian history of a successful stand at Cabul and a suppression of the insurrection!

But it was otherwise ordered. The crisis found us utterly unprepared. Mars was reposing on his laurels, unconscious of the net that had secretly been cast around him. An early winter of unusual severity had set in, and, in all the fancied security of external peace and a submissive, if not friendly, population around him, the Envoy had denuded Cabul of his best troops. These, under the gallant Sale, had started for their winter quarters at Jellalabad, with what seemed the easy task before them of punishing, *en route*, some refractory Gilzies who had occupied the Khoord Cabul pass, as their best mode of protesting against what they, perhaps truly, deemed an act of injustice, whereby they had been deprived of their customary stipends as keepers of the Eastern passes;—a measure of unwise economy to which the Envoy had been driven by the repeated calls of the Indian Government to retrench expenditure.

Sale encountered a more vigorous opposition than he had expected, but forced the passes, and, having patched up a hollow truce with the Gilzies, eventually lodged his troops in safety behind the walls of Jellalabad; not however without an effort of General Elphinstone to recall him to Cabul, where

his aid had meanwhile become urgently needed. But it was too late, for, encouraged by the outbreak at the capital, the whole country had risen in arms.

On receiving the order of recall, Sale summoned a council of war at Gundamuck, who decided that a return through the passess under existing circumstances was impracticable, and poor Elphinstone was left to battle with the difficulties of his position as best he could.

These were increased tenfold by the appalling fact that no sufficient supply of provisions had yet been laid in, and that even the existing supply was stored in a detached fort, affording no secure shelter, being open to attack from neighbouring strongholds, and difficult to defend as an outpost against the overwhelming numbers that suddenly threatened the entrenched cantonment on all sides. Still further to complicate the poor General's embarrassments, while yet in doubt as to the possibility of successfully maintaining his own position, which combined all imaginable disadvantages for defence in such an emergency, he was called upon to divide his force for the protection of the king, who occupied the Bala Hissar, or royal citadel, about two miles distant; and thus it happened that Captain Nicholl, the senior artillery officer at Cabul, and who commanded the noble old 1st Troop 1st Brigade of Bengal Horse Artillery, got separated with four of his guns and two-thirds of his men from the main force in the cantonment, where officers, men, and guns were most cruelly needed. His senior subaltern, Lieutenant Waller, remained in the latter with two guns, but being disabled by a severe wound in the very first day's fight, the *onus* of artillery command devolved upon Eyre, who thenceforth took the lead in all active operations of that arm, both in the field, and around the extensive lines of defence; his only available subaltern being Lieutenant Warburton, commanding the Shah's Native Artillery, consisting of 80 Punjabees, of doubtful fidelity. These men, with the exception of about 30 English Horse Artillery gunners belonging to Waller's field guns, constituted the whole artillery force for defending an *enceinte* comprised within 4,000 yards of low parapet.

Heretofore, anticipating no enemy, no guns had been mounted on the works; but not a moment was now lost by Eyre in placing every available gun in the best flanking position, ready for immediate service. The six iron 9 pounders, which had accompanied him from Delhi, now came into most opportune use, and, together with three 24 pounder field-howitzers, one 12 pounder ditto, and three 5½ inch mortars, formed the entire artillery reserve at hand. Henceforward, Eyre scarcely knew what



it was to rest. Day and night, his whole time was actively occupied, either in superintending the fire of the batteries, or in regulating the duties of his own department, which had now become excessively heavy, or in heading the two Horse Artillery guns in the numerous sallies against the enemy. It was necessary that he should be literally ubiquitous; and, so far as the issues of the struggle depended on the artillery, there was assuredly no cause for despondency.

The insurrection was inaugurated, as usual, on such occasions, with murders and assassinations on all sides. Isolated British officers, political and military, were the first victims. Burnes, Broadfoot, Rattray, and Maule fell at their respective posts during the 2nd and 3rd November. Eyre felt Maule's death most keenly, for they had been almost as brothers from boyhood. Colin Mackenzie, then a Captain and Assistant Political, narrowly escaped a similar fate, but, aided by a small native guard, he heroically defended his quarters in the heart of the city against an armed multitude, until the night of the 3rd, when, seeing no hope of relief, he succeeded, by a marvel, in withdrawing to cantonments with the greater part of his men, and was thus spared to bear a conspicuous part in the coming struggle.

Looking back on those eventful times, when the name of Colin Mackenzie first became familiar as a household word to Englishmen, and recollecting his varied claims to notice as a soldier, linguist, and an Indian diplomatist of the genuine heroic type, and how favourably his nobility of character and chivalrous bearing impressed all, even the Afghans, with whom he came in contact, we cannot but marvel and lament that a man of his mark, so obviously qualified for high political employ among impressible oriental races, should have fallen short, through lack of the requisite opportunity, of that eminence for which, in early life, he seemed so surely destined.

Nothing, perhaps, testifies more clearly to the craft wherewith the people of Cabul had succeeded in lulling the British with a false security, than the unsuspecting manner in which, up to the very last, so many of our public officials had domesticated themselves in the heart of that city. But it is probable that all their efforts to dislodge the British army from its entrenched position would have been as unsuccessful there as at Candahar and Jellalabad, but for the early loss of the Commissariat fort, with its whole stock of provisions, on which the troops were well known to be dependent. Eyre, in his narrative of military operations at Cabul, fully

describes the blunders and mishaps through which this important post was sacrificed, and adds:—

“It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence of this post, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first fatal blow to our supremacy at Cabul, and at once determined those chiefs, more particularly the Kuzzilbashes, who had hitherto remained neutral, to join in the general combination to drive us from the country.”

It is unnecessary that we should dwell upon the details of the desperate struggle of our troops to maintain their position after the failure of their supplies, further than they serve to illustrate the subject of our memoir. Mere passive resistance to the attacking foe was now out of the question. In order to eat, it was necessary to sally forth and fight day by day. Wherever rations for man and beast were likely to be found within reasonable bounds, thither a raid was directed, and generally with a successful result. But, inasmuch as such stores were invariably laid up in fortified strongholds with lofty ruined walls and flanking bastions pierced for musketry, and courageously defended by excellent marksmen, these adventurous expeditions, even when most successful, were fruitful of disaster, in the loss of valuable lives they occasioned.

Some of those forts required to be breached with Eyre's iron guns before an entrance could be effected, and his gunners were often shot down in battery by an unseen foe while so employed. On several occasions the enemy turned out in immense force to oppose the troops or the open plain, when Eyre invariably volunteered to lead the two Horse Artillery guns into action, and contributed his full share to the successes then gained;—successes which, had the final issue of the struggle been equally triumphant, would perhaps have been deemed worthy of record among the brilliant deeds of British arms in the East.

Subsequently, when General Pollock re-conquered Cabul, his chief engineer (now Sir Frederic Abbot) minutely surveyed the scene of operations, and thus reported thereupon to Government: “One glance at the accompanying plan is sufficient to show the extreme faultiness of the position. The cantonment appears to have been purposely surrounded by difficulties; indeed, a stranger might suppose that many of the mud-forts, approaching so closely to the walls, must have been built for the express purpose of besieging it.”

At length, on the 22nd November, while assisting with some artillery to drive the enemy out of the walled village of Beymaroo, whence supplies had often been obtained,

Eyre was severely wounded by a rifle ball, and disabled from further service in the field. On the following day occurred a serious disaster to our arms, which proved decisive of the fate of the Cabul force. Brigadier Shelton, after failing in an attempt to dislodge the enemy, who had turned up in great force on the neighbouring heights of Beymaroo (which position commanded the cantonment,) found himself compelled to make a movement of retreat, leaving one gun in their hands. This, however, was soon re-captured by a party of our troops who gallantly rallied for the purpose, and had reinforcements been then promptly poured out from cantonments, the day might have been retrieved; but, unhappily no such vigour being displayed; the enemy returned to the charge in increased numbers and with renewed energy; a prolonged and desperate conflict ensued, and our troops, finding themselves exposed to a deadly fire from concealed skirmishers, suddenly lost confidence, broke their ranks, and fell back in disorder down the hill, during which movement the unlucky Horse Artillery gun, being overturned on rough ground, was abandoned to its fate, and the Affghans obtained a fatal triumph.

Meanwhile, Eyre lay stretched, helpless and anxious, on his bed. It was the first time that the guns had gone into action without an officer at their head. On that day Serjeant Mulhall, a trusty and skilful subordinate, commanded them in the field, as the presence of Lieutenant Warburton was necessary within the lines to keep due control over his native artillerymen, as well as to direct the fire kept up from the guns in position. As the tide of battle swayed to and fro, Eyre could distinctly hear the defiant and often exultant shouts of the Affghans, sometimes approaching so near as to excite intense uneasiness. The troops had been absent from 2 A. M. till 1 P. M. About this time the door of Eyre's room flew open, and Colin Mackenzie rushed in, his pale and haggard look sufficiently announcing a tale of disaster. His faint and exhausted appearance excited apprehensions that he must be wounded, and, on opening his coat, a bullet dropped out, which had struck his shoulder, fortunately without penetrating the bone, though he felt its effects for several days. Eyre afterwards learned from eye-witnesses of the scene how bravely his friend had acquitted himself throughout the trying scenes of the day. But, for further particulars we must refer to the sixth chapter of Eyre's book, wherein he has endeavoured to render justice to all concerned. His criticisms on the battle are unfavourable to the tactics of Brigadier Shelton, and seem to represent faithfully the general impression produced on those

present, and to be borne out by the acknowledged principles of modern warfare. But, however that may be, it must be admitted that the Brigadier was inadequately supported during the crisis of the action, when a prompt despatch of reserve troops from the entrenchment might have turned the tide in his favour, and that he cannot justly be held responsible for a failure which he strove so bravely, though ineffectually, to avert.

But, despite of this disastrous check to British arms, the troops might doubtless have held fast their position through the winter, save for the ever-pressing necessity of taking active offensive measures to procure supplies. Hence arose the important question whether to abandon the entrenchment and occupy the Bala Hissar with the king, or to enter into negotiations with the Affghan chiefs, for a safe retreat from their country under the most favourable terms procurable. Unfortunately, the latter alternative was adopted. The impossibility of providing for the safe transport of the sick and wounded naturally operated as a bar to the bolder though desperate course, which had been more than once suggested, of a winter retreat, at all hazards, through the passes of Jellalabad.

Accordingly, on the 11th December, the British Envoy accompanied by his three assistants, George Lawrence, Colin Mackenzie, and Trevor, sallied forth, in accordance with a previous arrangement, to meet the leading chiefs on the open plain. Pre-eminent among the latter was Mahomed Akbar Khan, son of the deposed ruler ;—a man of fierce though noble aspect, and of a resolute, but crafty spirit, naturally embittered against the English who had driven himself and family into exile, and who at that moment held his father and wife as hostages in Hindustan.

The meeting, though sufficiently discordant in its elements, passed off amicably, and the terms of a treaty were agreed upon whereby the Envoy bound his Government to withdraw entirely from Affghanistan, and to restore the banished Ameer ; the first step to its fulfilment being the suspension of hostilities, and the immediate withdrawal of the detachment of British troops from the Bala Hissar. The latter measure was accordingly effected on the 13th and 14th December, though not without some manifestations of treachery on the part of the chiefs, and some consequent loss of life.

The chiefs next demanded the immediate evacuation of all the forts around the cantonment garrisoned by the British. Most of these had been secured with a heavy sacrifice of valuable lives, but were now surrendered for the sake of obtaining, in return for the sacrifice, a prompt supply of

provisions, which had become most urgently needed by the famishing troops and camp-followers.

On the 22nd, affairs took a new turn. Mahomed Akbar made secret proposals to the Envoy, which seemed to offer a tempting door of escape from present difficulties and from further humiliations. The chiefs had already shown a disposition to evade some of the conditions of the treaty, and to impose others still harder of acceptance, and the aspect of affairs seemed altogether so desperate that the Envoy was beguiled into acceding to a private interview with Mahomed Akbar for the purpose of arranging a scheme, whereby he hoped to sow division among his enemies and retrieve great misfortunes. The sequel is well known. The unhappy Envoy was entrapped, and assassinated by Mahomed Akbar's own hand, on the very scene of the interview, and almost within sight of the garrison. Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor were carried off to the city,—which the latter did not reach alive, being cut down by some of the fanatics who thronged the road,—and thus terminated this ill-omened attempt to outwit the wily chiefs of Cabul. The final catastrophe was fast drawing nigh.

Sir William Macnaghten had exercised special powers which died with him. Eldred Pottinger, the hero of Heerat, was the next senior surviving political officer, and, therefore, the responsible head of the mission. At the General's urgent desire he reluctantly consented to become the medium of communication with the treacherous chiefs, although still disabled from a severe wound received at Charakar at the beginning of the insurrection. Eyre devotes an interesting chapter to the heroic defence of that outpost, and to the adventurous escape of Pottinger and Haughton, both of whom, though grievously maimed and crippled by wounds, contrived to make their way safely to head quarters through 130 miles of a rugged and hostile country. On arrival in cantonments they were taken by Eyre to his own house, and carefully tended throughout the remainder of the struggle.

Notwithstanding what had so recently occurred, negotiations were renewed with the chiefs, who demanded fresh hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty. Pottinger in vain protested against any treaty whatever. A council of war decided that no other course remained. What followed is too remarkable to omit. Four married hostages with their wives and children, having been required by the chiefs, certain officers were invited in an official circular to undertake the risk. The following were the replies, as given by Lady Sale, in her journal: "Lieutenant

“ Eyre said, if it was to be productive of great good he would stay with his wife and child. The others all refused to risk the safety of their families. One said he would rather put a pistol to his wife’s head and shoot her; and another that his wife should only be taken at the point of the bayonet; for himself he was ready to perform any duty imposed on him.”

On this passage the *Naval and Military Gazette* thus commented: “ Channing, in his eloquent and philosophic analysis of the character of Napoleon, has felicitously defined three orders of greatness, in the last of which he assigns a place to the great conqueror of Europe. Following the spirit of that great thinker, we cannot but recognize in Lieutenant Eyre’s noble reply, a higher tone of feeling than can be traced in the answers of either of his gallant comrades. Therefore, while we may award to the latter niches in the same order with Napoleon, our acquiescence in the sentiments of Dr. Channing leads us to hail in Lieutenant Eyre’s conduct in this occasion the lineaments of that *first* order,—moral greatness,—through which the soul defies all peril; reposes an unfaltering trust in God in the darkest hour, and is ever ready to be offered upon the altar of his country or of mankind.”

Then came the retreat, with its attendant horrors, rivalling those experienced by the French in their winter march from Moscow. Eyre’s wound was still intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting a horse without assistance. To quote his own words:—“ Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so intensely bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defy the defences of the warmest clothing.” The thermometer stood at several degrees below zero; and men’s beards were coated icicles. There was a mingled multitude of 4,500 fighting-men (including 700 European soldiers,) and 12,000 native camp-followers, with their women and children. Their route lay through the Khoord Cabul pass, “ a truly formidable defile about five miles from end to end, shut in by lofty hills; between whose precipitous sides the sun, at this season, could dart but a momentary ray.” There, half-concealed behind rocks and bushes, eager hordes of armed Gilzies lay in ambush for their prey. The scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all attempts to silence or dislodge them. It was necessary to run the gauntlet of their fire; and not less than 3,000 souls perished in the attempt.

Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a little boy, emerged safely from the gorge: the latter, being strapped to the back of a faithful Affghan servant on horseback, had a very narrow escape, owing to the horse falling and throwing them both off, when in the very middle of the pass. To crown the misfortunes of the day, snow began to fall, and thousands had to pass the night without shelter, food, or fire. Only four small tents were saved, under which some of the women, children, and wounded found refuge. Eyre and Lieutenant Mein sat up all night in attendance on their dying friend Sturt, of the Engineers, who had been mortally wounded in the pass. At her husband's side his youthful bride also kept watch with them. She was the daughter of the gallant Sale, and well worthy of such a sire. To assuage Sturt's burning thirst, Eyre and Mein were obliged to wander, alternately, through the camp in search of fire to melt a cupful of snow, and often, before they could regain the tent, the contents had frozen again into a hard mass. Sturt did not survive the night, and was buried at early dawn. Mein's disinterested devotion to his wounded friend in hurrying back to save him at the risk of his own life, and dragging him through the pass under the enemy's fire, was justly extolled by Sir Robert Peel in Parliament, who quoted the scene *verbatim* from Eyre's book.

Meanwhile, Mahomed Akbar, like a vulture watching his prey, scanned every movement of the force from the neighbouring heights. Shortly after the retreat commenced, he had demanded that Pottinger and two other officers should be given up as hostages, and prompt compliance had been yielded. But still he was not satisfied. The ladies, married families, and wounded officers, were next required to be made over to his care, an assurance being given to the General that by such a mark of confidence alone could the chiefs be induced to provide for the wants of the force, and to restrain their followers from acts of hostility.

The General himself, in a memorandum which he subsequently drew up, thus explains his own motives: "I complied with his wish, hoping that as, from the very commencement of negotiations, the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him."

Eyre, on receiving a verbal order to prepare for the departure of himself and family, sought the General, in order to hear it from his own lips. The poor General was greatly distressed; but, warmly pressing his hand, urged him to mount and be off as the escort sent by Mahomed Akbar were impatient to start; so there

seemed to be no alternative. Mahomed Akbar, although suspected of treachery, was then professedly our ally, with whom a treaty existed. Hostilities were therefore at end, so far as he was concerned. It was pretended, on his behalf, that the Gilzie chiefs on the previous day exerted themselves in vain to restrain their followers. Captain Nicholl now commanded the Artillery in person, and Eyre felt that his own presence could no longer be of any service to the force. His obvious duty was to obey the General's wishes at all hazards; he, therefore, departed with the new batch of hostages, consisting of seven officers, ten ladies, and twenty-two children. Among them were Ladies Macnaghten and Sale. Counting, then, seven officers left behind at Cabul, and three made over on the march, the chiefs had now gained possession of seventeen British officers, nominally as hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty.

We have already alluded to General Elphinstone as the Sabinus of the British force in Cabul. It has, indeed, been often remarked that history repeats itself; but we know of no instance more remarkable than the perfect historical parallel between the occurrences of 1841-42 in Affghanistan, and those described in Book V. of Cæsar's "*Commentaries de Bello Gallico*." First, there was the sudden insurrection of the Gauls, just as the Romans were settling in their winter quarters. Their leader Ambionix, an exact prototype of Mahomed Akbar in savage and successful duplicity. Next, the Roman General Sabinus, another Elphinstone for indecision, entering into precisely the same sort of hollow treaty with Ambionix as did the English General with Mahomed Akbar. Next, the protest of Cotta (Eldred Pottinger) before the council of war, over-ruled. Finally, the retreat with a cumbersome train of baggage and extended line of troops; the General's misplaced confidence in Ambionix; the attack on his front and rear in a narrow valley; the confusion of the Romans from want of proper arrangements—their desperate though fruitless valour;—Sabinus (Elphinstone) seeking a conference with Ambionix (Mahomed Akbar) *in order to save the troops*; his treacherous detention, and the final annihilation of his army. On the other hand, we have the "illustrious" garrisons of Cicero and Labienus, represented by those of Sale and Nott, maintaining their isolated posts firm and undaunted against all opposition; signalizing themselves on all occasions by a similar display of patience, skill, and valour, until at length relieved by the advance of Cæsar (Pollock) with his over-powering army, under whose auspices all previous disasters were amply retrieved, and the Roman invincibility satisfactorily re-established.



As Eyre's narrative has now been long out of print, and the attention of our countrymen has begun once more to be directed towards the regions of Central Asia and the rapid extension of the Russian power in that quarter, we have deemed it not altogether inopportune to refresh the memories of our readers with some of the most striking particulars of this old and overtrue tale, which, just a quarter of a century ago, was perused with thrilling interest by all the civilized world.

Eyre and his associates in misfortune remained as captives in the hands of Mahomed Akbar during eight and a half months,—Eyre occupying his leisure in recording, on such scraps of paper as he could collect, the strange and stirring incidents which he had witnessed, while yet they were fresh in his own memory and in the minds of his fellow-captives, from whom, as well as from such public and private documents as had been saved and were within his reach, he industriously gleaned many important and interesting particulars. His chief object in these labours was to place, as far as in him lay, the whole unvarnished truth before the British public at the earliest practicable opportunity. He thus wrote to a friend: "I feel well assured that the more my statements are sifted, the more clearly will their truth be established in all essential points. Heaven knows I would give my right hand that such events as I have described had never occurred; but having occurred, why should I conceal them? Is the loss of an army nothing? Can our national interests be advanced by glossing over such unheard-of calamities and disgrace"? In another letter he thus expresses himself: "I wrote my narrative because it was at the time very doubtful whether any of the chief actors would survive, and I felt an anxious desire that, should we perish in captivity, the public might be able to judge properly of the respective merits of all concerned. I can boldly assert that there is not a sentence which I do not believe to be strictly true."

Perhaps few narratives written under such circumstances have so well stood the test of time,\* or have met more general and lasting approval. We have little doubt that honest old Gascoignes, the poet, who underwent some similar experiences in his youth during the wars in the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, very accurately expresses Eyre's feelings in regard to

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\* On one occasion, during his visit to Europe in 1855-6, Eyre happened to be looking over the bookshelves of a bookseller's shop in Paris, when he suddenly came upon his own work, translated into French. It is impossible to imagine a more pleasing surprise to an author than such a discovery.

his volume on Cabul in the following stanza from the poem, entitled "the Fruites of War."

"Go, little booke! God graunt thou none offense,  
"For so meant he who sought to set thee forth,  
"And when thou comdest where soldiers seem to wend,  
"Submit thyselfe as writte but little worth.  
"Confesse withal that thou hast bene too bolde  
"To speak so plaine of haughtie hartes in place,  
"And say that he which wrote thee coulde have tolde  
"Full many a tale of blouds that were not base."

The story of the captivity was appended to Eyre's narrative in the form of a journal, and may still be read with interest. We must content ourselves with a few of the more prominent episodes. On the fourth day after their surrender to Mahomed Akbar, they were joined by the General himself, with Brigadier Shelton and Captain Hugh Johnson, and learned with profound dismay and grief that the remainder of the force had been gradually shot down in the passes, the chiefs having played them false even to the end, notwithstanding all the concessions that had been made. It was evidently Mahomed Akbar's game to hold his captives as trump cards wherewith to extort from the British Government better terms for himself and country than he could well hope to obtain by any other means at his disposal. Hence, they found themselves, on the whole, well-treated, although their anxieties were kept alive by the fact that a small, though influential, section existed among the Gilzie chiefs who made no secret of their inclination to put the whole party to death; and whose debates on this momentous subject were often carried on in tones sufficiently loud to be overheard by their intended victims.

Their first place of confinement was the fort of Buddeabad in the district of Lughman, a stronghold of one of these same Gilzie chieftains, having walls twenty-five feet high, and lofty flanking towers, surrounded by a *faussebraye* and deep ditch. Here they remained three months, during which they were allowed to exchange letters with their friends in Jellalabad, where Sale still maintained his defensive position. On 19th February, they were alarmed by a violent rocking of the earth, accompanied by a loud subterranean rumbling sound; the lofty parapets around them fell in with a thundering crash; the dwelling house waved and tottered like a ship at sea, and all within it simultaneously rushed out into the central courtyard to find their terror-stricken Affghan keepers upon their knees ejaculating loud prayers to Allah for protection. It seemed as though the last day had arrived. Eyre had a narrow escape

from being crushed to death by a mass of the wall, under which he chanced to be standing while tending his horse, which he had been permitted to retain.

The same earthquake levelled in a few seconds the walls of defence which Sale's force had, with continuous labour, repaired and strengthened at Jellalabad. But the Affghans were unprepared to take advantage of the chance thus offered. On the 9th of April, tidings reached the captives that Mahomed Akbar's camp had been surprized by Sale, and his force completely routed, and on the following day they were hurried off towards the mountains after a sharp debate among the chiefs on the expediency of destroying them at once.

Poor General Elphinstone, in his already shattered state of health, could ill bear up under the fatigues and privations he had to undergo, and died at Tezeen on the 23rd April, "a happy release for him," says Eyre, "from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when he resigned the home-born pleasures of his native land to hazard the reputation of a proud name in a climate and station for which he was physically unfit."

The body was forthwith forwarded by Mahomed Akbar to General Pollock (by that time at Jellalabad) for honourable interment,—a tribute of respect to a fallen foe highly creditable to the Affghan chief.

On the following day, Captain Colin Mackenzie was despatched on a mission to General Pollock, taking with him the first portion of Eyre's narrative. After perusal by General Pollock it was forwarded by the latter to Lord Ellenborough's Private Secretary, and eventually to England for publication. Colin Mackenzie's journeys to and fro proved full of peril, for, although disguised as an Affghan and escorted by a well-known and popular sort of Rob-Roy, or freebooter, named Buttee, in the pay of Mahomed Akbar, whose knowledge of that wild mountainous country and its still wilder inhabitants stood him in good stead, he was in frequent and imminent danger of discovery and consequent death from parties of wandering Gilzies, whom they unexpectedly encountered, and who persisted in being unpleasantly inquisitive regarding the suspicious-looking traveller, with his face and form so closely muffled up in the folds of his turban and large sheepskin cloak, leaving his eyes scarcely as visible as those of the roughest Skye terrier, and whom it was necessary to palm off as a sick chief of Peshawur sent by Mahomed Akbar under Buttee's escort to his native place. One glimpse of the white skin beneath his wide Affghan trowsers, (which he found it next to impossible to prevent from rising

above his knee,) would have been his death warrant. But Heaven protected him.

The propositions whereof he was the bearer were, that the British General should treat with Mahomed Akbar as the acknowledged head of the Affghan nation, that there should be an exchange of prisoners, including all on each side; that the British should retire from Affghanistan; and that General Pollock should pay down a handsome *douceur* in money. In case of these arrangements being effected, Mahomed Akbar would be glad to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the British. This, however, was only his *public* message, but, in secret, Mackenzie had been desired to ascertain if a private arrangement could not be made, to the effect, that General Pollock should ensure an amnesty to Mahomed Akbar and his followers for the past, and that the British Government should bestow on him a large jagheer. In this case he would willingly assist Pollock in re-conquering Affghanistan.

Mackenzie returned from his mission on the 3rd May, without having opened any prospect of release for the captives, although the negotiation, as far as it went, had been of a friendly nature. He was immediately despatched a second time with more moderate proposals, but again returned with an equally ineffectual result. On the 23rd May, Mohamed Akbar removed all his captives from the Zauduk valley to a fort in the vicinity of Cabul. Here Mackenzie had nearly died of typhus fever, the result of his recent fatigues and exposure. Mahomed Akbar selected Major Colin Troup as his next envoy, and he was absent in that capacity from the 10th to the 27th July, but brought back no definite reply. Pollock was, in fact, busy in preparing for an advance on Cabul, with stringent instructions from Lord Ellenbrough to proceed with his military preparations without reference to any negotiations. Meanwhile, typhus fever and dysentery spread alarmingly among the captives, and, on the 7th August, Captain John Conolly breathed his last. His brother, the celebrated Arthur Conolly, had but recently been decapitated at Bokhara, after having been confined at the bottom of a dry well, in company with Colonel Stoddart, for eighty days without change of raiment.

On August 23rd, nine officers of the Ghuznee garrison joined the Cabul captives. Among them was the brave young Nicholson, destined to a brilliant career in the Punjab, and a hero's death sixteen years later in the moment of victory at Delhi. He now became Eyre's messmate, and beguiled the hours with animated details of the scenes he had witnessed during the ineffectual defence of that fortress;—with him too

was Dr. Thomas Thomson, since risen to eminence as a botanist and a traveller. On the 25th August, all were hurried off towards Bameean, *en route* to Kooloom in Ozbeg Tartary, with a threat held out that they would be sold into bondage on arrival. Eyre and Mackenzie were both at this time too ill to travel on horseback, and were packed into a pair of paniers to balance each other on each side of a camel, a mode of travelling for invalids, which their miserable experience on that memorable journey did not enable them to recommend for general adoption, except in cases where the penalty of torture has been incurred.

They had a strong escort, consisting of some 400 Affghan soldiers, deserters from the British service, under one Saleh Mahomed, their former Subadar. Their route lay over the steep mountain passes of Suffed Khak, Oonai, Hajeeguk, and Kaloo; the latter attaining an altitude of 13,400 feet; whence Eyre describes the view as "presenting a boundless "chaos of barren mountains, probably unequalled in wild "terrific grandeur." The valley of Bameean, beyond the Indian Caucasus, was reached on 3rd September.

And now, at the very time when hope began to yield to despair in all their breasts, and a life of wretched slavery seemed their inevitable lot, aid came from an unexpected quarter, and their speedy deliverance was at hand. Eyre thus tells the story in a letter to a friend in Calcutta:—

"On Sunday, September 11th, Saleh Mahomed, having received a positive order from Mahomed Akbar for our immediate march to Kooloom, our desperate condition induced Pottinger to tempt him with the offer of a bribe for our release. Captain Johnson volunteered to be agent in the matter, and found him more accessible than was expected. This man had hitherto kept aloof from every attempt at friendly intercourse with the prisoners, towards whom his manner had been invariably haughty and his language harsh. Great, therefore, was our astonishment to learn that he had been seduced from his allegiance to Mahomed Akbar and bought over to our side.

"Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the two English armies upon Cabul, and the probable defeat of Mahomed Akbar, led us to expect that chief's arrival among us as likely to happen at any moment. It was, therefore, necessary to be prepared against any sudden surprise. The Hazaret chiefs in the valley were sounded and found favourable to our scheme. The men composing our guard were gained over by a promise of four months' pay. A new Governor

“ was set up over the Hazaret province by Major Pottinger, the existing Governor being too much in Mahomed Akbar’s interests to be trusted.

“ On the 16th September, the country was considered sufficiently safe to admit of our setting out on our return towards Cabul. We had only proceeded a few miles when a messenger met us with news of General Pollock’s victory over Akbar, which cheering intelligence was shortly afterwards confirmed by a note from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was hastening to our assistance with 600 Kuzzilbash horsemen. On the 17th, we re-crossed the Kaloo pass, and encamped about three miles from its base. We had been here about two hours, when horsemen were descried descending the pass of Hajeeguk. Instantly Saleh Mahomed’s men were on the alert and formed up in line. Judge of our joy when the banner of the Kuzzilbash was distinguished streaming in the air, and imagine, if you can, with what emotions of delight and gratitude we eagerly pressed forward to greet our gallant countryman, Sir Richmond Shakespear, who soon came galloping up to where we stood. For the first time after nine miserable months of thralldom we felt the blessedness of freedom. To God be all the glory, for He alone could bring it to pass !”

There was still some danger that Mahomed Akbar might intercept their flight, but at Shakespear’s suggestion, Pollock despatched Sale’s brigade to meet them at Kot-Ashroo. All doubt was then at an end ; they were once more under the safeguard of British troops, who lined the heights of Suffed Khâk, and who raised hearty cheers of welcome as the procession threaded the pass ; among them most conspicuous, rode the gallant Sale with his long lost wife and daughter by his side.

On the 21st, Pollock’s camp at Cabul was reached, where the Horse Artillery guns fired a salute in honour of the event, and thus happily terminated the tragedy of the Cabul insurrection.

The events of those days have still such a thrilling interest for British readers, that we have been tempted to linger perhaps too long, over that portion of Eyre’s career, in connection with which his name first became familiarly known. It was his strange destiny to witness the “ Alpha ” and “ Omega ” of the downfall of the old sepoy army ; for it is now generally admitted that the first seeds of the mutiny of 1857 were sown in the Cabul campaign. In allusion to this, Kaye, in his “ Sepoy War ” declares.—“ The charm of a century of conquest was then broken. The Sepoy Regiments, no longer assured and fortified by the sight of that ascendant star of fortune,

“which once had shone with so bright and steady a light, “shrunk from entering the passes which had been the grave of “so many of their comrades. It was too true; the Seiks were “tampering with their fidelity. Brahmin emissaries were “endeavouring to swear them with holy water not to advance at “the word of the English Commander. Nightly meetings of “delegates from the different regiments were held, and perhaps “we do not even now know how great was the danger.”

Before leaving Cabul, Eyre, through a strange accident, recovered his friend Maule's Bible, on the flyleaf of which the owner had thus written, as if prophetically, two days before his murder: “In case of my death I wish this book to be sent “to my mother or dearest living relative.” No Mahomedan will knowingly destroy the Word of God, and it is remarkable that Arthur Conolly's Prayer Book, wherein he had entered a touching record of his sufferings and aspirations in the well at Bokhara, was, after the lapse of many years, left at the door of his sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner, who simply left word that he came from Russia, but of whom no trace could be discovered after a most diligent search.

Returning with Pollock's force to India, Eyre was posted to the new troop of Horse Artillery, raised to replace the old 1st Troop 1st Brigade which had perished in the Affghan passes, and with whose services at Cabul he had been so intimately associated. In his public report to the Commandant of the Artillery regiment, Eyre, speaking of the siege, thus writes: “The gunners, from first to last, never “once partook of a full meal or obtained their natural “rest:—of the hardships and privations undergone it would “be difficult to convey an adequate idea. Throughout the last “struggle all eye-witnesses concur in testifying to their stubborn “valour.”

While attached to the new troop at Meerut, Eyre originated what is believed to have been the first “soldiers' club” ever established; having for its object the suppression of drunkenness by providing for the soldier, when off duty, the means of sober and suitable recreation and refreshment. For this purpose Eyre hired a house conveniently situated to the barracks, which, with the aid of his brother officers and of small monthly subscriptions from the members, he fitted up with suitable furniture, and supplied with books, magazines, and popular games, and where tea, coffee, and other harmless beverages could be obtained when wanted. It soon became popular among the men, and contributed greatly to the reduction of crime amongst them. The value of such clubs has now been generally recognized.

On the news reaching India that Joseph Wolff was on the point of starting to Bokhara to ascertain the fate of Stoddart and Conolly and wanted some officer to accompany him, Eyre at once offered his services, but his letter failed to reach Wolff in time; it will, however, be found in the published memoirs of that enterprising though eccentric Jew missionary.

Eyre remained with his troop until December, 1844, when he was appointed by Lord Ellenborough, ever prompt to seek out promising officers and to reward good service, Commandant of Artillery in the new Gwalior Contingent, raised after the dispersion of Sindia's Mahratta army in the battles of Maharajpore and Punniar. The new force consisted of four Batteries of Native Field Artillery; one Battery of Garrison Artillery, two Regiments of Irregular Cavalry, and seven Regiments of Native Infantry; the whole forming a very complete and serviceable Brigade. All the English officers being picked men, the Gwalior Contingent soon acquired a reputation for the highest efficiency of which native troops were susceptible; and, as an instance of the loyal and soldierly spirit existing among them up to a late period, it is worthy of record that Eyre's artillery twice volunteered for foreign service, expressing their readiness to proceed either to Persia or Burmah, and received the thanks of Government, conveying "the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council has learnt the soldierly spirit evinced by these men." Their prowess and professional efficiency were, however, destined to be tested in a very undesirable and unexpected fashion during the Sepoy War of 1857-58, by which time a lamentable change had "come over the spirit of their dream"—for, led on by General Ram Singh, a chivalrous old Rajpoot Subadar of Eyre's artillery, the Gwalior Contingent succeeded in turning General Windham's flanks at Cawnpore, obliging him to retreat with great loss, and it was generally admitted that their triumph on that occasion was mainly due to the accurate fire of their guns.

Shortly after Eyre's arrival at Gwalior, his sympathies were enlisted on behalf of the Portuguese native Christians, of whom numbers had been thrown out of employ by the disbandment of the Mahratta force, wherein they had served as non-commissioned officers, buglers, and drummers, but who had been suddenly reduced, with their families, to destitution. Eyre made a strong appeal to the public on their behalf, which met with an immediate response. A sum of exceeding £600 was received from various parts of India, and, with this amount in hand, Eyre conceived and carried out the bold project of establishing a small Christian colony in the valley of Deyra



Dhoon at the base of the Himalayan range, and three hundred miles from Gwalior.

The scheme met with liberal support from the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and other high functionaries. Lands were forthwith purchased, and forty families, numbering 120 souls, left Gwalior for the land of promise, under the guidance of Father Felix, a worthy Italian monk of the Franciscan order, who volunteered his services. Contrary to general expectation, these poor men, on arriving at their destination, set to work with a good will at the novel task of building and ploughing. They found all the necessary materials ready prepared. To each family forty *begahs* (about fourteen acres) of land were assigned, besides a plough and yoke, a pair of bullocks, a cow, two pigs, one sheep, and a small stock of fowls. In a wonderfully short space of time a neat little village sprung up, with its church and school-room; and Father Felix proved himself just the man to gain all hearts, and to stimulate his flock to exertion. Before many weeks had passed he thus wrote: "*nous avons déterminé, de commun sentiment, de nommer cette nouvelle colony, ou pays, 'Eyre-town.' Je vous prie donc de ne pas vous opposer.*"

But Eyre *did* oppose it suggesting instead the name of "Esapore," or the "abode of Christians," which was adopted accordingly.

For about three years the little Christian colony struggled on under his fostering care, during which the colonists kept up a brisk fire of correspondence with Eyre, appealing to him in all their troubles and difficulties. Unfortunately, the climate proved less salubrious than was expected. During certain months a malarious fever prostrated their strength, and a murrain destroyed a large portion of their live stock, although they still continued to eke out a decent subsistence from the produce of their fields, and by the sale of eggs, poultry, and butter to the residents of the neighbouring hill sanatorium of Mussoorie. Eventually, owing to the continuance of the above causes, they gradually found it more advantageous to transfer themselves permanently to the hills, and thus the scene of their early labours became, in process of time, a flourishing tea-plantation in other hands. But the great object had been meanwhile gained of permanently rescuing the Christian families from destitution, and the example set of the practicability of forming such colonies led, ere long, to the establishment of another in a more salubrious locality, which, it is believed, still flourishes.

About this time Henry Lawrence's great scheme for a bill asylum for soldiers' children assumed a definite form, and he paid Eyre the compliment of placing his name on the "Committee of Reference."

They had for some time past corresponded on the best mode of overcoming the difficulties attendant on any attempt to render the asylum available for the children of our Roman Catholic soldiers, who formed so large a proportion of our European army in India, and whose claims to impartial consideration Eyre had strenuously advocated, not without some practical effect; although, as might be expected, there was a strong party utterly opposed to any concession.

In addition to his artillery duties, Eyre carried on, for several years, those of executive engineer of the Gwalior Division, and the pretty Gothic freestone church whose tall pinnacled tower still gives a home-like character to the British cantonment near Gwalior, was of his design and execution. The interior suffered considerable damage from the mutineers in 1857, who destroyed all the coloured glass and wood-work, a very fine organ, and a remarkably handsome carved-stone pulpit; turning up also the encaustic tiles of the floor. In 1854, Eyre was selected to accompany the Maharajah Sindia on his travels in the North-West, and thus witnessed the opening of the Ganges Canal, meeting there his friend Henry Lawrence for the last time, who spoke with intense disapproval of the annexation policy then in fashion, and did not conceal from Eyre his apprehensions that danger would soon accrue from it and find us unprepared.

In May 1855, in consequence of failing health, Eyre proceeded on sick leave to England. There he soon drew public attention by two lectures, at the Royal United Service Institution and before the British Association, on the subject of metallic boats and floating pontoon waggons for naval and military purposes. As the Crimean war was then in progress, his suggestions attracted the notice of Government, who twice deputed officers of both services to witness Eyre's experiments, and with favourable results on both occasions.

Early in February 1857, Eyre returned to Calcutta. He found people just beginning to feel uneasy regarding certain incipient symptoms of disaffection among the sepoye. The Maharajah Sindia of Gwalior chanced to have just arrived on a visit to the Governor-General, and closely questioned Eyre as to the opinions entertained in England about the seizure of Oude. This was delicate ground, but Eyre replied that it was a subject upon which our public men were not agreed,

and that while many approved, a large party viewed it with regret, as tending to disturb the minds of native princes. Whereupon the Maharajah with great animation exclaimed—“Ah! that is the truth, they reason rightly.” Just a year previous, Eyre had chanced to find himself seated at a *table d'hôte* in England, next to a very intelligent young native gentleman from Lucknow, who initiated a discussion on the same subject, and stated his confident belief that, ere twelve months should elapse, the whole of Oude would be in open insurrection. It is not unlikely that this well-informed prophet may have been the since notorious Azimoolah.

Having been posted to a Horse Field Battery at Thyet Myo, in Burmah, Eyre proceeded by sea to join it, and on the 20th March reached his destination, three hundred miles up the river Irrawady. By that time news had come from Bengal of mutinous outbreaks in the native regiments at Berhampore and Barrackpore. Two months later a telegraph summoned Eyre with his battery to Calcutta, to assist in suppressing the mutiny which had burst out with terrific violence at Meerut and Delhi, and was spreading like wild fire over the North-West Provinces. On the night of the 14th of June, Eyre found himself once more anchored off Calcutta. On that very day his old friends of the Gwalior Contingent had followed the fatal example set by the regular army, and had risen against their English officers, many of whom fell victims.

On landing the next morning in Fort William, Eyre found symptoms of alarm amounting almost to panic, pervading the European community. In fact, a clergyman, with his wife and family, had actually taken refuge in board the *Tubal Cain* during the previous night in expectation of a rise among the natives. Within the fort itself he found the Town Major employed in swearing in volunteers, and preparation making to hang a State-prisoner, in the ex-king of Oude's employ, who had been detected in tampering with the sepoys of the garrison. Next morning, however, the prisoner effected his escape from under the very noses of his European sentries, and the king of Oude himself was arrested. On the 17th June, Sir Partrick Grant arrived from Madras as Commander-in-chief, and while passing Eyre's ship received three cheers from the artillery men. It was a favourable omen that he should be thus greeted on arrival by the identical company of Artillery which had been mainly instrumental in suppressing the Barrackpore mutiny in 1824.

After several days of uncertainty, Eyre transferred his men and guns on the 10th July to the *Mullah* flat, in tow of

the *Lady Thackwell* river steamer, with orders to proceed to Allahabad. Their battery horses had been left behind in Burmah, to follow when opportunity offered. Meanwhile, many tragical events had been occurring in the North-West, especially at Jhansi, Neemuch, Fyzabad, Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Bareilly, where mutiny and massacre had been the order of the day; although the energy displayed by John and Henry Lawrence in the Punjab and in Oude, appeared to have, in some degree, stayed the progress of the insurrection. But the fate of India seemed trembling in the balance.

On the 25th July, while approaching the military station of Dinapore, the steamer picked up an English gentleman from a small boat, who announced that the three native regiments there had risen in mutiny at 2 P. M., on that day; and presently a bend of the river presented the dismal spectacle of burning houses in the distance. At 6 P. M., Eyre landed to offer his services to General Lloyd; and, at his desire disembarked three guns until those despatched in pursuit of the mutineers should return. On the following day, came sad tidings from the neighbouring station of Segowlee, that Major Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, who had been most successful in his efforts to maintain order in that district, had been murdered, together with his wife, by some of his own men. Mrs. Holmes was that same daughter of Sir Robert Sale, who, as Mrs. Sturt, had been Eyre's companion in captivity at Cabul.

Re-embarking his guns, Eyre proceeded up the Ganges to Buxar, which he reached at 3 P. M. on the 28th. Here he was informed that the Dinapore regiments having crossed the river Soan, were besieging the civilians of Arrah, in a house which had been, with fortunate foresight, fortified and provisioned by Mr. Vickars Boyle, a Civil Engineer. The mutineers were led by Baboo Koonwar Sing, of Jugdespore, a brave old Rajpoot chief of good family, great energy of character, and extensive influence, who had now assumed the title of Rajah, and had drawn towards his banner the whole fighting population of Behar, a province which supplied the sepoy army with some of its best soldiers. It was then suspected and has since been well ascertained, that Koonwar Singh had been for months past carrying on an active correspondence with the disaffected regiments scattered over the Lower Provinces, and, had not his daring schemes been prostrated at an early period, the whole of Bengal and its dependencies would soon have been in a blaze of mutiny and rebellion, from Benares to Chittagong; and who can say what might then have been the issue?

At Buxar was a valuable Government stud, and about thirty miles higher up the river was a branch stud at Ghazepore, on the opposite bank, where also was stationed a strong native regiment held in check by only one weak company of the 78th Highlanders. Eyre at once saw the importance of preventing the Dinapore mutineers from crossing the river, and as Lord Canning had recently telegraphed to Patna expressing great anxiety for Ghazepore, Eyre steamed up thither to land a couple of guns under his only subaltern.

In exchange for this trivial aid, the officer in command at Ghazepore allowed Eyre to take twenty-five Highlanders with whom he forthwith returned to Buxar, greatly to the relief of the Stud officers and other English inhabitants of that place. It most fortunately happened that, in the brief interval, the *James Hume* steamer had arrived at Buxar to take in coal, having on board 160 of H. M.'s 5th Fusileers under Captain L'Estrange. To that officer Eyre at once despatched a note, proposing that they should join forces for an immediate attempt to relieve Arrah. L'Estrange promptly replied in the affirmative, stipulating only that Eyre should send him a written order to that effect, taking on himself the whole responsibility.

This Eyre did not hesitate to do, and, in like manner, made himself formally responsible for the detention of the two Government steamers.

Early on the morning of the 30th July, guns and troops were disembarked, and arrangements made for a march to Arrah, distant about 48 miles to the east. At the same time, the *James Hume* was despatched to Dinapore with a letter to General Lloyd, informing him of the intended movement and inviting his co-operation. The Field Force thus extemporized consisted of three guns with 40 artillery men; 154 of H. M.'s 5th Fusileers, with six officers, two assistant surgeons, and seventeen volunteers; one of the latter being the Joint-Magistrate of Ghazepore, Mr. J. H. Bax, and three officers of the Stud. The twenty-five Highlanders were left behind with orders to return to Ghazepore by the first opportunity. Eyre appointed as his staff officer, Captain the Hon'ble R. H. Hastings, a most fortunate selection, as it proved, for his indefatigable exertions, zealously backed by the other Stud officers and volunteers, contributed largely to the success of the expedition. The knowledge of the district possessed by Mr. Bax, his coolness and energy, together with his influence with the natives in procuring carriage, rendered his presence with the force likewise of no small advantage.

By 5 p. m., everything was ready for a start. The guns were drawn by bullocks, taken, together with their native drivers, direct from the plough. The reserve ammunition and commissariat supplies were drawn on common country carts, and through Mr. Bax's exertions, four elephants were contributed by the Dumrao Rajah, for conveying tents and bedding. It was the rainy season, and the roads were very heavy; so that the poor bullocks, unused to such labour, moved provokingly slowly, and frequent halts were necessary to enable laggards to close up; hence it was break of day ere the first encamping ground, at Nyah Bhojpore, was reached. At the twelfth mile, a mounted spy, in the service of Koonwar Singh, was intercepted, and was brought in wounded. This proved that the enemy were on the alert, and that circumspection was necessary. The march continued till the night of the 31st, when the discovery of more hostile scouts operated as a caution to halt till daybreak.

On the 1st August, when near Shahpore, the dismal tidings came from Dinapore that a detachment of 400 men, which had been sent from that station for the relief of Arrah, had fallen into an ambuscade near that town, and been driven back with loss of half their number. Eyre, however, resolved to push on and strike a blow to restore whatever prestige might have been lost. Four miles further on, a bridge had been cut through and rendered impassable for guns; but after an hour's detention the damage was sufficiently repaired, and the force bivouacked for the night outside the village of Goojrajgunje, posting a strong guard to protect the bridge, beyond which a picket of the enemy was known to be posted.

At daybreak on Sunday, the 2nd August, the force again advanced, and had just cleared the village, when bugle notes were heard sounding the "assembly" in a wood which bounded the view about a mile ahead, and through which lay the direct road to Arrah. We quote Eyre's own account of what followed, as published in the appendix to the 3rd edition of Gubbins' book on the "Mutiny in Oude," where it has lain buried long enough, and whence we are desirous of exhuming it: "Eyre halted his force to reconnoitre. The enemy now began to show themselves in what seemed overwhelming force. But content with occupying the wood to our front, large bodies were seen to extend themselves along the woods on either flank, with the evident intention of surrounding the little force opposed to them. To bring matters to an issue, Eyre drew up his force on the open plain, and offered battle. The three guns opened fire to the front and flanks, causing the

“ enemy to screen themselves as much as possible behind broken  
“ ground. From this they opened a heavy fire of musketry, and  
“ Eyre ordered forward skirmishing parties of the 5th Fusileers  
“ to retaliate. The superiority of the Enfield Rifles now became  
“ apparent. Galled by their accurate fire, the enemy gradually  
“ fell back to the shelter of the woods. Meanwhile, Eyre  
“ directed the full fire of his artillery on the enemy’s centre,  
“ with the view of forcing a passage through the wood. They  
“ scattered themselves right and left, leaving the road clear,  
“ and under cover of the Enfield Rifles, the guns and baggage  
“ were promptly moved forward and pushed through the wood  
“ before the enemy could again close his divided wings. Emerg-  
“ ing from the woods, the road became an elevated causeway,  
“ bounded on either side by inundated rice-fields, across which  
“ the baffled enemy could only open a distant fire. Finding  
“ their intentions thus frustrated, they hurried back to inter-  
“ cept the force at Beebeegunge, distant about two miles ahead,  
“ where they had effectually destroyed a bridge, and com-  
“ pletely commanded the approaches to it by breastworks, and  
“ from the houses of the village. Eyre again halted his force  
“ to refresh the men and cattle, within a quarter of a mile of  
“ the bridge, and sent out scouts to search for a ford across the  
“ river Bunas, which separated him from the enemy. No  
“ ford was discovered; and as it was plainly impossible to  
“ effect a passage over the bridge, Eyre determined on  
“ making a flank march to the nearest point of the railway  
“ embankment, distant only one mile, along which there was a  
“ direct road to Arrah. This movement was for a time masked  
“ by the guns, which opened a brisk fire upon the village, while  
“ the infantry and baggage pushed forward in the new direction.  
“ But, no sooner did the enemy discover the manœuvre, than  
“ they hastened in great numbers to intercept the force at the  
“ angle of a thick wood which abutted on the railway.  
“ *En route*, Eyre discovered a ford, but as his force had already  
“ passed it, he proceeded, followed up pretty closely by a  
“ large body of infantry and cavalry, being raw levies of  
“ Koonwar Singh; while the three mutineer regiments pursued  
“ a course parallel to his own on the opposite side of the  
“ stream. On reaching the railway, it became necessary to  
“ halt the force and assume a defensive attitude, until the  
“ mutineers could be dislodged from the wood, from which  
“ they opened a very galling musketry fire. For a whole hour  
“ the force was hotly engaged at a great disadvantage, owing to  
“ the abundant cover which screened the enemy. Twice,  
“ during this period, the mutineers, seeing the guns left almost

“ without support, (L’Estrange’s infantry being occupied in skirmishing), rushed impetuously upon them, and were driven back by discharges of grape. At this juncture, Hastings brought word to Eyre (who, having no subaltern, was obliged to remain with the guns,) that the 5th Fusileers were losing ground, and that our position was becoming critical. Eyre, therefore, resolved on trying what a charge of bayonets would do, and despatched Hastings with an order to L’Estrange to that effect. Unable immediately to find L’Estrange, Hastings at once collected every available man, and himself most gallantly led them on ; L’Estrange promptly joining on learning the order which had been given. Rushing forward with a cheer they cleared the deep stream (now confined within narrow banks,) at a bound, and charged impetuously on an enemy twenty times their own number. Taken completely by surprise, the mutineers fell back in the utmost disorder, the guns opening fire upon their retreating masses, and in a few minutes not a man of them remained to oppose the passage of the force. Thenceforward an open road was available, which skirted the railway to within four miles of Arrah, where, a little before nightfall, the force was compelled to halt by an impassable torrent. The night was employed in endeavouring to bridge this over, by casting into the stream large piles of bricks, that had been collected on the bank by the railway engineers, by which means the stream was narrowed sufficiently to allow the construction of a rude sort of bridge formed from country carts, over which the guns and baggage marched, without further opposition, into the station of Arrah, and the relief of the beleaguered garrison was accomplished. After their defeat at the railway, the mutineers and Koonwar Singh had fled back with precipitation to Arrah, to remove their valuables to the jungle stronghold of that chief at Jugdespore.”

Among the slain were sepoys of nine different regiments ; a sufficient proof that, in this action, Eyre’s small force encountered, besides the Dinapore regiments, a formidable number of other trained soldiers of the regular army. We may remark here, *en passant*, that the scene of Eyre’s action on the banks of the Bunas, is the identical spot where Major Munro, on 12th October, 1764, first encountered the troops of Shooja-ood-dowlah, following them up from thence to Buxar, where he so signally defeated them in a pitched battle on the 23rd of that month.

Eyre continues : “ The relief of the garrison proved to have been most opportune, for their position had been so



“effectually mined, that a few hours’ delay must have ensured their  
 “destruction. They numbered sixteen European civilians, and  
 “fifty of Rattray’s Sikh Police. The position, which they had  
 “so miraculously defended against the three mutineer regiments,  
 “aided by Koonwar Singh’s levies, was a small upper-roomed  
 “house of substantial masonry belonging to Mr. Boyle, District  
 “Railway Engineer, by whose skill it had been fortified, and  
 “provisioned, in anticipation of some such crisis. But the  
 “strongest position is of little avail where stout hearts and an  
 “efficient leader are wanting to defend it, and, in the present  
 “case, such hearts and such a leader were forthcoming. To  
 “Mr. Wake, as civil Magistrate of Arrah, who possesses in  
 “a rare degree some of the highest qualities of a soldier,  
 “no less than to the unflinching fortitude with which his able  
 “efforts were supported by his brave associates, may be  
 “attributed the salvation of the garrison. During eight days  
 “and nights they were incessantly harassed, and so closely  
 “watched that not a loophole could be approached with safety.  
 “At one period their water failed, and they owed their  
 “supply to the prompt energy of the Sikhs, who, in one night,  
 “contrived with most inefficient tools, to dig a well on the  
 “ground-floor, twenty feet deep, whereby abundance of good  
 “water was obtained. During the last three or four days their  
 “position had been rendered doubly perilous by the fire of some  
 “guns of small calibre, which the enemy had mounted within  
 “fifty yards of the house, the walls of which were perforated  
 “by their balls in all directions. The defence of Arrah may  
 “be considered one of the most remarkable facts in Indian  
 “history.”\*

\* Mr. G. O. Trevelyan in the fourth chapter of “*Competition Wallah*” thus truly and graphically describes the Eyre of Arrah: “The English troops  
 “at Buxar were certainly a mere handful. But there was a man there  
 “who was neither a novice nor a pedant, neither a young soldier nor an  
 “old woman. Wherever hard knocks had been going on within the last  
 “twenty years—and during that period there was no lack—Vincent Eyre  
 “had generally managed to come in for a liberal allowance. In the  
 “Afghan war, the roughest of schools, he had learned to preserve an  
 “equal mind in arduous circumstances. When the intelligence of the  
 “outbreak, travelling with the proverbial speed of bad news, reached the  
 “station of Buxar, Eyre at once made up his mind to march, without  
 “waiting to hear whether an expedition had started from Dinapore.  
 “Perhaps he was unwilling to leave the fate of the garrison entirely  
 “dependant on the energy and promptness of General Lloyd. Perhaps  
 “he thought that a good thing like the relief of Arrah would bear doing  
 “twice over. His force consisted of a hundred and fifty and four English  
 “bayonets, twelve mounted volunteers, and three field-pieces with their  
 “complement of artillerymen. The distance to be traversed was fifty

Although martial law had been proclaimed in this district, Eyre left the execution of justice in the hands of the civil authorities, except in the case of certain native officials who had transferred their services to Koonwar Singh, and had been taken prisoners in arms against the State. These men were tried by Drum Head Court Martial, composed of the judge, the magistrate, and two captains, Eyre himself presiding over the Court, and, being found guilty, were hanged as an example. The inhabitants of the city and its environs were ordered to deliver up their arms in camp within forty-eight hours, and, long before that time had elapsed, a pile of 7,000 miscellaneous arms had been collected and broken up.

But, although the chief object of the expedition from Buxar had now been accomplished, there was important work still remaining to be done. Koonwar Singh, with a large body of mutineers and armed retainers, had fled to his stronghold at Jugdespore, distant about sixteen miles from Arrah, in the heart of a dense jungle. Captain L'Estrange, in reporting to Army Head Quarters, truly stated:—"The difficulty attending the enterprise was, by universal report, very great. The roads were represented as being (at this season of the year) almost impassable; and the position of Koonwar Singh and his followers was deemed, by all who had any knowledge of the country surrounding him, as being inaccessible." He added, "under all the circumstances, a feeling of doubt, if not of apprehension, as to the success of our expedition, might easily have pervaded troops less confident than ours were, in the judgment, talent, and courage of our leader."

Eyre, having been reinforced by two companies of H. M.'s 10th Foot and 100 of Rattray's Sikhs from Dinapore, marched from Arrah on the 11th August, passing over his late battle-field *en route*, where the marks of bullets on the trees bore ample

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"miles as the crow flies; and, as the waters were out over the face of the country, and the population was in a state of open hostility, the march proved long and formidable. On the way Eyre received tidings of the reverse sustained by Dunbar's detachment. It seemed foolhardy indeed to advance to the attack of an enemy who had just cut to pieces a force twice as strong as his own. But according to his view of the matter, this consideration did not in any wise affect the result of his reasoning. His axiom was the Arrah must be relieved. There was no one else now left to do the business, so of necessity it fell to him. He had not many soldiers and would be glad to have more. He did not share the sentiment of King Henry at Agincourt. He would have been delighted to see at his back a thousand or two of those men at Aldershot who did no work that day. But, as he had only a few, he must perform in the work with those few. So, on he went, nothing doubting."

evidence to the fierceness of the conflict. Next day, about 11 A. M., the enemy were found in strong position, having a river in their front, the town of Dulloor in their centre, partially protected by earth-works, and in their rear the formidable belt of jungle which covered the approach to Jugdespore. An advanced picket occupied the village of Narainpore, whence they were soon dislodged. The enemy's right was screened behind broken ground and low jungle, until the near approach of Captain Patterson's skirmishers drew forth their fire, whereupon Eyre opened upon them with grape, causing them to rise in confusion; when a timely forward rush, accompanied by a loud cheer from the men of the 10th Foot, drove them panic-stricken into Dulloor and the adjacent jungle. Meanwhile, L'Estrange and Scott with the 5th Fusiliers, assisted by a field-howitzer, held in check the enemy's left, consisting of Koonwar Singh's irregulars, horse and foot; which now simultaneously gave way, and a hot pursuit ensued, terminating only at Jugdespore itself. The enemy, as they retreated through the jungle, maintained a dropping fire on their pursuers, and abandoned two field-guns *en route*. Koonwar Singh had barely time to effect his escape in the direction of Sasseram, leaving his stronghold in our hands.

Eyre followed him up ten miles as far as Peroo, when he received from Dinapore an order of recall to join General Outram, who had meanwhile arrived thus far in progress to take up his command for the relief of Lucknow. Before leaving Jugdespore, Eyre, in order more thoroughly to destroy Koonwar Singh's prestige among the natives, blew up the palace and principal buildings, where he had established a manufactory of arms and ammunition, and had laid up large stores of provisions, and which, therefore, offered a tempting rendezvous for malcontents in such dangerous times. Koonwar Singh bent his course towards Rewah, with the ultimate intention of proceeding to Delhi; but eventually crossed into the Doab and thence to Oude, where he carried on a desultory warfare for several months, until forced by the successes of the British arms in all quarters to retire to his native jungles, pursued by Sir Edward Lugard. In crossing the Ganges he received a mortal wound and perished miserably, though stout-hearted and defiant to the last.

On the 21st August, the gallant little Arrah Field Force was finally dispersed, having terminated its brief and adventurous career in a campaign of three weeks' duration, fruitful in important consequences to the Government of British India. When this force was first improvised by Eyre at Buxar, on his

own responsibility, the entire province of Behar was in open insurrection, having proclaimed Koonwar Singh as their Rajah and ruler; the civilians of Arrah were besieged by the mutinous regiments of Dinapore without a hope of relief; our river communication between Bengal and the Upper Provinces was in danger of being interrupted,—a danger which imperilled the very existence of Havelock's small isolated force in the Doab; and Bengal itself showed symptoms of a general rising. What a change had Eyre's little campaign effected! Arrah relieved; the Dinapore mutineers twice defeated and dispersed; Koonwar Singh in full flight to the North-West; the district of Shahabad restored to order and tranquillity; and the route of the Ganges open for the safe transit of our steamers and troops!

On the night of the 20th August, Eyre was suddenly awakened from slumber to find the companions of his recent toils and successes standing round his bed to offer him the parting tribute of their esteem and gratitude. The feelings of the Arrah garrison had been embodied in some spirited verses by Dr. Halls, which that gentleman proceeded to read aloud whilst Eyre sat up in bed, half wondering whether the whole was not a pleasing illusion of the fancy! But three rounds of hearty cheers with which the interview terminated sufficed to assure him of the reality.

On the 19th August, General Outram thus encouragingly addressed Eyre: "I have only time to thank you for your very interesting letter of the 5th instant, which I have sent privately to the Governor-General. The official goes to-day to the Commander-in-chief officially. Both will, I am sure, most highly appreciate your glorious little campaign. What a refreshing contrast to the bungling that has prevailed elsewhere! Your successes enable me to dispose of troops, who otherwise must have been detained here, and especially am I rejoiced that your Troop is rendered available for even more important services. At Benares I shall have the pleasure of meeting you, when we can both talk over the measures I have in contemplation."

So highly indeed did Outram estimate Eyre's services, that he even recommended they should be rewarded by the Victoria Cross, in the following terms:—"In viewing the steady resolve of Major Eyre to effect the relief of Arrah, the perseverance with which he pursued his object, and the gallantry with which he led his small force to victory, even against such overwhelming numbers, I respectfully submit that Major Eyre established a special claim to distinction, and earnestly solicit His Excellency the Commander-in-chief

"to bestow on that officer the Victoria Cross." And to Eyre himself he wrote, as we have already recorded: "If acts of devotion to one's country entitle to the Cross, then surely the devotion you displayed at Arrah to your country, and the advantage that resulted to the country from that act, ought to secure it to *you* of all men."

It arose from no lack of appreciation of Eyre's services that the Commander-in-chief withheld the Cross, considering a Companionship of the Bath the more suitable reward. Congratulatory letters poured in upon Eyre from all quarters, including the highest Government officials,\* and the Governor-General in Council conveyed to him officially his special thanks, accompanying them with an expression of "admiration for the zeal, judgment, and resolution with which Major Eyre and his little force encountered and overcame the formidable obstacles opposed to them."

It was to be expected that, under Outram's command Eyre would not long remain idle. Accordingly, on the advance from Allahabad to Cawnpore, he was entrusted with a small expeditionary force to intercept, and, if possible, destroy a formidable party of insurgents from Oude, who, with 400 men and four guns, had crossed the Ganges to operate in Outram's rear, and cut off his communications with Allahabad. Eyre's force consisted of 100 infantry of H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers, 50 of H. M.'s 64th Foot, and two guns; and he was joined in the wood by 40 of the 12th Irregular Horse. Marching by night the town of Khoondun-puttee was reached a little before daybreak. The villagers reported the rebels to be near at hand, if not actually within the walls of the place; their boats being moored about a mile off. Eyre therefore ordered the cavalry to gallop ahead to guard the gates of the town, and should the rebels have fled, to pursue them to their boats, and hold them in check until the infantry and guns should come up.

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\* "Although," wrote Mr., now, Sir Cecil Beadon to Eyre, "I have not the honour of being known to you, I will venture to claim your forgiveness for the liberty I take in expressing the gratitude and admiration which, in common I suppose with every Englishman, I feel for the prompt decision with which you resolved upon effecting the relief of the Arrah garrison, and organized a force for the purpose, and for the admirable skill and bravery with which you and your little army withstood and completely routed an overwhelming force of the rebels, and finally effected your object with comparatively little loss." The expression of "gratitude and admiration" from one who was Foreign Secretary to the Government, indicates most clearly the feeling of intense relief which Eyre's victory produced in Government circles.

All turned out exactly as had been foreseen, for the rebels, hearing of Eyre's approach, had already begun to retire in hot haste to the river, and the cavalry, pursuing, reached the bank just in time to prevent the boats leaving their moorings. On the arrival of the infantry and guns, Eyre gave immediate orders to board, and an obstinate resistance was made, terminating in a desperate attempt on the part of the enemy to blow up the boats with all therein; failing to effect which, they threw their guns overboard and precipitated themselves into the river, where they were destroyed by discharges of grape from the guns, and a fatal fusilade from the infantry, none so much as asking for quarter, and only three of the whole number escaping alive. Thus Outram's instructions were fulfilled to the very letter.

Another large party of marauders from Oude, who had landed about four miles higher, taking warning by the fate of their companions, abandoned their project, and re-embarked before Eyre's cavalry could intercept them. The blow thus decisively struck was considered by Outram to have "prevented" a general insurrection in the Doab," and in forwarding Eyre's despatch, he wrote:—"I now consider my communications secure, which otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oude, from which evils, having been preserved by Major Eyre's energy and decision, that officer and the detachment under his command are, I consider, entitled to thankful acknowledgments from Government, "which, I am confident, will not be withheld. His reputation as "a successful leader had already been so well established that "I purposely selected him for this duty, in the perfect confidence that he would succeed." This elicited a further recognition from the Governor-General in Council.

Outram, having joined forces with Havelock on the 16th September, Eyre exchanged his light field-guns for heavy iron 18-pounders drawn by bullocks and elephants, and rendered further good service on the advance to Lucknow, which took place immediately after. On the death of Brigadier Cooper on the 26th September, while forcing a passage through the city for the relief of the beleaguered garrison, Eyre succeeded to the command of the Artillery Brigade, which he continued to hold until the final capture of the city by Lord Clyde, in March, 1858. Shortly after joining the Lucknow garrison, he was prostrated by brain fever, brought on by exposure and fatigue, and owed his life to the tender care of Martin Gubbins and his wife.

Subsequently, he took part, as Brigadier of artillery and cavalry, in all the active operations of the force, and was repeatedly

mentioned honourably in the despatches of Havelock and Outram, the latter styling him in one of his despatches as "the gallant Brigadier Eyre, whose victories at Arrah and Jugdespore have already given him an European reputation."

During the final siege of Lucknow, Eyre's artillery was mainly instrumental in repelling an attempt of the enemy's cavalry and infantry to break through the position at Alumbagh, which, if successful, must have exposed Lord Clyde's flank and rear to their attacks, besides intercepting his communications with Cawnpore. This affair was, however, for certain reasons best known to the Head Quarter Staff, hushed up as unworthy of notice, and, what is stranger still, when Sir Archdale Wilson, commanding the artillery at Lucknow, sent in his final despatch, making honourable mention of Eyre and his artillery subordinates at Alumbagh, it was brought back by a staff officer with an order for its erasure, as "*the Alumbagh had nothing to do with Lucknow.*"

Nevertheless, by a strange inconsistency, when Eyre and Frank Turner were ordered to proceed to join their new appointments, a complimentary order was published to the army at Lucknow wherein it was stated:—"His Excellency parts from them with the greatest regret, and takes the opportunity of testifying the high opinion he entertains of them. *They have been specially retained with this force till now, in consequence of that opinion.*" Still, even this could scarcely make amends to Eyre for the total omission of his name from the final despatch, which mentioned by name almost every other artillery officer who had so much as pointed a gun. The generous-minded Outram, ever disdainful of injustice, afterwards remonstrated against the omission, and wrote to Eyre as follows:—"I was as much disappointed as you could be on seeing the Commander-in-chief's despatch in print, to find no acknowledgment was made of the services of the troops at Alumbagh, and especially of yourself."

But, whatever mortification Eyre suffered thereby, he was amply compensated by a letter from Outram himself, who thus expressed his feelings on the close of the campaign, wherein they had been so long associated together:—"I avail myself of one of the few leisure moments allowed me to thank you for the able, zealous, and invaluable service you have rendered me; to give utterance to the strong feelings of admiration with which I regard you as a man, a soldier, and an officer, and to assure you of the warm affection which I bear to you as a friend. Your future career I shall continue to watch with deep and affectionate

“ interest, and if at any time or in any manner, I can be  
 “ of the slightest service to you, I shall esteem it alike  
 “ a personal favour and an honour to be permitted to aid you.  
 “ But you are now far above the necessity for help from any  
 “ one, for you have well and fairly earned the highest position  
 “ the service affords, and doubtless will obtain it when opportunity offers.”

Thus terminated Eyre's active services in the field. His remaining years in India were passed in comparative seclusion at the gunpowder agency of Ishapore,—where he twice received the thanks of the Secretary of State for India,—and latterly in the more laborious and important post of Inspector-General of Ordnance in Calcutta. During his residence here, Eyre warmly advocated in the editorial columns of the *Friend of India*, the establishment of military colonies in the Himalayan mountains, and found a supporter of his views in Sir Hugh Rose. The subject has very recently been taken up in England by Dr. F. Mouat, and been ably handled in two lectures delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, at which Eyre presided by special invitation.

He also took occasion while at Ishapore to give a practical demonstration, in the presence of Lord Canning and Sir Hugh Rose, of the adaptability for military purposes in India of the metallic floating waggons, on which he had lectured when in England, for pontoon purposes on the rivers of India. Two of these waggons being lashed together, were launched on the Hooghly, and found capable of floating a nine-pounder field-gun and its full proportion of gunners. Such was the impression made on the minds of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, that he was at once appointed President of a special Pontoon Committee, which entered thoroughly into the subject, and whose report, it was hoped, would ere now have led to some remarkable practical results in the reorganization of our pontoon system for army purposes in India.

On the establishment of the “ Outram Institute,” at Dum-Dum, to commemorate that great and good man's services by carrying out his own benevolent views for the welfare of the British soldier in India, Eyre was selected as President of a Committee for the practical development of the scheme, which, under the auspices and leadership of the Revd. Mr. Norman, may be said to have eclipsed all other attempts of a similar kind theretofore made; although the example has since been followed with remarkable success in other military stations.

He was selected by Lord Canning as a member of the Army Amalgamation Commission in 1861, and it is now well



known that, had the suggestions of that Commission been attended to by Sir Charles Wood, that minister would have saved himself and his country from the shame and trouble brought upon both by the incessant well-founded complaints, wherewith every subsequent year has teemed, of injustice and bad faith ;—complaints which have at length wrung some tardy concessions from his successor.

In the spring of 1863, the state of his health having obliged Eyre to repair to England, he became a Major-General on the full pay retired list, and his active career in India having thus terminated he was recommended by Sir Hugh Rose to the Home Government for further honours. These, however, have not yet been conferred, although backed by the Governor-General in Council, and by the Home Council of India ; neither has his name been included in the list of good service-pensions, for which he was equally eligible with other retired officers of artillery, who have received that reward, and whose services cannot be said to have surpassed those we have here recorded. Nor, to the universal surprise of the Indian public, as evinced in many a newspaper article no less than in conversation amongst military men, was the Knighthood of the Star of India conferred upon the man who had contributed far more than most recipients of the honour to maintain the connexion of India with England.

England, indeed, sometimes acts strangely in such cases. She makes heroes of officers who leave their posts during an action ; she bestows prize-money upon men who were hundreds of miles from the place of capture, whilst those by whose daring efforts and brilliant victories in the vicinity, that capture was made possible, are left unrewarded ; she showers with an indiscriminate hand crosses and decorations ; whilst an action which in any other country in the world would have raised its originator to high command and great honours, which in France was regarded as the brilliant action of the mutiny campaign, is in England rewarded with a decoration, such as is ordinarily given to military men for the most ordinary services.

Of all men in the world, however, Vincent Eyre can best afford to remain undecorated. His deeds need no adventitious prop, no tinsel ornament either to support or to commend them to his fellow-countrymen. They speak for themselves to his contemporaries, as they will speak to posterity. The neglect which he has experienced will only cause those actions to be enquired after, which stamped his name on the history of a crisis during which the British power was brought down

to a lower ebb than it had ever known before. It will never be forgotten that it was Vincent Eyre, who first dealt the most fatal and deadly blow to the rebellion, at whose hands the mutineers first received a retribution as prompt as it was effective. That successful march to Arrah acquires greater lustre from the fact that it followed immediately upon the defeat of double the number of European soldiers under another leader; that it was made in the face of men trained in our school, whose hands were yet red with the victory they had achieved over a larger force, who knew that with the defeat of Eyre they would gain possession of Behar,—would be in a position to march upon Bengal. Looking at men as they are, we may well assert that there are few who would have taken upon themselves the responsibility at which Eyre so eagerly clutched. There was no tarrying, no delay, no telegraphing for instructions, no sheltering himself under the wing of others. On the contrary; not only did he show himself able to think and act at the same moment,—one of the highest attributes of a man,—but he was ready to take all responsibility,—the responsibility of every one joining his force,—upon his own shoulders,—to give orders in writing,—to do anything, in fact, to insure movement and action. When we think how rare such qualities are in the world;—that other men, who from interest or from their official position, obtained a factitious reputation during the mutiny, showed when brought into action that they possessed them not,—we must the more honour the man who not only possessed but used his great gifts to such purpose,—to the saving of British interests in India. For, however much in these days of peace and security some people may be inclined to undervalue the effect of the great success of Arrah, this we know for a fact, that at the time it was regarded as the turning point of the mutiny, as the death-blow to rebellion in Behar, as so strengthening the hands of Government, as to enable it to turn its undivided attention to affairs in the North-West. What if Eyre had not succeeded? Where then would have been Havelock? Where the beleaguered garrison of Lucknow? In what a position would have been the Commander-in-chief, with the whole country between Allahabad and Calcutta in insurrection? Who can doubt that Ghazepore would have gone, that Patna would have gone, that Calcutta itself would have been sorely threatened? It was not possible, indeed, that a Lloyd or a Hewitt should have occupied the place of an Eyre. Men of that calibre are not the adventurous to whom alone adventures are possible. It

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needed for such an expedition a leader who laughed at responsibility when it might affect his action, who was cool, determined, resolute; who possessed the brain to contrive, the nerve to carry out, his daring plans. Such leaders are rarely met with now a days,—but such an one the Arrah field force possessed in Vincent Eyre.

The warm personal feelings which we entertain towards the subject of this sketch, knowing as we know how much there really is to admire in his character, have prompted us to the task,—the pleasing and inspiring task,—of laying his deeds, just as he accomplished them, before the readers of this *Review*. We have done this, of design, barely, almost nakedly. We have avoided everything but a recital of facts as they occurred, preferring to our own comments, the comments of such men as Lord Canning, Sir James Outram, Sir Cecil Beadon, and others whose testimony cannot be doubted. We have given the simple outline of a career of a British officer in India, commencing in the steady performance of his duty; he himself aiding that performance by constant study; and culminating in an expedition and a victory, both of which testified to the excellence of the seed sown, to the fertility of the soil in which it had taken root. How true indeed is the apothegm, that a life of preparation will not fail of glory;—how still more true, if possible, the dictum, that the opportunity will not fail the man, if the man only fit himself for the opportunity!

ART. III.—*The Bombay Survey and Settlement Act. (Act I. of 1865.)* An act to provide for the survey, demarcation, assessment, and administration of lands held under Government, in the districts belonging to the Bombay Presidency, and for the registration of the rights and interests of the occupants of the same.

THE Bombay Presidency proper contains three grand territorial divisions, the fertile plains of Gujerat; the Concan between the sea and the Western Ghauts; and the elevated lands of the Deccan. It is divided into seventeen collectorates or sub-collectorates, the supervision over which, in matters of revenue and police, is entrusted to two Commissioners, one in the Northern, and one in the Southern Division. The extensive but comparatively barren and unproductive territory of Sind, nearly equalling in area the rest of the Presidency, has been for upwards of 20 years under the Government of Bombay, and is entrusted to a Commissioner who exercises a greater authority in matters of civil government than the other Commissioners, and who corresponds more nearly to a Chief Commissioner in other parts of India.

The portion of this great territory, that belonged to Great Britain at the commencement of the present century, was most insignificant. With the exception of the Island of Bombay and a few other places, the collectorate of North Canara may be said to be the oldest British possession, it having been conquered from the Mysore House in 1801; for 60 years it remained under the Government of Madras, and, in 1862, it was transferred to Bombay. Fifteen of the districts came to us at the fall of the Peshwa in 1820, and the extensive province of Sattara lapsed twenty years ago.

For years before the overthrow of the Poona Government, the Mahratta territory had been overrun with contending armies, and subjected to all the evils of misrule and anarchy. When we assumed the government in 1820, nothing could exceed the disorder that prevailed in all matters connected with land and

the land-revenue. The old tenures and assessments were subverted, fraudulent claims to exemption from the payment of land-revenue were based upon false entries in the public registers, none but the most influential could venture to call his land his own, the assessments were liable to constant alteration at the caprice or discretion of the local or village officers, and corruption and peculation were prevalent. For the first few years, after the conquest of a warlike and turbulent country, our attention was chiefly directed to measures for strengthening our own position, and taking stock of what we had obtained, and but little was done systematically for the improvement of the civil administration of the new provinces. At length, in 1827, the Code of Regulations, known as the Elphinstone Code, became law, and was gradually introduced into all the territories subject to the Government of Bombay. This Code, as originally published on the 1st January, 1827, contained twenty-six Regulations classified as follows :—

- 1, Preliminary.
- 9, Civil Justice.
- 5, Criminal Justice.
- 6, Revenue Branch.
- 1, Military.
- 4, Miscellaneous.

From 1827 to 1834 the Government of Bombay continued to exercise legislative powers, and passed numerous Regulations altering and amending the Code, but leaving its main features almost untouched, in which state it remained for the next quarter of a century, during which the legislative power was vested in the Supreme Government.

The great Indian Codes, that have been enacted during the last six years, have entirely destroyed the Bombay Regulations as a Code; with the exception of a few provisions of the civil and criminal branches, and the six Regulations contained in the revenue branch, the Code may be considered as repealed. It is not our object to advert here to those portions of the Code that related to the civil and criminal law, but we may observe that they had become overlaid by interpretations and amendments, and were not adapted to the requirements of the time. The Code was an undoubted improvement in 1827, and acted as an agent of civilization for many years, to an extent which can scarcely be conceived by those who have not a knowledge of the state of the country, when we first took possession of it. But in 1860, it was high time that it should give way to a more perfect system of law, and none, who have turned their attention to the matter, can doubt that the Indian Penal

Code, and the Codes of Procedure are fully appreciated by all the natives of the country who have enough intelligence to study the law. The accuracy of definition, the sound practical wisdom that underlies the whole fabric, and the evident marks they bear of being the result of the laborious thought of highly cultivated minds, command the admiration of all, for these, by far the most magnificent monuments of our rule in India.

But it is to the Revenue Code of Bombay that we propose to direct our attention, and chiefly to that portion of it relating to the land-revenue, as it is contained in the 16th and 17th Regulations of the original Code, and the various Regulations and Acts by which these have since that time been modified.

Regulation XVI. of 1827 consists of three chapters, the first two of which relating to the appointment of Collectors, their assistants, and stipendiary establishments, remain almost unaltered and call for no remark. The third chapter relates to the appointment of hereditary officers, as agency which has always exercised a great influence in the territories of Bombay, and has been considerably modified by Act XI. of 1846.

The substantive law of the relation between Government and the cultivators of the soil is laid down in the seventeenth Regulation, which is by far the most interesting of the whole Code, and we propose to discuss the principles contained in it, and to examine their gradual development into the present revenue system of Bombay. The duties of a Collector as defined in the 16th Regulation, are "To assess and collect the several descriptions of public revenue, entrusted to his management, according to established usage, and to decide certain civil suits and to try claims to exemption from the payment of land-revenue," (Regulation XVI. of 1827 Section 2); and these duties are explained in detail in the following Regulation, the first chapter of which relates to the assessment of land, the next six to the collection of the revenue, the eighth to the trial of civil suits connected with land, and the ninth and tenth to claims to exemption.

The principle, on which the rules for assessing land are based, is that all land is subject to the payment of land-revenue, which shall be assessed by the Collector "according to the established principles that govern the assessment of lands of the description to which it belongs," unless a claim to exemption be proved, that the settlement be made with the occupant or person entered in the land-registers as occupying the land, and shall not exceed any "specific limit that may have been established and

"preserved," that the occupant shall be liable in person and property for the revenue of this land, and that the Collector shall fix the dates at which the instalments of revenue fall due.

It will thus be observed that, subject to the control of Government, a wide discretion was left to the Collector in fixing his assessments from year to year. He was only bound to recognize proved exemptions and established limits, and as the only limit recognized in the provinces conquered from the Peshwa, was that the assessment received not exceed two-fifths or one-third of the produce, it will be evident that there was scope for much rackrenting. The exercise of this authority was, however, practically limited by the number of holdings, and the great amount of work devolving on the Collectors, and no general revision of the assessment took place. Individual cases were taken up by the native officials, not always with strict regard to justice and moderation, but the bulk of the assessments remained from year to year as we found them at the conquest. The existence of such a power of interference gave great opportunity for dishonest and corrupt practices, and it is believed that in some districts, at least, the most shameful extortion was common. Besides this, it was held that with the exception of a few favourable tenures, no land was the property of the occupant, who might at any time be ousted on another person outbidding him and agreeing to give a higher rent.

The state of things that existed a few years after the passing of the Elphinstone Code was eloquently described by Sir Bartle Frere in a speech, delivered at the time of discussing in the Bombay Council, the Act whose title stands at the head of this article :

"His Excellency the President said that, after what had been stated in the petitions laid before the Council that day, he was unwilling to let the Bill be read a second time without bearing his personal testimony to its being a most valuable and necessary measure, and one, as far as he could judge, singularly free from all the objections which had been stated against it. Nearly thirty years had passed since he was personally connected with the operations which led to the commencement of the survey in this Presidency, and was himself employed in the districts in which the survey was first introduced. It was impossible to give any one, who had not seen the country at the time he was speaking of, an idea of how this India, which is always said to be so immutable, had changed for the better, and how much of that change was due to one good measure of administration, steadily and consistently carried out.

“ The principle of the Bill was two-fold, *1st*, the Bill stereotyped the change to which he had adverted, by confirming the past proceedings of the Survey Department; and *secondly*, it made provision for the future prosecution of the same beneficial process, hereafter. To give some idea of the state of this part of the country, before the changes in the revenue system, to which he alluded, had been introduced, he would briefly describe the condition of the people of the Deccan as he saw them in the year 1835, when, shortly after his arrival in this country, he was employed as an assistant of Mr. H. E. Goldsmid, whose name could never be mentioned without regret at the early loss of one of the most valuable and devoted servants this Government had ever possessed. Mr. Goldsmid was sent to enquire into certain charges of mismanagement in some of the districts of the Poona Collectorate. The whole of the Decan had been more or less exhausted by the errors and mismanagement of former Governments. The removal of the native court and army had destroyed the local market for produce. No foreign trade, adequate to supply its place, had grown up. The prices of agricultural produce and of labour had for years been steadily falling, and the Government revenue was as steadily decreasing. But what most attracted the attention of Mr. Williamson Ramsay, so well known as the sole and most able Revenue Commissioner of that time, was the extreme difficulty, with which even an inadequate amount of revenue was extorted from the cultivators; and he deputed Mr. Goldsmid and Lieutenant (now Colonel) Shortrede to inquire into the truth of the charges of oppression, which had been made against the revenue officers of the district he referred to. The situation was shortly this: Rarely more than two-thirds of the culturable land in any district were under cultivation. Frequently as much as two-thirds of the land was waste. Villages almost deserted were frequently to be met with; some were “*bèchiragh*” without a light in them, utterly uninhabited. The people were sunk in the lowest depths of poverty; they had few recognized rights in the land; the boundaries of the different villages and different estates were often unsettled, and gave rise to disputes which there were not the means of finally deciding. The revenue to be derived from the land was practically dependent on the discretion of the local officers. There were, it was true, fixed customary rates which nominally regulated the assessment to be paid. But they were so much higher than could possibly be paid at the then existing prices of produce, that it was necessary to grant remissions, of the necessity for and extent of which the local officers were the sole judges; and it was thus practically



“left to a very ill-paid class of inferior officials to decide what should be taken from the people.”

“The results of such a system might be easily guessed. In good seasons, the people were forced to pay to the uttermost farthing, without having the certainty that what they paid really went to the Government Treasury. In bad seasons, if they were unable to obtain remissions, they had no resource but to leave the country and seek subsistence elsewhere.

“He (the President) had seen many of the victims of this most wretched system. People had been brought before Mr. Goldsmid who deposed to having been tortured in the most cruel manner, in consequence of their inability to meet the demands of the native Collectors. They had been exposed to the heat of the sun, and were forced to stand with large stones on their heads, or to lie down with heavy weights laid on their chests. This state of things was reported by Mr. Williamson Ramsay, the Revenue Commissioner, to the Government. He showed that the fault lay less with the under-paid officials than with the Government itself, which required from its servants an impossibility, *viz.*, to realise the assessments of the most prosperous day of the Mahratta empire, when prices had fallen far below their former amount. He urged the injustice of entrusting such powers to ill-trained officials at a distance from all effective control, without taking the proper precautions of giving them such a salary as would place them above the influence of temptation. He pointed out a truth which is now generally recognized and acted on, that the true secret of a good land-revenue system is moderation in demand; that if the demands were moderate, cultivation would certainly increase; that the cultivators would be sure to prosper; and that in their prosperity the State would share. It so happened that these suggestions fell on kindly ground. Sir Robert Grant was then Governor of Bombay, than whom a more able statesman or larger-hearted philanthropist has never been at the head of the Government of any Presidency. On receiving the Revenue Commissioner's report, he cordially sympathised with his views, and charged him to see that the great principles to which he had given expression were effectively carried out. In execution of these orders Lieutenant Wingate was associated with Mr. Goldsmid, with a view to devise a complete plan for a general survey, and an equitable assessment of all Government land. These gentlemen were ably seconded by several officers chiefly drawn from the Army. And he (the President) might remark that this was only one of the many occasions on which the Government of India had been indebted to the Army for

“officers who had rendered the most effective aid in the general  
“administration of the country. He should only weary the  
“Council if he were to describe the different parts taken by these  
“officers in the operations of the survey. He could not, how-  
“ever, refrain from mentioning the names of some of the gentle-  
“men to whom, at the outset, the supervision of this duty was  
“entrusted, and to whose zeal and ability in laying the founda-  
“tion, the excellence of the superstructure is mainly due.

“Lieutenant Nash, of the Bombay Engineers, of the first and  
“ablest of their number, was no more. Lieutenant (now Colonel)  
“Gaisford, and Lieutenant (now Major) Davidson, had long since  
“retired from the Service, and were both, he believed, still living  
“a life of active benevolence in their native country. Two of the  
“original officers, however, of that time, Majors Francis and  
“Anderson, had been throughout in active charge of survey operations, and were, he was glad to say, now at the head of the  
“Survey Department; they had never ceased to preserve with  
“religious fidelity the great principle which had been laid down by  
“Messrs. Wingate and Goldsmid. It was but a small part of the  
“praise to which these officers were richly entitled, to say that  
“the success of the Revenue Survey in the Bombay Presidency  
“depended, in a great measure, upon their high qualifications and  
“tried character.”

This description applied more or less to the whole of the Deccan and Gujerat, but not to the Concan or to the district of Canara. There a feeling of property in land and tenures undisturbed for generations had created a very different state of things, for which an exceptional mode of treatment will be provided.

The features of this plan devised by Mr. Goldsmid and Sir George Wingate, as finally sanctioned in 1848, are as follows:—Each of the three superintendents of survey had six or seven assistants, two of whom were called “classing” assistants, and the rest “measuring” assistants; and under each assistant were about twenty native classers or measurers. When a district was to be surveyed, the survey officers were appointed assistants to the Collector, so as to give them a legal power of entering the land and assessing it. The land of each village was then surveyed and measured out into fields or “numbers” of convenient size, each separate holding, as far as practicable, being made into a separate number or numbers, which were all demarcated with boundary marks. The native measurers were kept at work in the field during the eight fine weather months, their operations being tested by the assistant by theodolite surveys, and his tests in turn

examined by the superintendent. The waste and unowned lands of the village were also measured off into convenient fields, and during the monsoon, the work of the fine season was recorded on maps, and a rough field-register was prepared. The map and register were then handed over to a classing assistant, whose duties consisted in examining the soil of each number, and other circumstances affecting its productive powers, when a place was assigned to it in one or other of the three scales of relative value, under the three heads of "garden," "irrigated," and "dry." The information collected by the measurers and the classers was then sent up to the superintendent, on whom the most delicate part of the work devolved. He had to fix the maximum rate of assessment for each of the three scales, or that rate which a field of the highest possible class should bear. This, the turning point of the whole system, seems a mysterious process, and we have been unable to find any clear explanation of the method adopted. Apparently much was left to the natural and acquired sagacity of the superintendent. By tentative processes maxima were struck, that yielded a revenue for the village or circle of villages, equal to the average of past years, and these were lowered or raised as the circumstances of the district seemed to require a decrease, or to admit of an increase in revenue. The maximum once fixed, all the other steps followed readily, each field fell into its place, and the area and rate gave the total assessment, which was then declared in force for thirty years, and the earliest settlements are now nearly approaching their term. It was felt that the improved condition of the people, and their greater independence made it necessary to strengthen the hands of the Survey Department, and, in spite of the strenuous opposition of some interested landowners, the Survey Act of 1865 was passed. By this Act the duties of assessing land are taken from the Collectors, and vested in officers of survey, who are formed into a separate department no longer under the Civil Commissioners of the division, but under Special Survey Commissioners, who correspond direct with Government, and full powers are given them to exact assistance, and lay down boundaries. Legal sanction is given to settlements for thirty years being made, and occupancy under them is declared (Section 36) to be a "transferable and heritable property," with a right of renewal at revised rates on the expiry of the term of settlement, and Government further binds itself that the revised rates shall be fixed "not with reference to improvements made by the owners or occupants from private capital and resources during the

"*currency of any settlement under this Act*, but with reference to "general considerations of the value of land, whether as to "soil, valuation, prices of produce, or facilities of communication," (Sec. 30); another Section limits the duration of a settlement to thirty years, and reservation is made of power to impose special local cesses for municipal improvement.

The words marked in *Italics* suggest a serious consideration, whether the occupants, under settlements made *before* the Survey Act was introduced, are liable to have their assessment revised with reference to their own improvements, and it would be well for the Government of Bombay to set this doubt at rest, as its existence implies the possibility of a short-sighted and grasping policy being attempted. We can not doubt but that the omission was unintentional, and that the integrity of the guarantee will be confirmed to all the settlements effected before the passing of the Act.

The result of the system of survey and assessment, that has thus been stereotyped by this Act, has been satisfactory, though it by no means comes up to the merit assigned to it by its staunch admirers. It had three avowed objects which were—(1) to equalize the assessment; (2) to survey and measure the land; and (3) to give a fixity of occupancy rights. The second and third of these objects have been obtained with remarkable success, and under the combined influence of the settlement, of an unexampled rise in prices, and of other measures of good Government, the position of the agricultural population has greatly improved. But as regards the attempt to equalize the assessment, the success has not been so great. The records of sales of land effected of late years, show the most marked discrepancy between the survey assessment and the market value of the land assessed. Some fields sell at more than a hundred times the assessment, and some at less than one year's assessment, and making every allowance for special enhancement of value, there can be no doubt that the "equable distribution of the land revenue" has not been accomplished in Bombay. One result, however, has followed from the survey which is very remarkable, and probably entirely unexpected by its originators. This is the establishment of the practice of periodical revision of the assessments, as a fundamental principle, and the avoidance of the prescriptive enjoyment of unchanged rates of assessment, which, in parts of the sister Presidency of Madras, seems to prevent any increase to the land revenue. There is no doubt that the assertion by Government, at so early a period of our occupation, of the right to revise and increase the assessment, has placed the Government of Bombay in a

position of advantage as regards its ryots; and it now remains to be seen whether these rights of the Government will be given up in obedience to Sir Charles Wood's despatch of 1862, and the demands of sound policy. The limitation of the duration of future settlements to thirty years, inserted so pointedly in the Act of 1865, seems to indicate an intention to avoid a permanent settlement of the land revenue, but as yet no other indication of the views of Government on this important matter has been made public.

There is no doubt that a certain advantage of financial position is secured by retaining the power to revise and increase the land revenue from time to time, but it can hardly be esteemed a privilege to be the only part of India where such a power exists, as the temptation to draw upon a province so easily squeezed, must be hard to withstand.

On the other hand, we view the arguments for a permanent settlement of the land-revenues of India, brought forward in Sir Charles Wood's despatch of 1862, as incontrovertible, and only surpassed in exigency by the one based on the existence, in that despatch, of a solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government, on the strength of which English capital has been invested in the soil of India. But the great question of burdening the land with the cost of Government, that now agitates the mind of men at home in its application to Ireland or to India, is one that demands for its due consideration a separate article.

The only other provision of the Survey Act, which it is necessary to notice, is one for giving legal authority to a rule for preventing the sub-division of numbers. With few exceptions, a person was bound to take up, retain, or relinquish entire numbers, and no sub-occupancies were recognized by the revenue officers. The 45th Section of the Act lays down a similar rule for the guidance of all civil courts. There has not been time to ascertain the result of this enactment, but it appears simple and effective, and will probably be found to answer well.

The powers of a Collector for realizing the land-revenue were much the same as in other parts of India. If he anticipated any difficulty he would lay an embargo on the crop before it was reaped, and he could levy the revenue by distraint or imprisonment. The practice enjoined by the survey rules was to sell a portion of the defaulter's land, it being argued that his liabilities in future years being small would be more readily met, at the same time as his arrears for past years were discharged. But of late years in surveyed districts there have been no instance where recourse to such violent measures was necessary. The Collector's powers can be exercised on behalf

of a superior holder, with this great difference between the Bombay and Madras systems that, whereas in Madras the superior holder could himself distrain the tenant's goods and chattels, and hand them over to the Collector for sale, no such power was given by the Bombay law, under which the distraint, as well as the sale, was effected solely by the Collector.

By the Code of 1827, the Collector was vested with the powers of a civil court, with regard to all suits for (1) the possession of land; (2) tenures; (3) rent; (4) use of wells, tanks, water-courses, and roads and fields; (5) boundaries. And by Act XVI. of 1838, the cognizance of all suits regarding the possession and tenure of land was vested in the civil courts, the revenue courts having power only to give *ad interim* orders in cases of wrongful dispossession. By further legislation in 1865, suits for rent and water-rights were also transferred to the civil courts, and questions relating to boundaries are disposed of under the Survey Act. The civil jurisdiction of the Collector has therefore ceased to exist, and his power is limited to enforcing the payment of Government revenue for the current or former years, assisting landowners to collect their dues for the current year, and passing summary orders in disputes about possession. The difference in the position of Collectors in Bengal and Bombay will be noticed, and the freedom of the latter from all work of the nature known as "Act X. Suits." There is no doubt that if the judicial machinery is sound and strong enough, it is right that civil suits of all descriptions should be brought within its scope, and the separate semi-judicial "Revenue Courts" can only be viewed as a temporary makeshift, to be abolished in Bengal as in Bombay, so soon as the regular courts can undertake their proper functions.

The duty of hearing and deciding on claims to exemption from the payment of land-revenue, was also vested in the Collector by the Code of 1827, but like the duties of assessment have been transferred to a special department, but not with the same happy result. It was found that the Collectors were quite unable to carry out such a systematic and complete enquiry into titles as was considered advisable, and, about 1848, separate Enam Commissioners were appointed, who afterwards merged in the Alienation Department, established by Act XI. of 1852. By this all-powerful machinery, with complete control over all the extant public records of former dynasties, and a most intimate knowledge of every circumstance that could affect its inquiries, raised above the law, and presided over by officers, than whom none abler could be found, or

less liable to be moved by sympathy with any claim to exemption however old, if it failed to reach the prescribed standard of proof, an investigation into titles was carried on for years, till after the terrible events of 1857 it was thought necessary to abandon the measure, and to offer to all those, whose titles to exemption had not been adjudicated, the alternative of having their titles confirmed on payment of an annual quit-rent of one quarter of the then existing survey assessment. Considering the moderation of the existing assessments, it is not surprising that these terms were eagerly and readily accepted, as well as the further boon that was offered, of having the rent-free land declared freely saleable and transferable on payment of a sum of one sixteenth of the assessment. By this means a very considerable portion of the lands of Bombay has been permanently alienated and settled at quit-rents, varying from one quarter to one-half of the survey assessment; and the great value of these estates will be seen, when, at the close of the thirty years' settlement, the assessments on the surrounding Government lands are doubled or trebled.

We have thus attempted to explain in a short and general way the present state of the law affecting land-revenue in the Presidency of Bombay. Let us glance for a few moments at the position of a ryot or occupant of land, the assessment of which was settled twenty or twenty-five years ago. We will suppose him to have increased the value and size of his estate by improvements, and the purchase or grant of waste land, and that, instead of being worth two or three times the annual assessment, it is now, notwithstanding the shortness of the remainder of the lease, worth from thirty to forty times the assessment. When the settlement expires he will have the right of renewing it for whatever further period, not exceeding thirty years, the Government may offer, on the assessment which may after revision be imposed. Supposing, what can hardly be doubted, that the Government will give the same consideration to the owner's improvements made during the currency of former settlements, as they promise to those made after the passing of the Act, two points will remain for decision by the officers to whom the task of revision is entrusted. The *first* is to fix the proportionate shares of the increased value that is due to the owner's private capital and resources on the one hand, and to "general considerations" on the other;—and the *second* is to fix the duration of the new settlement. No one will fail to recognize the difficulty and importance of both those operations, and we shall look with great interest to any proceedings of the Government of Bombay

that may throw light on their intended policy. It is probable that Sir Bartle Frere has left on record for his successor's information, some expression of his own views, although in his place at the Council of India he will be in a better position to watch the progress of the revision.


There is one point connected with the passing of the Bombay Survey Act that cannot be overlooked. Large survey establishments, costing many lacs of rupees annually, have been at work for nearly thirty years, and it is understood that the survey and settlement of the whole Presidency (except Sind) will be completed in a very few years. It does not appear therefore, why, on the eve of the completion of the survey, a new and costly department was created and given a legal *status*. We have seen no paper that throws light on this point, and if it is intended, as may be presumed, to do away with the survey establishments when their work is done, it seems a pity that these administrative details were embodied in the Act, especially as the previous system had worked so well, and been so successful. We trust that it is not intended to maintain the Survey Department, for the revision of the assesment as the several settlements expire, a duty which the Survey Act does not in any way require to be done by survey officers, but which might be safely left to the Collectors who will, by that time, be relieved from the pressure of work caused by the breaking up of the Alienation Department, and able to turn their attention to the preparation of statistics for the new settlements. A system seems to have grown up in Bombay, by which all difficult questions, affecting land-revenue or a Collector's duties, are referred to the Survey Department, and while every document that we have seen bears witness to the admirable manner in which the officers at the head of that department perform the extraneous work thus thrust on them, as well as their own legitimate functions, it cannot be doubted that this system generates a want of self-confidence on the part of the regular officers of revenue; the effects of this may be to lessen, in some measure, the power of the Collectors to deal with general questions in a practical manner, but that feeling will soon wear off, and can afford no reasonable grounds for maintaining the costly Survey Department of Bombay, even if our finances were more flourishing than they are. The revision of the settlement (unless a fresh survey is required) is a duty that fairly belongs to a Collector, and we cannot be too much on our guard against yielding to the temptation that besets those entrusted with administration, of creating special departments with the object of ensuring that difficult questions shall be



placed before them by responsible and carefully selected persons in such a manner that reliance may be placed on their opinion, and thus relieving themselves of a laborious task. No one knows better than Sir Bartle Frere, or has better expressed the evils of centralizing by departments instead of by individuals, and we cannot avoid expressing some surprise that it should have fallen to his lot to pass a measure that created a separate department for the performance of duties, which, in all other parts of India, are under the control of the Board of Revenue.

We understand that the Bombay Survey Act has been extended to the province of Sind and to the district of North Canara, recently transferred from Madras to Bombay. In a former volume\* we have discussed the peculiar tenures of Canara, and it is to be hoped that the Bombay survey will succeed in settling this difficult country on a firm and equitable basis. It is desirable that some information regarding the progress of the survey there and in Sind could be afforded in the administration reports, or by the publication of official reports. At present the results are concealed from the public, who are almost as much interested in them as the Government.

\* See No. 42 for December, 1853



- ART. IV.—1. *Elphinstone's History of India*. 3rd edition. London, John Murray, Albemarle Street.
2. *Ayeen Akbery, or the Institutes of the Emperor Akbar*, translated by Francis Gladwin, Esq. In three volumes. Calcutta, 1786.
3. *Early Travels in India. Purchas's Pilgrimage*. Calcutta, Lepage & Co., 1864.
4. *Travels in the Mogul Empire*. By Francis Bernier, translated by Irving Brock. Calcutta, R. C. Lepage & Co.
5. *History of the Mahomedan Power in India till the year 1612, translated from the original Persian of Mahomed Kasim Ferishta*. By John Briggs, M.B.A.S. Lieutenant Colonel in the Madras Army. London, Longmans, 1829.
6. *Inde*, par M. Dubois de Jancigny et par M. Xavier Raymond. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.

OF the many thousands who visit every year the city of Agra, of the hundreds of thousands who poured into it last November to witness the splendours of the Viceregal reception, held, if not in the ancient halls of the Moguls, yet on the plains which surround their whilom capital, there must have been some at least, to whose imaginations the past, speaking out from marble tombs and deserted palaces, appealed with a force more than sufficient to drive away even the gorgeous spectacle of the present. There were few, we will hope, so unimaginative, upon whose spirits the aspect of by-gone grandeur, so plainly visible in the great buildings of Agra and its vicinity, did not make some impression. To a large majority of yearly visitors, indeed, in a greater or less degree, as they survey the splendid ruins of Futtehpoore Sikree, or the marble halls of the magnificent palace in the Fort, whence the edicts of the Emperor gave law from Affghanistan on the

north-west to the extremities of Bengal to the eastward, whence he ruled Cashmire and administered even some portions of the Dekkan, this question must always present itself: "Who were these great sovereigns, these mighty monarchs, whose names are still household words among the Mahomedans of Hindostan, and the greatness of whose conceptions is evident to us by these magnificent monuments, by these splendid palaces, at which, we, natives of another continent, claiming for ourselves almost a monopoly of civilization, can gaze only with mixed wonder and delight? Who and what were these men? What means did they employ, to conquer, to administer, to raise these lasting monuments of their sway?"

Who were these men? Who, at least, was the chiefest and greatest amongst them? The answer is to be found in the very name of the city, in which the idea first occurs to the enquirer. Agra is but the old Hindoo designation of the once capital of the empire of the Moguls. Under their dynasty it received another and a more significant name,—a name that told the world who he was that had made it great, who had raised it from the lowly position of a Hindoo village to the proud elevation of capital of Hindostan. That name was Akbarabad, the city of Akbar,—of Akbar, the glory of the Moguls.

It is not our intention, on this occasion, to enter into a history of the place which Akbar thus delighted to honour,—though that is a task which has never yet been attempted, and which loudly calls for a historian,—nor do we propose even to offer a detailed account of the exciting events of the reign of that great monarch,—each of them demanding long and patient investigation. Be it rather ours to examine the system which succeeded so well with him personally, to glance at the principles by an adherence to which he built up, in a few years, a mighty empire,—an empire which he transmitted intact to his son, and which he fondly hoped would descend as a complete inheritance to his latest posterity.

We are the more encouraged to take this view, because it is beyond question that whether we regard the liberality of his views, his love of justice, his care for his subjects, none of the monarchs who reigned over Hindostan ever approached Akbar; because likewise if we compare him with contemporary European sovereigns, he gains immensely by the comparison. So highly indeed are his elevation of mind, his freedom from prejudice, his grand conceptions considered even in the present day in the West, that his system of administration has been referred to as that which his English successors empire of Hindostan ought to study and follow. "Those

who rule in India," wrote to us not long since an illustrious statesman, "should take lessons from Alexander and Akbar."

Jeellal-ood-deen Mahomed Akbar, the grandson of Baber and seventh in descent from Tamerlane, eldest son of the Emperor Humayun and his wife Hamyda-Bénou-Begum, was born on the 14th October, 1542, at Amerkôt in the valley of the Indus. It was as an exile, and amid the inhospitable sands of an arid desert that he first saw light. His father Humayun, though he had succeeded peacefully to the inheritance of Baber, had, after ten years of almost constant warfare, finally succumbed, in 1540, to the superior strategy and influence of Shir Khan Sûr, and having been defeated in a decisive battle on the Ganges near Canooj, had fled for his life to Lahore. Humayun, however, was doomed to experience the truth of the apothegm, that gratitude is but a sense of favours to come. It has but little respect for the past. A fugitive and helpless, all chance of recovering power seeming impossible, he found himself everywhere an unwelcome guest. From Lahore he fled to Sinde, thence, after some fruitless attempts to possess himself of Bukkar and Sebwan, to Jodhpore in Central India. Repulsed here, and fearing to be delivered up to the great antagonist of his family, Shir Shah, he attempted to make his way to Amerkôt, a fort in the eastern desert of Sinde. The horrors that attended his march to that place can scarcely be exaggerated. "Before he quitted the inhabited country," says Elphinstone, "the villagers repelled all approaches to their water which was to them a precious possession; and it was not without a conflict and bloodshed that his followers were able to slake their thirst." But in the desert itself they had to endure greater sufferings than these. Sometimes it was absolute want of water, sometimes it was the attack of enemies. Exhausted and debilitated, suffering the horrors of thirst in all their terrible reality, one by one his followers succumbed. When at last he came in sight of Amerkôt but seven of his party remained alive. - Even then he was haunted by the fear that the chief of that place, who was a Brahmin, would refuse him admittance,—a refusal, which, in his case, would have been equivalent to death in its worst form. The reply, however, was happily favourable, and he was saved.

Not many weeks after his arrival, Jeellal-ood-deen Mahomed Akbar was born. So straitened were his father's fortunes that, instead of the costly presents to his friends, customary on the birth of an heir to the house of Timour, he distributed amongst them his solitary possession, one pod of musk, accompanying the gift,

however, with the significant wish that like the odour of that perfume, so might his son's fame be diffused throughout the world.\*

It can well be imagined that the youth of one so highly bred, and born in circumstances so lowly, should be indeed stormy. The delights of ruling, once enjoyed, could never in those days be lightly given up; and even Humayun, abandoned by all but by his Hindoo protector, still dreamed of the palaces of Delhi and the lost sceptre of Hindostan. The thirteen years that followed the birth of Akbar were thus years of incessant warfare. The young prince may truly be said to have been bred up in arms. He was scarcely three years old when he was exposed to a hostile fire under the walls of Cabul. Thrice, before he had lived ten years, was he the prisoner of his uncles, bitterly hostile to his father and to himself. But freeing himself in 1551, after the final defeat of his uncle Kamran in that year, he joined his father, placed himself under his orders, and finally accompanied him in that triumphant march, which commencing at Cabul in January, 1555, and culminating in June with a great victory over Secunder Sûr at Sirhind, terminated in the autumn in the capture of Delhi, and the restoration of Humayun to his ancestral throne. A few months later Humayun died, and his newly recovered territory, still bleeding from the contests for its possession, devolved upon his son Akbar, then but a few months over thirteen years old.

When this event occurred Akbar was in the Punjab. He had been sent thither shortly after the defeat of Secunder Sûr at Sirhind,—a battle in which he had so distinguished himself, and so greatly by his example animated his soldiers that, it is said, “they had forgotten that they were mortal.” There had accompanied him, nominally as his second in command, but really as his tutor and adviser, Behrâm Khan, a Turcoman by birth, distinguished for his talents, and whose fidelity to the cause of the legitimate representative of the House of Timour had been proved upon many a battle-field. On hearing of the death of Humayun, Akbar at once assumed all the ensigns of royalty. He found, however, that he had entered at best upon a disputed inheritance. Almost simultaneously with his accession to the throne, there came the news of the loss of Cabul and a great part of Afghanistan; scarcely later the startling intelligence reached him that Hému, the Hindoo General of the last representative of the House of Sûr, had taken

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\* Elphinstone.

Agra and Delhi, and was preparing to consummate his victories by a march into the Punjab. Behrām Khan, however, was equal to the occasion. Accompanied by the youthful Emperor, himself eager for the contest, he marched in the direction of Delhi, encountered Hému at Paniput,—the second great battle of that name,—utterly defeated and took him prisoner. After the battle we meet with a striking trait in the character of the young prince. Behrām had doomed Hému to death, and he wished that the prince should earn the title of “Champion of the Faith,” by striking the first blow at one whom he deemed an infidel. But Akbar refused to strike a wounded enemy. He was deaf alike to the persuasions as to the entreaties of his General. And it was with a grief which his tender age prevented him from showing more openly, that he beheld the irritated Behrām strike off the captive’s head with his own hand, exclaiming as he did so, “Ill-timed compassion will lose you an empire.”

We must bestow but a cursory notice on the military achievements that followed, singling out those only for special notice, which serve to cast some ray of light on the character of our hero. The defeat of Hému had restored to Akbar the cities of Delhi and Agra, and had left him leisure to turn his undivided attention to the troops of Secunder Sûr, then threatening him in the Punjab. A campaign of eight months sufficed to quell this uprising, to deprive the insurgent leader of his strongest fortress, and to force him to retire to Bengal, to which the House of Sûr considered that they possessed a hereditary right. During this period, however, the virtual ruler was Behrām Khan. Akbar was still too young to take upon himself administrative functions, and he deemed it still prudent to submit himself to the counsels of one who was at least devoted to his dynasty and to his person. Nor can it be denied that the severe, stern, and resolute sway of the Turcoman nobleman was eminently adapted for troublous times. When, however, by the submission of the country a merciful and consolidating policy had become desirable, and the counsels and conduct of Behrām still ran on in a course of stern and vindictive cruelty; when Behrām himself, ignoring the rising intellect of the young Prince, still continued to treat him as a dependent and a nonentity, the cry of the country to be rid of a policy of severity and sequestration found an involuntary echo in the inmost thoughts of its monarch. Akbar, however, was pre-eminently of a noble and generous disposition. Behrām had adhered to his father in all his calamities; he had bound

his fortunes to his own, when his green youth prevented the possibility of his making head alone against the storms that threatened him. Even at this time he did not doubt that the very faults which called forth the complaints of his nobles were the result of a too great zeal for his dynasty. Soon, however, he came to find that he would have to choose between his people and his minister. The persecution of private individuals, their banishment, often even their death, at the instance, often by the sole orders of Behràm, caused a mistrust and discontent amongst the people, which even Akbar would soon have found it difficult to allay. Not even the most intimate friends of the king were safe against the minister's vengeance. Behràm in fact was virtually king, exercising his authority in a manner that tended to alienate the affection of the people from the rule of the Moguls. Once convinced of the dangerous tendencies of his minister's administration, Akbar felt that it was necessary for him to act promptly. He accordingly proceeded unexpectedly to Delhi, and issued an edict announcing his resolution to govern henceforth by himself, and enjoining on all the great officers of the empire to obey no orders but his own. Behràm, on his part, sensible of his helplessness in such a position, endeavoured first to mollify the king. But Akbar felt that it was better for him to be no longer connected with one who had so long enjoyed the sweets of power, and who had so misused its possession. He answered Behràm's submissiveness, therefore, by an exhortation to him to retire from power, and to seek, in a pilgrimage to Mecca, forgetfulness of the troubles and fatigues of a political career.

The sequel of this episode gives us another insight into that particular feature of Akbar's character, which tended so much to his success. Behràm appeared to comply with the requisition, but proceeding towards the Punjab raised the standard of revolt. Akbar marched against him, totally defeated him, and pursued him with such vigour, that he was forced to throw himself on the mercy of the Emperor. In those old days,—days in which stern retribution was considered to be the right, almost the duty of a conqueror,—when bloodshedding amongst competitors for power was a normal state of affairs,—an ordinary man would have at once ridded himself of so valiant a rebel. He indeed, who should have sentenced him to simple death without torture or deprivation of sight, would have been considered merciful. But Akbar was no ordinary man. He abhorred the shedding of blood in itself, still more especially deliberate slaughter, and his heart was sensible to noble and generous impulses to a degree that is uncommon even in this civilized

nineteenth century. He could not endure the idea even of wounding the *amour propre*, or of lowering the pride of one, who, though he had slighted his orders and defied his authority, had once been his guardian and his friend. Instead, therefore, of receiving Behràm as a conquered enemy, he met him as his old comrade,—as one whom he delighted to honour. He sent his nobles to meet him, seated him on his right hand, and bestowed upon him a dress of honour. Having proved his own ability and felt his power, he no longer even hesitated to offer him employment and honours. Behràm, however, wisely reverted to the idea of a pilgrimage to Mecca. He was accordingly honourably conducted to Goozerat, but when about to embark thence for Arabia, he was stabbed by an Affghan, whose father, years before, had been killed by his orders.

With the removal of Behràm from office there began the real contest for empire rather than the reign of Akbar. He was then scarcely eighteen years old, but he had been raised in the best of schools,—the school of adversity. His personal appearance must have been very prepossessing. He is described as strongly built and handsome, delighting in the chase and manly exercises, but never so happy as when an occasion presented itself to indulge in acts of generosity and benevolence. His manners were most fascinating, and he always comported himself as a monarch. From prejudices, even from religious prejudices, he was absolutely free. To his love of justice and the means he took to enforce it we shall refer further on.

His task after the death of Behràm was no light one. Even then he was little more than chief among his nobles. Succeeding as he did to an empire won by force of arms, there was then no check but the power of the strongest to the action of individual ambition. The idea of services rendered, of personal acts of valour; the consciousness likewise of abilities;—all tended to hold out to a man in those days of despotism, illimitable visions of power. Akbar thus found that, even in the ranks of his own victorious army, there were men who needed the lesson he had given to Behràm before they would be content to acknowledge him as the master whom they were bound to obey. It took him seven years to read them this lesson,—so in fact to found his authority that his simple *fiat* should be regarded as a decree that must be carried out. Many were the contests with rebellious nobles and corrupt administrators within that period; but it was not less the clemency of the king after each victory than his energy, his valour and activity during the campaign, that tended to his ultimate success. Magnanimity on the



part of a conqueror appeals with irresistible force to those instincts from which there are few natures so base as to be absolutely free. But at the age of twenty-five he was in reality master. Then it was that he determined to attempt the execution of the scheme that had been long maturing in his mind,—a scheme prompted by a noble ambition,—the desire of consolidating the various kingdoms of Hindostan into one great empire, so governed by sound and equal laws that a contented people would always be ready to rise up as one man against a foreign invader. For such a task there has seldom been born one more qualified than Akbar. An instinctive sense of right added to a profound judgment, a liberality based upon the truest kind of charity, a consummate knowledge of character, and a power of influencing others, combined with activity, courage, and great military ability to fit him for the work of conquering and consolidating an empire.

The first step was to establish his authority in the territories he had acquired. This, we have seen, he had accomplished. The second, to conquer the ancient dominions of the crown,—to make them solid, compact, and self-adhering. With this object in view he first turned his arms to the great country of the Rajpoots,—Rajpootana,—with the rulers of parts of which,—notably with the Rajah of Jaipore,—who himself, his son and his grandson, held commands in the imperial army,—he was in alliance. Oodypore alone had the hardihood to resist his army. But though Chittore, the then capital, was stormed, the Rana himself, and after his death, his gallant son, Rana Pertab, refused submission to, and alliance with, the Emperor. All the other states of Rajpootana, however, recognised his authority. That once recognised, attachment to his person and his dynasty always succeeded. The reason was that his enlightened principles followed in the track of his army. No sooner had opposition to his authority ceased, than the wise laws ensuring justice and toleration to all, healed the wounds which conquest had opened, and reconciled populations to his sway. He knew no respect of persons. The Hindoo had an equal chance with the Mahomedan for the great offices of State. The gorgeous temple stood side by side with the graceful mosque,—monuments of his toleration. Nay, to such an extent did he carry his wise liberality, that when, in pursuance of policy, he married two Rajpoot princesses, the daughters of the Rajas of Jaipore and Meywar, he built for their use, within the fort of Agra, an edifice in the style and architecture of the Hindoos, adorned with the emblems which they held sacred and suited for the performance of their worship. To avoid, however, giving

occasion of offence to his Mahomedan subjects, the building was designed so as in its exterior to have all the appearance of a mosque.

The tone of the government of Akbar at this period, and the manner in which it was regarded by the Hindoos themselves, is best illustrated by a letter which one of the princes of Rajpootana addressed to his great grandson, Aurungzebe, on the occasion of the imposition by the latter of a religious tax,—the *Jezia*, or Poll-tax on infidels, which Akbar had abolished. “Your royal ancestor, *Jeellad-ood-deen Akbar*,” wrote the Hindoo prince, “whose throne is now in heaven, “conducted the affairs of this empire for fifty years with “firmness and justice, watching over the tranquility and happiness of all classes of his subjects, whether they were followers “of Jesus, of Moses, or of Mahomed; whether they were Hindoos, “or materialists, or believers in accident or chance. All enjoyed, “to the same degree, his favour and protection; and thence it is “that the various populations under his rule, in gratitude for his “paternal care, have decreed to him the title of ‘Benefactor of “‘Mankind.’” When we reflect that this letter, written by one of an opposite belief to that of Akbar, was addressed, many years after his demise, to the bigoted greatgrandson in whose eyes it must have appeared the strongest condemnation of his ancestor, we cannot refuse our belief in the genuine feeling which prompted it, or in the reality of the sentiments it ascribes to the great Emperor. Can we too not glean from it this great lesson, illustrated as it is by the careers of the tolerant great grandfather and his fanatical descendant,—the last of whom imperilled and lost for his descendants by that unyielding fanaticism all that the first had gained for them by his liberality,—that the twin sisters, tolerance and charity, are the true foundation on which alone can rest an edifice that is to endure?

Most certainly in the case of Akbar this broad and liberal policy bore rich fruits. The admission of Hindoos,—strangers in race and alien in religion,—to the command of his armies, to the government of his provinces, concurrently with Mahomedans, acquired for his government the confidence of the entire Hindoo community. To the Raja of Jaipore, Man Singh, Akbar was indebted for some of his most brilliant triumphs. It was a Hindoo minister, *Todar Mull*, who introduced that financial system which bears his name. Under his advice, Akbar lightened the burdens that weighed upon agriculture; he abolished the capitation tax upon the Hindoos, a tax upon meetings for the performance of religious ceremonies, and very

many other imposts that pressed more especially upon the poorer portion of the population. But the Emperor did more even than that. Finding that great hardship resulted to the agricultural interests, as well as loss to the revenue, from the absence of a fixed principle upon which to levy the land-tax, he, after the most careful enquiry, took the average of the rates of collection for the ten years between the fifteenth and twenty-fourth year of his reign, and fixed that as a permanent settlement for the ten years to come. On all his officers he enjoined strict integrity, justice, and consideration. His instructions to his collectors of revenue, on whose judgment and discretion so much was depending, deserve to be recorded: "The collector "must consider himself," we extract from the Institutes of Akbar, a work compiled under the Emperor's direction by his able minister, Abul Fazil, "the immediate friend of the husbandman, be "diligent in business, and a strict observer of truth, being the "representative of the Chief Magistrate. He must transact his "business in a place to which every one may find easy access, "without requiring any go-between." \* \* \* \* His "conduct must be such as to give no cause for complaint. "He must assist the needy husbandman with loans of money, "and receive payment at distant and convenient periods. When "any village is cultivated to the highest degree of perfection, "by the skilful management of the head thereof, there shall be "bestowed upon him half a *biswah* out of every *beegah* of land, "or some other reward porportionate to his merit. \* \* \* "Let him learn the character of every husbandman, and be the "immediate protector of that class of subjects. \* \* \* \* "Let him promote the cultivation of such articles as will pro- "duce general profit and utility, with a view to which, he may "allow some remission from the general rate of collection. \* \* \* "In every instance he must endeavour to act to the satisfaction "of the husbandman."—We might make more extracts to the same purport. Throughout his Institutes, indeed, there breathes the same spirit,—an emphatic love of justice, a desire for the welfare, not of one particular class only of his subjects, but of the entire people, a determination to lighten, as much as possible, the burden of taxation, to eliminate from it every element of, or excuse for, oppression, thus welding the people into one great family, to each member of which was accorded perfect liberty of conscience, entire freedom of action within the limits of the laws.

But Akbar's great scheme comprehended something much more than the enforcement of rigid justice, and the assurance of complete tolerance to his subjects. He encouraged literature,

the arts, and sciences. Every labour which depended upon intelligence met with his full and hearty support. He appears to have felt that the great and certain end of education was to free mankind from every sort of prejudice. His intimate friend, Feizi, a Mahomedan, devoted himself to the study of Hindoo literature and science, to an enquiry into every branch of the knowledge of the Brahmins. The same nobleman translated the four Gospels into Persian. Akbar received and honourably treated at his court Christian missionaries. A Christian priest, called Padre Farábatún was invited thither expressly to undertake the instruction in the Greek language of some Mahomedan youths. Schools of every sort were encouraged, devoted with admirable impartiality to Hindoo and Mahomedan literature, and to these the youth of both religions were invited, to receive "education according to their circumstances and particular "views in life." The Court itself was a rendezvous for men famed for their accomplishments and literary knowledge.

It was impossible for Akbar, however, to devote, during the first twenty years of his reign, as much leisure as he could wish to the development of the arts and sciences. He had before him that task without which, he believed, his work,—the great work of his lifetime,—would be incomplete,—the welding into one empire of all the peoples of Hindostan. Many of the earlier years of his reign therefore were spent in warfare. To enter into the details of this warfare is not necessary for our purpose ; it will suffice if we give only the results. In 1573, he conquered Goozrat. Three years later he proceeded against the descendants of the Affghan family of Shir Shah Sûr in Bengal. Here, after a desperate contest, he succeeded in establishing his government in 1577 ; but it was not till 1592 that he definitively annexed that rich province to the empire. In the interval, he had crushed the rebellion of his brother Mirza Hakim, in Cabul,—extending, as was his wont, on its conclusion, pardon to the revolted prince,—and had succeeded in conquering Cashmire, even then known as the Paradise of Hindostan. Soon after he was engaged in a terrible conflict with the inhabitants of the Eusafzie country, who gave him more trouble than all his other opponents. In the course of the campaign his army met with some most severe checks, and several of his most valued officers were slain. Amongst them Rajáh Bír Bal, so well known to posterity for his wit and conversational powers, whose loss was severely felt by the Emperor. In the end, these daring mountaineers were humbled, though never absolutely subdued. From 1587 to 1592 he was engaged in establishing his authority in the basin of the Indus, in West Affghanistan and its immediate

dependencies. Finally he turned his arms against those kingdoms of the Dekkan, which had rejected his overtures and refused to submit to his authority. His lieutenants, however, were handled so severely in this campaign, that the Emperor was compelled, in 1599, to repair in person to the spot; the fall of Ahmednugger, soon after his arrival, and of Aseergurh some months later, broke up all the plans of the enemy, and enabled the Emperor to return triumphantly to Agra in the spring of 1601.

Thus then was completed the outer shell of the Empire of Akbar. All Hindostan, from Cashmire to beyond the Nerbudda, from Assam to the Suleyman range, obeyed his law. With the exception of the Dekkan, his empire may be said to have been consolidated in 1592. This monarch, whose justice, whose wisdom, whose care for his people, have passed into a proverb, had then the opportunity for which he had striven so long,—the opportunity of so promoting the happiness of his people, of so instructing his nobles, of so clearly demonstrating to all the advantages of his system, that the empire, founded on a basis so solid, might endure to his latest posterity.

Undoubtedly he did accomplish great things. An admirable system of justice, a contented population, entire religious freedom, an unstinted support of the arts and sciences, with a view to their being employed for the development of the country, an universal system of education, free and open to all, irrespective of religion or creed;—these were undoubtedly great blessings;—blessings which the European nations of that day were free from enjoying. Compare Akbar with his European contemporaries. Compare the enlightened Mahomedan of Hindostan who shrunk from blood and executions, with the sovereigns of our own England, who lived during the same period. Compare him with the ferocious Henry the 8th, the selfish and ambitious regents, Somerset and Northumberland, with bloody Mary! Contrast the universal tolerance of Hindostan with the fires of Smithfield! Even Elizabeth herself would suffer by the comparison. The decapitation of Essex stands in no favourable light by the side of the pardon of Behràm, while the feeling which prompted the death of the Queen of Scots could never have arisen in the spirit of the man who condoned the rebellion of his brother. Look again at France, for fifty years of the same period under the despicable government of the most contemptible of men,—the three last sovereigns of the House of Valois; at Spain, then the leading State of Europe, crushed and trampled upon by the brutal bigotry of Philip the 2nd. What a contrast do the two names present! Had the enlightened Akbar succeeded to the

throne of Charles V. who can doubt that that great country would have taken a foremost place in all that nourishes the vitality and tends to the advancement of a nation; that she would never have known the degraded position to which she has now fallen?

He must have been no ordinary man who, thus, virtually making himself master of Hindostan,—for he can scarcely be said to have inherited it,—so fashioned his own conduct, so impressed his ideas upon those about him, that he brought it to the pitch of excellence we have described,—so greatly, so far greatly in advance of his European contemporaries. In reading the account of the results of his administration, and in perusing those Institutes inspired by his spirit and his genius, it is impossible for us not to withhold our full and free consent to the opinion already referred to, and to say: “Not India only but every “country in the world should be ruled on the principles of Akbar.”

And yet we are forced to admit that the vast fabric which he raised, beautiful in so many points, possessing in itself such varied perfections, wonderful if we regard it, as we ought, as the work of a despotic sovereign three hundred years ago, contained nevertheless within itself the certain germ of failure. We allude not to the vast extent of empire. Adding immensely as this did, especially in that rude age, to the difficulty of the ruler, it was yet not the fatal worm which gnawed at the very root of the mighty fabric. If we admit that the principles of Akbar were based on the soundest ideas of humanity and justice; that he did indeed ensure the happiness of his subjects; that he encouraged institutions which, if persisted in, would have roused their better instincts, we must still admit that there was one thing wanting, and that the want was fatal as well to the excellence, as to the success of the system. The fault was this,—that he himself was the keystone of the arch which he had raised. Take away the keystone, and all the materials, rich and valuable as they were, lost at once their coherent power. The weak point of the system, in fact, was this;—that every thing centred in Akbar; that though, so long as he survived to control and carry it out, it succeeded admirably, it was liable to succumb and fall with his demise. In a word, it was not in the power of this Akbar to decree that he should be succeeded by a second Akbar,—by a man equal to himself in liberality, in love of justice, in the power of influencing his fellow-men. Granting that his principles were the principles which the governing power in Hindostan ought always to follow, yet his system provided no security that they would be carried out by his successors. His subjects

in fact possessed no guarantee, no certainty of belief that on his death oppression would not take the place of justice, or that liberality and order would not be displaced by bigotry and misrule. It was, as we have said, a system that centred and was bound up in, the life of Akbar.

Some idea of this must have flitted occasionally before the mind of the great sovereign of Hindostan before he quitted the scene in which his own beneficence had reaped triumphs and victories so rare. The affection and partiality of a parent could not have entirely blinded his eyes to the vicious propensities of the son who was destined to be his successor, to whose care he would have to resign those numerous peoples, whose material interests he himself had watched so tenderly. More than once a rebel against the paternal authority, pardoned, as Akbar was wont to pardon all enemies, Selim had nevertheless continued to show such an absolute viciousness of temperament, that even his friends could not contemplate his succession without dismay. When he ordered a man who had offended him to be flayed alive, to the horror of his father, Akbar might well ask himself whether such a man could fit in as the keystone of his arch, as the supporter and maintainer of his system. The result showed how fatal was the defect inherent in that system. Although under his immediate successors, Jehangire and Shah Jehan, the empire, which he virtually founded, maintained, in a great measure, its outward form of grandeur; yet the government of his greatgrandson, the bigoted Aurungzebe,—himself in all his conceptions the very opposite of Akbar,—dealt it a blow from which it sickened and died. We might even go further with respect to its internal advancement. That indeed ceased with Akbar.

When, therefore, we are told that India ought to be ruled on the principles of Akbar, we ought to beware of confounding the immortal principles which it was his glory to have initiated three hundred years ago with the system which, it seems, it was impossible for him to avoid. Though we may admire ever so much those principles, we should take heed ere we called even for an Akbar,—with the system indispensable to an Akbar,—to put them into action. Under the circumstances of such a rule, viewed even in its most favourable light, the country may indeed attain temporarily to a very high degree of prosperity, its material interests may be well cared for, the intellectual life of its people fostered and stimulated, but it is impossible that it can last. Sooner or later the inevitable hour will arrive when sensuality and tyranny take the place of government and just administration to such an extent, that the last state of the people

becomes even worse than the first. It was the system of which Akbar but an accident that led to those devastating wars which ravaged India for a hundred years—which impoverished her people, threw her back in the scale of civilization, until in the beginning of the nineteenth century she was far behind the nations whom she had immeasurably surpassed in the seventeenth.

Far be it from us to affirm that Akbar himself was responsible for such a result. It was his glory that, in spite of the despotic system which was then inevitable, he laid the foundations of his government so firmly, that though they were often shaken, sometimes much loosened, his dynasty continued to rest upon them for nearly an hundred and sixty years after his death.\* The system, however, is incompatible with human progress. It failed in Europe as much as it failed in Asia. It ruined the Stewarts of England and the Bourbons of France. In Hindostan it led by certain steps to the predominance of the strongest and the government of the sword.

Need we contrast such a government with that under which we are all living,—a government which, however it may fall off in some respects, at least offers to the people the material advantages presented by that of Akbar, whilst it is free from the death-warrant of an ephemeral existence? Is not the certain conviction that such blessings as universal toleration, an equal administration of justice, perfect equality in the eye of the law, a discriminating taxation, are not dependent upon the life of one man, but are fixed and settled institutions which governors cannot arbitrarily alter,—is not such a conviction a real boon and a solid consolation even to those who would naturally prefer a native dynasty? We know that a very eminent European writer, who travelling in the disguise of an Asiatic, associated with Asiatics on terms of equality, and who thus came to hear and to learn their real sentiments, has lately told the world that the natives of India would prefer a bad native, to the best European, government. It is possible that this may be so. It is probable, we think, that among the ignorant and the bigoted, the superstitious and the unlettered, some such idea may prevail. But it is impossible that it can have any *locus standi* amongst those who, availing themselves of the advantages which education has placed within their reach, have studied the history of their country. These cannot but see that a system which requires an Akbar to be its prop cannot possibly have any permanent vitality. It is not every year that an Akbar comes into the world. It

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\* Elphinstone dates the extinction of the Mogul empire from the third battle of Paniput in 1761,



is but once in a thousand years that such a man is born on the footsteps of a throne. Can the advantage of being governed by such a prince, great as he was undoubtedly, be weighed in the balance against the two centuries of misgovernment that followed his demise?

It is not perhaps surprising that those who have had no personal experience of misgovernment and but little of oppression;—who have never suffered from the exactions of military licence or from the ruthless tyranny of court favourites, should point to the reign of Akbar as an indication of the sort of governor which Hindustan, if left to itself, would produce. But it is impossible to base any sound argument on the administration of but one man out of many. We cannot sever the man from the system. That system gave India Akbar, but it gave it also Aurungzebe, and the successors of Aurungzebe. It is certain that the effect of the measures of Aurungzebe was to loosen the bonds of union, which the wisdom and liberality of Akbar had knit together to form his empire. It is too a remarkable fact, and one which we must never lose sight of, tending as it does to show the retrograde and debasing effect of despotism on the human mind, that the bigotry of Aurungzebe endeared him far more to his Mahomedan co-religionists than did the liberality of Akbar; and that even in the present day, it is the memory of Aurungzebe, the persecutor, far more than that of Akbar, the beneficent, that Mahomedan writers delight to honour.

We admit, indeed we glory in admitting, that there was much, very much in the conduct and the sentiments of Akbar that is worthy of the earnest attention of the present rulers of Hindostan. Many of his precepts they have already literally followed. In this respect, indeed, they may be regarded as his legitimate successors. Far more than any of the native sovereigns who came after him have they endeavoured to emulate his liberality, his toleration, his encouragement of education, his hatred of tyranny and oppression. In some respects they may not have acted up to the greatness of his mighty conceptions. An impartial observer, noting what he did and what they have attempted, could not fail to be struck with the fact that, whereas Akbar was able, within a very short period of his reign, to conciliate the complete confidence and regard of his Hindoo subjects, those feelings with respect to the English have been but of slow and tardy growth. Nor is this difference to be explained by the assertion that in the case of Akbar it was a native governing natives. Akbar in Hindostan was almost as much a foreigner as we are. "Of all the dynasties that had yet

“ruled in India,” writes Elphinstone in his account of the reign of Akbar, “that of Tamerlane was the weakest and most insecure in its foundations. The houses of Ghazni and Ghor depended on their native kingdom which was contiguous to their Indian conquest; and the slave dynasties were supported by the continual influx of their countrymen; but, though Baber had been in some measure naturalised in Cabul, yet the separation of that country under Camran had broken its connection with India, and the rival of an Affghan dynasty turned the most warlike part of its inhabitants, as well as of the Indian Mussulmans, into enemies. *The only adherents of the house of Tamerlane were a body of adventurers, whose sole bond of union was their common advantage during success.*” How was it then that this foreigner, with his body of adventurers to support him, succeeded in that particular point in which we have so generally failed, *viz.*, in conciliating the affection of the people? We believe that the reason simply was, that he did not give all the offices in the State to that body of adventurers. He had, on the contrary, Hindoos to command his armies and to govern his provinces. He made as little distinction on account of nationality as of creed. Had a satrap misgoverned a province in his time, as the Raja of Mysore misgoverned Mysore in our own, Akbar would undoubtedly have displaced that Raja, but he would have sent a Dinkur Rao to succeed him. It would thus have been impossible to misconstrue his motives, or to accuse him of lust of territory or of tyranny. It is true that we profess to be animated by the same motives; that we declare it to be our sole object to educate the natives of this country to self-government; it is a fact that by slow but gradual steps they are being admitted to the higher offices of the State. And we conscientiously believe, however it may seem to some who may think our steps too slow, too uncertain, sometimes even retrograde, that this is the real tendency of our Government. The result depends mainly, if not entirely, on the progress made by the people of Hindostan. We cannot doubt that one great reason which prompted Akbar to confer the high offices of State upon Hindoos was on account of the greater ability, the stricter integrity, that they displayed. But the world is advanced much now since the days of Akbar. The successors of the adventurers who followed Clive are better administrators than the adventurers who followed the son of Humayun. It is for the people of Hindostan to point the moral. Let them show themselves in all things capable; let them cast aside those prejudices which weigh them down with the weight of ignorant

ages ; let them show themselves as enlightened as the most enlightened monarch of Hindostan, and it is certain that they will then no longer have to complain that India is not, even in this respect, governed on the principles of Akbar.

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## ART. V.—NATIVE GOVERNMENT IN NATIVE STATES.

UNLIKE the Roman and the Mogul empires, the continent of India, when under its Hindu kings, never enjoyed the blessing of one ruling authority as the master of the whole country and the director of the destinies of all Hindus as one people. Hence it is the Hindu scripture, the Vedas, the Dursanas, the Upanishadas, the Shmruti, and the Puranás, are differently read and interpreted, and the numerous religious sects that have come into existence since the last two thousand years, *viz.*, the deists, nationalists, monotheists, atheists, not to speak of such subdivisions as Shyvas, Sháktas, Gánapatyas, Shouras, and Vyshnavas, have all been the great obstacle to the development of everything Hindu but the Sanskrita language, which, with the primitive Aryans inhabiting the different parts of India, had been the universally spoken tongue, though variously pronounced and accented by the people of the different provinces. The Syumbhaha, or primitive Manu, who is described as the author and dictator of the Hindu Laws, both social and religious, must have lived at a time when there was only one king to govern a limited number of Hindus confined but to one province of the country. But as the Aryan family increased in numbers and spread over the distant parts of the continent of India, they set up different kings to rule over them, and different legislators and commentators to frame laws and regulations best suited to the requirements of their respective countries. The same Hindu law of inheritance, which provides for the son the heirship to his father's property in Northern and Central India, would debar him from this natural right in the Dekkan, whilst it would entitle him to the inheritance of his maternal uncle's property after his demise to the disappointment of the son. In cases of marriage the anomaly of the law is the same, if not greater, with a certain class of Brahmans in the Dekkan and in the hill territories of Kámoon and Gurhwal, where it is lawful to remarry the widow of one's elder brother after the

decease of her husband; but which practice would be at once condemned as un-Hindu and irrational in the countries between the Ganges and the Nerbada. The original institutes of Manu are the same, but the commentators, Kulluka and others, have put different interpretations on the code used in different parts of the country in conformity, perhaps, to the customs then prevalent in the Hill States, the Dekkan, and Hindustan proper. The kings of the different branches of the Solar and Lunar dynasties, who parcelled out the territories of India amongst themselves, and settled in distant parts of the country, thus became independent in their respective dominions from the beginning; and, partly from the jealousy of their neighbours, partly out of inclination arising from peculiar education, mode of thought, constitution, climate, and the external features of their countries, partly from the influence of their courtiers and the current of public opinion then prevalent in their States, each chief became anxious to hand down his name to posterity, and to surpass his contemporaries by the support or introduction of some new system, either in the administration of government, the framing of laws, the expounding of a philosophical doctrine, or the introduction of a new religion into his own country. And thus the Aryan Hindus, descended from one common stock, speaking one language, and professing one religion, became constitutionally as distinct a people from each other as the several sects of Christians inhabiting the continent of Europe. The Hindu name, once as mighty as the Greek or the Roman in comparatively later times, and by many degrees superior to either in wealth and intelligence, became gradually weak and divided in strength as the society grew older, and thus commenced the undermining of the great fabrics of unity and nationality, the sources of the power and strength of a nation.

The world's history and the history of the different nations that inhabit it must prove beyond a question that domestic discord either in the administration of a government or the profession of religion, in every clime and country, has proved fatal to the cause of a nation's independence or advancement. And India, the earliest advanced country in the world,—a country which had always led the van of civilization and intelligence in the Eastern Hemisphere,—first became a prey to the domestic rivalry consequent upon divided authority. We may hear of imperial rulers as having swayed the sceptre from the Himalayas to the islands in the Indian Ocean, but a Chandragupta and Vikramaditya had, owing to the constitution of the Hindu society, and the first principles of government then recognised in the country, suffered themselves to be represented in the remote

parts of their dominions by dependent but actual kings, while contenting themselves with the shadow of the empty name, Samráta, or king of kings. The principles of Hindu government, as laid down in the Institutes of Manu, do not require the direct and absolute rule over a people or a country, but are satisfied with a general acknowledgment by neighbouring States of its superiority. When a conquered country was too extensive to be directly governed, fresh aspirants to sovereign honours were recruited from the ministry or the army, and, as rewards for special services, either in the field or in the cabinet, the newly conquered countries were often ceded to generals and ministers and dependents. There were thus parcelled out to the provinces of Hindostan as many kings as there are peoples and languages within her boundary. And, what was the result of this early dismemberment of the Great Indian Empire? The question may be at once answered without pause or hesitation. The result was that, it became a prey to the lust of conquest of foreign nations. When, for instance, the Punjab was invaded by Alexander the Great and the position of Porus was jeopardised, he received no aid or military support from his native allies against the Macedonian intruder, though there were at that time powerful kings with mighty armies and full exchequers in the Doab and the Cis-Sutlej States. What an eminent statesman wrote in the eighteenth century referring to the notion of an alliance among the Indian princes, may well be applied to so ancient a period as the reign of Chandragupta. Warren Hastings in one of his despatches to the Court of Directors observes—"The scale of power is "evidently turned in our favour, and this is of more importance "than would well be imagined in Europe, where the policy "of nations is regulated by principles the very reverse of those "which prevail in Asia. There, in contests between nations, "the weaker is held up by the support of its neighbours, who "know how much their own safety depends on the preservation of "a proper balance. But in Asia the desire of partaking of the "spoils of a falling nation, and the dread of incurring the resentment of the stronger party, are the immediate motives of "policy; and every State wishes to associate itself 'with that "'power which has a decided superiority.'"

The above weighty remarks, penned by Warren Hastings on the occasion of an alliance between the late East India Company's Government and that of Berar, may well be applied to every stage of a Hindu society and government, and every stage of the life of the individual Hindu from the ancient to the modern times. We find, for example, that the kings of

Palibothrá or Pátáliputra, the then leading power in India, instead of supporting such a patriot warrior as Porus, entered into an alliance with Alexander's general, and welcomed a Grecian at their court as ambassador. The simple-minded Hindu monarchs thus deceived themselves and their people by sowing, with their own hands, the poisonous seed which afterwards yielded bitter leaves; and, which, though removed and rooted out for a time from the original spot, germinated elsewhere with increased fecundity to the bitter repentance of the Hindu nation. The observations, written by the Grecians at the court of Chundragupta on the system of Hindu government; the resources of the country; its military defences; its mode of warfare; the prevalent religion of the country; the manners and customs of the people, &c.; were read with avidity by the learned Greeks, and embodied in the historical and antiquarian works, which, on the decline of that nation, came into the possession of the Arabs with other scientific and metaphysical treatises, the fruits of the labour of ages. The Arabs made the best use of what the Greeks had collected with so much labour and skill. With them, the idea of the conquest of India rose simultaneously with the taste for the cultivation of science and philosophy; and the alluring account of the wealth of India, conveyed to them by the Grecian antiquarians, constantly danced before the eyes of the first "Caliph," called by the Mahometans Khulipha Wallid.

The Khulipha, on his first attempt to extend his conquests over the regions of eastern Asia, sent a detachment of his force from Persia to Sind, under the command of Mohmud Cassim. With that invasion commenced the first intrusion of Islam over the soil of the Aryans;—a soil watered by streams issuing from the sacred chain of mountains, the abode of gods, demi-gods, heroes, and saints,—the objects of veneration with the Hindu, the field of description to his poets, the object of his pride, the cause of the singularity of India as contrasted with other regions of the world. The Hindu, though learned, thoughtful, and scientific, had till then never known any nation but his own, any language but his own, nor any religion but what was expounded to him by the Brahman. He was simple, honest, unaffected, mild in his temper, comely in his deportment, urbane in his manners. It is a tradition of the Hindu of those days that though a gallant soldier he was unacquainted with stratagems and artifices; never fought for an unlawful cause; and when once engaged in the field, never retraced his steps, however overwhelming the force he might have to face; for to him it was salvation to die a hero or a martyr; to return home escaping death in the field

was both cowardice and sinful. The traditions of the ancient wars, as contained in the *Rámáyan* and *Mahábhárat*, were as sacred to him as the ten commandments are to a Christian; and the exaggerated descriptions of those original and flowery poets about the destruction of the myriad millions of *Rákshas* or demons by the blow of one arrow, when directed with the aid of the deity of war, caused the Hindu to look slightly upon the *Mlecha* barbarians, who came into his country with a handful of soldiers to fight with the descendants of *Agni* and *Ráma*, the specially created and specially gifted beings of the *Devatas*. Hitherto the self-contented Hindu had been ignorant of the mode of warfare of the followers of the Prophet. He had never heard that stratagems and artifices constituted the principal part of modern warfare, that the stoppage of the supply of water, the addition of fresh arms and reinforcements from outside the garrison, had more effect than the waving of a thousand swords in the open field by the best trained swordsmen. He never imagined that with the Moslems victory was followed by plunder, plunder by fire and rapine, and the latter by wholesale slaughter and the dishonouring of women. He never thought that his temple would be converted into a mosque, his dwelling house into a barrack, and his places of public resort into slaughter-houses. When the army of Cassim first encountered that of the Hindu *Rajá* of Sind, it was shamefully defeated, but reinforcements from Persia gave fresh vigour to the Arabs, and roused their desponding and sunken spirits to another action, which sealed the fate of the Hindus of Sind, and dashed to the ground the pride of the Rajput soldiery. These, seeing the imminent danger at hand of a disgraceful defeat, and submission to the caprice of the foreigners, first murdered their women and children, and then, with naked swords in their hands, opened the gate of the garrison, and furiously rushed upon the enemy to meet with certain destruction. Cassim Alli, thus victorious, immediately took possession of the fort and palace, planted his standard on the former, and took possession of everything he could find in the latter, together with the two beautiful daughters of the king as trophies of the war. The latter were sent as present to the *Khulipha*, as a token of respect to the "Commander of the Faithful," but this valued present cost the general his life, and retribution came so soon and from such an unexpected quarter, that Hindu historians have ascribed it to the vengeance of Heaven.

The partial conquest of India, thus commenced by the Arabs at so early a date as the eighth century, was carried to its full extremity by *Mahmud Ghuznivi*, who next appeared



in the field of warfare against the Hindus. Human depravity never rose so high as it was with the Ghuznivites, and human forbearance never stooped so low as it did among the Hindus of that time. The Ghuznivite plundered his property, and the Hindu patiently submitted to it; the Ghuznivite dragged him into slavery, and the Hindu followed him like a lamb. In the twelve inroads of Mahmud Ghuznivi into India he succeeded not only in plundering the country of its accumulated wealth and carrying away its people into slavery, but caused likewise the utter subversion of the Hindu monarchies of Delhi and Kanouj. With the Ghuznivite raids ended the very name of Hindu independence.

The only Hindu principalities in Central India that escaped devastation by these Mahometan marauders, were the States of Udyapur and Amber (modern Jaipur), respectively governed by Chohan and Kachwa, Rajput princes, the offshoots of the royal house of Ayodhyá. The former principality was founded by Rájá Kanaksen in A. D. 144, and the latter by Sura Rájá in A. D. 966. These two States, together with the principality of Marwar, founded in A. D. 1459, by Raja Jodh, a descendant of the Ruthore Rajput kings of Kanouj, at present constitute the Rajputana States. The other minor principalities, *viz.*, Ulwár, Bikanier, Dungurpur, Sirohi, Protubgurh, &c., were either fiefs of the three principal States first named, or at one time their dependencies. They however gradually became independent during the long course of time, when the parent States succumbed to the Mahometan or the Mahratta powers. It is asserted by some that Siváji, the founder of the Mahratta monarchy, and the Bhonslá family, also sprang from the house of Udyapur. The chaos and confusion which followed the depredations of Mahmud Ghuznivi had scarcely subsided into order, before other Mahometan conquerors appeared in the country. Amongst these, Baber, with his numerous Tartar followers, reached Delhi, conquered the city, and usurped its throne. Anxious then to extend his conquest over the Rajputana States, and to bring to subjection its proud rulers, who had hitherto escaped the inroads of Mahmud Ghuznivi, Baber marched his army *via* Muthura, and at Futtehpur Sikree met Ráná Sanga, the Rájá of Udyapur, who had proceeded thither to oppose the progress of the Mahometans. In a fierce action which ensued between the Rajput followers of the Ráná and the Tartars of Baber, the former were defeated and routed, and Ráná Sanga fled to Udyapur. This action decided the superiority of the Mahometan soldiery over the Hindus, and brought the Rajputana

States in subjection to the court of Delhi. Thus India lost its last remnant of power. The House of Udyapur was the pride of the Hindu nation, the offshoot of the royal house of Ayodhya, of the proud line of kings of the Solar race, who dictated laws to the country, patronised education, science, and arts;—a family which was hitherto considered sacred and unapproachable by any nation in the world.

On the death of Baber, Humayun temporarily succeeded to power, but he had neither the talents nor the means to assert his superiority over the Rajput States which had thrown off the yoke on his father's death. But there was to be born a man for the throne of Delhi, who would bring all India into his subjection; whose personal vigour, skill in the military tactics, talent, and foresight, would smooth everything that should attempt to stand as an obstacle in the way of his progress. This was Akbar, who, soon after his accession to power, made an effort on the famous fort and town of Chittore, which he reduced, though not with little difficulty. Thus demonstrating his power as a military leader and the sovereign ruler of India, he first conceived the idea of the importance of a friendly alliance with the Rajput States, and with this view invited the princes of Udyapur, Amber, and Jodhpur to his court, and gave them the joint offices and usual dignities of minister and general, attaching thereto great outward distinction and respect. Akbar demanded of these princes services which at once reduced them from independent rulers to functionaries, and confined them constantly to the side of the Peacock-throne. The tributes which he exacted from them were however somewhat disproportionate to their means, and the military service they were required to perform for the empire, drew off the best soldiers of Rajputana to harassing and tedious wars, either in the inhospitable climate of Cabul, or in the unknown countries of the Dekkan. The reign of Akbar was followed by that of Jehangeer, Shah Jehan, and lastly of Aurangzebe, in whose time the position of the Rajput princes grew worse. The notorious mis-government of Aurangzebe, his oppression of the people, especially of the Hindus, caused by the imposition of the tax upon the infidels, known as the *Jezeea*; his interference with the religion of the soil; his direct violation of the laws of sovereign and subjects, both in social and religious matters; his disrespect and ill-treatment of the Hindu allies at his court; the constant wars in remote parts of his dominions; and the internal feuds about the court of Delhi;—all combined to diminish the awe and respect which the Hindu chiefs had hitherto entertained

for the person of the emperor. The forced conversion of Hindus to Mahometanism in Aurangzebe's reign had gone so far, that in cases of disputed inheritance between two or more brothers, the Futtowah of the law always supported, with the express sanction of the emperor, the party that embraced Islamism. Thus it was that hundreds of high caste and respectable Hindu families became converted Mahometans. Human weakness is more or less to be seen in every clime and country of the world, among the ancients as well as the moderns; and it has been the ruling principle of almost every king and government to extend the State religion to the subject class when the same is of a different persuasion. But before pronouncing any opinion upon this system of religious bigotry, or, we might say, abuse of religion, it should be enquired into and examined why this idea generally prevails amongst sovereign princes. The common interpretation of the question would perhaps be, that a sovereign being the guardian of society, both for secular and religious matters, and being held responsible for the spiritual welfare of the people committed to his care, is bound, if he is sincere in his religion, and zealous for the welfare of his subjects, to dictate that religion to the people which he himself is convinced to be true. But apart from this argument, the question is susceptible of analysis in other ways. It should be closely examined and scrutinized in all its bearings, not in the superficial light of a bigot or a religious enthusiast, but in the light of a man as a rational being. The arguments which we generally meet with upon this subject, and the opinions *pro* and *con*, as they are recorded by some, generally issue either from supporters of this system, or from men who condemn the practice as based upon a mistaken theory. Taking for granted that a king's anxiety for the future state of his subjects is paramount in his mind, we must expect from the self-same philanthropic ruler a corresponding care for the subject's well-being in his present state of existence; and where the latter falls short of the former, the deduction we draw is, that the motive, which is ascribed to philanthropy, piety, and everything that has a good import, is only immediate, secular, and political. The first impulse which guides the actions of an intelligent human sovereign in times of peace, is the consolidation of his power and government. To make these permanent he requires the agency of his own subjects, who, if they are of a different religious persuasion, would very seldom, if at all, heartily sympathise and co-operate with the ruling power; to obtain this end therefore the sovereign as a human being is

driven to seek the instrument of religion, thinking that a common faith insures common political action, and forgetting the simple axiom that unity of race and sympathy of a common aspiration have more association with country and nationality than religion alone. The distinction between the conquerer and the conquered cannot be removed by unity of religion. This social gulf always remains unbridged as far as human pride and human vanity are concerned, and this pride and this vanity are coeval with human nature, and a part of its calling. It has been said above that country and nationality have more association with unity of race and sympathy of a common aspiration than with religion, and to prove this assertion perhaps some illustration is needed. Take for instance, a converted Mahometan, say, of Hindu extraction, to an assembly of genuine Mussulmans engaged in a conversation about the faithlessness and immorality of the Hindus, their rough and uncourteous manners, and their crafty and cunning habits. Or take another converted Mussulman of English parentage to the same assembly, and turn the discourse upon the subject of the climate of England, the mode of dress of the people of that country, the want of a zenáná system among them, and condemn all these as bad and improper, and then watch the emotions of the heart of these two converts. If they have a spark of nationality in them, they will, to the utmost of their power, try to advocate the cause of their countrymen and their customs. Again, it may be asked what nation or government has up to this time received the support and hearty co-operation, in times of need, from the subject-class it had converted to its own religion. The case of the Persians will be a good illustration to this point. They were originally converted to Mahometanism by the Arabs, and their country was taken possession of by the same nation. But when the subject-class grew sufficiently strong and powerful, they dispossessed their rulers of the government of the country, and assumed it themselves. Aurangzebe's flagrant violation of the law by making it the instrument for the conversion of the Hindus, sowed the seed of that dissension and ill-will among the whole Hindu population, and tended more than anything to bring about the fall of the Great Mogul Empire.

We propose now to inquire how the position of the independent native chiefs stood under the tyrannical government of Aurangzebe, how the internal management of their respective States was conducted, and how the prosperity and welfare of their subjects were consulted. The example set by the emperor of tyranny and misrule at the metropolis of the country produced a magnetic effect upon the minor governments of the native

princes, and the spread of this infection was unavoidable so far as the imperial demands and extortions were concerned. The native princes were required annually to supply the imperial army with mercenaries from their respective States, and compliance with this demand not only exhausted Rajputana of its best soldiers, but gave occasion to the practice of tyranny upon the people, who, unwilling to volunteer for military service, opposed their chiefs in every possible way, got up rebellions and conspiracies, sometimes withheld the payment of their usual tribute, and ignored the sovereign rights of their rulers. The chiefs in their turn had to repel force by force, and to engage themselves constantly in small wars with their own subjects. A native chief in those days could hardly collect the land-revenue of a small village without demonstration of military strength; and to move his officers and functionaries in the districts in the harvest season was as dangerous as to move a caravan with precious commodities through the country. For this reason the nazims, or revenue collectors, were always provided with a certain number of military followers and guns, and with ammunition. This practice obtains in native States up to the present day as a relic of an ancient institution, though the necessity does not exist to the same proportion. The numerous forts and strongholds which attract the notice of a foreigner travelling in the Rajputana countries, were originally built either as military posts to keep in order a certain number of villages around them, or they were intended as office buildings and residences of the State functionaries. The judicial administration of a native State under the Mogul government was the same as it was throughout the empire. The chief being both supreme magistrate and civil judge, and the nazims,—his deputies in the districts,—being invested with judicial powers to try minor cases, often oppressed the people as much as did the Mahometan governors of their neighbouring Subas. The office of a minister then, as at present, was in many cases hereditary, and was chiefly vested in Brahmans or in the nearest relations of the chiefs themselves. But a soldier of fortune now and then also aspired to this office of dignity and emolument, and sometimes by favour of his chief he succeeded in obtaining it. The authority then exercised by ministers was like that of the late Zalim Singh over the ruler of Kotah, or of Jungh Bâhâdur over the nominal king of Nepâl. The Hindu princes under the Mahometan government, after the example of the Mogul emperors, had generally been men of weak mind, improperly trained, and insufficiently educated; though not perfectly illiterate, none

of them could claim more than average merit either as a man or as a ruler. The company these princes generally kept either in the precincts of the zenáná or in the outer apartments of their palaces, was anything but compatible with their position as responsible heads of governments. The deficiency in education, the consequent moral weakness, and the addiction to vice and debauchery of their rulers, all tended to extend the authority and influence of the ministers, and it would have been unreasonable to expect that a shrewd Brahman or a covetous Rajput who held the office of minister would have corrected the vices of his chief, instead rather of contributing to it. Every picture has its two sides, and when it is looked through the dark one it presents an obscure and gloomy aspect. The ministers of native courts, whether in times of yore or at the present day, are almost always accused of being crafty, cunning, dishonest, of seeking self-aggrandisement and thereby ruining the States over which they hold authority; but when the question is discussed and balanced in the scale of humanity, what allowance, may we ask, is ever made for the circumstances of their temptation, their want of proper education (we mean according to the European mode of education), want of a knowledge of the system of administration as taught by European jurists and political economists, the example set by their predecessors in office and not unfrequently their predecessors in family, coupled with a sense of the insecurity of their position? Let a man of any country with any amount of education be placed in the position of the old dewans and ministers of the Hindu sovereigns, and few, we fear, would come out of them with their integrity untarnished, and their reputation unsullied. It is not easy in the present day to conceive how fearful and dangerous it was for a minister's interests to interfere with the inclination or mode of life of a royal master, when a breath or a whisper in support of a most admitted truth, if it were against his cherished convictions, would have paved the way of the minister to the gaol or to the executioner. Human frailty and human weakness have in many cases paid too dearly for indulgence, and this system of the investiture of supreme authority in the hands of a single individual in the office of minister, has not been unfrequently attended with danger to the sovereign, and in some cases with the total deprivation of power. The examples of this, in Indian history, are very numerous.

It has been stated that the native princes were, in general, inefficient rulers, and tools in the hands of their ministers and dependents; but occasionally there sprung up a genius, such as the Mahárájá Jai Singh of Jaipur, who at once combined in

his own person the virtues of an enlightened ruler and a learned politician, a patron of letters, and a promoter of science and arts. This prince has handed down his name to posterity, and is even known to the learned of Europe for his inquiries and observations into the Arabic science of astronomy. The noble mind and the lofty aim of this Hindu prince are best illustrated in the plan and construction of the beautiful city of Jaipur,—a city, which, of all others in Northern and Central India, is the one built upon scientific principles. Rájá Jai Singh's love of letters induced him to invite pandits from Bengal, Cashmir, Benares, the Dekkan, and other parts of India to his court, and to collect those ancient scientific and philosophical works which were almost lost to the country. The immense library he had thus collected, not only saved to the world the Sanskrita literary and scientific works, but latterly they rendered invaluable assistance to the exertions of Sir William Jones and Mr. Prinsep, in their efforts for the collection of a complete library of Hindu works in the Asiatic Society's Museum at Calcutta. Many Sanskrita works of very ancient date on theological and metaphysical subjects, which had become lost sight of for want of study and reproduction since the time of Sanker-Achárjya, or, to speak properly, since the decline of the Hindu monarchy of Konouj, were found in Rájá Jai Singh's library. Nor did the Western sciences receive less attention from his liberal and inquiring mind. The mathematical science of the Arabs and their astronomy were then known in India, and they had received a fitting place in Jai Singh's mind. The observatories constructed at Delhi and Jaipur by this prince, at an immense cost and after much labour, have been admired by modern scientific men of Europe, and they are a triumph of labour for the investigation of scientific truth. The great dictionary or encyclopædia of the Sanskrita, Arabic, Persian, and Hindi languages, containing a vocabulary of miscellaneous subjects, called the Jai Sing-Kalpadruma, had also been compiled at his court. As a Kshatrya and an offshoot of the great Surjya-bansa, Rájá Jai Singh was the only prince who had performed the Ashamedha Zagyá after the reign of the Pándavas,—a Zagyá for which the Hindu Shástras provide the highest merit, and which can be only undertaken by the mightiest of kings. As a soldier and a politician, the Raja had always distinguished himself both in the field and in the cabinet of Delhi. His name is still cherished with esteem and veneration by the people of Malwa, to which province he was appointed viceroy by the emperor of Delhi. But such men as a Jai Singh and a Inswart

Singh (one of the Jodhpur princes who had many of the virtues of Jai Singh) were not common amongst the native rulers. It may be argued perhaps, that the government under which there were born such men as Birbul, Todermul, Mán Singh, Abul Fazil, Abul Fyozee, and Jai Sing, must have been paternal and enlightened. The question may be easily answered in the affirmative with reference to Akbar's reign, in which five out of the above-named six personages, flourished, and the worst enemies of the Mogul government would even admit that monarch's reign to have been prosperous. But others, with high sounding titles, who sat on the Peacock-throne after him, not even the apologists of the Mahometans, with a shadow of truth, can support. Their system of administration gradually deteriorated till it came down to Aurangzebe.

The reign of Aurangzebe was followed by that of Mahomed Shah. A weak monarch, surrounded by evil counsellors, whose immediate motive was self-aggrandisement rather than the interests of the empire, Mahomed Shah early succumbed both to foreign and domestic enemies. The inroad of Nadir Shah into India, the defeat of the emperor's army at Kurnál, and his plunder of Delhi, gave fresh stimulus to the Mahrattas, who entered into a league with the princes of the Rajputana States for the complete overthrow of the Mahometan power. With this view the Peishwah asked the opinion and assistance of Raja Jai Singh in a diplomatic correspondence with that prince through the medium of an ambiguous verse of the Sri-Bhagabata. The Rajput princes of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Udaypur, on the other hand, tired at last of the intolerable misrule and tyranny of the Moguls, entered into a confederacy amongst themselves to throw off the yoke of the House of Delhi. And thus commenced, from all sides, aggressions upon the Mogul government, already predisposed to decay. In the palmy days of the Moguls when Akbar was in the zenith of his power, and when Aurangzebe, quelling the insurrections in the Dekkan, had contemplated the conquest of China, no politician or soldier had ever thought, nay, even the Hindu feudatories had never dreamt, that the House of Timour would thus meet with sudden destruction, and the Great Indian Empire be reduced to fragments. The display of power and the display of riches, which had hitherto attended the court of Delhi, and the external pomp and grandeur that were always present with its monarchs as the necessary attendants of royalty, were something extraordinary and beyond human conception at the present day. The world's mightiest kings, Alexander



the Great, the Roman emperors, the Hindu monarchs of old, and the modern sovereigns of Europe, were mere ciphers in comparison with the Mogul emperors of Delhi, as far as royalty attended with absolute power and inestimable riches are concerned. But it must never be forgotten how much, with one brilliant exception, that power was abused. The Great Mogul, who issued mandates from the Peacock-throne of the Dewankhas, under the silver-ceiling which when melted into coin gave three crores of hard cash to the conquering Nadir Shah,—whose person was adorned with the finest diamonds in the world,—whose palaces were of marble, and whose plates and drinking vessels of gold,—whose camp-equipage alone would have emptied the exchequer of other princes,—whose smile or frown could make or unmake a Raja or a Nawab,—and whose mandate was obeyed from Hindokosh to Cape Cormorin,—possessed, be it ever remembered,—the gold and treasures only to squander them,—the patronage only to misuse it,—the power only to divert it from its proper object,—the protection of the governed. Never were the interests of the millions of the indigenous populations of India taken into proper consideration. It seems as though it had been the decree of Heaven, that there should be a total revolution of all this; that the scion of the House of Timour should be blinded and kept prisoner in the hands of the Mahrattas, and the country parcelled out amongst a number of petty chiefs and foreign merchants. And, lastly, that one offshoot of the same House should rove a fugitive in the Central Asian desert, and another receive a compassionate allowance of the munificent sum of twenty-five rupees a month from the hands of a British Viceroy. Time works wonders. Human pride and human vanity should learn by this the lesson which does not require the philosopher to tell us, that of all other fortunes the fortune of a king is as shifting and changing as the mercury in the thermometer.

The object of this article merely being the history of the Hindu States of Rajputana, our readers will perhaps question the propriety of our touching on the subject of the decline of the Mogul empire; but as the latter event is inseparable from the former, we do not apologize for having devoted a short space to the subject.

The rise of the Mahratta power commenced with the decline of the Mogul empire; and, when the Peshwah extended his conquest over the provinces of Central India, his generals commenced depredations over Rajputana, and levied tribute upon the three principal States of Udyapur, Jaipur, and Jodhpur. The anarchy and confusion which followed the Mahratta supremacy

over Rajputana; the plundering exploits of the Pathan freebooter, Amir Khan, and of the Pindaries; and the domestic war in the country itself, involved these principalities in a state of chronic disorder for a certain time. The House of Udyapur, once the leading power in the country, had, by this time, been reduced to such a state of insignificance as to be obliged to accept for its representative the subsistence allowance of rupees 1,000 a month from the ruler of Kota. The non-interference policy which then prevailed in the Council Chamber of Calcutta, under the Presidency of Lord Cornwallis, and the existing treaty with Scindia, prevented the British Government from entering into an alliance with the Rajputana States. But the exigencies which arose shortly afterwards, most fortunately for the future good of these States, and the renewal of the treaty with the Mahārāja of Gwalior in 1817, left to the Government the discretion to enter into a political alliance with the Rajputana States for the general suppression of the incursions of the Pindaries. Thus the States of Udyapur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, Bundi, Jhalawar, Pratabgurh, Bunsware, Dungurpur, Sirol, Kishungurh, Karowli, Tonk, Ulwar, Bharatpur, and Dhoolpur were taken under its protection, and the political relation with the remote States of Bikanir and Jussulmir were improved. The stipulations in most of these treaties are, that the chiefs should not enter into disputes and wars with their neighbours; should rule over their territories according to the established usages and customs; abstain from political or diplomatic correspondence with other States; refer all international disputes to adjustment by the British Government; and in the exigencies of the State supply military force according to their means. The conditions on the part of the British Government are, that it should protect these States from domestic or foreign enemies, even with military aid when such should be required; that it should not interfere with the internal administration of their Governments, nor introduce British laws or courts into them, leaving the chiefs the absolute rulers of their respective States. The stipulations contained in these treaties have been generally well fulfilled on both sides; and the administration of the native States gradually began to assume that sober and enlightened tone, in which we find many of them at this day.

The princes and chiefs of Rajputana, thus disembarassed from their ruinous and degrading submission to the Mahometans, and thus entirely freed from the vexatious incursions and forced extortions of the Mahrattas and the Pindaries, had time and opportunity to devote their attention to the consolidation

and improvement of their respective States. With the connection of the British Government with these States, indeed, commenced the new era of the rule of our native princes.

To give a history of the present system of administration of a native government and the mode of working of its different departments, we think it necessary, first of all, to enter into the subject of the duties of the prince himself, who, as absolute ruler of his State, occupies at once the place of both the highest functionary, as well as that of the sovereign. The principal duties, which occupy the time of a Hindu prince in the early part of the day, are the daily performance of religious rites and ceremonies, commencing with the gift of a cow to a Brahman. He then visits the different temples in and adjacent to the palace, attends the place where the Vedas are recited by the Brahmans, and then engages in his morning worship. Thus passes the time of a Hindu Rájá for upwards of three hours in the day, and when he has finished, the physicians are called into his presence. Amongst these, the personal physician invariably comes with one or two kinds of medicines which he had been ordered to prepare the previous day; the other physicians in their turn present draughts, *shurbuts*, and other preparations in common use in the season, which are never used but sent to the medicine-room for courtesy's sake, there to dry or decompose in the phial in which they were brought. The European doctor who is attached to every Political Agency is also invariably surgeon to the prince at whose capital he resides. In this capacity the doctor is valued highly, and is applied for when there is any purely surgical case. As a physician he has no footing in India in native society, except in the presidency towns where there are communities of English-speaking natives; and in a native court it cannot be reasonably expected that the doctor will find a royal patient to drink a fever-mixture prepared by a Mahometan native doctor. European medicine for internal use is so much detested by natives of rank, that even in medico-surgical cases the doctor who performs the operation of the knife is not allowed to give his pills to the patient, and if he persists in doing so at any time, his medicine finds a place in the general medicine room side by side with the draught of the hakeem.

In the midst of this, when the prince is engaged in receiving and consulting his physicians, it is not uncommon that a Chela or a Khawas comes in with folded hands, and informs him that the minister is waiting at the door for permission to enter. When the order issues for his admission he makes his appearance before his master, is made to sit with the physicians, and to join in their conversation till the signal from a personal attendant of

the prince informs him, that the latter is ready to hear what he wishes to represent to him. But it being the rule with native governments, and perhaps with all governments presided over by one absolute ruler, that at the time of the transaction of State business all outsiders should depart, the physicians, who have hitherto taken the lead in the conversation before the prince, are unceremoniously signalled to make their exit. The prince and the minister now being alone, the business (whatever it is) is transacted as quietly as a domestic matter between a yielding husband and a prudent housewife. The business done, the minister makes his exit, and the time comes for an audience with the court pandits and astrologers, who one by one make their entry with Sanskrita verses and couplets of their own composition in their hands, and occasionally with copies of Purans and Upanishadhas.

No sooner are these erudite but uncourtly persons seated, than each of them, eager to display his own learning and genius, struggles to take the lead in the conversation, and to convince his royal auditor that pandit A has better knowledge of Nyáa than pandit Z, or that astrologer B's calculation of the last solar eclipse was correct while astrologer X's was wrong. And it is not uncommon among these honest but ambitious persons, that they are easily enraged when their opinions are contradicted in any nice question of Hindu jurisprudence or philosophy. To support their own arguments they would talk for hours together with a tone and vehemence only next to quarrelling. These pandits being Brahmans, have a kind of licence of speech before Hindu princes, which is not enjoyed even by ministers and members of royal families. The pandits being dismissed, the breakfast is called in, and with it the man whose business it is to taste all things before the prince sits down to his meal. This custom of having all eatables and drinkables tasted beforehand is immemorial in India, and is a caution against poisoning which is not of rare occurrence in native States. With the breakfast ends the business of the morning, and then comes the time for a short rest. In the afternoon, between three and four o'clock, when the prince rises from his coach, the time is generally devoted to sundry small matters, such as the taking of medicines, giving orders about horses, elephants, and carriages. Should any foreign merchant happen to arrive with curious articles for sale, such as jewels, valuable diamonds, horses or elephants, he is admitted into the presence of the prince at this time of the day, and his articles are examined and in many cases purchased also. Then comes the time for evening prayer and

the visiting of the temples, which is generally accomplished within an hour after nightfall.

The greater part of the State business is transacted during the night. At this time all the ministers and principal officers make their entry into the palace one by one, and are allotted seats in a separate building; but no sooner does the prince make his appearance in the private hall of audience, than the ministers are called in at once, and are made to sit near his person according to their respective rank, the prime minister occupying the first seat among the State dignitaries. Then the judges are called in, the revenue officers, the foudar, the commanding officers of regiments, the vakeels of different departments, the officer having charge of the intelligence department, the officer in charge of the treasury, the officers of the public works department, and many others too numerous to detail, who in their respective turn solicit orders for the business of their several departments, and that having been given, they one by one make their exit. If any foreigner happens to come for an interview with the prince, either with the object of opening a commercial agency at his capital, taking land in lease, or requesting employment in the State, he is introduced to him at this time of the night, and receives attention to his request or not according to the nature of the question advanced. When the business with the outsiders has been transacted, then commences the private counsel with the ministers on important financial and administrative matters, which generally takes an hour, but in special cases occupies much time, and even lasts till a late hour in the night. The conferring of *Khiluts*, which is customary in native courts on the occasion of conferring appointments, is also done at this time. All business having thus been transacted, the musicians and dancing women are called in, who divert the company for a short while. The ministers then take their leave, and the prince goes to supper. After supper the *Kissawalla* or the narrator of tales is brought in, and made to sit outside the *purda* of the bed-chamber, and the prince lying on his sofa hears the idle talk of this man, who, as is wont with his class, is often blind, eloquent of speech, witty, humorous, and having in his memory the tales of the "Arabian Nights," and similar stories from the *Gulbakawli*, *Bahar-danish*, and *Budramoonir*.

The above is a short account of the daily duties of a Hindu prince; but we should not omit here the mention of some others which, though not of daily occurrence, are nevertheless constant, such as meeting the Political Resident at his court, which generally takes place once or twice a week, and

sometimes oftener, and the review of troops of all arms and descriptions. The meeting with the Political Agent is strictly private, and in it the ministers have no share. In this the British representative gives his advice and opinion to the prince on administrative matters.

Next to the prince and over the head of all, is the office of the prime minister. This officer, as a rule, is a high caste Brahman or Kshettrya, born of a wealthy and influential family, and invariably a relation of a high functionary, and a landholder. He must combine the virtues of a politician, a diplomatist, and a financier, and must be possessed of an amount of aptitude and penetration equal to his calling. He must be popular, religious, and liberal, must respect all ancient customs and institutions whether of the State or of the people. He is required to be of mild temper and sober habits, accessible to all, and patient in everything. An outward show and pomp in his house, carriage, and retinue, are also among the principal requirements of the prime minister of a native court. In Hindustani his designation of office is *Moosahib*, which means constant attendant of his sovereign. It is not easy to find a man with all the above qualities in every prime minister, but more or less these functionaries combine in them some of the virtues stated above. As an instance of liberality it has been said of the late Rawal Shew Singh, prime minister of Jaipur, that he gave a reward of Rs. 100 to a man for dyeing a *pugri* to his liking, and which was really the labour of four annas. His dhobi, his tailor, and other menial servants were all provided with horses and *báhlis* for their conveyance, and had grants of land yielding a good annual income.

The functions of a prime minister of a native court are manifold. Though there is a separate financier in every State under the designation of *Dewan*, the former is always held responsible for the proper arrangement of the finances. He has the chief control over the judicial and the revenue departments of the State, and is always appealed to when the decisions of the lower courts are not satisfactory to the suitors. In political correspondence with the British Government or its local representatives, the prime minister is in some cases the author, and, in others, the dictator of all such despatches. In the usual amicable correspondence, which is also kept up with the friends and relations of his prince, the prime minister is often the medium, and sometimes the dictator of these epistolary correspondences. When he is an old and faithful servant, he is invariably the referee in all disputes and differences between the prince and his wives, and between the latter alone. In former times the prime

minister had always the chief command of the army invested in him; but the modern usage is, that any military arrangement made by the commander-in-chief (who is called the Bukshee Fouj or Moosahib Fouj) shall not be final, until it receive the sanction of the prince through the office and under the seal and signature of the prime minister, who is thus virtually the controller of the deeds and actions of the head of the army, though the actual command is taken away from his hand. The judges, the magistrates, the revenue collectors, the officers of the customs department, of the educational department, of public works department, &c., are all under the immediate orders of the prime minister who, with his coadjutor, the Dewan, exercises supervision over all the departments of the State.

Next to the office of the prime minister is that of the Dewan, or minister of finances, whose duty it is to make the annual settlement of land revenue, give villages in lease, and through the Nazims advance money to the cultivators as *tuccavi* for the purchase of bullocks and the digging of wells. The arrangement of the customs revenue, of the salt revenue, the sayer, the ferry collection, the taxes upon quarries and mines, the collections from the mint, &c., are under the disposal of the Dewan, who is also appealed to from the decisions of the Nazims in revenue cases. The duties of this functionary are as onerous and responsible as those of the prime minister; and his office is by no means less important than that of the latter.

The judicial department of a native government, although a model of our law courts, is still an anomaly. There being no proper system for judicial training, the judges are recruited from the different departments of the public service, without discrimination as to their previous training or employment. The judicial department of a native State, as the exponent of the system of Hindu administration, must, of course, be expected to be officered by men who have studied the Hindu law and jurisprudence, but in this instance the quasi legitimate claim of the pandits is often ignored, and the service is opened to men of all shades of life, from clerks to military and revenue officers, and sometimes to private individuals having no other claims to the office of a judge than that they are jagirdars, respectable bankers, or favourite physicians of the prince. It must also be borne in mind at the same time, that the law courts of a native State still go under the disguise of an institution, the guiding principles of which are the Institutes of Manu and the works of other Hindu legislators, while the officers who preside over them are as

innocent of Mitakshara or Yagyabalka, as they are ignorant of the simplest acts of the Legislative Council of Calcutta. It has been a moot question for a long time with the British Government, whether it has any authority to interfere with the judicial administration of a native government, when such administration falls short of the requirements of the present time. The philanthropic public who take an interest in the welfare of the natives of India, do now and then ventilate this subject in the newspapers and periodicals of the day, but the treaty-obligations cannot be ignored for the sake of justice, which being a political question, is as a matter of course, more important than its subordinate,—the judicial. But the fact of a deficiency in the latter branch of the administration may, it is apprehended, prove injurious to the body politic, and destroy that political balance which our statesmen so studiously try to preserve. It may be argued in support of the neutral policy of our Government, that a certain stipulation in each treaty with the native princes and chiefs, has created a barrier to the march of the catholic laws of the British legislators beyond the frontiers of our districts. We do not mean to advocate here the extension of the British laws to the territories of the feudatory princes, to the disparagement of the solemn promises as contained in large sheets of parchment, bearing the seals of such illustrious personages as Lords Lake and Cornwallis. We contend rather for the adoption of a middle course between the two extremes, *viz.*, the letting alone of the judicial administration of a native government, or forcibly introducing the English laws. The middle course we propose would be a slight pressure from the paramount power towards the organization of a purely judicial service with training in the Hindu and Mahometan laws. The Brahmans learned in Shmruti, who acquit themselves well in public examination, might be selected for judges in Hindu States, whilst Mussulman Moulvis equally tested in Mahometan laws, might be appointed to similar posts in Mahometan States. Now the question arises, whether the British Government is at liberty under the existing treaties to exercise such a pressure upon its allies, however wholesome and disinterested it may be. Any reader of the Political History of India or of the International Laws of Great Britain will answer the question in the negative, and no doubt; *prima facie*, the proposition would look like an intrusion rather than a friendly suggestion on the part of the paramount power. But every rule has its exception, and the traditional custom of India proves it to be properly susceptible, beyond the least shadow of a doubt, to such external pressure from the sovereign power,



which protects the minor governments, and is their guardian and acknowledged superior by treaty rights. Moreover, when we see a slight laxity and deviation from the original policy (although with the consent of the feudatories) in the matter of the suppression of Satty, Thuggy, and Dacoity, and the general administration of the criminal justice of a native State, the unusual scrupulousness in the case of the civil justice is hardly compatible with the British name and its enlightened Government. The Hindu and Mahometan laws, both civil and criminal, in their original crude state, cannot be said to be so liberal as the present laws of the European countries; but their administration by trained lawyers with the aid of commentaries, precedents, and decisions of ancient Hindu and Mahometan judges, would be preferable to the hodgepodge of all laws or no laws at all.

The criminal law of the Hindus, excepting that portion which provides mutilation and other punishments of torture for heinous crimes, may be well applied to Hindu States in supersession of the Mahometan laws that now obtain in them; whilst in the civil branch, the laws of inheritance, of evidence, of mortgage, of conveyance of rights and properties, the relation between master and servant, between husband and wife, and between sovereign and subjects, are as liberal as those of any legislature of the modern times, and may all be well applied to the present stage of society under a native government. We all now try to see how these tribunals stand practically as courts of justice. Apart from their merit as law courts, and the mistake to be found in the theory of their existence, they are in general good Panchaets or arbitrary tribunals, presided over by two or more judges whose business it is to decide every case according to the established usages and customs; and in points of dispute where the legal question preponderates over usage, the court pandits are applied to for *Vebeastha*, and they in a body give their opinions quoting the passages of the *Shástras* applicable to the case. The suitors and their agents (the latter, though not lawyers, yet go by the name of *vakeels* in *Rajputana*), and sometimes their relatives and dependents, are allowed the right of pleading in support of their claims, and are carefully heard and contradicted after the fashion of trained judges and lawyers of our courts. In some States, where the expense of the judicial tribunal has lately increased with the increase in the number of judges, the law stamp has been introduced as a means of defraying the expenses of this branch of the public service, and to reduce the number of unnecessary suits that annually accumulate on the file.

The criminal justice of a native State is dispensed by a Foujdar and his deputies. The office of the Foujdar is a reserve for Thakurs of influential and respectable families; and when in special cases this post of dignity and emolument is given to an outsider, his family and social position are looked to more than his merit as a judicial officer. Although the position of a Foujdar of a native State corresponds with that of our district magistrates, the former enjoys more authority as a judicial officer, inasmuch as he is invested both with the powers of a magistrate and a sessions judge. There being no demarcation observed between a committing officer and the officer invested with the powers of the session, the same Foujdar who tries minor cases would also try cases of capital offence, and pass sentence upon them; and his sentence can be confirmed or reversed only by the court of ministers under the presidency of the prince, for whose approval sentences on capital offences are forwarded. Appeal also lies from the decision of the Foujdar to the ministerial court and to the ruler of a State himself; the chief civil court having no control or jurisdiction over the foujdaree court. The law and procedure which guide the business of this court have from a long time been Mahometan. The Hindu criminal law as contained in the Institutes of Manu has been superseded by Mahometan laws, perhaps ever since the Mahometan conquest of India; but before these States came in contact with the British Indian Government, certain of the old Hindu customs used to be observed, those especially which awarded light punishment to Brahmans convicted of murder or culpable homicide. According to Manu a Brahman convicted of manslaughter should be punished with the shaving of his head, deprivation of his property, and the turning him out from his land of residence; but he should not be put to death. In cases of adultery among females, the same law provides a system of punishment which would be regarded as too severe at the present time. It is therein enacted, that a woman convicted of adultery should be shaved of her head, deprived of her nose, and being mounted on a donkey turned out of the community where she lived. These anomalous proceedings could not be preserved and tolerated under a Christian Government, holding the supreme sway of the country; and hence the British Government was obliged to recommend the discontinuance of these and other similar practices in native States. The result has been that the criminal courts in the Rajputana States, being divested of some of their Hindu procedures, without accepting in their place the penal laws of the British Government, have become purely Mahometan.

courts, in many places, too, presided over by Mahometan magistrates.

The management of the police, being a concomitant of the office of Foujdar, the same functionary controls this department also. The police of Rajputana, though not organized on the principle of our new detective and protective police, is still useful and efficient under proper management; and in some respects excels the constabulary of the British territories. In tracing thieves the Mina police-man has a peculiar aptitude or almost instinct, which is not approached by the Hindustani and the Punjabi police, with all their improved system of drill and training. Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, and Colonel Tod have one and all deservedly commended the system of tracing thieves by the Minas, who, as a class of police-men, if adequately paid and properly managed, would excel all others of this branch of the service. The Mina will trace a thief, when he proceeds to his work *con amore*, through rock, sand, or water, and under the greatest disadvantages of rain and wind. Once show him the spot where a burglary, highway robbery, or cattle-lifting has taken place, and he will trace the perpetrator of the deed by his footprints to a distance of one hundred miles and sometimes more. Nor is the Mina less useful in other respects: as a watchman, a single individual of his caste, when appointed to a village, will not suffer theft or robbery to be committed within his boundary. But when not in the service of any Government or State, the same Mina is the worst thief and obstinate cattle-lifter. In the principalities of Jaipur and Ulwar, the Minas are hereditary watchmen, guards of forts, arsenals, and treasuries, and they keep their trust very faithfully.

The general management of police of a native State is on the whole satisfactory. Considering the geographical position of Rajputana, the nature of its soil, the frequent hills and deserts which abound in the country, the dearth of provisions at all seasons of the year, the scarcity of employment for the labouring class, the low rate of wages paid to them, and the hereditary band of robbers and freebooters who inhabit these provinces, the comparatively few cases of theft and robbery, which annually take place in these States, are creditable to the management of the police. In walled cities and towns throughout Rajputana, cases of house-breaking and gang-robberies are of rare occurrence; and if at any time such are committed, the robbers very seldom escape detection. Highway robbery on caravans and pilgrims, the lifting of pack cattle of the Banjaras and camels of foreign merchants, are among the

daring forms of robbery, to which the traveller, when going from place to place inadequately guarded, is occasionally subjected. The principal cause of the occurrence of highway robbery is the want of good roads. In the Jaipur and Bharatpur territories there are metalled roads, but in Marwar and Mayer, in the sandy deserts and in steep ascending passes, under the scorching sun of a June day, the cart driver becomes confounded and bewildered; he is tired and fatigued; hungry and thirsty; perspiring like a stage-horse on duty; his bullocks unyoked, his wheels broken, and his cart sunk a foot under the sand, he cries out for assistance; and with what assistance does he meet? He sees before him twenty or thirty Minas or Mewatees running to his rescue with spears and matchlocks in their hands. They arrive near him, unload his cart of every thing it contained, and drive off the weary bullocks quietly towards a neighbouring jungle. These Mewatees here commit a daring robbery, but what marauders would resist the temptation under such advantageous circumstances? Who would refuse a dozen bales of cloth, *pushmina*, or silk in a manner thrown at his feet? Even a bunia would oscillate for a moment whether to give shelter to the man or to plunder his property.

The revenue administration of a native State is something peculiar to itself, and is an institution which has few parallels in modern times. The greater portion of land in each State being alienated in jagirs and religious grants, the revenue derived from the *khalsa*, or that portion of land which is under the direct assessment of the State, is the property of government, and meets all its expenditure. The jagirs are of several kinds; amongst which that given for military service is the principal, and is one not resumable by the State, as long as the service originally agreed upon is faithfully performed. When the Rajputana principalities were first founded, and the country taken possession of from the Minas, Bhils, and other aboriginal peoples who occupied it, the conquest was, as tradition goes, effected by military adventurers of the Rajput tribe, with leaders at their head from amongst the scions of the ruling families of Ayodhya and Konouj. A land thus conquered, by the aid of military chiefs and soldiers of their own blood and kin, admitted a permanent right to the occupation of its soil on certain conditions from the beginning, supported by the laws and customs of the country. As a consequence of the necessity for constant military aid from them for the preservation of the conquered land, the feudal lords received their grants of villages in jagir, in consideration of the duties which they engaged to perform on an emergency,

and the number of horses they supplied for the constant service of the State. Another kind of jagir was the grant made formerly as provision in land for the support and maintenance of the junior members of a royal family, who have no claim to the throne, (which is always secured for the eldest son), but who being born of royal blood had to be provided with means suitable to keep up their dignity and position. This latter jagir is also granted on the same principle as the former, and held on the same conditions as those of the feudal lords:—the supply of effective cavalry horses and sowars for constant duty being compulsory, and a main condition of the grant. On the demise of these jagirdars leaving natural heirs of their own body, the son succeeds to the estate of his father, and his titles and honours, with the sanction of his government; but in the event of a failure of direct heirs, and when the landholder dies intestate, the adoption of an heir cannot be made without consulting the native government, and without procuring its sanction to that effect previously. In a few and isolated cases the adoption is made without the knowledge and consent of the Durbar; but it is not recognized nor are the honours and titles allowed, so long as the sanction of the Durbar has been not procured.

It has been asserted by some eminent writers on Indian questions, that the feudal system is the source of strength of a native government, and the cause of the happiness and prosperity of its subjects. The question when politically viewed apart from its merit of economy, has an aspect of sound policy and far-seeing political motive which prompted its originators to establish this system. The theory is based upon a sound principle, although in practice, by the gradual deterioration of the native governments and with them of the Rajput aristocracy, the system has been the source of occasional domestic feuds and differences. But the constitution of a Hindu government and its want of means to support an adequate military force, are defects well compensated for by the feudal system, which, in the emergency of the State, is more useful than a large army on regular pay. Under its operation, indeed, the commonest soldier feels the same concern for the stability of the State, as the feudal lord and the chief himself, for all of them are bound together by in the tie of a common interest in land, which being hereditary is valued more than money.

The other kind of jagir is the assignment of land made for State service. Under this head are included the jagirs of the highest functionaries, as well as of the commonest putwary of a village. These jagirs are often hereditary but sometimes for

life only, and they are resumable by the State at any time. The fourth kind of grant is that made for religious, educational, and charitable purposes. These do not lapse to the State on any account, but constitute a sort of endowment, and in this way has been alienated the greater portion of the land of a Hindu State. In the event of mismanagement of these endowments, the lands are temporarily resumed and officers appointed to superintend and bring their revenues into a proper state, keeping the accounts quite separate from the State financial accounts. The main source of revenue of a native State, as has been before mentioned, is the government share upon the produce of the khalsa land. The ryot of Rajputana, who is a tenant-at-will, and not a permanent tenant like his brethren of Bengal, cultivates his land under a lease from the neighbouring nazim or revenue collector. He is also sometimes a subordinate tenant to a zemindar, who takes in contract a purgunnah or a certain number of villages for a certain period, generally not exceeding three years. The ryot, although a tenant at will, acquires a right to the soil when it has been cultivated by him and his ancestors for a long period, and is not liable to ejectment so long as he continues the same cultivation under the terms granted in his lease. The assessment of taxes upon the cultivator is generally made twice a year in the seasons of the two crops of Rubbee and Rhoriff, and according to the value of the produce. The Nazim sends out Ameens to the villages under his jurisdiction, to estimate the crop of each cultivator when it is ripe in the field; and after this has been made upon every acre of the cultivated land, the share of the State is demanded. If the ryot is affluent, he pays it in money, if not, in produce, which is sold by the officers under the Nazim, and the amount remitted to the local treasury. The system of payment in kind is not a favourite system with the cultivator, nor is it profitable to the Nazim, who being responsible for the disposal of the grain and the realization of its price, tries to avoid this mode of payment; but the circumstances of the ryot sometimes compel the revenue officers to accept it.

The army of a native State is composed of the three principal arms of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and is generally officered by Mahometan and Rajput officers under the general command of a Commander-in-chief, who is designated Bukshi of the Fouj. The artillery is recruited from the Mahometan population of the State, and the infantry from both Hindu and Mahometans, while the cavalry branch of the army is mostly filled by Rajput horsemen, partly supplied by the jagirdars, and partly consisting of men engaged on regular pay. Besides the above three arms of

the modern system of warfare, there are irregular foot soldiers in some States who carry with them sword, shield, and knife, and occasionally bow and arrows, and go by the name of Nagas. These forces are drilled and equipped, though inadequately, yet after the European fashion, and are constantly reviewed by the Commander-in-chief, and occasionally by the prince himself. As to the efficiency of the army of a native State for active military service, the question can be better decided by professional men, but to ourselves, as superficial thinkers on the subject, it seems plain that the force maintained by a native prince is a match for the turbulent people he has to govern, though regarding it in the European sense of the term, it is essentially deficient.

The expenditure under the head of public works of a Hindu government, is a large item which the financiers have to meet from the State revenue. The lump sum, which is annually debited against this department of the State, is not expended on reproductive public works, but on such works as the construction of a Dharmashala, the sinking of wells in the vicinity of large towns, and the building of Bistraths in public bathing places on the Ganges and the Jamuna. The excavation of tanks, the construction of reservoirs, of roads, and of passes, and the erection of pillars and columns in the sacred shrines of Badrinarain, Kedarnath, Jwalamuki, Kashi, Gya, Muthura, and Brindabun are the favourite works of public utility with the native princes; while roads and canals in their own territories do not meet with the attention they deserve. It is a long established custom in India to construct public works in sacred places for the benefit of the pilgrims; and these have no doubt their merit from the Hindu point of view, when the question is reflected purely in the light of their religion. But it may be questioned whether the ruler of a State, as the guardian and responsible agent for the comfort and happiness of his subjects, ought to be allowed to fritter away the public revenue on philanthropic or religious works, the merit of which, according to his own religious teaching, accrues but to himself. In the social point of view, the subject has an equal share in the State revenue with the ruler himself, and after all the items of the State expenditure are paid, the balance ought to be appropriated to measures which would promote his comfort and well-being. This can only be secured by promoting his social and intellectual advancement, by establishing educational institutions, and giving free and liberal instruction to the unlettered;—by constructing good roads for the lame, the blind, the infirm traveller, for the poor man who carries a load on his head, for the distressed

widow who carries half a dozen children with her, and for the wretched cart-driver who drives a pair of famished bullocks wearied and fatigued by the constant strain to overcome the obstruction of rock and sand, of depressions and prominences of the road, which hinder the progress of his vehicle. Regarded financially, roads, bridges, and canals are the pioneers of trade and commerce, and consequently the forerunners of wealth and civilization.

The department of public instruction under a native government is another subject which is worthy of notice here. It is a notorious fact that Hindu rulers are invariably supporters of education, and are often unusually attached to men of learning and genius who reside at their courts. An astronomer, a logician, or a bard meets with that reception from a Hindu prince, which in other countries would be awarded to ministers and plenipotentiaries. The Peishwas of Puna, and the Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Udyapur ever took a delight in the influx of learned Brahmans, who formerly used to crowd to their courts from the different parts of India; and the extensive grants in land, which have been assigned to some pandits for their provision, prove beyond a doubt that the Hindu princes truly appreciated the merits of education. It used to be a custom in Rajputana that a Brahman, when he finished his education, was presented to his ruler by the court pandits; and after being publicly examined before the assembly of learned men and State officers, a title, approaching the meaning of the university degrees of Europe, was conferred upon him, and a pension granted for his maintenance. The educational grants in native States are generally given in jagirs, and in few and rare cases, the school-master's bill is paid from the treasury. The general education of the people at present being simply instruction in the Hindi language, a Brahman in each village has a Patshala of his own, which is supported partly by the State grant, and partly by fees received from the pupils and attended by boys of the Brahman, Rajput, Veysha, and Sudra castes, and sometimes by the village Mahometan boys as well. The education imparted in this institution is the reading and writing of Hindi, with arithmetic and letter writing. But in cities and towns throughout Rajputana, the better class of Brahmans study Sanskrita, and the Kshatriyas and sometimes the Veyshas also; whilst the Kyeths and Mahometans, as in other parts of India, acquire an education in the Urdu and Persian languages. These educational institutions, whether Sanskrita or Hindi, Urdu or Persian, are supported by the State. The pandit maintains his bidyalya from the



income of the land which has been assigned to himself or his ancestors; and the Moulvi obtains the means of his livelihood from a similar source as the Brahman, besides the fees he collects from his pupils. In some States schools and colleges have also been established for the study of the English language, and these institutions are largely attended by the sons of the nobility and gentry, who have commenced to appreciate the benefits of an English education.

The predominant class of people in Rajputana is the Rajput, after which the country has derived its name. In the Hindu gradation of castes, his social position stands only next to the Brahman, but above all others. The correct term expressive of his tribe is *Kshatrya*, the vulgar pronunciation of which is *Chuttri*. He is identical with *Thakur*, which appellation he has assumed to himself because of his presumed descent from the proud lineage of Ram, the demigod and the Raja of the Hindus, for which reason he is also called Rajput or offshoot of the family of a Raja. This is always a doubtful point with all foreigners and even with the inadequately informed Indians who often mistake the *Khetri* of a different blood for the *Kshatrya* of pure descent. The *Khetri* of the Punjab and elsewhere is a supernumerary caste over and above the four original divisions, and resembles the *Vyda* of Bengal in the circumstance of his coming into existence, and gradually growing into a tribe as large as any other caste. But as the history of that race has no affinity to the history of the *Kshatrya*, we dismiss the subject with the remark that these two races are as distinct from each other as the Brahman and the Veysha. It has been conjectured by some European writers that the modern Rajputs of India are of Scythian origin. These writers base their arguments upon two principal points; first, that since the extermination of the *Kshatrya* race by Parasu-Ram, the country had been entirely denuded according to the Purans of its warrior caste; and secondly, that a similarity of manners and habits, and, above all, a constant warlike propensity is observable in every individual member of the Rajput tribe. Colonel Tod and others of his school have supported this theory. We venture to assert, however, that European antiquarians have never been so miserably misled, and never committed themselves to such grievous error as in the case of the supposed Scythian origin of the Rajputs. The discovery of the tope of Manikyala by General Ventura, and with it, of some Scythian, Bactrian, and Grecian coins, and a similar discovery by Colonel Tod in Central India, caused the latter and Mr. Prinsep to

conceive the idle theory of the Scythian origin of the Rajputs. The extraordinary zeal, which then prevailed among the members of the Asiatic Society, for antiquarian research, induced them to commit similar errors in other matters likewise. The mistake, however, has been rectified by more than one writer on Indian history, and the opinion of Mountstuart Elphinstone on this subject is entitled to more respect than that of others. This historian, with his usual judgment and a true appreciation of all questions Indian, has proved beyond a doubt that the conjecture about the Scythian paternity of the Rajput is as erroneous as the argument in favour of it is untenable. Examining the question from a Hindu point of view, we find the Puran mentioning Ram and Januk as contemporaries of Parasu-Ram, the exterminator of the Kshatryas. Subsequently, at the epoch of the great battle of Kurukshatra, we find mention made of numerous families of Kshatrya kings and warriors in the Mahabharat, which proves the existence of that race long after its destruction by the Brahman warrior of the Punjab; and the Scythians of Central Asia were not brought into contact with the people of India, nor did they tread its soil till then. Under these circumstances it may be fairly asked (taking for granted the Scythian origin of the present Rajputs), what has become of the millions of Kshatryas who lived in the reign of the Pandavas? The extermination of Parasu-Ram was only confined to the limits of five rivers of the Punjab, and it did not probably extend to the banks of the Jamuna or the Ganges. It is only the poet who, with the licence of his craft, has extended the story to Cape Comorin.

Again, the restless and warlike habits of the Rajputs have led some to conjecture, that this race must have an early connection of blood with the Scythians; but the supposition does not stand upon a more solid ground than if it were vaguely asserted, that the Egyptian priests were descended from the Brahmans or *vice versâ*, because the priesthood of both the countries had a similitude in their religious monopoly. If the Scythians have any claim to the paternity of the Rajputs by reason of their wandering habits, the same cannot in justice be denied to the Arabs and Tartars, and hence we shall have three different races to contend for the origin of the fourth. It is a matter of no small regret that the antiquarians, who advocated the doctrine of the foreign origin of the Rajputs, lost sight of the simple fact that this proud race would even scorn the idea of their connection with the people of the moon, were such theories advanced to them. If there is any race of people upon the surface of the earth who

think themselves purer and of more aristocratic birth than another, it is the Rajput of India, who regards all other races and nations, except the Brahman of his country, as beneath him, as impure, base-born, and contaminated. To his eye no mortal man is equal to him in purity of blood and nobility of lineage, except those born of the families of Ram and Krishna themselves. The three principal Indian castes who wear the Yagya-Sutra or sacred thread, *viz.*, the Brahmin, Kshatrya, and Veysha have an innate aversion to mix or intermarry with any nation, however powerful or opulent it may be; and hence they have, as a rule, always kept themselves aloof from the foreigners who have, from time to time, conquered the continent of India.

The national character of the Rajput is a point which has many distinctive features, not exactly in harmony with the rest of the Hindus as one people, and not easily to be accounted for in the points in which it differs from the others. The early division of Hindus into different castes reduced them literally into different nations, though inhabiting the same country, and professing the same religion. The Rajput is a soldier to all intents and purposes both by nature and profession. He is first initiated into a military life by his mother when in his cradle, who relates to him the stories of the memorable defence by his race of the forts of Chittore and Ranathambore, the repeated repulse of the Mahometans from before those forts, and the resolution and constancy of the illustrious garrisons, who fought and died within them instead of surrendering to the enemy. He hears tales of the shooting of lions and tigers by his father and grandfather, and is exhorted to follow in their footsteps when he arrives at age. When he emerges from the *zenáná*, his education commences with the Hindi translation of the Ramayan and the Mahabharat, in which he finds the recital of the warlike exploits of his race. His diversions and recreations are all soldierly from the beginning. He becomes accustomed to riding, shooting, running, swimming, and other manly exercises at an early age; whilst the Bhats and others who attend on him, constantly read the genealogy of his family, and the soldierly virtues of his ancestors before him. It is in fact repeatedly impressed upon him both by precept and example, that he was born a soldier, must lead the life of a soldier, and die a soldier. The sword which is the favourite arm of a Rajput is an integral part of his costume, and he would not move a single step without it. In his private residence he also keeps this weapon with him constantly: in the bathing-room, in the dining-room, in his bed-chamber, and in the company of his wife and children, the Rajput will

be ever found with it at his elbow. As a soldier he has some peculiar virtues which are not approached by other Asiatics. He is an excellent horseman, a successful shooter, and an expert swordsman; he is staunch in fight; gallant in the field; and sober at home. He is liberal in his expenses; ferocious in his looks; haughty and overbearing in his manners; rough and uncourteous in his demeanour; but unusually simple and candid when the inmost feelings of his heart are examined after a little familiarity. He is not totally free from duplicity and dishonesty, but he would never wilfully commit them unless prompted by some exciting purpose. He is fond of land, of followers, and of women; and wherever he resides he is sure to acquire these three things to an extent more than necessary. He is careful of the strict privacy of his females and the preservation of their dignity, which he holds to be his sacred duty, and the source of his national honour. The Rajput women of respectability are invariably chaste and honourable, beautiful and educated, fond of their own religion and religious in its practice, accomplished in all social points. The sterner sex has also a high sense of charity and forgiveness, and a strict regard for religion.

It will be a material defect in the execution of the object of this article, if we were to omit to mention the political relation of the British Government with the native States, and the functions of the British representatives who reside at the courts of the Rajputana princes. But before entering into the details of this subject, it must be stated in justice to the political officers, that the outside public who occasionally talk and write upon the subject, greatly underrate the duties and responsibilities of our Political Agents, which, if impartially judged and carefully inquired into on the spot, would be found as onerous and delicate as those of any office in India. And, perhaps, no branch of the public service requires the exercise of so much tact, or entails so great a trial of temper and judgment, as the situation of a political officer in a native State. The British Government, as paramount power in India and amongst its protected allies of Rajputana, deemed it necessary, on the first conclusion of treaties with the native powers, to appoint a British officer in each State as the medium of communication between the Supreme Government and its feudatories; as the friend and disinterested adviser of the latter; and as a check against the intrigues and machinations of the courtiers and nobles by whom they are surrounded. It has been said above that the duties of a political officer are both onerous and delicate; that they are not easy is proved by the failure of many men of

undoubted ability who have been engaged on political missions. May we state what, in our opinion, has constituted the cause of such failure?

May not the reason be, that a British political officer in his mission to an Asiatic court is guided by his Christian impulses of right and wrong; his cherished notions and convictions of the law of nations, the rights of sovereigns and princes; and the duties and responsibilities of a plenipotentiary as taught in the European school of politics;—whilst the intrigues of the Asiatic courtiers, the one-sided policy of its rulers, and the non-fulfilment of their pledges and promises, set at naught all the tact and ingenuity of the British politicals? The Indian public, meanwhile, always impatient for a speedy and successful termination of a foreign policy, weighs the acts of a diplomatist in the scale of hope, which ever longs for success, and is never accustomed to receive in its balance the reverse of its wishes, however impracticable the final issue of it may be. The position of a public functionary in a diplomatic capacity in India is more delicate than it is in Europe. His situation becomes doubly difficult when his deeds and actions become the subject of public criticism. These remarks do not apply to the Rajputana politicals, who, as British agents deputed to inland protected States, guide the helm of their respective ships in a calm and untroubled sea, unaccustomed to the waves and storms which hazarded the political vessel of a Macnaghten or a Malcolm. But, peaceful as the mission of a Rajputana political is, it is not devoid of the interest which attaches itself to similar functions in other countries of the world, nor does it demand the less exercise of discretion and judgment, than is necessary in the remote allied States, and never do the actions of these officers escape public comment, when they commit the least error in the discharge of their duties. But it may be inquired, —what are the main duties of our Rajputana Political Agents, and how far have they succeeded in the performance of them? We would reply that a Political Agent in a Rajputana State has manifold duties to perform. He is the president of the court of *vakeels* established for the purpose of deciding cases of inter-jurisdictional disputes: he is the channel of communication between the British Government and the native prince, and the adviser of the latter in the administration of his State: he is also the referee in all differences between the chief and his nobles and courtiers. In his capacity of president of the court of *vakeels*, he has to decide a large number of cases annually, and this alone is enough to occupy the time of an active and intelligent officer. Although aided by his coadjutors, the native *vakeels*

of the different States, the Political Agent is the soul and substance of this court; without his constant supervision it would become corrupt and stagnate like other institutions in the hands of the natives. As the medium of communication between the native government and the Viceroy and his local representative, the Agent of the Governor-General, the political agent has to conduct a large amount of correspondence daily both in English and vernacular. In his capacity of adviser to the native ruler, he has to pay one or more State visits to him in a week, besides the weekly or fortnightly inspection of the jail and the educational institutions. His house is a regular thoroughfare from early morning to four o'clock in the evening, and men of all sections of native society and of all shades of life resort to him for advice and assistance in their respective affairs. It has almost grown to be a fashion among the gentry of Rajputana to keep up a constant intercourse with the British representative; and for this reason many Thakurs and others resort to the house of the Political Agent, even for matters of no great moment. The prince himself encroaches much upon the time of the Political Agent, by constantly sending for him and asking his opinion and advice in almost every measure which he undertakes for the administration of his State. This increased confidence of the people and their chief in the advice of the British Agent, reveals to us a state of things which could at the outset scarcely have been hoped for: which even the originators of the policy of appointing political officers in native States, did not, perhaps, fully anticipate at the time. It is highly gratifying to see that a Rajput prince, whose ancestors studiously avoided the advent of the Mahometan dignitaries and princes of the blood of the House of Delhi into their territories, even on the occasion of hunting excursions, does, of his free will and accord, invite the Agent of the Governor-General to his court, and when that officer's time is occupied with other more important business, that the prince himself should travel miles from his own territory for an interview with him, and candidly ask his advice on State matters. It can be easily inferred from the above how it tends to the advantage of the Hindu princes, and the credit of the British name and the British Government that such appointments should be well filled. We have often heard many old and thoughtful Rajputs remark, that the integrity and the sense of responsibility of the British officers are the grounds of the stability of the British empire in the East, and the source of the prosperity and advancement of the nation. The Political Agent renders an invaluable service to a native State when the prince is a minor, and the

administration of the government is conducted by a Regency Council under his directions. In this instance many an officer has given English education to the minor princes, established English schools in their States, and greatly reformed their judicial and revenue administrative system, a service which has been duly appreciated by the princes themselves, when they have arrived at the age of discretion, and taken in their own hands the reins of government.

The general administration of a native government for the last thirty years has assumed a sober and enlightened tone theoretically not far behind that of an ordinary civilized modern State. Whether we look at its revenue system or its judicial courts, its police or its army, we find everywhere traces of system and order based upon the laws and customs of the country, and evincing a good administration. Whether we look to the flourishing shop of the bunia, the well-cultivated field of the ryot, or the beautifully planted garden of the mali, our eye meets everywhere marks of the happiness and prosperity of the people. In cities and towns, in the midst of squares and bazaars, the banker sits with the same ease and contentment of mind with his iron-chest loaded with gold and silver coins and his writing-box containing cheques, notes, drafts, and hundis, as he would do in the British cities of Delhi and Agra. The confectioner has the same flourishing and attractive shop as his brethren of Benares and Allahabad, and the artizan produces the same fancy articles as the members of his craft in other parts of the country. The carpenter works with his chisel with the same independence of spirit, as his race throughout India; and the blacksmith beats his anvil and sings his ballad in a mood of mind equally expressive of happiness and contentment. In a word, security of life and property in a native State is not less than it is in the British districts, and forced labour is to the full as restricted in the one as in the other. The feudal lords in the districts, and the officers and ministers in the seat of government, who, in former times, often lived at variance with their prince, now execute his orders and mandates with a care and punctuality indicative of a thorough spirit of discipline. The money-lender, who in olden times used to oppress, torture, enslave, and sell his insolvent debtor, has been taught to realize his money by the legitimate means of the civil court. The criminal, who, only sixty years ago, if convicted of a crime, would have lost some of his limbs, now obtains food and clothing within the precincts of a jail, as well as medicine and medical attendance when the state of his health requires it. The administration of a Hindu prince has likewise

its other phase, which in some respects is so mild and humane that it excels all the theory of humanity of a Christian Government. The poor and the infirm, the lame and the blind obtain full subsistence from the State alms-houses, and the widow and orphan of respectable but destitute families are provided with the means of living from the public treasury. The defaulting ryot is not dealt with so unceremoniously as under the British laws, nor is he at once ousted from his field as in the British provinces under the permanent settlement.

It may be asked, perhaps, how this change for the better administration of a native State has come on so suddenly and within so short a period. The question may be at once answered by a few comprehensive sentences; first, by the able supervision of our political officers; secondly, by the example of the liberal administration of the British districts which environ the protected States on all sides; thirdly, by the gradual infusion of a better *morale* into the minds of our Hindu princes themselves, partly by English education, and partly by intercourse with British officers and other foreigners; and lastly, by the fostering care of that paternal Government, which for India's good, holds the paramount sway of the empire from the Khyber Pass to Adam's Bridge. The present generation is somewhat inclined to the idea of constant change and radical reform. Whilst admitting the principle of effecting progressive but gradual improvements in the system of native administration,—for progress to be permanent must be gradual,—we conscientiously believe that it is of all things most necessary that the existing relation of the native States with the paramount power should continue, as it is, without interruption; for it is by virtue of the connexion as it now exists, that the Hindu princes will appreciate more and more the social, moral, and political benefits which they derive by an alliance with the representative in Asia of European civilization, and that they will be kept in constant remembrance of the duties and responsibilities with which it has pleased the great Dispenser of events to entrust them.

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ART. VI.—1. *Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science.*

2. *Proceedings of the Bethune Society for the Sessions of 1859-60, 1860-61.* Calcutta, 1862.

3. *Transactions of the Benares Institute for the Session of 1864-65.* Benares, 1865.

4. *Proceedings of the Association of Friends for the Promotion of Social Improvement.*

5. *Five Hundred Questions on the Social Condition of the Natives of India.* By the Rev. J. Long. (Read before the Royal Asiatic Society, 19th June, 1865.)

6. *The Ninth Annual Report of the Family Literary Club, with the Anniversary Address.* By the Rev. J. Long. Calcutta, 1866.

SOCIAL Science is the science which investigates the laws and principles which lie at the root of society, with a view to the happiness and welfare of mankind. Its province is to enquire into the internal economy of States, and the conditions by which it is affected; the various phases of society and their several relations; their social evils and abuses; and, contemplating these in the light gained by experience, to devise the means of amelioration, and to give a civilizing and enlightened impetus to the onward progress of the human race.

We shall not stay here to enquire whether such a thing as a science of society is possible. If society is anything more than a fortuitous agglomeration of human beings taken at haphazard; if there are any moral principles which pervade and regulate the whole constitution, no less surely than there are laws of human conduct which affect each member of society; if, in fact, there is much that is analogous in the body politic and in the individual man, we shall take it for granted that the consideration of the one may be treated in as scientific a method, and, provided that a sufficiently large area be selected, with as satisfactory and accurate results as may the consideration of the other. The science of history is in fact the science of society, with this difference only that, while the former extends its

researches to all ages and countries, Social Science (properly so called), though always ready to avail itself of the experience of the past, limits its immediate enquiries to the existing conditions around us. But they equally purpose to trace the connection between cause and effect in the action of communities, to determine the laws which operate in their midst, and the extent to which they are affected by external circumstances.

It is obvious therefore, that our study is intimately connected with the science of government. Treating as it does of questions of social importance, it is clear that many of them must be of political importance likewise, as affecting the happiness of the majority, or as calculated to leave a permanent impress on the character of the nation. The amendment of the laws and institutions of a country, popular education, the relief of the poor,—these and similar questions have a political no less than a social meaning, and their proper solution is no less conducive to good government, than it is to the happiness and welfare of those concerned. It may not unnaturally be expected therefore, that among the votaries of Social Science will be found not merely the enthusiastic philanthropist, who finds his highest pleasure no less than his chief duty in promoting

institutions, determines how far the general principles of Political Economy and similar abstract sciences are applicable. There is probably no country in the world, and there probably never existed a country in which the pure maxims of political economy could be strictly carried into practice without the most dangerous consequences. The pre-existent conditions can never, in reality, exactly correspond with those on which the philosopher works in the pursuit of his favourite theory, and until these conditions are accurately determined and understood, it is impossible to foresee whether the application of theoretical principles will work for evil or for good.

It will be seen from the above that Social Science is in its very nature eminently practical. It deals ever with the present, with the phenomena of society in operation around us and in our very midst, with the actual condition of mankind. And in the same way its suggestions are always practical. It is ever striving after improvement, it bears on its front the watchword of amelioration, it recognises the great law of our nature, and aims at the promotion of such measures as tend towards the moral and intellectual advance of the human race. And regarded in this aspect, it cannot be surprising that it has never failed to enlist among its supporters the practical man of business, as well as the theorist and philosopher. To many, indeed, its chief recommendation appears to be this—that it leads men to act no less than to think and talk. For, in the first place, being based like all other sciences on the observation of facts, it obliges everyone, who is desirous of engaging in its pursuit, to use his own eyes in the contemplation of the mixed good and evil around him, to look not merely on his own things, but every man also on the things of others. And then when facts have been ascertained, experiments tested, and the true solution has been applied, the fortunate discoverer, so far from being left to boast of having contributed his labours and their results to the cause of science merely, has the further satisfaction of knowing that he has been the means, perhaps, of alleviating intense woe and suffering, or otherwise of benefiting numbers of his fellow-beings. It is this practical view of Social Science, which must ever constitute its chief attraction and its superiority over all other Sciences, whether physical or moral.

The study of Social Science is not so novel as perhaps its name might lead us to suppose. But it was for a long time confounded and treated in connection with Political Economy, and it is only of late years that it has been recognised as a distinct and independent, though nearly allied branch of study.

Like every other science, it has of late years made prodigious strides. Public attention has been drawn to the subject, and it is becoming extremely popular not only in Great Britain, but on the Continent and in America. The solution indeed of the various problems connected with the condition and progress of society, cannot fail to excite an interest in every man, in whose breast is to be found a spark of humanity, or who is not wholly wrapt up in himself. The statesman, the philanthropist, the practical man of business, all who have dealings with their fellow-men, and who desire, from motives of duty, of benevolence, or even of selfishness, to do their best towards improving the condition of those around them, and of making this world more beautiful and happy, have found a pleasure and an interest in the pursuit of Social Science. It may be that all are not able to study the subject scientifically, but all may contribute their observations and experience.

The first attempt in Europe to effect a combination of individual efforts in the pursuit of this science, and to organize on an adequate scale the machinery necessary for the attainment of the objects at which it aims, dates no further back than 1857. In that year, at a meeting held at Lord Brougham's residence and attended by forty-three persons of influence, was founded the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science. The new Society was based on the model of the British Association for the advancement of Science. It seeks to excite public interest and to effect the objects in view, by an Annual Congress of its members, lasting a week and held in different towns of the United Kingdom. At these Congresses addresses are delivered and papers read and discussed, the result being that by these means important facts have been elicited, new principles of action have been laid down, and several beneficial measures for the good of society or particular classes thereof recommended to the notice of the Government. A Volume of its Transactions, containing the more important papers which have been contributed, is annually given to the world. And not the least among the advantages which have been gained by these provincial meetings, has been the local interest which has been raised in the towns which the Association has visited in sanitary and all other measures of social improvement. The Association was at first divided into five departments—Jurisprudence, Education, Punishment and Reformation, Public Health, and Social Economy. To these a sixth department was added in 1860 for the consideration of questions connected with Trade and International Law; but this division of the subject appearing somewhat redundant, the sections

were shortly afterwards reduced to the four—Jurisprudence, Education, Health, and Social Economy. The objects of the Association were thus stated by its Committee:—"to aid the development of social science, to spread a knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence, and to guide the public mind to the best practical means of promoting the advancement of education, the prevention and repression of crime, the reformation of criminals, the adoption of sanitary regulations, and the diffusion of sound principles on all questions of social economy, trade, and international law. The Association aims to bring together the various societies and individuals who are engaged or interested in furthering these objects, and without trenching upon independent exertions, seeks to elicit by discussion the real elements of truth, to clear up doubts, to harmonise discordant opinions, and to afford a common ground for the interchange of trustworthy information on the great social problems of the day."

It was, perhaps, no more than was to be expected, if such an Association, notwithstanding the influential names by which it was promoted, should at first be regarded with suspicion, if not with absolute disfavour. Men shook their heads, as they asked each other, *Cui bono?* and not unnaturally preferred to wait and see what the Society really could and would effect. There seemed to be a general feeling that it was but the offspring of a passing enthusiasm, of which no trace whatever would remain in the course of a few years. But the Association soon triumphed over these prejudices. Its meetings proved a glorious success; some important measures of real service to the country were carried through its instrumentality; and at length it so far succeeded in winning public favour, that its members are now counted by thousands. The subject was moreover taken up with interest on the Continent, in Russia especially, and the International Association was formed in 1862.

The credit of calling public attention to the subject in this country, is justly attributable to the Rev. James Long,—a Christian gentleman who has so long identified himself with the elevation of the masses in India as to require no further introduction to our readers. From time to time Mr. Long has endeavoured to interest the public of England and India in the history and progress of civilization among the people of this land. His "*Five Hundred Questions on the Social Condition of the Natives of India*" have already been noticed by this Review. And we have now before us his lecture on "*Social Science for India*," delivered last April at the Family Literary Club, "much to the satisfaction of the ladies and gentlemen

present," as the Report informs us. But Mr. Long did not confine his exertions to mere lecturing on the subject. He succeeded in forming Societies for the prosecution of its study at Kishnaghur, Ooterparah, Sooree, and Berhampore,—institutions which, it is to be hoped, will shortly form valuable adjuncts to the Bengal Social Science Association. And availing himself of the sudden interest created in social questions among Europeans as well as natives, by the late visit of Miss Carpenter to this country, he has, we believe, succeeded in placing the movement on a satisfactory and permanent basis.

To those who take an interest in the progress of social science in Great Britain, the name of Mary Carpenter was not unknown. Her successful labours in the reformation of juvenile criminals and in the establishment of Ragged Schools, had given her a world-wide reputation for large-hearted philanthropy and wise beneficence. It was, therefore, with a feeling of confidence, that Mr. Long laid his suggestions before her, and it was with a sincere pleasure that she heartily seconded his proposals. Miss Carpenter lost no time in inviting a few of the leading European and native gentry to meet her at the rooms of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The meeting was well attended, and the numerous applications for invitation proved the warm interest taken by the community, either in the subject itself or its promoter. The chair was taken by the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Cecil Beadon, the Viceroy also signifying by his presence the approval with which the movement was regarded by the Government. Miss Carpenter addressed the meeting at some length. She sketched in pure and fluent diction the history of the National Association of Great Britain, and its labours up to the present time, urging the expediency of organizing a similar institution, either affiliated or otherwise, in this country. Her address was followed by a unanimous resolution, admitting the benefits to be derived from the study of social science in India, and a Committee was appointed to devise measures for establishing an Association for its promotion.

The Committee at once proceeded to draw up a scheme for effecting the objects of the proposed Association. In this they gladly availed themselves of Miss Carpenter's large experience, though owing to the peculiar conditions of this country,—peculiarities acknowledged by that lady herself before her departure from India—their recommendations differed in some material points from those originally suggested by her. A large number of persons having intimated their design of joining the Association, a general meeting of the members was held on the 22nd January last, at which the proceedings of the Committee

were finally adopted. A council and office-bearers were elected, and a constitution was thus given to the new Society. And here we must take our leave of the Association for the present, in the hope that at some future day we may have reason to revert again to its labours when we may find the young and tender plant, which has just been planted, a strong and vigorous tree, bearing abundant fruit and shooting out noble branches.

The objects, aimed at by the Bengal Association, are similar in their scope to those described above. The Association will endeavour to collect, arrange, and classify series of facts bearing upon the social, moral, and intellectual condition of the people of Bengal, and by such means to assist in the promotion of measures for the good of the country. In the department of education, for instance, what a wide and noble field is open to the exertions of the Society. While the revenues of the State have been expended in the foundation of Universities, and the encouragement of a forced and unnatural system of training for the higher classes, what has hitherto been done for the education of the poor? What proportion among the masses throughout the length and breadth of Bengal can even write their own names? And for those who are able to read, what is the character of the literature available to them? Is it not in the highest degree puerile, disgusting, and immoral? What again is the prospect of female education, and by what means can it best be fostered and improved? What is the effect which it is likely to have on Hindu society in general, and is there any real cause for the latent opposition entertained by some of its leading members? We believe that by the popular discussions of questions like these, many facts will be brought to light which escape the notice of the Government Inspectors, while the public mind will be disabused of very many errors which it at present entertains.

Neither is education the only department with which the Association may advantageously deal. The condition of the labouring classes, the improvements of agriculture, the facilities for communication, the provision of a poor-law for Bengal, and the principles upon which it should be based,—these are subjects on which much valuable information remains to be collected, before remedial or progressive measures can be applied. The encouragement of habits of prudence and economy among the lower orders, for instance, must be preceded by an enquiry into the existing means by which and the extent to which they hoard their savings at present. Would not the establishment of Government Savings Banks, in the neighbourhood of the large towns at least, not only have the effect of attaining

the object in view, but at the time of setting at liberty a vast amount of the precious metals, which are now unprofitably manufactured into bangles or buried underground? The increase of habits of intemperance among all classes has already attracted the notice of the natives themselves, and calls for the fullest investigation with a view to the removal of its cause. The subject of the public health too is one which should early receive the attention of the Association. The importance of vital statistics cannot be over-rated, and it is possible that the genius of the Society might be able to devise some better system of registration of births and deaths, than has hitherto been found practicable even in Calcutta. The expediency of requiring some degree of professional skill in the native quack doctor or *kabirāj*, of checking the adulteration of food, and of interdicting the indiscriminate sale of poisons, and the effect of these measures on the rate of mortality, may also be fairly discussed. And deeply connected with this subject are the general laws of sanitation, as affected by overcrowding, by insufficient drainage, by close and ill-ventilated houses.

These are some of the questions which invite the attention of the Association. We have not attempted to enumerate all which have occurred to our mind, for one idea leads so rapidly to the conception of another, that, were we to do so, we should find ourselves with a set of questions before us as ample and as intricate as that propounded by Mr. Long. But we have perhaps said enough to demonstrate, that the new Society by the discussion of these and similar topics, by collecting facts, by sifting and examining theories, may do much towards ascertaining the general laws which are in operation in this country, and so determine the principles on which all measures of progress should invariably be based.

But it is necessary that we should say a few words as to the manner in which these objects are to be attained. It would be possible perhaps even in this country, as at home, for the Association to hold Annual Congresses from year to year in the chief seats of wealth and intelligence. The Association might, undoubtedly, successfully meet at such large centres as Kishnaghur, or Dacca, or Benares, and the result of such meetings would be no less advantageous in the moral and material improvement of such towns, than it would be productive of increased popularity to the Association itself, and its wise and benevolent objects. But at the same time we are of opinion that the Committee have very properly determined that, for the present at least, the discussions of the Society shall be confined to the metropolis. Quarterly meetings then for



the reading and discussion of papers will be held in Calcutta, where a standing Council will always be at hand, to give weight, accuracy, and solidity to the Society's proceedings. And here we must be allowed to point out that the whole of this wise scheme will assuredly fall to the ground, if the natives are not willing and indeed forward to contribute such information as it lies within their power to afford. We cannot and we do not for one moment expect such a sudden influx of original papers as has fallen to the lot of the National Association of Great Britain, where some two hundred papers on all questions are read and disposed of at each Annual Congress. But we do expect that educated natives in all parts of Bengal will do their best to second the exertions of the Association, by supplying such facts as will enable it to come to a right decision on the questions which it may choose to take up. It is only in this way that they can avoid being mis-represented, both here and in England, by ignorant and misguided, though probably well-intentioned philanthropists, some of whom appear, from time to time, even in Calcutta. It will probably be found convenient to issue circulars calling for information on particular points, and the amount of good which the Association can effect will depend upon the character of the replies which are received. If they are inaccurate or untrustworthy, they will obviously be useless for any purpose whatever. Or if, instead of being strictly confined to matters of fact, they attempt to speculate and wander away from the subject in hand, it is equally clear that they will not be much more valuable. The first business of the Association will be to collect reliable statistics, accurate data on which its deductions may be safely based. And herein will be the great advantage of a central standing Council, which will be in the position to compare, test, examine, and revise the papers as they are received, and thus provide that conclusions are not drawn from erroneous or insufficient premises. In course of time, as Branch Associations and Local Committees are formed in the Mofussil, it will be relieved of a large proportion of these duties, and we may then hope that an attempt will be made to introduce the valuable practice of periodically visiting and holding a Congress of the Association in the large towns of Bengal.

But it may perhaps be objected that the new Society is only aiming at objects, which similar institutions have already attempted to compass. True, but if those objects are good and noble, and if they have not as yet been fully attained, that is surely no sufficient reason why another attempt should not

be made. Rather perhaps is it incumbent upon us to endeavour to detect in previous institutions the elements of failure, and so avoid the rock on which the vessel has hitherto been wrecked.

First, then, in the order of time probably comes the Bethune Society, founded by Dr. Mouat fifteen years ago. It is well known that this Society has a section devoted to sociology, but without the slightest disparagement to that noble institution, which indeed we hold in the highest respect, it is perhaps not too much to say that as regards this particular section, its labours have not been marked by any great success. The fact is, the Bethune Society was established for a very different purpose; it was established for literary and intellectual recreation rather than the promotion of social progress; for self-improvement rather than the improvement of the masses. And hence it cannot be a matter of surprise that the Society has never made much progress out of Calcutta. *There* we have pleasure in admitting the great good which has been effected through its instrumentality; and we believe that its labours will be well seconded, but in no way interfered with, by the new institution which has lately been established.

The "Association of Friends for the Promotion of Social Improvement" also proved greatly useful for some time in the discussion of social questions peculiar to the country, and in the diffusion of sound and enlightened views among the educated portion of the native community. But it unfortunately wandered into the maze of legislative reform, and then appears to have lost itself. It lacked, moreover, the weight and solidity, which a due admixture of the European element would have given to its discussions. We are informed that it is now "in abeyance," and it will probably at once be merged into the Bengal Social Science Association.

The Benares Institute is similar in its objects to the Bethune Society of Calcutta, and was perhaps one of the most hopeful native institutions that have yet arisen in this country. Founded in 1861 by Baboo Ram Kali Choudri as the "Benares Debating Club," it threatened at first to languish from mere want of support; but in 1864, the rule precluding the admission of Europeans was cancelled, and the expediency of the change was very soon manifest. Under the able management of the Revd. M. A. Sherring, the usefulness and popularity of the Society rapidly increased, as many as thirty-seven papers being received during the first year after the change. The section on Social Progress, we are informed, was especially popular "and contained no less than thirty-seven members, of whom

"eighteen contributed essays on as many important subjects connected with civilization and human progress." We have not heard lately of the further labours of this Society, but the above, we think, affords ample encouragement in the establishment of a catholic institution, whose labours may be extended throughout the whole of Bengal.

The character and objects of the Mahomedan Literary Society are implied in its very name. Like the Bethune Society, it aims at self-improvement rather than the promotion of social progress. Under its able and energetic Secretary, Moulvi Abdul Latif, it promises to become a useful and popular institution in the cultivation among Mahomedans of this country of that art and refinement for which they have been so justly celebrated throughout the world. But, confined as it is to one section of the Indian community, and being founded, moreover, for purely literary purposes, its objects are of a very different nature to those of the Social Science Association.

Such are perhaps the most important of the numerous Debating Societies, which have sprung up during the last twenty years among the native community of Bengal. The new institution, occupying as it does a different field, will in no way interfere with their free action and continued usefulness. The Bengal Social Science Association is practical and scientific rather than literary: its objects are not confined to the good of its immediate members, but in a catholic and cosmopolitan spirit it seeks the amelioration of all classes throughout the country. And therefore, while no argument as to its future can be fairly drawn from the fate of previous institutions,—for never was an Association in this country founded under equally favourable auspices,—it is obvious that it may flourish side by side with those which are still in existence, and, so far from interfering with their objects, may actually aid them in the noble ends for which they were originally established.

But it cannot be concealed that, however practicable and valuable such an institution as the Bengal Association confessedly may be, there are considerable doubts abroad as to its durability and permanence. It is thought that when the enthusiasm to which it owes its rise has passed away, the Society will collapse spontaneously, and disappear into the oblivion of the past. But these are doubts which can only be solved by time, though at the same time those who withhold their adhesion in consequence of entertaining them, are unconsciously, perhaps, doing their best to bring about the fatal catastrophe of which they are the unhappy augurs. We have seen that the same doubts were expressed in England on the formation of the

National Association, an institution which after a glorious career of ten years was never so useful or so popular as it is at the present day. And we venture to predict for the Bengal Social Science Association a career equally successful and of long duration, if only natives and Europeans will take the trouble to communicate the simple facts which come under their immediate observation. It must be remembered that it is not elaborate papers on theoretical questions that are needed, so much as a plain, unvarnished statement of ascertained facts, the basis and groundwork of every scientific system.

But there is another and, perhaps, more serious charge brought against the new institution, with which we feel ourselves compelled to deal at greater length. "Whatever may be the advantages of social science at home," say these detractors, "we don't believe in it for this country. We are at a loss to see what permanent good it can effect in India." And although this objection may seem somewhat indefinite, we never could get it stated in clearer or more satisfactory terms. There may be a latent and mysterious meaning underlying the words, which can alone be comprehended by the initiated, or it is perhaps possible that they simply give expression to a similar vague and uncertain doubt as that which we have already considered, and which means no more or less than that the speaker does not wish to commit himself to the project, until he has seen whether it is likely to attain even a measure of success.

For our own part we are unable to conceive any argument in favour of the study of social science, which is applicable to Great Britain and not also applicable to India. On the other hand, we can imagine very many additional reasons for the pursuit of the study in this country. It may not be out of place to enumerate some of these.

To put it upon its lowest grounds then, we conceive that the establishment of an Association for the promotion of social science in India, cannot be otherwise than beneficial in tending to bring together in harmonious and philanthropic contact all classes of Europeans and natives. It is an unfortunate circumstance incidental to our peculiar occupation of the country, that there really is so very little in common between ourselves and even the most intelligent of the native community. Differences of race, of civilization, of religion,—differences, at times unhappily fostered by class prejudices,—alienate the two nations from each other, while there is scarcely a single stand-point which may be occupied by both in common. Any institution, therefore, which tends to bridge over this chasm and to afford common interest to both nations, is well deserving

of support and encouragement. It is not a question of political animosity between the governing body and the governed,—between the conquering invader and the vanquished patriot. Our rule has now been so long and firmly established, and during all that time has been so merciful and just, that in Bengal at least we venture to say that all such animosity has long since disappeared, and British government is acquiesced in as most conducive to the moral and material welfare of the country. But, identify ourselves as we will with the natives, there are race distinctions which can never be obliterated, and to which we cannot shut our eyes. We may call the Hindus our “Aryan brothers,” and perhaps it is well that we should thus at times call to mind our common origin; but at the same time it must be remembered that for more than two thousand years the brothers have lived widely apart, in different circumstances, and without intercourse of any kind. Time and the external conditions with which they have been surrounded have moulded in a distinct form the character, the habits, and the institutions of each. And now, when they meet again on the banks of the Ganges, it is scarcely to be expected that they should either of them find it an easy thing to accommodate their ideas to the other. But if there can be found any subject, the study of which may excite a common interest and be pursued in union by both as brethren, it is surely not bad policy to endeavour to make the most of it. It is indeed possible that by enquiring into each others’ manners and institutions, and discussing their respective merits and defects in common, we may not only both derive improvement, but learn to respect each other the more.

Nor is this all. Putting all lesser differences of class and caste aside, the native community itself is divided into two distinct portions, each with its own distinctive character and customs. There was a time no doubt when the Mahomedan was as obnoxious to the Hindu, as ever the Englishman has been to either. And if to some extent the two have been, externally at least, fused into one nationality, we may be quite sure that the union can never be perfect, so long as their respective religions, which have so much to do with the meanest actions of their every-day life, differ from each other so widely. The Association of course will steadily set its face against the discussion of questions touching either Moslem faith or Hindu worship, but at the same time there are many subjects which may fairly be discussed, but yet which cannot be properly viewed in all their aspects without taking into consideration the different modes of thought prevalent

in the two great sections of the native community. And if, by associating European, Hindu, and Mahomedan in the consideration of social amelioration and reform, the new institution is enabled to weld together more closely these discordant elements of Indian society, we conceive that its labours will not be altogether thrown away.

Rut we are further of opinion that the Bengal Social Science Association may, under proper management, prove of the utmost value and importance to the Government. The very variety and distinctness in creed and nationality of the subjects which we have just been considering, renders the wise and just administration of this large empire, the most difficult as well as the most wonderful problem which the world has ever witnessed. The broad and liberal principles on which the British rule is carried on, the endeavour to harmonize the dogma of non-interference with a civilizing and enlightened progress, while they have justly won the admiration of all, impose nevertheless upon our administrators a task which might be thought almost superhuman. For, divesting our minds of all ideas of superiority and right derived by conquest, if we endeavour to conceive of our Government as that which we would fain have it, a popular and national Government, adapting itself to the circumstances and feelings of its subjects, instead of ruthlessly shocking their dearest associations and privileges, we shall at once see that the realization of our conception requires so intimate an acquaintance with the wants and wishes of the people, that a whole life-time may well be spent in its formation. That our rule has hitherto been as successful as it has been proves that, if we have sometimes made mistakes, we have not greatly lacked the requisite knowledge in matters of importance. But, when we come to details, and desire to inspect the inner social life of the masses, perhaps even the oldest Company's officer, who prides himself upon his knowledge of the natives, will at times confess himself to be at fault. And, if we turn to England, to that Parliament in which is ultimately centred the controlling authority over all England's dependencies, east or west, is it not notorious that its members not only display gross ignorance on all questions relating to India, but actually endeavour to avoid their discussion?

The difficulty is perhaps not so obvious so long as our Government is stationary. If it were possible indeed, and we were content to let things remain *in statu quo*, to let the wheels of our administration drag on in the official ruts of the old by-paths, there would not be much danger of our running counter to any of the customs or habits of the natives.

But, so soon as we attempt to advance a single step, (and what Government is not bound to advance?) so soon as, regarding ourselves as the representatives in the East of the Western civilization of the nineteenth century, we attempt to extend its blessings to this country, with the introduction of railways and a more luxurious mode of life, with the extension of trade and commerce, with the progress of legislation and the purer administration of justice, we do run the risk of committing some egregious mistake, which may have the effect of engendering in the minds of the natives a deep-seated feeling of hostility in place of that confidence which should ordinarily exist between the governing and the governed. And in this view the Association may render important service to the Government by discussing such matters, either upon the motion of Government or otherwise, and in placing before it information on ascertained facts. In the amendment of the law, its operation would probably be found most beneficial, not only in discovering the temper and wishes of the community,—and for one section thereof this is done already by the British Indian Association,—but further in explaining the objects and policy of the Government. By the union of Europeans with natives, we may hope that if the prejudices of the latter are sometimes conceded, the arguments of the former may not be altogether without their due effect; that objections will be carefully weighed and sifted, and that, while the frivolous are rejected, a broad and liberal spirit will acknowledge the force of those which appear to be based on sound reason.

The ignorance prevalent in England regarding this her greatest dependency has frequently been deplored by this country, but it is by the people of India themselves that the evil can alone be remedied. While the English are left to gather information regarding this great country from the conversation or writings of occasional travellers, whose ignorance, perhaps, or want of opportunities, has rendered their observations comparatively worthless, if not actually false, it cannot excite surprise, if the views which are thereby propagated are imperfect, erroneous or even ludicrous. The gentleman who enquired the other day whether the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway Company had not obtained running powers over the Mutlah line, afforded a very fair specimen of the gross and shameful darkness in which the people of England grope in the discussion of all questions relating to India. It is therefore, as has been frequently pointed out, a duty which the natives owe to themselves, and which they are bound to perform, to co-operate with those who are endeavouring to dispel that darkness,

and to supply accurate and authentic information. More particularly as regards their social condition, much of which is impenetrable and unintelligible to a European, such information can only be furnished by the educated members of native society. A genuine portrait of native manners, customs, and institutions at the present day is undoubtedly a desideratum, which we hope ere long to see supplied, but without which no real measures of progress can be properly or safely introduced. The desire to learn more of India and its people has of late years greatly increased. Not only has the application of British capital to works of industry and improvement in this country given to many a personal interest in its welfare, but there has arisen a deeper sense of England's duty to this vast and teeming empire. Such happy signs augur well for India's prosperity, and cannot be regarded with indifference by those of the native community, who really have the good of their country at heart. In 1863, an Association was founded, with Lord Shaftesbury for its President, "for promoting the moral and social well-being of India." Its objects were stated to be two—(1) "to collect and diffuse authentic information on Indian subjects, and (2) to observe the course of legislation with the view of promoting measures, calculated to advance the well-being of all classes of the natives of India." But though the Association is, we believe, still in existence, yet it has actually never effected much, for this simple reason that it is situated at too great a distance from the scene of its labours. What is really wanted is an institution of the kind in this country under able and intelligent guidance, the proceedings of which would be given to the world under some sort of guarantee for their accuracy and fidelity. The transactions of the Bengal Social Science Association will, we believe, place in the hands of those gentlemen in England, who are interested in the progress of this country, information at once accurate, varied, lucid, and comprehensive.

The East Indian Association, which has lately been organized in London, is a professedly political body. Its probable merits and defects were fully and impartially discussed in the *Hindoo Patriot* of the 14th January last, and valuable as the institution undoubtedly is for the agitation of important principles connected with the administration of this country, it can never be expected to enter into the more intricate, if not also more interesting, questions of social progress. But on the other hand, a body like the Social Science Association may undoubtedly do much to aid its proceedings by furnishing valuable and reliable statistics, and by exhibiting the various views of the different sections of the native community.



It is indeed one of the greatest difficulties which a foreign Government has to contend with in India, that the rules and principles, which are applicable to one province of the country, are found to be so little adapted to the circumstances of another. The various races and nationalities, which have been commingled here, each with their own distinct manners, customs, character and institutions, render the task of laying down any general law applicable to the whole of India, one of very great moment and requiring the fullest possible information. Among such a varied population, social questions particularly are of increasing interest and importance. The field is specially wide for the consideration of such topics, and the establishment of a body, which will enter fully into them in all their bearings, is, we conceive, in this country more than in any other specially called for.

But further, we conceive that the study of social questions may do much in this country towards elevating and educating the higher classes of the natives. Our system of education wants to have a practical turn given it; it depends too much on mere memory, and requires to be supplemented by observation and the general application of fixed principles. Mere book-learning may make a good clerk, but it will never make a good and valuable citizen. And if it is an object so to educate the natives, that they may take a proper part in the administration of the empire, we must first create in them a sense of their responsibilities and an interest in the welfare of the country. After the many proofs to the contrary which we have lately witnessed in Calcutta, it would perhaps be too much to say that a benevolent and philanthropic patriotism is altogether wanting among the native community, but we think it cannot be denied that such a spirit is deplorably deficient. Were it not so, we should find the public relieving the Government of a large portion of its present duties, by devising and carrying out measures of social amelioration. But the Indian Government is essentially regarded as a paternal Government, and its subjects are too apt to look to it, like children, for the promotion of every project connected with their happiness and welfare. And thus the Government does much at the present time which might well be done, and which ought to be done, by the people themselves.

And surely it will not be contended that any project which has in view, or which may tend to, the cultivation of a public spirit and self-dependence, is not well worthy of support. If our Government is to be national and popular in this country, the people must be taught that they are not only units of the State, to be provided for and taken care of, but that, as such,

they have duties and responsibilities incumbent upon them. This is the education which is really wanted in Bengal, and which our Government has lately been doing its best to inculcate. Indeed, that alone is the true view of civilization which represents it as the growth, among all classes, of those powers of self-government, which qualify an individual for the civil duties of citizenship. And in this view any institution, which aims at raising the independence of the citizen, cannot fail to be valuable as increasing the power and intelligence of the State. In this country, however, so notoriously deficient are public spirit and public opinion, that it has long been the anxious and studied policy of Government to stimulate and foster them. With this view it has established Imperial and Provincial Councils, which may be considered the germs of future Indian Parliaments; it has left an audacious and not always over-loyal native press free and unfettered; it has encouraged municipalities and other institutions, which have a direct tendency to the education of the higher classes in self-government. And this policy is wise and will no doubt produce good fruit in due course of time. Already we see the British Indian Association bristle up from time to time, when it sees or thinks it sees its Hindu or zemindarry privileges in danger. But the defect of that Association is this—that it can, by its very nature, only take a one-sided and partial view of a question, whereas a Social Science Association, comprising as it should representatives of every section of the community, would thus be in a position to furnish every shade of opinion to Government.

Excepting, however, the action occasionally taken by the British Indian Association, it will readily be admitted that the interest taken in the course of legislation in this country is, if to any extent entertained, at all events very feebly expressed. Bill after Bill is introduced and passed through Council, without a single dissentient voice, or without the slightest popular discussion. Looking at the present constitution of the Indian Legislative Councils, this absence of opposition from within can scarcely excite surprise; but the absence of discussion without is, it must be confessed, an unnatural symptom in the condition of the country. The course of legislation usually runs not more smoothly than that of true love, and it is the rocky channel that contains the purest water. There can be no doubt that discussion is not only good for the people themselves as training them to take part in a national government, and interest themselves in the legislation of the country, but conduces moreover to greater care and diligence in the preparation of

legislative measures. And so far from viewing such discussion with displeasure, the prudent legislator will endeavour to encourage it, and avail himself of the various opinions that are put forward to improve and perfect his schemes.

We have thus attempted to sketch some of the advantages which the present movement in favour of social science may fairly be expected to yield. We have seen that the new Association presents another common ground, on which European and native, Hindu and Mahomedan, may meet in union and on equal terms, with the noblest of all objects before them,—the amelioration and advancement of the people of this land. We have considered the modes in which the Government may derive assistance and relief from the transactions of such a Society in the passing of measures calculated to promote the social welfare of the country. And we have lastly estimated the effect which such an institution is likely to have on the education of its native members in the important principles of self-reliance and self-government, and in the encouragement of that public spirit which is confessedly so sadly wanting in India. And if these results do in any degree flow from the Bengal Social Science Association, it will not, as we conceive, have been founded in vain. On the other hand, its objects must be admitted to be noble, wise, and philanthropic, and as such, claim the warmest support. For our own part we anticipate success, if only the native members of the institution are true to the interests of their country, and avail themselves of the opportunities now offered to them. At any rate we would urge that the merits of the new Association demand a fair trial, before being condemned as the impracticable dream of a visionary enthusiast.

- ART. VII.—1. *The Seir Mutakherin*, by Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, an Indian Nobleman of high rank, who wrote both as actor and spectator. Calcutta, 1789.
2. *Mémoire pour le sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives*. Paris, 1759.
3. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan from the year 1745*, by Robert Orme, M.A., F.A.S. London, John Nourse, 1773.
4. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre*, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844.
5. *Inde*, par M. Dubois de Jancigny et par M. Xavier Raymond. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
6. *An Account of the War in India, between the French and English, on the Coast of Coromandel, from the year 1750 to the year 1760*. Compiled by Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq. London, T. Jeffreys, 1761.
7. *History of the Mahrattas*, by James Grant Duff, Esq. Longmans, 1826.
8. *The History of India*, by the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone. London, John Murray, 1849.
9. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.
10. *The National Review*. Vol. IV. London, Chapman and Hall, 1862.
11. *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Wilks. London, Longman, 1810.
12. *The History of British India*, by James Mill, with Notes by H. H. Wilson. London, 1858.

THE vigour and energy displayed by Bussy at Amboor and Gingee, his prompt action at Kuddapah, alike on the field of battle as after the death of Mozuffer Jung, his subsequent march through the entire breadth of the Dekkan, and his triumphant entry into Aurungabad on the 29th June, 1751,

have been already adverted to.\* What there then remained to him to accomplish, and how he accomplished it, we have still to record.

But in order that we may obtain a complete and comprehensive view of the situation,—that, transporting our minds to the past, we may gaze at a panorama from which the light of the present is excluded, so as to see the India of that day, exactly as India then was, we purpose in the first place to give a brief retrospective sketch of the country known as the Dekkan, defining its original connexion with, and its degree of dependence upon, the empire of the Moguls.

The term Dekkan, though embracing in its literal meaning the whole of the southern part of India, was always held by the Mahomedans and has been since held by ourselves, to comprehend only that portion of southern India lying between the Nerbudda and the Kistna. After the extinction of the Toghlucluck dynasty in 1399, there arose from the ruins of the Delhi monarchy six independent sovereignties south of the Nerbudda. These were the states of Golconda, Bijapore, Aurungabad, Beder, Berar† and Khandesh. Of these, in the course of time, Berar merged into Aurungabad, and the greater part of Beder into Golconda, the remainder being swallowed up by Bijapore. But with the accession of the house of Timour to the throne, there commenced a struggle on the part of its representatives to recover these ancient appanages of the empire. Their efforts were so far successful, that in 1599 Khandesh was incorporated by Akbar into his dominions. Thirty-eight years later, Aurungabad, till then governed by the Nizam Shahee dynasty, and the capital of which had been captured by Akbar in 1600, was finally conquered by Shah Jehan. The dynasty of Adil Shah in Bijapore succumbed to his son and successor, Aurungzebe, in 1686; whilst the dynasty of Kootub Shah in Golconda offered a successful resistance to that monarch but a year longer. Thus it happened that twenty years before his demise, the whole of the country, lost to the crown of Delhi on the dissolution of the empire under Mahomed Toghlucluck, had recognized the supremacy of Aurungzebe.

It must not be imagined, however, that every portion of the three fallen monarchies of Golconda, Bijapore, and Aurungabad,

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\* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXVI.

† The Berar of those days did not include nearly so much territory as the kingdom of that name governed by the Mahratta family of the Bhondla. Nagpore itself did not form a part of it, being the capital of the adjoining province of Gundwana. Its capital was Illichpore.

stretching as they originally did to the sea to the westward, and comprising the cities of Poona, and Sattara, as well as Bijapore and Golconda, was in an equal degree of subjection to that monarch. Before even their conquest had been achieved, there had appeared the first germs of a power destined to rival, and finally to overshadow even, that of the Mogul. Commencing as a robber and a freebooter, Sivajee succeeded in baffling, sometimes even in defeating, the armies of the emperor. Leaving the capitals of the Mussulman dynasties to be occupied by the Moguls, he filched away whole districts for himself. So successful had he been in such enterprises, that on his death in 1679 he left, as an inheritance to his son, the western or seaboard portion of the territories that owed allegiance to the rulers of Aurungabad and Bijapore. The consequence of this, and of the subsequent contest of the Mahrattas with Aurungzebe, was, that on the death of that prince in 1707 the territory called the Dekkan, dependent on the Delhi empire, comprised the ancient kingdom of Golconda, a portion of the old kingdom of Aurungabad, with Aurungabad itself, and but a small slice of Bijapore. Dependent on this, however, was the long slip of 560 miles of territory on the eastern coast, known as the Carnatic. The western coast, with the exception of the parts occupied by the English and Portuguese, but including the cities of Poona, Sattara, and Bijapore, had become permanently Mahratta.

Aurungzebe was himself exercising regal functions in the Dekkan when his last illness attacked him at Ahmednugger. On his death,—the 21st February, 1707,—the authority in that quarter devolved upon his son Azim Shah, with whom was the best officer of the late emperor, Zoolfikar Khan. When, notwithstanding the efforts of Zoolfikar, Azim Shah was defeated and slain by his brother Sultan Moazzim at Agra in June of the same year, the latter so highly appreciated the talents of his opponent's general, that he at once appointed him Subadar of the Dekkan, conferring upon him at the same time the title of Ameer-ool-Amrah. Zoolfikar, however, preferred the intrigues of the Delhi court to an independent viceroyalty. He accepted indeed the appointment, but leaving Daood Khan Punnee as his deputy, he joined the court of Moazzim, who had assumed the title of Bahadoor Shah. On the death of this prince in 1712, a grand opportunity was offered to Zoolfikar for the exercise of the adroit baseness that with him was habitual. He took full advantage of it, so full indeed, that he very speedily met with the ordinary fate of unprincipled intriguers. For, having betrayed the emperor Jehânder Shah into the hands

of his nephew Farokhsir, he was at once strangled by order of the new sovereign. Zoolfikar was succeeded in the governorship of the Dekkan by Cheyn Koolich Khan, who was dignified on the occasion by the title of Nizam-ool-Moolk, a title which has gone down to his descendants, the present rulers of Hyderabad.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, known likewise as Asof Jah, was still Subadar of the Dekkan when the first contest for supremacy between the French and English began in the Carnatic. We have seen how in the early part of those struggles he imposed his law upon the contending parties by the appointment, after the murder of Sudder Ali, of his trusted lieutenant, Anwarood-deen, as Nawab of the Carnatic. His death and the consequences resulting from it,—the succession of his son Nazir Jung, his alliance with the English, his murder at the battle of Gingee; the installation of Nazir Jung's nephew Mozuffer Jung, his death at the moment of victory over the revolted Nawabs;—and finally the elevation in his place of his uncle Salabut Jung, the next surviving son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, have been already recorded.\* We have now to see what sort of inheritance it was upon which Salabut Jung thus entered, the obstacles that lay in his path, the difficulties that seemed to increase with every movement that he made. The office of Subadar of the Dekkan was not an hereditary office. It was in the gift of the emperor of Delhi. Now, at the time of the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the imperial throne had just fallen into the nominal possession of Ahmed Shah, and that monarch found himself too beset with difficulties of his own to pay much attention to the affairs of the Dekkan. It was in consequence of this, and of the increasing anarchy at Delhi in succeeding reigns, that the satrapy of Hyderabad,—the appointment to the government of which still remained nominally in the Crown,—came to be regarded virtually as an appanage of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk. It was however the knowledge that the real appointment was vested in the emperor, which induced the various claimants of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk to the Subadarship to fortify their pretensions by the publication of an imperial firman. It was by virtue of such a rescript, real or pretended, that on the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, his son, Nazir Jung, set forth his claims to be his successor. Relying upon the same authority, the validity of which was equally doubtful, Mozuffer Jung disputed those claims. When death had removed these two competitors, and the French General, Bussy, had elevated the third son of

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\* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIII. *Ibid*, No. LXXXVI.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, Salabut Jung, to the dignity, that nobleman, records Mr. Orme "did not think it safe to appear in sight of the capital before he had acted the stale but pompous ceremony of receiving from the hands of an ambassador, said to be sent by the Great Mogul, letters patent, appointing him viceroy of all the countries which had been under the jurisdiction of his father, Nizam-ool-Moolk."

Salabut Jung, however, was but the third son of that famous viceroy. The elder brother, Ghazee-ood-deen, had indeed, as we have stated, preferred, on the death of his father, to give a sullen acquiescence to the elevation of his second brother, Nazir Jung, to the Subadarship, rather than to plunge into a contest with one who had taken care to possess himself of his father's treasure. But time had changed the aspect of affairs. Nazir Jung had gone, Mozuffer Jung had gone, and in their stead reigned Salabut Jung,—a man reared in the lap of luxury, unused to govern, effeminate, slothful, and possessing an almost empty treasury. This state of things presented an opportunity for self-aggrandisement, which, in the decline of the Mogul empire, few possessed sufficient virtue to resist. Ghazee-ood-deen at least had not that sufficiency. Through the agency of Mulhar Rao Holkar, he opened out negotiations with the Peshwa, Ballajee Bajee Rao, and succeeded in inducing the great chief of the Mahrattas to support his pretensions.

We have seen how the difficulty presented by this alliance had been momentarily overcome. A present of two lakhs of rupees, during his march to Golconda, had induced the Mahratta general to retire. Such presents, however, ever form but incitements to new attacks. From the date of his triumphant entry into Aurungabad,—the 29th June, 1751,—to the autumn of the same year, Salabut Jung had indeed lived unthreatened. During that interval, however, Ghazee-ood-deen and Bajee Rao had had time to cement their plans, and it soon became but too clear that the prospect of a larger bribe had combined with the promises of Ghazee-ood-deen to determine the Peshwa to make a new and more formidable attack upon the Dekkan on the earliest and most convenient occasion. Affairs in that quarter being thus threatening, we may proceed to enquire how they were influenced by the conduct of Bussy, how likewise his presence in the capital of that division of the empire affected, or was likely to affect, the plans which Dupleix was revolving for the growth of a French empire in India.

The march of Bussy to Aurungabad in 1751, at the head of a force of three hundred Europeans and two thousand disciplined sepoys, his overthrow during that march of the three



conspiring Nawabs, his prompt elevation of Salabut Jung to the office and dignity of Subadar, had had the primary effect of making the French absolute masters of the situation. Bussy had, indeed, been a consenting party to the payment of two lakhs of rupees to Bajée Rao, as the price of his retreat,—but solely because he considered, and rightly considered, that the possession of the capital, and the peaceful occupation of the country, in the first instance, were objects which could scarcely be purchased too dearly. Arriving at Aurungabad, he so ordered his conduct that whilst nominally the faithful ally, he might really be the master, of the Subadar. To this end he selected as his own residence, and as the place to be occupied by his troops, a fortress at one of the extremities of the city, and completely commanding it. On the defences of this he mounted his guns, and disposed his detachment in such a manner that it might be ready for immediate service. He established amongst them the most rigorous discipline. No soldier was permitted to leave the fort but at a fixed hour and at a fixed time, and not even then without the written permission of the commandant. Punishments, more or less severe according to the offence, followed every infraction of discipline. The result was all that could be desired. There were neither bouts of drunkenness amongst the soldiers themselves, nor quarrels or altercations with the townspeople. The richest and most valuable goods were freely displayed under the protection of the French soldiery. Indeed, their conduct at Aurungabad was so exemplary that the natives soon came to admire them for their courtesy, as much as they had before feared and esteemed them for their valour.\*

Nor was Bussy for a long time less happy or less successful in his dealings with the Subadar and his courtiers. It was impossible that a man possessing any discrimination of character could be long associated with Salabut Jung, without noticing the frivolity and weakness of his nature. Few could fail to see that in a government like that of the Dekkan,—a government quasi-independent, but which, notwithstanding, a powerful emperor at Delhi might at any moment reclaim,—a government which, thus founded on no solid or permanent foundation, was exposed to the incessant attacks of the encroaching power of the Mahrattas,—everything must depend on the character of the ruler. If that ruler were weak and unstable; if he had no resources within himself, no mental energies upon which

to fall back and to depend ; it was certain that he must become the sport of fortune, the tool and instrument of the strongest mind that had access to him. Now, Salabut Jung, Bussy early divined, was that weak and unstable nature, and he determined that no one but himself should play the part of the strong-minded counsellor. In the force which he commanded he had one instrument upon which he could count to enable him to attain the desired position. It was not, indeed, that he displayed or intended to display his troops in an attitude of menace. He was far too wise, far too clear-headed, for that. He shut them up, as we have seen, in a fortress, and drilled them into courtesy and gentleness. But the moral effect of that force was increased thereby tenfold. Whilst they excited no jealousy, not a man but knew what they had done, what they could do, what they were ready to attempt, at the slightest word from Bussy. His power of restraining such a force added greatly to the influence of its presence.

But it was not upon the force that he so greatly relied. That was indeed the basis of his power : but a less able man might notwithstanding have used the influence given him by so strong a position to little purpose. Bussy trusted for the success of his plans to his own acquaintance with native character. Though frank, open, and conciliatory, he was in those days, before yet age and gout had begun to undermine his faculties, a model of resolution and tact. He had spent many years in India in close contact with the natives, more especially with those of high rank, and he understood them thoroughly. He had too the advantage of possessing a settled plan. Before leaving Pondichery he had concerted with Dupleix the manner in which he was to carry on his relations with Mozuffer Jung, and he anticipated no difficulty in following his instructions to the letter now that he had to deal with the more facile character of Salabut. A glance at the map of India, and a recollection of the history of the period, will show how vast, how gigantic, yet, under ordinary circumstances, how feasible was this plan. Separated by the Vindya range from the disorganised empire proper of the Mogul, the possessor of the Mahomedan province of the Dekkan seemed to be in a position to be able to give law to the whole of South-eastern India. He commanded a large army and ruled over a warlike population. He was the liege lord of the ruler of the Carnatic, and he wielded in that province itself the authority of the Mogul. He was thus the possessor of the moral and physical power ;—he had the right to use force, and the force ready to be used,—and in those days, when the name of the Mogul was everything, and the reputation of the European settlers comparatively nothing, that double

power was apparently an irresistible, really a very potent, lever.

This being the position of the province known as the Dekkan, and this the power of its ruler, can we greatly blame that policy which at a moment when France had all but overcome her hated rival in the Carnatic, determined, without striking a blow, to make that position and that influence purely French? What a vista did it not hold out to a patriotic ambition? What dreams of empire, what visions of imperial dominion! Possessing the Carnatic, by this policy gaining the Dekkan, the minarets of the Jumma Musjid and the jewelled ornaments of the Peacock-throne seemed near enough to excite the fancy and to stimulate to irresistible action!

This tempting vision offered yet another advantage. It seemed so easy of accomplishment. Knowing the native character so thoroughly as did Dupleix, he was well aware that notwithstanding the obligations under which the reigning viceroy might be to the French, they would all be forgotten unless he were continually reminded of their power as a people,—unless he had constantly before his eyes evidence of their superiority. It was therefore, primarily, not less to maintain French influence at the court of the Subadar, than to support the pretensions of Mozuffer Jung, that Bussy had been directed to accompany that prince to Aurungabad. Dupleix did not doubt that with the French troops under a soldier-diplomatist in occupation of his capital, engaged to support the Subadar, and, what was of more consequence, the Subadar himself feeling that that he could depend upon them alone to support him, the soldier-diplomatist, if he were skilful and able, would inevitably draw to himself the whole influence of the province, that he would shape its foreign policy, and inspire its political action,—that he, in fact, would become the omnipotent mayor of the palace, the Subadar subside into the powerless automaton!

Thus to divide his forces and to lose the services of his ablest general in the presence of such an enemy as were the English, who had the sea as their base of operations, was undoubtedly to run a great risk. Yet before we condemn Dupleix too harshly for running such a risk, we must point to the situation of affairs on the coast at that time. The two nations were nominally at peace. The entire Carnatic and Trichinopoly, with the sole exception of the town of that name, had acknowledged Chanda Sahib as Nawab. The English had positively refused to assist Mahomed Ali in the defence of that city. But, even were he to succeed in persuading them to do so, it seemed as though Dupleix had nothing to fear from their efforts, for Lawrence,

their ancient leader, was absent, the genius of Clive had not then been discovered, and Dupleix knew and rated at its real value the capacity of such men as Gingen and Cope. Could he foretell that out of that dispirited colony of baffled enemies, who not even venturing to remove their seat of government to Madras, remained cooped up in Fort St. David, idle spectators of his daring enterprise, there would arise one of the most consummate leaders of the age? Ought he to have acted as though such a contingency were possible? Yes, undoubtedly, if we are to judge men by the highest standard, if we are to make no allowances for human impulses and human passions, we are bound to declare that he ought so to have acted. Before sending Bussy to the Dekkan, he ought at least, as a measure of wise precaution, to have made sure of Trichinopoly, to have crushed the last rival of Chanda Sahib. Had he done that,—had he thus deprived the English of all pretext to interfere,—and had he then been able to send Bussy to Aurungabad,—the Carnatic would have been his, the Dekkan would have become his, and before long all India, south of the Vindya range, would have acknowledged the supremacy of the French.

Still though it was a great, as it turned out, indeed, a fatal fault, who will assert, that in the presence of so great a temptation, and in the prospect, seemingly certain, of repose in the Carnatic,—for, it will be remembered, Mahomed Ali had lulled the suspicions of Dupleix by promises to surrender,—who, we say, will assert, that such a fault ought to be imputed as a crime to the illustrious Frenchman? We must recollect that the moment was so opportune,—Mozuffer Jung going to take possession of his government, the necessity that he should be accompanied by a body of Frenchmen so urgent, the peace of the Carnatic so assured,—that there seemed but small necessity for the services of a Bussy. To Dupleix it must have appeared as if he incurred a very small and a very distant risk, in order at once to grasp a very present and very certain gain,—a gain which must have an enormous effect on the result of any future struggles in the Carnatic. Can we even blame him much if he, looking into the future with but human eyesight, decided to run that small risk? The prospect, indeed, was so peculiarly alluring to a brilliant imagination, that Dupleix would not have been Dupleix had he decided to neglect or to defer it.

As it was, everything seemed at first to favour the daring plans of the French Governor. He could not certainly have been more fitly or more ably represented than by the clever and versatile Bussy. We have already noticed the skilful and unobtrusive manner in which this officer disposed his soldiers

in Aurungabad. His own conduct was based upon the same principle. To appear as nothing, yet to be everything in the State; to show himself to the world as the commandant of the French Contingent, maintaining in the eyes of the natives by his lavish expenditure and outward show the dignity of that office; to direct in secret all the foreign relations of the Government, to make all their acts chime in with French interests. In this manner he laid the foundations of an influence destined to survive the loss of power and prestige at Pondichery, and which, had that power and that prestige not fallen, would, in all probability, have worked with a most decisive effect on the events that were to follow. From the date of the arrival of Bussy in Aurungabad, on the 29th June, 1751, all his efforts were directed to the establishment of this occult influence. He entirely succeeded. Very little time elapsed before he had brought Salabut Jung to the persuasion that the safety of his person depended on the presence of the French troops at his capital, and that the security of his empire could be best assured by his following the counsels of the French general. The latter kept himself all this time studiously in the background. His secret influence, however, was exerted to appoint as ministers of the Subadar men whom he believed to be devoted to himself, and although he was more than once, as we shall see, deceived by the superior *finesse* of Asiatic intriguers, he never wanted the boldness and promptitude to repair every error, and even to use to the advantage of his country the opportunity afforded him by the attempts to weaken his influence.

Whilst Bussy was thus employed in laying the foundation of French power at the court of the Subadar, the intelligence reached him of the alliance between Ghazee-ood-deen and the Mahrattas, having for its object the expulsion of the French nominee, Salabut Jung. Whilst, in all probability, Bussy would have preferred to pursue that task of consolidation which would have enabled him to employ the resources of the Dekkan in aid of the French designs in the Carnatic, he can scarcely have regretted the opportunity, which this threatened invasion seemed likely to afford him, of teaching the warlike inhabitants of Western India to respect French discipline and French valour. Whilst, therefore, the news, that Ghazee-ood-deen himself was advancing from the north at the head of 150,000, and Ballajee Bajee Rao from the west with 100,000, men, spread consternation and dismay in the court of Aurungabad, whilst some counselled retreat, and others even entered into negotiations with the invader, Bussy himself remained calm and unmoved. When called upon by the Subadar for his opinion, he gave him advice of the same nature

as that which Clive a little later gave to Governor Saunders,—advice which stamped him at once as the man for the occasion :—“Care not,” he said, “for the invading army, you will best “preserve the Dekkan by marching upon Poona.” It is a signal proof of his great influence at the court of the Subadar, that this bold advice was promptly followed. The better to make his preparations the Subadar had moved from Aurungabad to Golconda. When, after many days, he ascertained that the allied enemies had begun their movements from two opposite directions upon Aurungabad, he, accompanied by Bussy, and in pursuance of the plan suggested by him, broke up from that place, and, leaving Aurungabad to its fate, marched upon Beder,\* the original capital of the ancient kingdom of that name. Besides the large but irregular army of Salabut Jung, Bussy had with him 500 French troops in the highest state of discipline, and 5,000 drilled sepoys. Meanwhile, no sooner was the rainy season over, than Ballajee Bajee Rao entered the Dekkan, and, proceeding on the true Mahratta principle of making war support war, ravaged the country on every side. It is not to be imagined that he had any particular regard for Ghazee-ood-deen, or any particular hatred for Salabut Jung. With him it was simply a matter of business. Whilst the two Mahomedans were fighting for the sovereignty of the province, it was for him to hold aloof until one was thoroughly beaten, and both were completely exhausted. Action on his part, then, would give a large slice of the Dekkan to the Mahrattas. Meanwhile little dreading any movement on the part of Salabut Jung, he proposed to enrich himself and his followers by the plunder of the border provinces of the Dekkan. The bold march of Bussy upon Beder, however, entirely disconcerted these plans. Still more was Ballajee troubled when he saw that the enemy had no intention whatever of

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\* Grant Duff and the author of the “*Sair Mutakherin*” both state that Ahmednugger was the town upon which the Subadar marched after leaving Golconda. Mr. Orme on the contrary indicates Beder. We are inclined to believe that in this instance Mr. Orme is correct. The Mahrattas were marching on Aurungabad from Poona, and their natural route would take them through Ahmednugger. Considering that Ghaze-ood-deen was likewise marching upon Aurungabad, a movement of Bussy upon Ahmednugger would certainly not have had the effect of alarming Ballajee Bajee Rao about the safety of Poona. On the other hand, Beder lies in the direct route from Golconda, where Bussy then was, to Poona, and it is the place whence the most telling attack could be made on the Mahratta territory. We can easily imagine how the intelligence of an expedition starting for Poona from that place, would inevitably bring down Ballajee from the north to protect his capital.

remaining at Beder, but were moving thence direct upon his capital. Renouncing at once all thoughts of the invasion of the Dekkan, Ballajee hastened to proceed to the defence of his own dominions. He was at the head of a numerous army, confident in their leader, and in whom their leader reposed the fullest trust. Very often had he led them to victory, more than once indeed over this same army of the Dekkan, which now had the presumption to invade the sacred soil of the Mahrattas. Could he doubt the result now? Of the foreigners who accompanied the army of Salabut he might indeed have heard, but the smallness of their numbers was sufficient to deprive them of any formidable character. They, besides, had never come in contact with a regular Mahratta army; had never been called upon to repel those sweeping charges of cavalry, which had so often proved fatal to the armies of the Mahomedans.

Selecting then 40,000 of his best horse, and leaving the remainder to follow, Ballajee hastened to bar the road to Poona, and, if possible, to destroy the enemy at a blow. The Subadar with his French allies had but just left Beder *en route* to Poona, when they learned the approach of the Mahrattas. In accordance with the Mahomedan tactics they formed up to await their attack. Bussy, however, so planted his guns, consisting of ten field-pieces, as to command the ground over which the enemy must charge. Having done this and placed his infantry in line in support, he calmly awaited the approach of Ballajee.

It was indeed the first time that the Mahrattas had regularly met an European enemy on the open field,—for the Mahratta contingent in the Carnatic had consisted of comparatively a handful, and they had there acted the part of auxiliary skirmishers rather than of an independent force. But Bussy had before him now the flower of the Mahratta army,—and of the Mahratta army in its best form. The Mahrattas were at that time the rising power of Hindostan. The warriors of that people had not then begun to depart from the traditions, an adherence to which had made them a people. Their splendid horsemanship, their long endurance, their ability to move without tents, without baggage of any sort, without other supplies than those which each individual soldier carried upon his horse, had combined with their daring tactics to render them superior to those Mahomedan armies, which a long course of misgovernment and want of system had ruined. The luxurious equipments of the armies of Aurungzebe formed a striking contrast to the unostentatious camps of Akbar, and from the time of the death of the Aurungzebe even the appearance of discipline had ceased. The

Mogul armies, hopeless of victory, conscious of the incapacity of their leaders, half-beaten before they had struck a blow, felt themselves unfit to make head against the new power that was gradually overwhelming Hindostan.

Bussy was well aware of this. Full well did he know that the issue of the contest that day depended upon himself and his soldiers, upon those French whom he had led almost across the continent; who, starting from the waters of the Bay of Bengal, were now straining their eyes to gaze upon the Arabian Sea. He waited for the attack, however, full of confidence. At length it came. The clouds of dust, the loud tramp of countless horses, could forbode nothing else. It was clear that 40,000 of the choicest horsemen of the East, headed by their Peshwa, were about that day to endeavour to surpass all their former deeds of valour. At full speed, though without order, with spear in rest, shouting victory, they charged. But the nerves of the little band of Frenchmen were neither shaken nor unstrung. Standing at their guns, they waited coolly the order of their commander. When it came, discharges of grape and cannister, not single but continued, combined with a never-ceasing file firing from the infantry, told the Mahratta horsemen what kind of enemy this was against whom they would have to contend for empire. The result was never doubtful. After a few rounds, the Mahratta horse could bear no more. They turned their horses' heads and disappeared.\* Bussy was not the man to allow a victory to remain barren. He persuaded the Subadar to march instantly towards Poona, not stopping to listen to the offers of the Peshwa for accommodation, but to move straight upon the capital.

There were, however, as is usual with an oriental army, wheels within wheels. Ballajee Bajee Rao, the Peshwa, was on bad terms with Tara Bae, the grandmother of the youthful Raja of Sattara, and she was even then disputing his right to govern for her grandson. With her, therefore, to weaken Ballajee, the advisers of Salabut Jung had entered into communication. On the other hand, Ballajee, recognising at once the value of the services rendered by the French Contingent to the Subadar, endeavoured by all those means so common at an oriental court to excite jealousy of the French leader by attributing to him personal

\* The author of the *Sâir Mutakherin*, a Mahometan, thus writes of the battle, "Ballajee Rao, without suffering him (Salabut Jung) to come so far (as Poona), met him half way with an army of 50,000 horses but was defeated; at which time the French with their musketry and their expeditious artillery drew smoke from the Mahratta breasts."



motives and private ambition. We shall see that both these efforts bore their fruit in their season.

Little caring for, probably ignorant of, these intrigues, Bussy, still prevailing with the Subadar, moved on until he found himself once more in the vicinity of the Mahratta army at Rajapore on the Ghore river. The time was propitious for an attack. An eclipse of the moon had called all the Hindoos to their devotions, and Bussy was resolved to take advantage of their superstition to beat up their quarters. It was a new thing to his Mahomedan allies to witness this attempt to fight the Mahrattas with their own weapons,—to attempt to surprise those who had owed a great part of their success to their own quickness and vigilance. So great was their opinion of the Mahrattas that this attack seemed to them, witnesses as they had been of the flight of the cavalry of Ballajee in the open field, to savour more of rashness than prudence. Nevertheless Bussy attempted it. Taking advantage of the moment when the eclipse of the moon would, as he believed, engross all the attention of the enemy, he moved upon their camp, and opened suddenly a fire of artillery and small arms. The surprise was complete. Ballajee himself, who was “busy at his devotions and naked, “had hardly time to throw himself on an unsaddled mare, on “which he saved his life by flying with all his might.”\* His example was followed by his entire army, and though the accounts of the slaughter vary,† it is certain that the Mahrattas lost an immense quantity of booty, and that a heavy blow was dealt to their prestige as warriors. Proportionately, and even more than proportionately, did the victory increase the reputation of Bussy. It can easily be understood on how high an elevation those who had so dreaded Mahratta dash and daring must have placed the man who knew thus how to avail himself of their weaknesses.

The day following this exploit, the 23rd November, 1751, Bussy advanced towards Poona, the Mahrattas contenting themselves with hovering about his flanks, and endeavouring, though unsuccessfully, to impede his advance. On the 24th, he attacked and destroyed the town of Tullygaom. Two days

\* *Sêir Mutakherin*.

† Grant Duff asserts, on the authority of Mahratta accounts, that the surprise was incomplete, and that the Mahrattas did not suffer materially. The author of the *Sêir Mutakherin* states on the other hand, that the Mahrattas “were set upon in the night, and with so much success, that “they lost a vast number of men, whom the French consumed in shoals “at the fire altars of their artillery.” Grant Duff admits that this action had an immense effect in raising Bussy’s reputation.

later, Ballajee made another desperate effort to recover his lost prestige. Some of the most famous Mahratta chieftains,—amongst them two sons of Ranojee Sindia and Koneer Trimbuck Yekbootce,—were chosen to lead a renewed attack on the allied camp. On the 27th November, this attack was made, the enemy charging the native troops of Salabut Jung, dashing through every obstacle and completely overwhelming them. It seemed for an instant as though it would be impossible to restore the day. The little band of Frenchmen all this time, however, maintained their position, threatened but not assailed. At last, noting the slaughter of his allies, Bussy changed his front and brought his guns to bear upon the masses of hostile cavalry with such effect, that they retreated from the field they had almost gained, and gave time to the troops of the Subadar to rally from their disorder. The next day, the town of Korygaon on the Bhima was occupied by Bussy, who thus found himself within twenty miles of the capital of the Peshwa.

It formed no essential part of the plan of Salabut Jung, however, to make any conquests from the Mahrattas. His interests pointed rather to breaking up the confederacy between that people and Ghazee-ood-deen, even, if possible, to forming an alliance with those who had been the allies of his rival. Swayed by the wise counsels of Bussy, he had, in the presence of two armies, each superior to his own, succeeded not only in preventing a junction which would have overwhelmed him, but in forcing the one army to meet him on the ground he had chosen, and in so dealing with it as to convince its leader that it was for his interest to ally himself with him, rather than with his competitor for the rule of the Dekkan. Thus, after the last battle, the Peshwa began to consider whether it was necessary or advisable to continue the contest further. Any nearer approach to Poona or Sattara, might, he felt, give to the partisans of Tara Bae a weight sufficient to endanger his own influence and power. He accordingly opened out negotiations with Salabut Jung, and although these were protracted, owing to some difficulties raised by that nobleman, an armistice was concluded at the beginning of the year.

Salabut Jung was however anxious to come to an understanding with the Mahrattas, the more so as his own army, badly organized and worse officered, was almost in a state of mutiny. The men had some reason for their discontent, for their pay was considerably in arrear, but the officers, especially the superior officers, for the most part uneducated in their profession, were jealous of the credit gained by the French. They constantly insinuated that Bussy had ulterior objects in view which a prolongation of hostilities alone could procure for

him. But there was another reason not less potent. Ghazee-ood-deen was now marching upon Aurungabad, and it was an object with Salabut to deal with him whilst yet the recollection of the recent campaign should be fresh in the minds of the Mahrattas. The advice given by Bussy, under these circumstances, was worthy of his reputation for tact and skill. The French leader had not been unobservant of the signs of discontent. But it had seemed to him even less desirable for French interests than for those of the Subadar, to march upon Poona. He resolved, therefore, to act in such a manner as at the same time to allay those discontents, and to further the interests of his countrymen. He accordingly supported the propositions in favour of peace, both openly and in private, thus alike disarming his enemies and gaining still more entirely the confidence of the Subadar.

The armistice concluded, the army returned toward Golconda, overthrowing on the way some refractory Rajahs who had refused tribute. But in the course of its march an incident occurred which called for the prompt action of Bussy. The prime minister of the Subadar, Rajah Rugoonath Dass, a man devoted to French interests, was assassinated by some of the Affghan soldiers of the army, whose officer the Rajah had insulted. It then became necessary to arrange that a fitting person should be appointed in his place. And here Bussy for the first time allowed himself to be over-reached. He had met at the court of the Subadar a nobleman of ability and skilful address, Syud Lushkur Khan. This man had divined the designs of the French, bated their persons, and dreaded their influence. Nevertheless, in order the better to counteract their plans he dissembled his sentiments, and pretended for Bussy in particular the greatest devotion and esteem. He hoped by this means and by his influence to obtain office under the Subadar, intending, after he should have obtained it, to use all his power to thwart the French power and to undermine the position of the French leader. Bussy was completely taken in. Believing Syud Lushkur to be the man he represented himself to be, he recommended him to the Subadar as a fit successor to the deceased Rajah, and obtained for him the appointment.

There was, however, much for Bussy to do before the intrigues which Syud Lushkur instantly set on foot had time to work. Ghazee-ood-Jeen yet lived and threatened. So far indeed from abating his pretensions in consequence of the defeat of Ballajee, he had stirred up the Bhonsla to attack the Dekkan in the north-east, whilst he himself, with Mulhar Rao Holkar to assist him, should enter it through the gate of Aurungabad.

The threatened invasion of Hindostan by Ahmed Shah Abdallee, had indeed combined with the hostile attitude of the Rohillas, and the consequent intrigues at the court of Delhi, to detain Ghazee-ood-deen at that capital longer than he had anticipated. By degrees, however, the difficulties in the way of his departure were removed, and, in the month of September, 1752, he reached Aurungabad with an army computed at 150,000 men.

Then began those intricacies of intrigue such as are seen only in an oriental court. There were assembled at Aurungabad, Ghazee-ood-deen, whose real and avowed object was to obtain the sovereignty of the Dekkan, and to obtain which he was ready to sacrifice a portion of it to the Mahrattas; on the side of that people, Ballajee, supported by Holkar and the Bhonsla, was endeavouring to persuade each of the rivals to offer him a higher bid than the other. Salabut Jung had there no avowed representative, although his minister, Syud Lushkur, was present at the conferences. This man, however, the better to carry out his plans, had persuaded his master to connive at the fiction that he had been dismissed from the office of Dewan, and had, therefore, proceeded as a discontented noble to the confederates. In this way, he urged, he could better worm out their secrets. His real object, however, was to cement to the utmost of his power the alliance between the Mahrattas and Ghazee-ood-deen, with the view of expelling Salabut Jung, and, with him, the French general and his troops.

The right of Ghazee-ood-deen, as the elder son of his father, gave him in this dispute a moral influence, which was not without its effect on the nobles of the Dekkan, and which very much disturbed Salabut Jung himself. It is possible that under the circumstances, and in the face of the Mahratta alliances, which Ghazee-ood-deen had at length cemented by the offer of a considerable sacrifice of territory, he might have been inclined to listen to a compromise, when an event occurred which removed the necessity for further negotiations. Living at Aurungabad in the ancient palace of the Subadars, was one of the widows of Nizam-ool-Moolk,—she who had borne him but one son, the next in order to Salabut Jung, Nizam Ali. All the hopes of this lady were concentrated in the ardent desire to see this son sitting on the viceregal seat of his father. Between that wish and its accomplishment there were however two obstacles. One of these, Salabut Jung, was out of her reach; the other, Ghazee-ood-deen, was at Aurungabad. To thrust him out of the path she wished her son to follow she had no scruple as to the means by which such a result could be obtained. She accordingly invited Ghazee-ood-deen to a feast, and in a dish of

which she persuaded him to partake, telling him truly that it had been prepared with her own hands, she poisoned him. Ghazee-ood-deen died that night.

Freed by this crime from his principal rival, Salabut Jung, as next in the order of succession, was at once acknowledged Subadar of the Dekkan. He had still, however, before him the whole force of the Mahrattas, not only the army of the Peshwa, but, united with it, those of Holkar and the Bhonsla. The ruler of the Mahomedan state of Burhanpoor, who had before declared for Ghazee-ood-deen, now announced his intention to stand by his engagements with the Mahrattas. There remained then to Salabut Jung the alternative of a murderous and doubtful war, or the resignation to the Mahrattas, offered by Ghazee-ood-deen, of the territory west of Berar from the Taptee to the Godavery. The decision was left by the Subadar to Bussy, and he regarding a solid peace on such conditions as more favourable alike to the interests of the French and the Subadar than a doubtful war, recommended compliance with the terms offered, stipulating only that the Bhonsla should retire beyond the Wyn Gunga river. This stipulation was agreed to, and peace was proclaimed.

These arrangements having been completed, Syud Lushkur returned, unsuspected, to his office of Dewan, and the Subadar, who, accompanied by Bussy and his army had been moving in the direction of Aurungabad, set out for Hyderabad, destined thenceforth to be the capital of the Dekkan. This was in the early part of 1753. During the year that had passed, Bussy in addition to his own duties had been in constant communication with Dupleix, had watched and lamented over the incapacity of Law without being able to draw him from his embarrassment, and had shown in every letter his own readiness to be employed for the best advantage of France. In the course of it he learned the decline and death of Chanda Sahib, at the same time that he received from Dupleix intimation as to the utter unfitness of him who should have been his successor. Under these circumstances he applied himself with untiring zeal to use his position at the court of the Subadar for the benefit of France. How, he thought, could this be more strenuously carried out than by the appointment of Dupleix himself to the Nawabship of the Carnatic. This appointment had indeed been conferred upon Dupleix by Mozuffer Jung, but, from motives of policy, Dupleix had made over the dignity of the office to Chanda Sahib. On the death of this latter, was it to revert to Dupleix, for him either to administer the office himself or to appoint a deputy in his place, or was he to suffer it to be bestowed upon some possible enemy of the French power? To such a question there

could be one reply. By his influence with the Subadar, with whom the nomination legally rested, the confirmation only of the court of Delhi being required, Bussy procured the issue of the patent for the investiture of Dupleix, the receipt of which at Pondichery we noticed in our last number.

We have now described to our readers the manner in which Bussy was employed during that trying period, when the unassisted genius of Dupleix had to contend against the steadfastness of Lawrence and the vigour of Clive. Although the scene of his action continued to be still distant from Pondichery, yet his movements were so intimately connected with the policy of Dupleix, that we propose to continue the account of them up to the moment, when in an evil hour for the interests of the French, their greatest proconsul was recalled to be another victim to the besotted government he had served but too well.

The year upon which he was now entering, 1753, was to see Bussy exposed to many trials, to witness his successful over-riding of the dangers and artifices peculiarly calculated to test the qualities of a statesman: to show how vain are troops and resources and strong military positions, when there is not a man to command them. In the month of January, just after peace had been concluded with the Mahrattas, and whilst the Subadar was on his return march to Hyderabad, Bussy, worn out by fatigue and exposure, was suddenly prostrated by sickness. So severe was the attack, that, unwilling as he was, at a moment so critical, to relax his grasp of the threads of the various negotiations in which he was engaged, he was nevertheless forced in obedience to the directions of his medical advisers, to consent to proceed for change of air to Masulipatam. The reluctance with which he allowed himself to be persuaded was due mainly to his conviction, that just at that precise period the maintenance of the influence of the French depended almost wholly on his own presence at the court of the Subadar. He had no one near him to whom he could entrust those delicate negotiations; not a single officer, in whose judgment, even in whose ability to maintain discipline over his troops, he could place any confidence. His second in command, M. Goupil, was a man of the most ordinary abilities,—one of those simple characters whose want of imaginative power constantly exposes them to the machinations of intriguers. To leave the force in his hands, even had Bussy possessed, as he supposed, a devoted friend in Syud Lushkur, was indeed a risk: to leave it with him, when that Dewan was his determined though secret foe, was to expose it to almost inevitable disgrace. Fortunate was it for Bussy, that in

the state of weakness to which his malady had reduced him he never once suspected the secret object to which all the machinations of Syud Lushkur were directed. It is scarcely too much to suppose that the shock of such a discovery and the endeavour to counteract its effects would have been fatal to him. Even though not suspecting it, the prospect of his departure caused him terrible uneasiness. But there was no help for it, he must have rest and change and relaxation or he must die. With a heavy heart, then, he set out, leaving his place to Goupil, his counsels to the Subadar and Syud Lushkur, and promising to all a speedy return, little imagining probably the form and fashion which that return would take.

No sooner had the Subadar reached Hyderabad after his departure, than the Dewan commenced the secret machinations, by means of which he hoped to effect a permanent breach between the Subadar and the French, to rid the country, in a word, of the latter. In this course the weakness and indecision of Goupil came greatly to his aid. We have before adverted to the strict discipline which, from the time of his arrival at Aurungabad, Bussy had introduced into his army, and we have pointed out how the exact and rigorous order which he enforced had contributed to the confidence of the people, even to their affection for their European allies. General as such feelings were among the population, they were far more deeply implanted in the breast of the Subadar himself. Salabut Jung had not been a careless spectator of the fate of his relatives. The fact that his own brother, Nazir Jung, his nephew, Mozuffur Jung, had both been treacherously slain by their own adherents, had impressed him with the advantage of having in his immediate vicinity a body of men unconnected with his own nobles, upon whom he could fully and entirely rely, whose support would enable him to make a successful stand against the worst form of rebellion. He had determined, therefore, at the outset, never to separate himself from the French. To them he had been indebted for his quasi-regal position; depending upon them only he felt that he could maintain it. These resolutions in their favour had been confirmed and strengthened by the signal services rendered by Bussy in the war with the Mahrattas, not less than by the exact discipline which he had maintained amongst his men.

On the departure of Bussy however, the Subadar not only lost the man with whom alone, of all the French, he was accustomed to hold confidential intercourse, but he witnessed likewise, very soon after, a marked change in the conduct alike of officers and soldiers. Goupil, in fact, was not even a disciplinarian; he was simply good-natured and weak. The

regulations which Bussy had so rigidly enforced, were by him one by one set aside. The consequence was that the troops who had been, under the one, the preservers of public order, became, under the other, its persistent infringers. Drunkenness and licentiousness took with them the place of sobriety and discipline. This change of conduct on their part was naturally followed by a change of feeling on the part of the people, until by degrees the alienation became marked, and the dislike to the foreigners intensified. Syud Lushkur had not only watched this change of conduct with an eager eye, but he had, by many means in his power, excited and stirred it up. The most effective of these means was the withholding from the French their monthly pay. Not only did he hope thus to incite them to some acts of indiscipline such as would embroil them with the people, and exhibit them in an odious light to the Subadar, but he trusted to it likewise as the charmed weapon, by which he would procure the removal of their head quarters from Hydrabad, and their final expulsion from the Dekkan. He set to work, however, with great caution and with all the appearance of friendship. When he informed the French officers that he possessed not the funds to pay them, he accompanied this avowal with numberless professions of the most profound regret, laying the blame on the tributaries who had neglected to send in their imposts. When, some time afterwards, the French officers, beset by their soldiers for want of money and themselves seriously inconvenienced on the same account, again complained to him on the subject, he went a step further. The state of affairs, he said, as to the non-receipt of the public revenue, remained the same, but, he added, the French were at liberty to take the law into their own hands, by moving against the refractory tributaries. These, in different parts of the country, distant from one another, he indicated; nor did he fail to point out to the French officers the pecuniary advantages which might result to them personally from such a mode of collecting the revenue. This proposition, apparently so fair and even considerate, completely deceived Goupil and his officers, and some detachments were at once sent out. Under other circumstances it might perhaps have been difficult to obtain the consent of the Subadar to their departure, but the acts of violence and disorder recently committed by the French had even scandalised Salabut Jung, and he offered no opposition to the plan.

But though the force had been thus diminished, Syud Lushkur determined to divide and weaken it still more. He persuaded the Subadar to return to Aurungabad,—the city in his dominions most distant from the seat of the French



power,—accompanied only by a small detachment of French soldiers and sepoys, leaving the remainder at Hydrabad, the governor of which city received at the same time the most positive instructions to make them no advances of pay. He determined at the same time to disembarass himself and the court of the presence of M. Goupil, who, imbecile as he was, yet by virtue of his commission as commandant *ad interim* of the French forces, occupied a position which, when the plot was ripe for execution, might give him sufficient influence with the Subadar to defeat it. This part of his scheme he managed with an adroitness, the coolness of which is worthy of admiration. He went to Goupil, told him of the intended movement to Aurungabad, intimated the intention of the Subadar to take with him but a small escort of French troops, and then begged that he would command it. Goupil, unsuspecting, replied that his duty was to remain with the bulk of the force, and that as the escort was to be so small, it would suffice if it were commanded by an officer of inferior rank. He accordingly remained at Hydrabad, sending M. de Janville, an officer of but little weight or experience, to command the escort accompanying the Subadar.

Determined from the outset to leave no stone unturned to accomplish his end, Syud Lushkur had likewise entered into a correspondence with the English, offering to aid them with the whole power of the Dekkan, if they would assist him in his schemes for the expulsion of the French. This proposition coincided in entirely with the wishes of Mr. Saunders, but, engaged at the time in a deadly struggle with the French before Trichinopoly, he was able to lend only a moral support. He entered, however, into an active correspondence with Syud Lushkur, and encouraged him to persevere in his great undertaking. Towards the end of April, 1753, the plot seemed on the verge of success. The French were scattered all over the country; their main detachment at Hydrabad had been starved into a condition bordering upon mutiny; in attendance upon the Subadar was a young officer without influence or ability. It seemed natural to Syud Lushkur that troops, so high-spirited as the French, thus starved and neglected, would be but too glad to accept a free dismissal from the country in which their presence seemed to be so unwelcome. So completely, indeed, did Syud Lushkur count upon the success of this policy, that he wrote at that period to Mr. Saunders, telling him to have no fear for the result, "for," he said, "I have arranged the mode in which to rid myself of your enemies. The plan is in action, and with the assistance of Providence, the result

“ will be what you wish. I expect to be with you by the end of the rains, and to arrange then everything in a satisfactory manner.”

Meanwhile, the French at Hydrabad were in want of everything. The governor of that city, Mahomed Hoossen Khan, had carried out only too well the orders he had received, and had refused the French troops and sepoys even the smallest supplies. Nor were their detachments better off in the provinces. Separated from the main body and from one another, they were not in a position to effect anything in presence of the silent opposition that seemed everywhere to rise up against them. They fell at once into despondency; every thought turned towards Bussy; had he been on the spot, they argued, this dilemma would never have occurred; he alone could extricate them from it. Such were their thoughts, and, thus thinking, they despatched messenger after messenger to their old leader.

When Bussy received these messengers and the letters they carried, he was lying still sick in Masulipatam. The sea-breezes of the coast had indeed contributed somewhat to the restoration of his strength; but prudence would have counselled him a longer intermission from the harassing duties of official life. But almost simultaneously with the letters from Hydrabad, there came from Pondichery a communication which decided him. That confidential letter from Syud Lushkur to Mr. Saunders, from which we have extracted, happened to be intercepted by French agents. By them it was carried to Pondichery, and handed over to Dupleix.

Dupleix received this letter at a time when he was meditating those proposals to Mr. Saunders for peace, which he essayed in July of this year, and to which we shall refer in their proper place. To this course Bussy, from his sick bed at Masulipatam, had long urged him, advising him to renounce the old policy of empire he had so long followed. To make proposals for peace with any effect, however, it was necessary for Dupleix that he should be paramount in at least one province of India. Hitherto he had trusted that his prestige in the Dekkan would make up for his losses in the Carnatic. But now, this letter showed him that his prestige in the Dekkan was waning, his power about to be annihilated. He comprehended all in an instant. He saw at once how it had happened, how it was to be remedied. With him to think strongly was to act vigorously. He at once despatched to Bussy a letter, written in the most emphatic terms, urging him, even though his health might not be completely re-established, to set out immediately for Hydrabad. The manner in which Bussy acted on the receipt of this

letter is thus recorded by Dupleix himself: "Le sieur de Bussy," he writes, "was too zealous a patriot not to sacrifice even health "itself for the benefit of the State." Without delaying a day he issued orders to all the detachments in the district to unite at a place near Hydrabad, where he proposed to join them at the end of that month.\* Setting out then himself, he found all his troops, amounting to 500 Europeans and 4,000 sepoy, assembled there. His first step was to re-established the relaxed discipline of his little army, the next to restore their confidence: this done, he marched upon Hydrabad. The governor of that place, intimidated by his prompt action, and seeing that the scheme of his chief had missed fire, consented after some demur to liquidate the arrears of pay, without, however, engaging to make any stipulation for the future.

Meanwhile a letter from Dupleix to the Subadar had made Syud Lushkur aware of the interception of his letter to Mr. Saunders. He knew then that the mask had fallen from his visage, and that the keen glance of the ruler of Pondichery had read all the thoughts of his heart. Still he seemed resolved to trust to the chapter of accidents to carry him through his hazardous game. Still he refused to advance the necessary sums to Janville's detachment. Still he ordered Mahomed Hoossen Khan to temporise and gain time. He thought most probably that at Aurungabad, in the extremity of the Dekkan, in close contiguity to the almost impregnable fortress of Dowlutabad, he was safe even from the scorn of Dupleix and the vengeance of Bussy.

But he was not. The communications of Bussy with Mahomed Hoossen, and the shifting and prevaricating conduct of the latter, very soon convinced the French leader that under the circumstances of the case but one course of action remained to him. He must march at once to the city which the advisers of the Subadar had selected as the place whence to offer to himself and his French these repeated insults; he must push these traitors from their seats, and re-establish with the Subadar his old bonds of confidence and amity. Every preparation accordingly was at once made for a march upon Aurungabad on the conclusion of the rains.

An undertaking more hazardous, more difficult, more daring, it is not *easy* to conceive. From Hydrabad to Aurungabad is a distance of five hundred miles. The officials of the entire country were under the sway of Syud Lushkur. The equipment of the force for such a march was a matter of no small consideration. No money was

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\* May, 1753.

forthcoming from Mahomed Hoossen, and the expenses not only of the equipment but likewise of the supplies had to be met and provided. But besides this, the possible attitude of the Subadar and his advisers had to be looked to. There were no means of knowing what Syud Lushkur, wielding as he did the resources of the province, might not attempt in such a conjuncture. There was the possibility, indeed, that the handful of Frenchmen might have to fight their way to Aurungabad, surrounded by enemies, with no resources but their own brave hearts and the courage and capacity of their leader.

Nevertheless, Bussy not only found means to equip the force, but no sooner had the rains ceased to fall than he set out. The mere fact of his march completed the confusion that reigned in the mind of Syud Lushkur. It unnerved and unstrung him. As abject and depressed as he had before been haughty and confident, he despatched letters of submission to Bussy, tendering his resignation, confessing his fault, and requesting the French general to appoint another in his place. This submission however did not stop Bussy. He still marched forward until he arrived within a few miles of Aurungabad. He then altered his plan. Feeling himself master of the situation, he was unwilling that the terms which he resolved to impose should seem to be the result of force or compulsion on his part. He resumed then at once the old character of the submissive ally of the Subadar. He claimed nothing, but hinted at everything. Sometimes he flattered Syud Lushkur, at other times he whispered the faintest indication of a menace. The result answered his expectations. Having allowed his wishes to be penetrated, everything that he coveted was granted, and Syud Lushkur, who had exhausted intrigue in order to rid the Dekkan of this French warrior, was forced to sign his name to a treaty which rendered that same Frenchman independent of ministerial influence; which severed from the Dekkan to add to the government of Pondichery four of the finest provinces on the eastern coast of Hindostan.

On the 4th December, all preliminaries having been arranged, Bussy was met by Syud Lushkur and other lords of the court, and conducted into the presence of Salabut Jung. This interview, which was of a purely formal character, having been concluded, Bussy signed with Syud Lushkur the articles of agreement, by which the French alliance was thenceforth to be regulated. The principal of these provided that the four provinces of Mustafanagpur, Elore, Rajamundrum, and Chicacole, should be made over to the French for the support of their army so long as a certain strength should be maintained in the Dekkan, they receiving the rents then due on account of them; that the

French troops should have the sole guardianship of the person of the Subadar; that he should not interfere in the affairs of the Carnatic; and that the other affairs of the State should be conducted with the concurrence and by the advice of M. Bussy. In return for this Bussy engaged to support Syud Lushkur in the office of Dewan.

By this treaty there accrued to the French four hundred and seventy miles of seacoast, from the Chilka Lake to Motupalli; stretching inland to a distance varying from thirty to a hundred miles, watered by such rivers as the Kistna, the Gondemana, and the Godavery, and,—including the district of Guntoor, previously ceded,—containing the important towns of Ganjam, Chicacole, Vizianagram, Vizagapatam, Coringa, Yanoon, Masulipatam, Guntoor, Ellore, and Nizampatam. This united territory, afterwards called the Northern Circars, possessed an area of about 17,000 geographic miles, and yielded an annual revenue of about £400,000 sterling. The forests within its limits abounded in teak; one part of the country was famous for its manufacture of cloth, another for its growth of rice. Nor was it wanting in capabilities of defence. Resting on the sea it was covered from the inland by a chain of mountains running, at unequal distances, nearly parallel with the coast. These mountains were covered with impenetrable forests possessing only three or four passes, capable of being defended by an hundred men against an army. To use the language of the English historian, “these territories rendered the French masters of the greatest dominion, both in extent and value, that had ever been possessed in Hindostan by Europeans, not excepting the Portuguese, when at the height of their prosperity.”\*

Was not such a prize worthy of the struggle? Did not this important cession of a rich, a defensible, country, justify to some extent the pertinacity with which Dupleix continued to struggle, the obstinate retention of Bussy in the Dekkan? What impartial observer, looking at the position of the French and that of the English in the month of December, 1753, would hesitate to affirm that the main advantages rested with the French? The English of that period could not help seeing and admitting it. Had it been possible for Dupleix at this period to have waived something of his high pretensions, to have given up his scheme in its shadowy outline in order to be the more secure of its substantial proportions, his policy might yet have ultimately triumphed. But it was not to be possible. When we do revert to the history of the negotiations that he inaugurated,

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\* Orme, from whom this account of the Northern Circars has been mainly taken.

we shall, we fear, be forced to allow that the sentence pronounced by the French historian\* upon one of whom in the greatness and versatility of his genius Dupleix was in many respects the type and the forerunner, may be applied also to him, and to admit, that if in war he was guided by his genius, he was sometimes impelled, to too great an extent, in politics by his passions.

The first act of Bussy after receiving the patents for the transfer of the four provinces, was to send thither a body of one hundred fifty Europeans and two thousand five hundred sepoy to take possession of and to protect them; that force being placed under the orders of the French agent at Masulipatam, M. Moracin. There is conclusive authority for stating that the mode in which these provinces were administered by the French, was such as to do them great honour. "The rent was moderate, enforced without rigour, accurate accounts were prepared, and most of the hereditary officers, if not those possessing rent-free lands, were confirmed in their property."†

But although thus foiled, notwithstanding that his efforts to expel the French had resulted in the aggrandisement of that nation, Syud Lushkur Khan did not in the least relax his endeavours. He was still left minister, and to the minister there were abundant opportunities of whispering calumnies into the ears of a credulous prince. Once more, therefore, he resolved to play upon the fears of Salabut Jung. He represented to him that it had ever been the policy of the French to make the accession of a new ruler an occasion for their own profit and advantage; that to this end they had supported Mozuffer Jung against Nazir Jung, and on the death of the former had preferred him, the present Subadar, to the legitimate heir of Mozuffer Jung; he added, that out of all these transactions the French had made a profit, and that now, having obtained all that was possible from the reigning noble, they would be prompt to listen to the ambitious offers of his brothers. He, therefore, urged the Subadar at once to place his brothers in confinement. He did this in the hope that Bussy, knowing the innocence of the two princes, would at once intercede in their favour, and that this intercession, interpreted by the Subadar to his discredit, would instil into his mind suspicions which must tend to his speedy disgrace.

With the Subadar, indeed, this scheme produced the desired result. He issued prompt orders for the incarceration of his brothers. But Syud Lushkur had mistaken the character of

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\* M. Thiers. *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire.*

† Grant Duff.

Bussy. This able officer at once recognised the right of the Subadar to an uncontrolled supremacy in his own family. The imprisonment of the two princes did not affect French interests. Although, therefore, urged by several of nobility and by many friends of Syud Lushkur to intercede in their behalf, he held himself studiously aloof. To all their importunities he replied that he respected the orders and the secrets of the Subadar and his ministers, and that he did not wish to mix himself up in State affairs which did not concern the interest of his nation. This prudent conduct on his part convinced the Subadar of the groundlessness of the suspicions with which his minister had endeavoured to poison his mind. As to Syud Lushkur, he was so disconcerted at the result of this second intrigue, that he sent in his resignation and retired into private life. He was succeeded in his office by Shah Nawaz Khan, a nobleman of high character and position, believed by Bussy to be attached to French interests. Opportunity was taken at the same time to remove from office all the adherents of the fallen minister, and to replace them by others professing devotion to the French.

This change had the happiest results. From the time of its taking place to that of the recall of Dupleix in August of the same year, the condition of the French troops remained unaltered. It is true that Janojee Bhonsla, son of the famous Ranojee, who had died in the March of the previous year, made an attempt to invade the dominions of the Subadar. No sooner, however, had he learned that it was Bussy who was marching against him, than he hastened to conclude a peace.\* Another attempt of some stray Mahratta bands to disturb the French occupation of the Northern Circars was dissolved by the fire of the French artillery,—the disaffected noble who had incited it being forced to throw himself on the mercy of Salabut Jung. In other respects, thanks to the prudence of Bussy, to the confidence which he inspired in all about him, everything continued tranquil. The French troops, well housed and regularly paid, showed their ancient discipline and recovered the lost confidence of the people. In the month of April, Bussy accompanied the Subadar to Hyderabad. After remaining with him there for two months, he set out for Masulipatam to settle the affairs of the four new provinces he had obtained for France on a regular basis. The day before his departure an incident occurred which is worthy of being recorded. The Subadar summoned for that day a grand council of his ministers, and

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\* April, 1745.

invited Bussy to be present at it. On his entering the hall of audience, the Subadar and his nobles hastened to assure him that as they felt, one and all, that to him and to French valour alone they owed their present peace and prosperity, they wished, before he left for the coast, to swear to him an inviolable attachment and an eternal gratitude, requiring from him a solemn oath on the sacred book of the Christians to continue to them his protection, and to return to their aid when they should be menaced by an enemy. A Testament was then produced, and in the presence of all Bussy took the required oath. Then, leaving behind him officers whom he could trust, he set out for Masulipatam. Here he was when the arrival of Godeheu at Pondichery, on the 1st August following, gave him the first intimation of the fatal blow which France herself had dealt to her own struggling children in the East.

It is now time that we should return to Dupleix. We left him at the end of 1752, disappointed indeed in his views on the Carnatic, but still maintaining a bold front before his enemies; still hopeful of the future, especially hopeful of the action of Bussy in the Dekkan: not having resigned one of his daring schemes, or faltered in the prosecution of his far-seeing plans of empire; still cool, determined, resolute; confident in himself, confident in the fortunes of France. He had likewise this consolation, that the great Genius who had delivered the English at Trichinopoly had left India for Europe, and he was himself daily expecting the arrival of 700 men under a leader who had proved his steel. It was not, alas!, for him to imagine that those troops and the gallant de la Touche would meet with the most terrible of all deaths\* in the broad ocean, and that he would have again to parry, with diminished resources and without a general, the powerful attacks of Saunders and Lawrence.

The number of European troops which Dupleix had at his disposal at the beginning of 1753 did not exceed 360. To support these were 2,000 trained sepoy, and 4,000 Mahratta horse under the command Morari Rao. Major Lawrence, on his side, was able to bring into the field not less than 700 Europeans aided by 2,000 sepoy, and 1,500 horsemen in the employ of Mahomed Ali. With respect to the cavalry arm, therefore, the French had the superiority both in the number of the troops and the material of which they were composed. But in the number

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\* A body of 700 men under de la Touche left the Isle of France for Pondichery in a vessel called the *Prince* in 1752. She, however, was destroyed by fire with nearly all on board.



of Europeans, the nerve and mainstay of an army, the English had immeasurably the advantage.

But notwithstanding this real inferiority, Dupleix determined to make up by the rapidity of the movements of his force for its inequality the matter of Europeans. In the leader of the Mahrattas, Morari Rao, he met with a man willing and able to second him in this mode of warfare. With him it was concerted that whilst the Mysoreans under their regent, the uncle of their infant king, should press the city of Trichinopoly,—upon which Dupleix had renounced none of his views,—he, with his own Mahratta cavalry, and the entire available French infantry, avoiding a pitched battle, should so occupy Major Lawrence and the English, that no opportunity should be afforded them of assisting the beleaguered garrison of that city. The fall of that place would, it was hoped, at once ensure the overthrow of Mahomed Ali and the supremacy of the French.

In pursuance of this plan, the allied force of French and Mahrattas, under the command of Morari Rao and M. Maissin, marched from Valdour on the 14th January, and intrenched themselves on the river Punar, near Tiruvadi, seven miles from Fort St. David, and in close vicinity to the spot in which d'Auteuil had defeated Cope and Mahomed Ali in July, 1750. From this place, which they fortified very strongly, they commenced a series of harassing movements against the English, cutting off their supplies, capturing their forage parties, and rendering it most difficult for the garrison of Tiruvadi to hold any communication with the garrison of Fort St. David, or with the inhabitants of the surrounding country. In vain did Lawrence attempt to bring them to action; the allies on his appearance in force invariably drew up behind their intrenchments. To such a state of distress was he reduced at last, that he found himself compelled to use his whole force as an escort to the convoys whose arrival was necessary for the support of his troops. This service wearied and dispirited his army, besides entailing upon it many losses from the Mahratta skirmishers, who never failed to hover about and harass his line of march.

For three months this state of affairs continued,—the French and Mahrattas constantly issuing from their impregnable position to annoy and damage the enemy. On the 12th April, in particular, the English force returning to Tiruvadi from Fort St. David with a convoy was surrounded by the whole body of the enemy, and but for the ability of Lawrence and the misconduct of the French battalion, which hastily abandoned a defile which it ought to have held, would have been in great danger. The same day, however, Lawrence having been joined by 100 English and

100 Swiss from Madras, determined to endeavour to put an end to the unsatisfactory state of affairs by storming the French intrenchment. He accordingly made a strong reconnaissance in its direction, the next day, even mounting two 24-pounders on a battery which he threw up against it. The little effect, however, which the fire from these two pieces produced on the enemy's defences, as well as an examination of their strength, determined Major Lawrence to desist from the attempt as one that was beyond his power.

The three months during which the main force of the English was thus kept employed on escort duty at Tiruvadi, had been used meanwhile to a very different purpose by the contending parties at Trichinopoly. This city, after the surrender of Law, had been left by the English commander under the charge of Captain Dalton, having under him a force of 200 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy. An abortive attempt on the part of the regent of Mysore to surprise the city after the departure of Major Lawrence, had resulted in his retiring with his troops to Seringham. Here he entered into correspondence with Duplex at the same time that he continued to profess friendship for Mahomed Ali and the English. When, however, the junction of his subsidiary, Morari Rao, with the French, and his stoppage of the supplies necessary for the English left no doubt as to his hostile intentions, Mr. Saunders resolved no longer to keep terms with him, but sent instructions to Dalton to treat him as an enemy.

The twelve months of renewed warfare before Trichinopoly, of which we are about to give a general description, were fraught with the most important consequences to both the rival European nations then struggling in India. We shall see the genius of the people displayed in the form for which each has for centuries been remarkable. The daring of the French, their activity, their courage, their devotion, will be found not less conspicuous than the obstinacy, the perseverance, the coolness, and intrepidity under difficult circumstances, of the English. We shall have to admire not less the address and versatility of Dalton and the vigour and presence of mind of Lawrence, than the skill of Astruc and the dashing intrepidity of Mainville. In one point, and that an essential one, the English had the advantage at the outset. Their European soldiers were superior in number; these too had shared in all those conflicts which had terminated in the surrender of Law; they had served with Clive and with Lawrence, and had learned under their able leading to believe in their own invincibility. The French soldiers, on the other hand, were, at all events for several months,

not only fewer, but they were dispirited by defeat, and had ceased to place the smallest confidence in the officers who led them on.

The campaign opened on the 3rd of January by an attempt on the part of Dalton to drive the Mysoreans and Mahrattas by a night-surprise out of Seringham. Night-surprises with a force composed to a great extent of native troops are always more or less hazardous, and this one proved to be no exception to the rule. At first victorious, the darkness of the night caused amongst his men a confusion, which the repeated charges of the Mahratta cavalry converted into disorder. The attack was consequently repulsed, and Dalton was forced to retreat into Trichinopoly with a loss in killed and wounded of 70 Europeans and 300 natives. Far from being cast down by this defeat, Dalton exerted himself with success to foil all the attempts of the Mysore leader to take advantage of his success; and when, at last, this latter succeeded in establishing 8,000 of his best troops at the Fukeer's Tope,—a strong position, four miles south of Trichinopoly, Dalton availed himself of his personal acquaintance with the character of their commander,—one Virana,—so to play upon his fears, that he abandoned of his own accord his impregnable position, and left it still feasible for Dalton to communicate with the open country beyond.

But before this had happened, Dalton had ascertained from personal inspection that but three weeks' supplies remained to him in Trichinopoly. At the time that he made this discovery, the position of the regent of Mysore in Seringham, and of Virana to the south of the town, had effectually barred from him all communication with the country, and ignorant then how far he might be successful in his attempts to frighten the latter, he had despatched an express messenger to Major Lawrence begging him to march to the relief of the city.

Major Lawrence received this intelligence on the 1st May, not quite three weeks after he had proved the inutility of attempting the French position on the Punar. His part was instantly taken. Leaving 150 Europeans and 500 sepoys under Captain Chace for the defence of Tiruvadi, he marched with the remainder of his troops, amounting to 650\* Europeans and 1,500 sepoys for Trichinopoly by way of Chillumbrum, Condore,

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\* Major Lawrence had with him at the beginning of the year 700 Europeans; he was joined in April by 200 more as stated in the text; deducting from these the 150 left behind and 100 as casualties, there would remain 650. Of these he sent 100 into hospital on arrival at Trichinopoly, and his force was further thinned by desertions.

and Tanjore. He took with him no tents and only the quantity of baggage absolutely necessary. As he approached Trichinopoly the plain was crowded with the 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry that formed Virana's force. They, however, offered him no opposition, retiring into Seringham, as he, on the 17th May, entered Trichinopoly.

But this movement on the part of the English did not escape the eagle eye of Dupleix. Conjecturing at once that the destination of their force could be no other than Trichinopoly, he instantly despatched 200 Europeans and 500 sepoy to Seringham to reinforce the hundred men he had sent thither at the beginning of the year. The command of this force he confided to M. Astruc, a promising officer though untried in command, and he directed him to proceed by the Volcondah and Ootatoor route, already familiar to us from the movements of the previous year. In the entrenched camp on the Puar, there remained 160 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy under the command of M. Maissin.

Hostilities between the rival powers before Trichinopoly commenced on the 21st May by a daring attempt on the part of Major Lawrence to drive the enemy out of Seringham. In this, however, after operations which lasted twenty hours, he was foiled.\* He accordingly withdrew his troops, who had suffered but slightly, and moved to the Fukeer's Tope, the old position of Virana, four miles south of the town. Despairing then of driving the French out of Seringham, he set to work to supply the city with provisions. Owing, however, to the numbers of the Mahratta horse and the intrigues of the enemy with his allies, he found this a work of greater difficulty than he had anticipated. Nevertheless, as its accomplishment was of primary importance, he devoted to it all his energies, though it compelled him rigorously to avoid hostilities for the five weeks following his repulse from Seringham.

This time had been well employed by Dupleix. No sooner had he ascertained the small number of troops left behind by Lawrence at Tiruvadi,—a number liable to be diminished by the necessity of providing supplies for that garrison and for Fort St. David,—than he sent instructions to Maissin to spare no efforts to storm it. Maissin in consequence attacked the place first on the 3rd of May, and failing, renewed the assault some days later. He was, however, once more repulsed, but when the English, not content with repelling the attack, sallied forth to the number of

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\* Mr. Orme attributes this failure less to the skill of M. Astruc than to the want of perception on the part of Captain Polier, a Swiss officer in the English service. He admits however the ability of Astruc.

60, accompanied by 300 sepoys, into the plain, they were surrounded by the Mahratta horse, and cut to pieces to a man. From this success resulted the capitulation of Tiruvadi with all its remaining garrison, the capture of Chillumbrum, and a movement on the part of Mortiz Ali, the Nawab appointed by Dupleix, to recover the strong places of the Carnatic. Accompanied by fifty French soldiers and a considerable native force, this chieftain did indeed cause considerable alarm to the partisans of Mahomed Ali, completely defeating on one occasion the troops of that Nawab commanded by his brother, although aided by a party of forty English, most of whom, after a gallant resistance, were slain in the encounter.

The Carnatic thus once more cleared of active enemies, Dupleix again bent all his energies to the capture of Trichinopoly. The troops that had been on the Punar were accordingly despatched to reinforce those in Seringham,—a measure by which the French force in that island was raised to 450 Europeans and 1,500 drilled sepoys. Their arrival at that place combined with the inaction of Lawrence to incite Astruc to vigorous measures. Marching out of Seringham, therefore, he crossed the Cauveri and took up a position to the south of Trichinopoly, a little to the north of the English camp.

Learning next that Major Lawrence was confined to the city by ill-health, Astruc profited by his absence to take possession of some heights, about a mile south of and commanding the English camp. These heights, known as the Five Rocks, being guarded only by sepoys, Astruc easily carried them. He at once diligently set to work to fortify them, and succeeded so well that when Lawrence, hearing of their loss, moved out to endeavour to recover them, he was repulsed and compelled to retire to a position about a quarter of a mile nearer the town out of reach of the enemy's fire.

This bold and successful manœuvre on the part of Astruc gave an immense advantage to the French. Their position at the Five Rocks was not only unassailable, but it was the key of the surrounding country. It enabled them to intercept all the supplies destined for the garrison, and to bar a passage to the enemy's convoys. The advantage they possessed in cavalry seemed to render any movement on the part of Lawrence impossible. Nor did the idea of a general action present to the mind of the English leader any impression that it would better his position. Sickness and exposure had worked with such effect upon his garrison, that he was unable to bring more than 500 Europeans into the field. To support these he had but 1,300 sepoys, and 100 horse,—the rest of his native allies remaining in the





city out of dread an encounter with the Mahrattas. On the other side Astruc commanded 400 French soldiers and 1,500 sepoy, supported by 8,000 Mysore horse, 1,200 foot, 3,500 Mahratta cavalry, and 15,000 irregular infantry. Was it likely, was it even probable, that the small superiority in the number of Europeans, or that the superior ability of their leader should make up for the general numerical superiority possessed by the French and their allies?

The position of the English was indeed gloomy, and it seemed as though a few days' patience on the part of Astruc must compel them either to attack an impregnable position or to capitulate. To precipitate matters, however, Astruc resolved to force the enemy to take refuge within the city itself. This, he saw, must be the result of the capture of another eminence called the Golden Rock, about a mile nearer to the city than his own position, and on which there was only a sepoy guard. This rock taken, there was no position between it and Trichinopoly which could afford shelter to the English force.

We see now clearly the position of the hostile armies. On the one side Astruc, with a force on the whole overwhelmingly superior, though in one particular, that of European troops, inferior by one-fifth;—Astruc with this force possessing an almost inaccessible position, barring supplies from the garrison, and needing only the possession of another height, one mile nearer the city, to ensure its downfall; on the other side Lawrence, sick and weakly, in a defensive position, unable to attack with any chance of success, with no native allies, dependent solely on his Europeans, and well aware that the capture of the Golden Rock, from which they were but a mile distant, by the French, was alone wanting to ensure his ruin. Such was the position. It will be patent to all that it only remained for the English leader to await with what calmness he could command the attack of the French.

After some days' mingled dread and expectation it came. On the morning of the 7th July, watching the moment when a large number of the English sepoy had been detached to receive their rations, Astruc detached a select body of his grenadiers and best sepoy to attack the Golden Rock, whilst he himself supported their onslaught with his whole army. The advanced party moving with the dash and celerity peculiar to French soldiers, clambered up the heights and after a vigorous resistance carried the post. Meanwhile Lawrence, who was in camp, had no sooner noticed the movements of the enemy against the rock, than he hastily collected all his available force, amounting to 420 Europeans and 500 sepoy, and hastened to support his



men on the rock. So much time, however, had been lost in turning out, that he had scarcely covered half the distance between his camp and the rock, before the position had been carried by the French. Scarcely too had he endured the mortification of seeing the flag of France waving over its summit, when the fire of the French artillery from either flank of the base of the rock, showed him that the whole force of the enemy had arrived to repel any attack that might be made to recover it.

The loss of the rock and the extraordinary danger of his own position became evident to the mind of Lawrence at one and the same moment. What was he to do? To retire was to expose himself to almost certain destruction, for his retreat would be harassed and impeded by the crowds of Mahratta horsemen who were even then threatening his battalion. To advance, was to advance in the face of a triumphant enemy, possessing a strong position, vastly superior in numbers. It appeared indeed but a choice of deaths. Thus seemed to think Lawrence. For a moment he halted, though but for a moment only. That brief interval was sufficient to bring him to a resolution worthy of himself, worthy of the nation to which he belonged. Under all doubtful circumstances to attack, is a principle which should be stamped upon the mind of every commander. Especially when retreat and attack present alike sombre aspects should the general recollect that the one encourages, the other demoralises; the one ensures defeat, the other at least offers a chance of success; it is, at the very worst, better to die advancing than retreating, to command the respect of the enemy rather than to afford him an opportunity for the display of his contempt with its concomitant encouragement to his soldiers.

It is probable that some such thoughts coursed through the mind of Lawrence, as after that momentary halt he detached a chosen body of grenadiers and sepoys to storm the hill on its front, whilst he himself moved rapidly against the main body of the French, drawn up on the left of its base. It was a heroic resolve heroically carried out. The grenadiers and sepoys clambered up the hill without pulling trigger, and reaching the summit, charged the French stationed there with so much vigour and impetuosity, that they drove them headlong down on the opposite side. Meanwhile Astruc, noting the advance of Lawrence but not the movement of the grenadiers, had drawn up his men with their right resting on the left spur of the rock which, he deemed, covered his flank. Opposing thus his own line to the English, who by this time were within fifty yards of him, he ordered the Mahratta horse and his native allies to move up and take them in flank and rear. Their destruction

seemed to him to be, beyond question, inevitable. But just as his arrangements were about to take effect, the fire of the English grenadiers from the rock on his right flank startled and discomposed his line, and before they could recover from their surprise, a volley from the English followed by a bayonet-charge completed their confusion. The French officers, and conspicuously amongst them the gallant Astruc himself, exerted themselves to restore the battle, but it was in vain. Completely panic-stricken by the suddenness of the surprise at the moment when victory seemed certain, the French soldiers hurried from the field, leaving it to Morari Rao and his Mahrattas to cover their retreat. This service was performed by these famous horsemen with their usual gallantry. They even indeed attempted to dispute the field with the English, when, three hours later, Major Lawrence moved off to his old position with the two French guns,—the trophies of the day,—which he had captured. But the little body of Englishmen, formed in a moving square, repulsed every attack, and finally halting, poured in so continuous a fire upon the masses that they broke and fled in all directions.

It is impossible to over-estimate the service which Major Lawrence rendered his country on this eventful day. But for his unsurpassed coolness and presence of mind Trichinopoly would have fallen, and with it all the hard-earned conquests of the previous year. Fortunate indeed would he have been if in the presence of the swarming Mahratta cavalry, and the French troops, flushed with victory, he had escaped the fate of Law. His merit on this occasion was the greater, because the French leader, Astruc, committed no glaring mistake. His plan was well conceived and well executed. He could not imagine that his soldiers would give up the place they had won almost without a blow. He acted throughout with courage and judgment; and though forced to succumb, it was in consequence of an event which it had been impossible to foresee, and against which he could not have provided. The greater honour is on that account due to the Englishman, who, in a sudden and dangerous crisis, elected to dare all in the face of an overpowering enemy, rather than to yield to him the field!

Nor is it possible to leave this subject without a word with respect to those gallant troops who followed him so nobly. Those men had been trained by Clive and by Lawrence himself to the same state of perfection attained many years later by the veterans of Wellington. They were men who could be trusted to perform any service,—men who regarded neither difficulties nor numbers, who asked merely to be shown the position of the enemy and to be told to attack it. No finer feat

of arms has been performed in any part of the world than the assault by a handful of grenadiers of the Golden Rock, held by an enemy that had just conquered it, and whose army was formed up at its base! The attempt alone was sufficient to intimidate an enemy whose *morale* was inferior, who had not learned by experience that the one way to conquer was to move straight on. It was, in fact, one of those deeds of heroism which deserves to be recorded in the archives of a nation's history, never to be suffered, as has been the case with this, to fall into oblivion and neglect.\*

The French after their defeat retreated to the Fukeer's Tope, thence to continue the system of blockade which they had inaugurated. Astruc after his defeat had resigned his command, and had proceeded to Pondichery. His successor, M. Brennier, determined to attempt to effect by blockade the object that force had failed to compass. He succeeded indeed in reducing the townspeople to extremities: the price of rice speedily rose to one rupee the pound; of firewood there was an absolute want; the city became rapidly deserted by its inhabitants, who preferred even the risk of attack from the enemy to death from starvation. In his chief object, however, Brennier had no better fortune than his predecessor, for Lawrence, determined to employ every possible means to avert disaster, moved with the main body of his army in the direction of Tanjore, leaving Dalton to defend the city.

On learning this movement on the part of Lawrence, Brennier proposed to himself two plans:—the first to storm Trichinopoly whilst so weakly guarded;—the second to move upon Lawrence with his whole force and destroy him. But unfortunately for his own purposes, he allowed his mind to rest upon both objects at the same time, instead of concentrating all his energies upon one. Thus, the better to carry out the first he sent into the town a devoted Frenchman named de' Cattans, who engaged to act the part of a deserter, and whilst so employed to

\* The story is told at length by Mr. Orme, Colonel Wilks, and by Major Lawrence. Their works however, published at intervals from upwards of half a century to nearly ninety years ago, are scarcely available for the general reader. Mr. Mill describes the whole campaign of 1753 in nineteen lines, and makes no particular allusion to this action. Barchou de Penhoen is more just to his adversaries than Mr. Mill to his friends. He writes:—"Lawrence knowing how much he could depend upon his troops, "marched boldly against the French, and after an obstinate and bloody "combat, remained master of the field of battle." It will not then be denied that this gallant action has, with modern historians, fallen into 'oblivion and neglect.'

make drawings of all the internal defences, and to indicate the weak parts of the fortifications. It happened, however, that de Cattans was discovered, and obtained a promise of his life solely on the condition that he should indicate to the French leader the strongest parts of the fortress as those which were the weakest and least guarded. This was accordingly done.\* So much time, however, had passed in the interval, that before these papers reached Brennier he was entirely engrossed by the other plan,—the interception and attack of Major Lawrence, who, he heard, was escorting a large convoy of provisions from his camp near Tanjore into Trichinopoly. It was of the utmost consequence to the French that this movement should not succeed.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th August, Brennier moved from his camp and took up an extended position stretching from Weyconda on the south-west to the French Rock on the south-east of the city,—the points the French occupied in force being Weyconda itself, next to that the Golden Rock,—the scene of the defeat of Astruc, but of which in the absence of Lawrence they had taken possession;—the Sugarloaf Rock, distant about half a mile from it; and the French Rock. Their infantry and artillery were strongly posted at the Golden and Sugarloaf Rocks; the space between the Golden Rock and the French Rock was filled by swarms of cavalry; there was a small detachment at Elmiseram; whilst Weyconda was held by sepoys, the intervening spaces being filled by masses of irregular troops, whose line stretched even to the banks of the Cauveri. In this position, occupying all the strong posts, Brennier believed he could intercept and destroy the English force, burdened as it was with a large convoy.

But the English had advantages that he knew not of. It was true that their force was burdened with a convoy, but it was not less so that whilst encamped near Tanjore, Lawrence had received a reinforcement not only of 5,000 Tanjoreans, but of 170 Europeans, and 300 sepoys from Fort St. David. But that was not all. By means of the high tower in the centre of the city, Dalton was able to observe all the movements of the French, and to communicate them to Lawrence. This he did not fail to do on the present occasion. The English leader marched to the attack therefore, not only at the head of a body of Europeans considerably larger than that of the enemy, but with almost as perfect a knowledge of his movements as if he had been an officer on Brennier's staff.

\* De Cattans was nevertheless hanged as a spy in sight of the French force, on the return of Major Lawrence to the city.

It will have been noticed that the two rocks, called the Golden and Sugarloaf, formed the key of the French position. The Golden Rock was, however, by far the most important of the two, as it commanded the entire country between it and the city, and Brennier ought to have held it at all costs. Lawrence knowing its importance, determined, after depositing his convoy in safety, to direct on it his main attack. The better, however, to delude Brennier, he halted his troops in front of the Sugarloaf Rock, and made all his dispositions as if to attack it. Brennier, completely deceived, believing that he was to be attacked on the Sugarloaf Rock by Lawrence's entire force, sent hurried orders that the greater part of the force on the Golden Rock should be despatched to reinforce him. Lawrence gave him plenty of time to carry out this movement, but it had no sooner been effected than he detached his grenadiers and 800 sepoys to seize the Golden Rock. This they did without much difficulty. Before, however, it had been accomplished, Brennier noticed the movement. Then, too late, perceiving his error, he sent a detachment to preserve or to recover it. This detachment finding the rock lost did not attempt to recover it, but taking up a position on some high ground between the two rocks, opened a very galling fire on the English. Lawrence, noticing this, conceived the idea of cutting off and destroying this detachment before it could be assisted by the main body, which, after making a slight forward movement, remained as if paralysed on the slopes of the Sugarloaf Rock. He accordingly detached five hundred men, natives and Europeans, for this purpose. They advanced without guns in the face of a heavy fire of artillery which mowed down many of them. This caused a hesitation on the part of their leader, but Lawrence perceiving it, ran out to them himself, and led them to the charge. At this moment, also, Dalton, who from the tower within Trichinopoly had watched the progress of the fight, hastened to the ground with his detachment and two field-pieces, and attacked the French in rear. Separated from their main body, which all this time remained in an extraordinary state of inaction, the French detachment retreated to Weyconda, not however till they had inflicted and suffered heavy loss. Brennier, whose earlier movement might have saved the day, no sooner beheld the retreat of his detachment, than, seeming to recover himself, he advanced with his main body to attack the victorious English. It was, however, too late; for his troops, disheartened by the retreat of their comrades, and by the sight of the English in force on both flanks, declined the combat, and retreated, as fast as possible, to the Five Rocks, and thence followed their

comrades in disorder to Weyconda. The Tanjorean cavalry which might have handled them severely, feared, even in their retreat, to attack the soldiers of France. They contented themselves with reducing Elmiseram, which was but slightly guarded.

This second battle before Trichinopoly cost the English 40, the French 100, Europeans, and proved not less than the first the superior generalship of the English leader, and the higher *morale* of his soldiers. It is difficult to imagine a conduct more imbecile than that exhibited by Brennier. He allowed himself to become the dupe of the most transparent stratagem, and its success so confounded him that he seemed incapable of giving any orders until it was too late to retrieve his vanished fortunes. It is not surprising that the French soldiers should display their want of confidence in such a leader.

Meanwhile, after the action, the French concentrated in Weyconda threw up intrenchments, as though prepared to defend it. Lawrence, whose supply of provisions had become again exhausted, advanced, a few days later, to the Five Rocks, and on the 4th September made as if he would attack Weyconda. Brennier, totally demoralised, did not ever attempt the defence of the place, but retreated hurriedly and in disorder to Mootachellinoor on the banks of the Cauveri, a position which assured his communications with Seringham. Here, to his surprise, he was joined by an important reinforcement of 400 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and six guns under M. Astruc, and 3,000 tried Mahratta cavalry under Morari Rao. Astruc at once re-assumed the command of the French force.

This reinforcement ought to have changed the fortune of the campaign. The French soldiers, of which it was partly composed, were men who had but recently arrived from the Isle of France, and who had been engaged during the few subsequent weeks in overrunning the Carnatic. They were free from the discouragement that had fallen on the others, and should have been employed on the offensive before they had become inoculated by the despondency that reigned in the camp. But ill-success had made Astruc over-cautious. The third day after the junction, he led the combined force towards the south, and took possession of the Five Rocks, and the Golden and Sugarloaf Rocks, recommencing that system of blockade which had twice before brought the English to such straits. Lawrence on his part moved towards Elmiseram alike with a view to cover his convoys, and to effect a junction with a fresh reinforcement of Europeans then shortly expected. In such a position it was the policy of the French to avail themselves of their superior numbers to attack the English. The occasion

was favourable: Morari Rao in particular urged it upon them; but their councils were divided, and Astruc himself was averse to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword. He confined himself, therefore, to intercepting supplies and attacking convoys, whilst he hurried on the defences he was throwing up at the Golden and Sugarloaf Rocks. This was acting the policy of Lawrence. This officer remained in the open plain, amusing the French by feigned attacks, till the 27th September. On that date he was joined by 237\* Europeans and 300 sepoys. As bold as his adversary was timid, he at once determined to attempt the storm of the French intrenchments before they should be quite finished. Astruc had, like Brennier before him, placed the greater part of his force on the Sugarloaf Rock, the intrenchments of which had been completed on three sides; to the Golden Rock he had detached 100 Europeans, 600 sepoys, and two guns, intending to fortify that also. The space between the rocks and all around them was occupied by the Mahrattas and Mysoreans. Astruc hoped, by holding an impregnable position here, to blockade the English on three sides, whilst Dupleix should induce the king of Tanjore to renounce their alliance. This would complete the investment, and ensure the fall of Trichinopoly.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 27th September, the detachment under Captains Ridge and Calliaud joined Lawrence. That officer resolved to attack with as little delay as possible. Moving accordingly on the morning of the 1st October to the Fukeer's Tope, he drew up his men and offered battle. Astruc, however, having declined it, he encamped on the ground on which he was drawn up. But before break of day on the following morning, he advanced at the head of 600 Europeans, six guns, and 2,000 sepoys towards the Golden rock, assaulted it in three columns before he had been perceived, and carried it without giving the French leisure to fire their two guns, which were captured loaded. Only waiting to re-form, Lawrence then advanced quickly towards the Sugarloaf Rock, his men shouting and drums beating, the Mysoreans fleeing before them. Here, however, in front of unfortified face, the French were drawn up to receive him, with a strong body of sepoys on their left. These men, however, would appear to have been disheartened by the sight of the fugitive Mysoreans escaping from the English, as well as by the shouts of the latter, for they gave way without striking a blow.

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\* One of the officers with these was Captain Calliaud, a name subsequently famous in Anglo-Indian warfare.

The right division of the English, following them up, discovered the left flank of the French unguarded. They, therefore, wheeled to the left, and took their line in flank at the same moment that the two other divisions charged it in front. Stationary as they were, the French could not stand this double attack. In vain did Astruc exert himself to restore the battle. The English pressed on so hotly that rallying was impossible. Broken and divided, fleeing in disorder and dismay, the scattered remnants of the French force made no halt till they had placed the waters of the Cauveri between themselves and their pursuers.

This great victory, gained by the superior boldness and daring of the English leader, was decisive. Eleven pieces of cannon, one hundred and eleven prisoners, amongst whom were M. Astruc and ten officers, 200 killed and wounded, testified to its importance. On their side the English lost but forty men. Nor were its results on Trichinopoly less favourable to the English. That city was at once delivered from the horror of scarcity. For whilst the main body of the French took refuge, cowed and paralysed, in Seringham, Major Lawrence sweeping their detachments from the country south of the Cauveri, poured supplies into the city, and then moved himself with the main body of his troops to Coiladdy on the north bank of the Cauveri, within the territories of Tanjore. In this position we must leave the hostile parties, the French baffled and humiliated, without confidence in themselves or in their leaders; the English proud of themselves, proud of the general who had three times led them to decisive victory, proud likewise of their achievements, confident and secure as to the future;—here we must leave them, to return once again to the action of the Governor whose great plans had thus been so strangely baffled.

Whilst these tremendous conflicts were going on in the vicinity of Trichinopoly, Dupleix, continuing to feed and to strengthen his armies before that place, had been exerting himself to the utmost to restore peace to the Carnatic. To this course he had been moved by several concurring reasons. The Directors of the French Company and the French Ministers had never ceased to urge it upon him. The continued warfare from which so much had been expected drained the pockets of the shareholders, a result ill calculated to satisfy those who looked only for dividends. The contest which, Dupleix had declared over and over again, could not possibly last long, and could not end but in the elevation of France to a pitch of unprecedented glory, seemed to the Directors likely to be spun out indefinitely and to end in humiliation rather than in advantage. In that august body the want of immediate success on the part of Dupleix



had produced the usual results. Those who had long been envious of his success now joined the faction that was really alarmed, to agitate for an end to such a state of things. The longer the war lasted, the more powerful and persistent became the adherents of the party in favour of peace at any price.

But that was not the only reason. Dupleix was himself most anxious for peace with the English, if only to give him time to consolidate his arrangements with the native powers, to obtain from his European rivals an acknowledgment of his right to the territories conceded to him by the representatives of the Mogul. He had previously, in February, 1752, addressed Mr. Saunders with this object, but the answer he received not having been of a nature to encourage him in the hope of a successful result, he had allowed the subject to drop. In the July of the following year however, urged by the considerations to which we have adverted, as well as by the pressing solicitations of Bussy, who, by an engagement to become his stepson, had but just acquired a fresh right to advise him, he attempted to renew the negotiation. Saunders met him in what may be termed a conciliatory spirit, if we have regard only to the main object proposed to be attained. But the course of their correspondence soon showed that though they equally wished for peace, the rival powers held very different ideas as to the conditions on which that peace was alone attainable. Dupleix insisted on the recognition by the English of himself as Nawab of the Carnatic,—an office which had been bestowed upon him by the Subadar and been confirmed, he asserted, by the Mogul Emperor. The English Governor on the other hand loudly asserted the claims of Mahomed Ali. Under these circumstances it would appear that whilst both governors continued to negotiate, they felt alike strongly that the terms of the treaty would be decided, not by their arguments or protests, by the validity of the parchments they displayed or of the patents promulgated in their favour, but by the armies which were then contending for the possession of Trichinopoly. This fact alone is sufficient to account for the perseverance, constancy, and energy displayed, by Mr. Saunders in sending reinforcements to Lawrence, and by Dupleix in the despatch of every available soldier to strengthen the forces of Brennier and Astruc.

It will readily be conceded, we think, that having regard to the number of European troops he despatched to the scene of action, and the largely preponderating force, and superior excellence, of his native allies, Dupleix had good reason to hope for a decided success before Trichinopoly. He at least had strained the resources of Pondichery to assure himself of such a result,

and it was not for him to anticipate that a fatality would continue to be inseparable from the operations of the French leaders before that place. He was not a man to be easily discouraged. He had replied to the first and second battles of the Golden Rock by pouring in fresh reinforcements and urging his generals to renewed exertions. When even the news reached him of the third and most fatal defeat on that fatal ground he did not despair. That intelligence on the contrary only nerved him up to make another vigorous effort, conducted with more subtlety, more daring, than any of the others. His plan was, whilst still continuing to negotiate with Saunders, to send secretly to Seringham the last reinforcements he had received from Europe, with instructions to their commander to use them at once to attempt the storm of Trichinopoly, whilst Lawrence was resting, with the main body of his forces, at Coiladdy, fifteen miles distant.

In pursuance of this determination, 300 Europeans and 1,200 sepoy were despatched from Pondichery early in October under the command of M. de Mainville. They arrived at Seringham on the 21st. The better to conceal his intentions Mainville endeavoured, and very successfully, to conceal the fact from the English garrison and from Lawrence. He did not even endeavour to intercept the supplies of the garrison, but employed his whole time in preparing for the meditated enterprise. At length, on the 8th December, all his arrangements having been made, without any suspicion existing on the part of the English, Mainville determined to put his plan into execution. His orders were clear and precise: 600 Europeans supported by 200 more and the sepoy, were to attack and carry the work covering the gateway known as Dalton's battery. As there were here but fifty sepoy, Mainville anticipated that this could be accomplished easily and without firing a shot. He therefore gave the strictest orders to abstain from firing. This work carried without alarming the garrison, it was determined to dash round the traverses, of which there were two, and apply a petard to the gate of the town, or should that fail, to attempt to escalate,—the walls here being but eighteen feet above the rock;—for this purpose ladders had been prepared.

Following this arrangement Mainville crossed the Cauveri at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 9th, and succeeded in reaching the base of the outwork, without having been perceived. The 600 Frenchmen escalated this place and surprised the sepoy, whom they found mostly asleep. Had they then but pushed forward, had they obeyed Mainville's instructions to abstain from firing, nothing could have saved Trichinopoly. But

instead of thus acting, their evil genius prompted them to turn two of the 12-pounders which they had captured and found loaded against the walls of the town. They accompanied this fire by a volley of small arms and by shouts of *Vive le roi*.

The effect of this fire was to rouse the garrison. Under orders received from Captain Killpatrick, the commandant, detachments instantly proceeded to their respective alarm posts ready to receive the enemy. Meanwhile the French, after their insane and useless volley, pressed along the passage round the traverses, and under the guidance of an English deserter followed closely by two men carrying petards, had arrived within a short distance of the gate,—the exact locality of which, however, was known only to the deserter. Whilst they were advancing, the English had hurried to the gate, and had commenced an indiscriminate fire into the passage leading up to it. The night was dark, and they could take no aim; nevertheless, their first fire killed the English deserter and the two petardiers when within a few paces of them. The others, not knowing exactly what had happened, began after some little confusion consequent on the darkness to attempt the escalade. Their ladders, however, had suffered so much from the enemy's fire and from other causes, that they had but a small number available. Those that they had were nevertheless boldly planted, and an officer preceded by a drummer and followed by his men led the way up one of them. The drummer however was killed, the officer pulled into the town, and the ladder thrown back. Others were similarly treated, until, having lost all their ladders, without ropes or any means to retreat down the rock they had ascended, exposed to the fire of the enemy without being able to return it, the French were driven to despair. They could not even make known to the garrison their wish to surrender. For some hours longer, hiding themselves as best they could, still exposed on the least movement to a continued fire, they were left in the most pitiable position. When at last day dawned it was only that the greater part of this large force, which had set out with such hopes of victory, which had had victory within its grasp, might surrender, *en masse*, prisoners of war. Of the entire body of 600 men, eight officers and 364 men were taken prisoners, many were wounded, one officer and 40 men were killed; the remainder, nearly 200 in number, jumped down from the rock into the ditch, and though several of them were maimed in the attempt, were carried off by their comrades.

It would seem in sober truth, that a fatality did attend all the French operations against Trichinopoly! This enterprise, well planned, up to a certain point well executed, certain then

under the conditions of ordinary prudence to succeed,—why did it fail? What was it that prompted that ill-timed and useless volley? The second query is an answer to the first; to the second itself it is beyond our power to reply. We must content ourselves with remarking that that foolish act of a few foolish men changed entirely the face of events. It not only by its consequences took away from the French the hope of ever gaining Trichinopoly; \* it not only gave all the triumphs of the campaign to the English; but it was the main cause of that humiliating treaty, in which, but a few months later, France gave up the labour of years, renounced the right even to aspire to dominion in the territories of Hindostan. What a lesson does not this story convey to soldiers,—what a lesson to mankind in general! What a lesson never to turn, when in the pursuit of a great end, either to the right or to the left, to allow no lighter thoughts, no ideas of vain glory, to move us off the direct path by following which with singleness of purpose we can alone hope to reach the desired goal!

To the views of Dupleix, the author of the plan, although not responsible for any part of its execution, the blow was fatal. Nor had it, unfortunately for him, come entirely unaccompanied by other disasters; Mortiz Ali had a little before been defeated before Trinomalee, and Mahomed Komal, another French partisan, before the pagoda of Tripetti. But this was the finishing stroke, this it was that convinced Dupleix of the necessity of at least entering into negotiations with the English governor. Far better for him to come to terms, even though they might be disadvantageous, than to see his best-laid plans thwarted and ruined by the want, on the part of those who were to execute them, of ordinary prudence and the commonest self-command.

Accordingly, and with the hope rather than the expectation that that some practical result might arise from the meeting, Dupleix proposed that commissioners should be appointed, armed with full powers, to treat regarding an accommodation. To this the English Governor acceded, and the little town of Sadras belonging to the Dutch, nearly equi-distant from Madras and Pondichery, was fixed upon as the seat of conference.

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\* Major Lawrence writes: "The scheme was well laid, and had not French petulance made them too soon discover themselves, they perhaps might have had time to execute their designs." Mr. Orme writes that the assault "exposed the city of Trichinopoly to the greatest risk it had run during the war." Col. Wilks: "if the orders prohibiting firing had been obeyed, the place must in a few minutes have been in possession of the French."

The English commissaries, Messrs. Palk and Vansittart, arrived at this place on the 30th December; the French,—M. Kerjean, M. Bausset, and Father Lavour, the principal of the Jesuits,—delayed by the non-arrival of passports from the English governor,—not till the 21st. The next day the conference held its fresh sitting. The English commissaries began by declaring that they had no propositions to make, and none to listen to, which did not comprehend the acknowledgment of Mahomed Ali as sole and legitimate master and Nawab of the Carnatic, or which did not guarantee to the king of Tanjore the full and entire possession of his kingdom.

The proposals of the French commissaries were, in words, much more moderate. They suggested that Madras should be quit of the annual ground-rent due to the government of the Carnatic; that Pondemaly and its dependencies should be ceded to the English Company; that all the expenses of the war on the part of the English should be defrayed; that the French Company should give to the English Company the necessary securities for freedom of commerce; and that in consequence of these cessions, the English Company should evacuate the countries and fortified places dependent on the Carnatic; that for Mahomed Ali there should be provided a suitable governorship in some part of the Dekkan under the mutual guarantee of the French and English Companies; that he should be considered quit of all monies due by him to the treasury of the Dekkan; and that the king of Tanjore should be maintained in the possession of his territories under the guarantee of the two Companies. Such were the French propositions, extremely moderate, even conciliatory, in their outward form, but in reality no less favourable to French, than were the counter-proposals to English, interests. The French scheme, in fact, must be examined rather with reference to what it omitted than to its contents. We find in it no mention of the Subadar of the Dekkan, none of the Nawab of the Carnatic. But, the rival candidate for the last-named appointment being in it provided for, the intention was clear to take it for granted that Salabut Jung would be acknowledged as Subadar, and his nominee, Dupleix, as Nawab of the Carnatic. Exactly then as the English proposition claimed all that the English had been contending for, so did this of the French ask everything that Dupleix had demanded from the very beginning. The English commissaries received the French propositions in silence, but at the next meeting of the conference they declared that their instructions forbade their even discussing any articles, until the two which they themselves had presented should have been subscribed to by the French deputies. To this the

French would by no means agree. They challenged Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Palk to show them any patent conferring upon Mahomed Ali the office of Nawab of the Carnatic; they showed them that it was not an hereditary office; that the father of Mahomed Ali had been appointed by the Subadar of his day; and that his successors had, on his demise, given the office, originally to Chanda Sahib, and secondly to Dupleix: and they produced several patents granted to the latter, and a letter from the Great Mogul confirming all that Salabut Jung had granted in favour of Dupleix. The English to this replied, that Mahomed Ali had received his appointment from Nazir Jung, and afterwards from Ghazee-ood-deen, but that the patents were at Trichinopoly; the letter from the great Mogul they treated as a forgery. Something more was said, but little to any purpose. That meeting was the last held by the conference. Finding it impossible to agree even upon preliminaries, the English commissaries left on the 5th February for Madras, the French, three days later, for Pondichery.

Dupleix was the less inclined to abate any of the pretensions on this occasion, for whilst the conference was sitting he received from Bussy the intelligence of that gift of the four Circars to the French Company, the history of which we have already recorded. The possession of these rich provinces rendered him quite independent of English wishes. Better, he argued, to maintain war than to give up one iota of his just claims. He opposed no obstacle, therefore, to the breaking up of the conference, but throughout the written communications which followed, he adhered, without renouncing a single article, to the rigid programme he had dictated to his agents at that assembly. When Saunders even yielded so far on his side as to concede in substance every claim of the French, with the exception of that which referred to the Nawabship of Carnatic; when even he agreed so to modify his claims in this respect, as to leave that office vacant, on the understanding that Mahomed Ali should be appointed to it, under the protection of the two Companies, by Salabut Jung, whom the English would then acknowledge, Dupleix haughtily rejected the proposal, and insisted only the more strenuously on the validity of his own titles.

In the course of our history we have had many occasions to point to the versatility of intellect, the untiring energy, the varied resources under all circumstances, the self-denial, the persistence, the patriotic devotion of this illustrious Frenchman. All these qualities he united\* indeed to an extent such as is seldom found in one man. But the same candour, which has forced us to admit and to admire these great virtues, compels

us to lament the fatal obstinacy which influenced his conduct throughout this memorable negotiation. Too clear it is, alas! that on this occasion he was guided, not by his genius, but by his passions. His pride would not allow him to take that one retrograde step which he, more than most men, would have known how to make the prelude of a further advance. He had fought so long and so openly, so persistently, for this empty title, therefore he would not lower himself by giving it up now,—now especially, when the influence of Bussy at Hydrabad and the possession of the four Circars seemed to make him virtual master of the Dekkan. Blind and fatal reasoning! His successes in the north ought to have made him more compliant, more yielding, more anxious to conciliate. He should have been content to bide his time. There would not always be a Saunders and a Lawrence at Madras. England had had its Morses, its Floyers, its Copes, and its Gingen, and might have them again. He too, who had influenced every native with whom he had come in contact, who had so bent to his will a Mozuffer Jung, a Chanda Sahib, a Mortiz Ali, as to make them like clay in the hands of the potter, who had won the daring spirit of Morari Rao, was he to despair of gaining a Mahomed Ali? Once independent, free from the clutches of the English, as by this treaty he would have become, and Mahomed Ali would speedily have fallen under the sway of that potent influence, that irrefragable will. Whilst then, as Englishmen, we cannot but rejoice at the unyielding pride which preferred to risk everything rather than to yield one small portion of its pretensions, we cannot but lament, regarding the question abstractedly, that so vast a genius should have been marred by this one great failing. In similar circumstances Napoleon acted similarly. In 1813-14, he too preferred the risk of the sacrifice of his throne to the certain sacrifice of the smallest of his pretensions. The reason which prompted both these great rulers was the same. It was simply, we repeat, this, that on an occasion requiring peculiarly a cool judgment and clear discrimination, they were both alike influenced by their passions!

Meanwhile, hostilities did not cease in the Carnatic. Even before Trichinopoly the temporary success of the French arms seemed almost to justify Dupleix in his policy of haughty persistence.

After the failure of his attempt to surprise Trichinopoly, Mainville had withdrawn his parties within Seringham, and there awaited reinforcements. These Dupleix, with his usual promptitude, had sent him. On their arrival, Mainville resolved

to strike another blow at his enemy. He had observed that the guards which escorted convoys periodically sent into the city had gradually become smaller. Formerly Lawrence had made a point of attending them with his whole army, but, satisfied apparently of the inaction of the French, he had latterly remained himself in camp, sending only a much smaller party with the convoys. Having noted this, Mainville determined to surprise and attack the next convoy regarding which he might receive tidings. Intelligence having reached him very soon afterwards, that a particularly large convoy, escorted by only 180 Europeans, 800 sepoys, and four guns, would endeavour to make its way into the city, from Killahcottah, a small fort on the south of the Cauveri about twelve miles from Trichinopoly, on the early morning of the 26th February, he made the following preparations to intercept them. Between Killahcottah and the village of Coutapara, a distance of five miles, the ground, covered with trees and underwood, afforded cover for a large body of men; here accordingly he sent 12,000 horse under Morari Rao and Innis Khan, with instructions to lay in ambush about two miles beyond Coutapara, and not to attack the convoy until at least half its length should have passed them, and it should have been attacked in front by the French. He himself, with 400 French and 6,000 sepoys, took post in front of Coutapara, at the point where the wood debouches into the plain. These dispositions having been made on the evening of the 25th, he anxiously watched the result.

The morning of the 26th February had already dawned, and yet no convoy had appeared. Half an hour later, however, a small platoon was seen advancing, followed by the carts and bullocks in single file, the soldiers marching, also singly and unsuspecting of danger, on either side. They reached the point where Morari Rao was posted, they passed it even, not making, though they had seen some native horsemen in the woods, any change in their disposition. The French, however, were still two miles off, and Morari Rao, anxious that the surprise should be complete, noting too the negligent manner of marching, and fearing lest something might occur to give the alarm before the convoy should reach the French, determined to anticipate his orders. He accordingly sent to the parties he had posted in the wood to hold themselves in readiness to charge. He then gave the signal. The effect was electric. The English, without order or cohesion, their small body stretched along a long line of carts, could offer no effectual resistance. They could only die at their posts. The Mahrattas galloping amongst them, attacked all who opposed them. The English still resisted,



however, until the French troops arriving, offered them quarter. This was accepted; of the whole force, 50 were killed, 138, of whom 100 were wounded, were taken prisoners.\*

This, however, was but a transient gleam of success. On the 23rd May, a French force, 700 strong, supported by a large body of sepoys and Mahrattas, was repulsed near the Sugar-loaf Rock by a body of English, much inferior in numbers, on one of those occasions when a victory on the part of the French would have terminated the war in those parts. Again however the tide turned. Mainville, prompted by Dupleix, took the sudden resolution of abandoning his position before Trichinopoly, and of carrying the war into the enemy's country. Moving eastward, accordingly, he attacked and took Killahcottah, then possessed himself of Coiladdy. Here he caused the waters of the Cauveri to be diverted into the channel of the Coleroon, with the view to distress the people of Tanjore. Having seen this done he moved back to Trichinopoly, and took up the position at the Five Rocks whence he could best intercept the supplies destined for that city. Morari Rao, about the same time, completely defeated the army of the king of Tanjore. To cover the capital of the king of that country, Major Lawrence had left his position near Trichinopoly, leaving it feasible for Mainville to make the movement we have recorded. He was, at the time we are writing, wistfully watching from Tanjore the movements of Mainville at the Five Rocks whilst—such is Oriental diplomacy—the secret agents of Dupleix had more than half succeeded in detaching the King whose country he was protecting from the English alliance!

It will be seen then that Dupleix had at least some reason for maintaining his pretensions in his negotiations with the English. Had he been an absolute prince we can scarcely doubt but that in the end his policy would have triumphed. The last ally of the English, the king of Tanjore, was ready to abandon them, and notwithstanding the reverses of 1753, he still held a stronger position than ever before Trichinopoly in the middle of 1754. The famous grenadiers, who had borne the brunt of all the victories of Lawrence, had been killed or made prisoners, and his own troops, resuming the offensive, and victorious in more than one skirmish, were threatening the possessions of the English and their allies on every vulnerable point. It had become, in fact, a question with the latter whether the English alliance

\* Amongst these men was the famous battalion of grenadiers which had borne the brunt of all Lawrence's battles.

was worth maintaining at so great a risk to themselves, at the cost of so heavy a drain on the resources of their country.

But when the state of affairs was thus favourable, there came into action those other circumstances upon which Dupleix ought to have, but had not, sufficiently counted. The success of Bussy in the north, of Mainville and his partisans towards the south-west, were of little moment so long as he did not also possess the confidence of his masters in France. In those days when a communication to the Home Government could not reach France in a less a period than six or eight months, Dupleix ought to have been prepared for the effect which the disasters of the previous year would probably have on a corporation in which a large minority was, as he well knew, already hostile to himself. It was the consideration of the consequences likely to follow a long record of disasters, all burdensome to the finances of the Company, that should have powerfully influenced him in his dealing with the English governor. It is the more strange that he should have neglected to allow such a consideration to weigh with him, because he well knew the jealousy to which his proceedings had given birth, and he was aware that by success alone in India he could maintain his position with the Directors in France. Perhaps it was that he felt,—and of this policy we have a memorable example in our own day,—all the scorn of a great genius for men so inferior to him in all respects; perhaps also he did not reckon to its fullest extent the extreme length to which human meanness and human ingratitude would not hesitate to have recourse. He, evidently, conscious of his own deserving, did not fear the result of any scrutiny. He had to deal however, as we shall see, with men to whom consciousness of deserving was but a phrase, when the conduct which accompanied it did not exactly dovetail with their own paltry notions and petty ideas.

A party amongst the Direction in France had, indeed, been endeavouring for some time to compass his downfall. So far back as 1752 the complaints of Governor Saunders and his friends to their own Company, regarding the boundless ambition and enormous views of Dupleix, had found an echo in the heart of the French Direction. It was in consequence of this that they had that same year despatched M. Duvalaer to London, charged with full powers to negotiate, in concert with the French ambassador at the Court of St. James', with the English Ministers, regarding a basis upon which to settle affairs in the East. Both parties vehemently declared that they wished for peace; that their one aspiration was to engage in commercial

operations, to abstain from all interference in the affairs of the natives of India.

In the course of these negotiations, the English Ministers, instructed by the India House, which again received its inspiration on this point from Governor Saunders and his friends, never ceased to attribute all the evils of which the two Companies complained to the one man who ruled at Pondichery. But for him, they declared, there would have been no contests, no ruinous expenditure, no interference with commercial undertakings. He alone was responsible for all. These complaints, constantly repeated, could not fail to work upon the credulity of certain members of the French Company's Direction. These were simple enough to believe that their most deadly enemies and rivals were capable of giving them purely disinterested advice; that they wished the removal of Dupleix as much for the advantage of the French as of their own Company. We need scarcely observe that those tactics ought to have made the French more reluctant to part with the man whom their rivals would have removed. Passion, however, never reasons; it seeks rather excuses whereby to give a cloak to its own darling plans. In this instance it so worked upon the French Directors, that a majority was gradually brought round to the idea that French and English interests would be alike consulted by removing from his post the man who was the firmest supporter of the former, the most determined foe of the latter.

It was not, however, all at once that they fell into this snare. For a long time, indeed, Duvalaer continued to defend Dupleix and to retort against Saunders the accusations which they piled upon the head of the French governor. But not the less insidiously did the poison work. Not the less did the impression gradually become disseminated, that Dupleix was the sole obstacle to a good understanding. The prudent boldness of the English ministry favoured this view. Without actually declaring that they saw no hope of a cessation of hostilities so long as Dupleix should remain governor, yet letting it plainly appear that such was their belief, they equipped four ships of war, embarked a full regiment on board, and despatched them ostentatiously under the orders of Admiral Watson to the East Indies.

Well would it have been for Dupleix, well for France herself, if the French Company had been able to answer this demonstration by an assurance that peace had already been concluded between the two governments on the spot: that there was no need for further negotiations. At any moment from July to December, 1753, it had been in the power of Dupleix to have expedited

such a message. None however came, and the French Directors were brought at last to the determination to sacrifice this one man for, they professed to believe, the benefit of the whole nation. They accepted, therefore, a proposition made by the English commissioners to the effect that both the governors, English as well as French, should be recalled, and that in their place two commissaries should be nominated, one by each nation, to proceed direct to India, there to place matters on such a footing that future warfare between the two settlements, so long as their principals remained at peace, should be impossible. In consequence of this resolve, the French ministry nominated M. Godeheu, at one time member of council at Chandernagore, to be commissary of the King to conclude peace, and to verify and examine the accounts of his predecessor. From the Directors the same Godeheu received likewise his commission as Governor-General of the French settlements. The English, more astute, made no fresh nomination, but sent out the necessary powers to Governor Saunders and the members of his council.

The first intelligence received by Dupleix of these proceedings was contained in a letter from Godeheu himself from the Isle of France, announcing his early departure from that place to co-operate with him as commissary of the King and of the Company in India. The letter was written in a modest and submissive tone, the writer lamenting his own inexperience, and expressing his earnest desire to be guided by the experience of his old friend. Whatever may have been the feeling of Dupleix on receiving this communication, it can scarcely be doubted but that its friendly tone and his personal knowledge of the writer must have tended to re-assure him. He had known Godeheu since his early youth and had ever befriended him. He had been his superior at Chandernagore, where he had ever been treated by the young councillor with marked deference and respect. He had even, on one occasion, been the means of saving his life. After his departure from Chandernagore, Godeheu had become a Director of the French Company, and in that capacity had corresponded closely and intimately with Dupleix. He had ever evinced towards him a devotion and an admiration that were quite unbounded.

The appointment of a man so befriended, so devoted, to act,—as Dupleix then believed,—solely as commissioner to bring about peace,—could have in it nothing to alarm the French governor. He did not know,—in fact he had had no opportunity of knowing,—that this man, seemingly so devoted, was one of those miserable vermin who seek to raise themselves by fawning on and flattering great men. He did not know that

all the time this Godeheu had been writing to him letters full of the most fulsome professions of friendship, he had been intriguing amongst the Directors for his downfall, in the hope to be himself appointed as his successor. He did not know that so far from desiring to aid him or to profit by his advice, this Godeheu had asked for authority to send him home in disgrace and arrest, but had been over-ruled by the Directors, who had especially forbid him to use force or restraint, except in the improbable event of the resistance on the part of Dupleix to lawful authority. How could he know such things, how, even, could he divine them? A noble and generous nature invariably revolts from the very suspicion of baseness. It appears to him too horrible, too unnatural, a degradation of intellect below the range of even the animal creation! Endowed himself with a lofty sense of honour and a warm sympathising nature, how could Dupleix imagine that one whom he had treated as a friend and as a confidant could use that friendship and that confidence but to betray him?

But Dupleix was not suffered to remain long in his self-deception. On the 1st August, the ship *Duc de Bourgogne*, having Godeheu on board, arrived in the roadstead of Pondichery. A letter was at once sent off to Dupleix announcing his arrival, and intimating that one other ship was accompanying him, and that three more with 2,000 troops on board would follow in a few days. Dupleix at once went to meet his ancient comrade. His reception, however, was most frigid. Godeheu declined to become his guest, or even to land until a house should have been fitted up for him. He made over to Dupleix, however, three documents:—the first, a letter from himself containing profuse professions of anxiety to make his situation as little painful as possible;—the second, a demand for a full report on the state of affairs in French India;—the third, an order from the King containing his recall. The first letter was probably written with the intention of diverting Dupleix from offering, as he feared he might, armed resistance to his authority, for, on landing the next day, in great pomp and splendour, received with all deference by Dupleix on the quay, he curtly informed him that he expected him to sail at once with his family for Europe. He then proceeded to the Council Chamber, and had his commission read out. The silence which followed this reading was interrupted by Dupleix himself, not indeed by querulous complaints or undignified protests, but by the loyal cry of *Vive le Roi!*

It was on the 2nd August, 1754, that Dupleix thus made over to Godeheu the command of that vast extent of territory

on Indian soil, which partly in actual tenure, partly by means of the influence he exercised, he had gained for his country. Ten weeks later, the 14th October, Dupleix and his family bade a last adieu to the land to which he had devoted a life-time. The public acts by which that interval was distinguished belong to the career of M. Godeheu, and we shall treat of them under that head. Of the conduct of Dupleix during that period we will merely state here that it was distinguished by a loyalty, an abnegation of self, a devotion to the interests of the Company which had cast him off, of which the history of the world gives few examples. It was replied to, on the contrary, on the part of Godeheu by a spiteful arrogance, an anxious desire to wound and annoy, a determination, if possible, to ruin and dishonour the ex-governor, such as could only have emanated from a mean and paltry spirit. Not only did Godeheu, as we shall see when discussing his public acts, reject advice by following which he would have established French domination on a secure basis, but he ordered his commanders to preserve an inaction which saved the enemy from destruction, simply because action would have justified the long-pursued policy of Dupleix. But it was in his treatment of the pecuniary claims of Dupleix on the Company, that he showed the greatest malevolence. Unable to detect a single flaw in his accounts, finding that even the private invitation on his part of accusations against the ex-governor failed to bring against him a single tenable charge, disappointed in the hope he had indulged of sending home in chains, he resolved at all events to ruin him in his private fortune, and to dismiss him a dependent and a beggar. To a man so utterly unscrupulous the means were not wanting. The examination of the accounts of the Company at Pondichery showed an amount due by it to Dupleix of between six and seven millions of francs (£ 240,000 to £ 280,000). As soon as Godeheu ascertained this fact, he forbade the commissaries he employed to proceed with the question of accounts, compelling them merely to sign a certificate to the effect that the vouchers produced by Dupleix had reference to the public accounts. By this subterfuge he avoided placing on record an acknowledgment of the sums due to Dupleix. But this was not all. We have before stated that Dupleix had been in the habit of advancing to his native allies his own private fortune for the expenses of the war. These advances had been made on the security of certain districts in the Carnatic, from the revenues of which they were repayable. In fact, the agent of the native princes, by name Papiapoulé, had at this time in his possession an order

to make over to Dupleix the revenues of those districts, in payment of the sums due to him. At the time of Godeheu's arrival, some of these advances had been repaid; others, however, to the amount of twenty-two millions of francs (£880,000) were still standing over. At the rate, however, at which they were then being paid in, this sum would have been reimbursed during the following year, 1755. Godeheu, however, seeing in this a means of enriching the State at the expense of Dupleix, chose to consider these advances as sums irregularly laid out by his predecessor for his own private advantage, and not for the benefit of the State. He, therefore, suddenly seized Papiapoulé in his own private house, placed him in confinement,\* under circumstances most insulting to Dupleix, deprived him of all his papers, and farmed the revenues of the districts to another native for the sole benefit of the Company. In addition to this he refused to allow a bill drawn by the Company itself in favour of Dupleix to the amount of 422,606 francs (£16,904) to be cashed in Pondichery. Having thus effectually ruined him, having exposed him to the claims of those who were his creditors, solely because on the credit of his character they had lent their money to the State, Godeheu allowed to depart, beggared though not dishonoured, blasted in his fortune, cheated out of the fruits of his then ripening labours, this by far the most illustrious of the illustrious men, whom the France of Louis XV. produced only to show how unworthy she was, in her then degraded state, of a progeny so deserving.

"England," says a recent French writer,† "has been much admired and often cited for having resolved that great problem of how to govern, at a distance of four thousand leagues, with some hundreds of civil functionaries and some thousands of military employés, her immense possessions in India. If there is much that is wonderful, much that is bold and daring, much political genius in this idea, it must be admitted that the honour of having inaugurated it belongs to Dupleix, and that England, which in the present day reaps from it the profit and the glory, has had but to follow the paths which the genius of France opened out to her." Yes indeed! Now that the lapse of a century has cleared away the passions and prejudices of that exciting period,—now that from the basis of accomplished facts we can gaze at the ideas and conceptions of the men who were the pioneers of European conquest on Indian soil,—there lives not a candid Englishman who

\* He remained in irons till released by Lally, in 1758.

† M. Xavier Raymond.

will deny to the great French governor the credit of having been the first to grasp the necessity of establishing European predominance in Hindostan,—to show practically how that predominance could be established and maintained. The work of Dupleix did not indeed last, because it was his misfortune to be born at a season when his country was sunk in the lowest abyss of profligacy and misgovernment,—when all the offices of the State had become the patronage of a licensed harlot, when virtue and honour and truth were openly scoffed at and derided. It did not last, because the besotted Government he served recalled him at the beck of the immemorial enemies of France, just at the moment when his schemes were about to blossom into golden fruit. But the effect of those schemes survived him. The ground he had so well watered and fertilized, the capabilities of which he had proved, was almost immediately after his departure occupied by his rivals, and occupied with the immense result which is one of the wonders of the present age.

Nor can we doubt that if Dupleix had had but two years more to mature his great schemes, the rich heritage of Bengal would have fallen to him instead of to his rivals. The possession of the five Circars gave him an excellent basis from which to operate with the Nawab Nazim of Bengal. Who can doubt but that had Chandernagore been under his control in 1757, he would have hesitated to unite with Suraj-ood-dowlah to crush the English settlement on the Hooghly, or that he would have crushed it? Clive acted then as Dupleix with the prior opportunity would have acted before him. In this as on many subsequent occasions the spirit of the great Frenchman ruled in the camp of his rivals and successors.

It is impossible to deny to Dupleix the possession of some of the greatest qualities with which man has ever been endowed. He was a great administrator, a diplomatist of the highest order, a splendid organiser, a man who possessed supremely the power of influencing others. He had an intellect, quick and subtle, yet large and capable of grasping; an energy that nothing could abate; a persistence, a determination, that were proof against every shock of fortune. He possessed a noble, generous, and sympathising nature; he was utterly incapable of envy or jealousy; \* and was endowed besides with

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\* We have, we would fain believe, placed in its true light the real reason of the quarrel between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, and have vindicated the character of the former from all the charges which the hatred and prejudices of the hour had heaped against him, and which subsequent writers had repeated, without examining them. No one ever charged him with being jealous of Bussy; yet Bussy had a far greater influence than La Bourdonnais.



that equanimity of temper that enabled him to bear the greatest reverses, the most cruel injustice towards himself, with resignation and composure. He was not indeed a general. He did not possess the taste for leading armies into the field. Yet he showed, on many occasions,—notably on the occasion of the siege of Pondichery by Boscawen,—that he could not only stand fire, but could defeat by his unassisted and natural skill, all the efforts of the enemy. The character of his government and the influence of his own presence are attested to by the English historian of that epoch, writing, as he was, under the influence of the prejudices of the period. “All his country-men,” writes Mr. Orme, “concurred in thinking that his dismission from the Government of Pondichery was the greatest detriment that could have happened to their interests in India.”

When we think indeed how much he had accomplished,—how he had built up the French power, how he had gained for it an unparalleled influence and an enormous extension of territory ;—when we reflect that with half the 2,000 men that Godeheu brought out with him he could have crushed the English, already reduced to extremities at Trichinopoly,—we cannot but marvel at the blindness, the infatuation, the madness, that recalled him. The primary cause was, no doubt, as we have stated, the degraded condition of the France of Louis XV. But there was yet, we believe, another reason, not entirely dependent upon the state of his country, for we have seen it act under other rulers than Louis XV., and under other governments than France. To borrow the words of the French historian :\* “Dupleix had against him that crime of Genius, which so many men have expiated by misery, by exile, and by death.”

It was on the 14th October, 1754, that Dupleix bade adieu to the country of his greatness. Baffled as he had been in his large schemes, ruined as he was known to have been by the measures of Godeheu, he was yet, in spite of the declared hostility of that personage, followed to the place of embarkation by the principal officers and employés of Pondichery, and by all the common people. Their generous hearts spoke out the universal feeling of regret at his departure. Their grief was far more eloquent, infinitely more expressive, than could have been the smiles of a *Pompadeur*!

Very briefly we propose to follow the disgraced governor to his last hour. Before he had landed in France, the minister,

\* *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre*, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen.

Machault, fearing, in the then state of European politics, the result in India of the recall of Dupleix, and hoping it might not have been actually accomplished, had sent to Dupleix a despatch in which he affected to treat him as governor, Godeheu merely as commissary of the king to make peace. This despatch reached Pondichery after Dupleix had left it, though it had been expedited by the minister in the hope that it would prevent his departure. His arrival, therefore, in France was looked upon in the light of a misfortune, and it appeared for some time not improbable that he might even be re-instated in his post. He was, therefore, well received and flattered with hopes of a settlement of his claims. As soon, however, as the intelligence of the disgraceful peace made by Godeheu,—to which we shall presently refer,—reached France, and the disagreements with England were consequently regarded as settled, the ministry at once began to treat Dupleix as man from whom nothing more could be hoped, but who, on his part, would importune them with claims. They therefore, or rather, acting with them, the Court of Directors, at once changed their manner towards him, and absolutely refused to take his accounts into consideration. In vain did he remonstrate. In vain did he point out that he was persecuted by creditors who were simply creditors, because, on his security, they had advanced their funds to the government of Pondichery. In vain did he write a memoir, setting forth, in a modest but graphic style, all he had done, the sums of money he had advanced. For seven years he urged and pressed his claims, supporting them by incontestable proofs. He received not even the shadow of redress. Nay more. Many of those whom he had befriended in his prosperity, and who had advanced sums to the Pondichery government, sued him for repayment. Even Bussy, who was to have been his stepson, deserted him in his extremity, broke off the marriage, and appeared in the list of claimants against him. To such a state of misery was he reduced, that three months before he died, his house was in the occupation of bailiffs. Three days before that sad event, he thus wrote in his memoir: “ I have sacrificed my youth, my fortune, my life, to enrich my nation in Asia. Unfortunate friends, too weak relations, devoted all their property to the success of my projects. They are now in misery and want. I have submitted to all the judiciary forms; I have demanded as the last of the creditors, that which is due to me. My services are treated as fables; my demand is denounced as ridiculous; I am treated as the vilest of mankind. I am in the most deplorable indigence; the little property that remained to me has been seized. I am compelled to ask for decrees for delay in order not to be

"dragged into prison." Thus wrote, three days before he died, the man who had done for France more than all her kings, beside whose exploits the deeds of her Condés, her Villars, her Turennes, sink into insignificance. The founder of an empire treated as the vilest of mankind, his just claims unattended to then, unsettled even to this day ; \* the man who acquired for France territories in the East larger than France herself, treated as an importunate impostor ! Not long could even his brave spirit endure such a contest. He died on the 10 November, 1764. †

Not the less will he rank with posterity as one of the greatest of Frenchmen ; not the less will even the descendants of his rivals in Hindostan place him on the same pedestal as the greatest of their own heroes,—on the pedestal of Clive, of Warren Hastings, and of Wellesley !

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\* Strange it is that considering the mutations France has herself gone through, she should still have allowed these claims to remain unsettled. The Republic, the first Empire, the Restoration, the Orleanists, the second Republic, and the second Empire, must divide with the Bourbons the shame of this great scandal. We append an extract from the letter of the Paris correspondent of the *Globe* of the 17th May, 1866, showing that even up to the time of his last descendant these claims had been neglected :

"Another death which is worthy of record is that of the last descendant of the great Nabob Dupleix, the celebrated Governor of Pondicherry. The coat of arms granted him by Louis XV., for the diplomatic triumphs gained by him over the English in India, glittered for the last time over the portal of Saint Philippe du Roule, as the modest coffin which contained the remains of the last of the Dupleix was borne out to the cemetery. Of the great siege of Pondichery, of the glory and magnificence of Dupleix, of his riches and his disgrace, of his humiliation, his poverty and miserable death, nothing is remembered now. Even the *fête* which he had instituted at Pernan, his native place, to celebrate the raising of the siege of Pondichery, has long been discontinued for want of the funds which he had intended to be annually devoted to the dowry of one of the village maidens. He died in the most abject poverty, after having had at his command whole multitudes of men and millions of rupees ; and the faithless agent charged by him with the settlement of the perpetual fund for the good work of which he had been dreaming for years beneath the hot scorching sun of India, and amid the strife and bloodshed by which he was surrounded, never having sunk the money, the celebration of the one glorious souvenir of his life, that too has passed away, and his very name is now no more. When the *Ministère des Finances* was entered by the mob in 1830, the last appeal of Dupleix imploring a settlement of his claim of 13 millions against the Government, was thrown out amongst other papers scattered to the winds. It fell into the hands of the professor of philosophy at the College Louis le Grand, who had it framed and glazed, and hung up in his class-room, where it afterwards served as illustration to many and many a lesson on the vanity of riches and the varied conformation of the wings they make to themselves when they flee away."

† He died in a house in the Rue Neuve des Capucines, on the site till recently occupied by the Foreign Office, within a few doors of the official residence of the Company.

## SHORT NOTICES.

1. *The Speech of Lord Cranbourne in the House of Commons on the Amalgamation Question.* Hansard, 1866.

THE boldness and good sense of Lord Cranbourne have annihilated Indian "grievances" for ever. We trust that the odious word which he has sent down to Hades may never be revived. To such an extent had the weakness of his predecessors loosened the proper ties of subordination in this country, that a grievance-monger had come to be tolerated as a sort of local institution, as an Indianized type of the American lobbyist-waiter. All this has passed away, thanks to the decision of the Tory Indian Minister, and we have now, we would fain hope, done with grievances for ever.

To such an extent had this grievance-mongering become a nuisance, that it prevented many honourable soldiers who entertained a strict idea of discipline, from bringing before the Government those points which, not in consequence of the intentions of the Government, but rather by reason of the very transformations through which the army has passed in the last few years, pressed hardly upon themselves. It was peculiarly trying to these men to allow year after year to pass by without making any attempt to bring their views before the Government. We know, however, that they did so, that they preferred to suffer personal inconvenience of no ordinary character, to being classed with men who appeared, at least, to have banded together, to appeal from their Cæsar to the Parliament of which Cæsar was but a member. The decision of Lord Cranbourne has removed their scruples on this head. It is now open to those who feel that time has so altered the effect of many of the rules regarding Indian officers that the mode in which they work is the very opposite of that intended by those who originally drew them up, calmly and temperately to invite the attention of the Government they serve to the manner in which their interests have become injuriously affected during the last few years.

We confess that we have always considered that the time has arrived when some modification of the new Furlough Regulations has become necessary, especially since, more, certainly, from the action of time and the working of circumstances, than from deliberate design, the intention of those who framed those Regulations has ceased to be fulfilled. To illustrate our meaning we propose to give a short history of the new Furlough Rules and their action, and to indicate the mode in which the anomalies, which now appear to press hardly upon many officers, may be remedied. It is not necessary in this view that we should do more than allude cursorily to the old Regulations which obtained prior to the 17 November, 1854.

Before that date the officers of the Bengal Army were subject, with respect to leave to England and the colonies, to certain rules, generally known under the designation of the Old Furlough Regulations. Under these Regulations an officer was permitted a furlough of three years to Europe after ten years' service on the English pay of his rank. By this furlough he forfeited any appointment he might be holding, but he returned on the expiration of it to his place in his own regiment. The same rule applied in cases in which officers were forced to proceed to Europe on medical certificate; but officers were allowed to proceed on sick leave for two years to the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Australia, and Egypt, retaining their appointments, counting their leave as service, and drawing for the entire period one half of the Staff salary of their appointments, in addition to Indian pay and allowances. These rules likewise permitted all leave taken in India to count as service for pension.

But on the 17th November, 1854, other rules were promulgated, which, under the title of "New Furlough Regulations," have gradually taken the place of the old rules, and constitute, with some alterations which will be presently referred to, the rules which govern the leave granted to officers of the Staff Corps.

Under these rules, officers were allowed furlough to Europe for two years after every ten years' actual service in India. In taking this furlough they forfeit their appointments, and come at once upon English pay. It was conceded, however, that two years of leave out of twenty of Indian residence should count as service.

At the same it was ruled that staff officers might proceed to England for six months, forfeiting Indian allowances, but without loss of appointment.

All leave taken in India or elsewhere, in excess of privilege leave, was no longer permitted to count as service. With

respect to leave on medical certificate, the privilege of going for two years on Indian pay and allowances to the colonies, counting the time as service, was withdrawn, but in lieu thereof officers were allowed to proceed on medical certificate to Europe for fifteen months, retaining their appointments, drawing for the first six months Indian pay and allowances, and a moiety of the Staff salary of their appointments, but for the last nine only English pay. All these rules, with respect to leave not counting as service, were to have retrospective effect.

It will be seen that these rules, even at the time of their first promulgation, were particularly favourable to officers who fell sick, but bore hardly, even by comparison with the old rules, on officers who remained at their posts of duty. Thus, under the old rules, an officer was enabled, at intervals, to enjoy six months' relaxation in the hills, counting the time as service. Under the new rules this last condition, fatal to the indulgence of the privilege, was withdrawn. The three years' furlough of the old rules after ten years' service was changed for two years after ten, and an additional two after twenty years' service, a privilege of which few could avail themselves. The one counterbalancing advantage consisted in the permission to count two years' leave out of twenty of duty as service.

The sick officer, on the contrary, benefited largely by these rules. At intervals of three years he was allowed to proceed for fifteen months to Europe, retaining his appointment, and receiving, by the grant of Indian allowances and half Staff for the first six months, a sufficient sum to defray, to a great extent, the cost of the voyage to and fro.

The consequence was that applications for furlough diminished, whilst sick certificates to proceed to Europe greatly increased.

By General Orders of the 10th April, 1861, the Staff Corps of the three Presidencies were constituted with effect from the preceding February. The Order directed that with one or two modifications the new Furlough Rules should be extended to the Staff Corps. Of these modifications one still further improved the condition of the sickly officers, for it extended the period of sick leave to Europe from fifteen to twenty months. The other affected injuriously the prospects of all officers, for it abolished the privilege of retirement on pension of rank after twenty-two years' service.

But these modifications but slightly represent the effect which the action of the new Furlough Rules, combined with the change wrought by the Staff Corps in the constitution of the Army, has had on the prospects of officers who keep their

health and remain at their posts. What that effect is will now be shown.

The old and the new Furlough Regulations had this at least a common, that they were both designed for an Army containing irregular regimental organisation. It is true that both denied to an officer, who might take furlough to Europe on private affairs, the right to keep his appointment. But, under a regimental organisation, this was seldom a real hardship. A Senior captain might, for instance, calculate, that on the expiration of a furlough of three years' duration, he would return to India major of his regiment, with a fair chance,—if he were known to be a good officer, with the certainty,—of obtaining the command. In such a case, and it was not an uncommon one, an officer would have returned from furlough to a better appointment than that which he had resigned to take furlough.

Even in the case of a Lieutenant or junior Captain but little real hardship was occasioned by this system. As no officer could take his furlough before he had served ten years, and as, practically, but few took it at that period exactly, it followed that a Lieutenant taking it could almost always calculate on the probability of his returning from furlough a Captain, most likely with two companies for him to take charge of. At all events every officer returned to a fixed position,—to his own place in his regiment,—taking rank above all his juniors in the cadre of his regiment.

But the change in the organization of the army has entirely subverted this arrangement. The same, or nearly the same Furlough Rules apply, but under the new system, they produce an effect not only very different from that brought about when a regimental system was in force, but, it is scarcely too much to say, the very opposite of that which those who drew up the new Furlough Rules intended they should cause.

For, under the present system, if an officer of fifteen or twenty years' service, who happens to command a regiment or to hold any other Staff appointment, wishes to take furlough, he has the prospect before him of returning,—not to his appointment, not even to his regiment,—but to,—what is termed,—general duty. If a Captain, he is forced often to do duty with a regiment,—not as under the regimental system in a fixed position senior on parade to all his juniors in rank,—but to a position which makes him, *de facto*, junior to his juniors in rank, possessing no command,—a position which, by an officer conscious of deserving, is scarcely to be borne.

If a Field-officer, he is compelled to do general duty at a station, that is to say, he is liable to the very light station-duties

devolving upon a Field-officer, but no military duties, as such, are allotted to him; the position is one, not only pecuniarily trying, but wounding to his self-love, and coming, as it would, after holding the command of a regiment for many years, it would be almost heart-breaking. In fact, it is so terrible in its prospects, that very few officers have been found willing to subject themselves to the ordeal. They would rather altogether forego their furlough.

It thus has actually happened that the clause in the new Furlough Regulations, granting furlough to officers of the Indian Army, has become virtually a dead letter. All officers of the Staff Corps being Staff officers, not one of them can take leave to England for a longer period than six months every ten years, without subjecting himself to the consequences we have alluded to. The result is that with a few rare exceptions, none of them do take furlough. Some endeavour to evade the rigour of the Regulations by trying for a medical certificate. Others, more conscientious, deny themselves the pleasure and profit of a visit to England, and remain at their posts. Very few take furlough.

Many remedies have been proposed for such a state of things, many extravagant, almost all beyond reasonable expectations of fulfilment, and, therefore, impracticable. Now, no practical man would ask more of the Government than he thought the Government would be likely to grant. Before, however, we discuss the remedy we would suggest, we would prefer to indicate some of the reasons, why we think a change is desirable. Furlough to Europe, in the first place, forms or ought to form, if it be properly considered, part of the education of an officer. It has hitherto been the pride of the Indian Army that it has maintained itself, in point of efficiency, on a par with the armies of Europe. But the officers of that Army have been very much aided in their efforts to bring about this result by the long furloughs of which they were, in former days, able to take advantage. It is unnecessary to allude to the benefits which a visit to Europe opens to an officer. At the very lowest estimate it opens his mind and widens the range of his ideas. All the improvements in military science, alike in England and on the Continent, may and often do, come under his observation. After a residence of twelve or fifteen years in the stagnating atmosphere of India, accustomed only to its local politics and small personalities, a visit to Europe is indeed, in many cases, absolutely necessary, to make an officer thoroughly efficient. Yet, under existing arrangements furlough is, as we have seen, practically denied to the Indian officer. The case is rendered more marked when it is contrasted with the rule



that obtains, in this respect, in the Royal Army. A Royal officer is permitted to proceed on leave to Europe, without any formal restriction as to length of service, provided only that his commanding officer can dispense with his services. His promotion goes on during his absence, and he returns, on the expiration of his leave, to the position he formerly held in his regiment. His *status* in fact is fixed and definite, whilst that of the Indian officer who takes furlough is full of doubt and uncertainty.

It would be easy to point out at greater length the extent to which the State suffers by this practical denial of furlough to officers of the Staff Corps. For, if the officers are not allowed an opportunity of improving themselves, the prohibition re-acts on the men whom they command. Enough, however, has been indicated to show the tendency of such a course. It is a course too, be it remembered, which has only run for six years, for it is, as we have shown, by the want of sympathy of the New Furlough Rules with the Staff Corps Regulations, that the present complication has arisen. It is evident likewise that the result of this complication is opposed to the principles which guided the liberal-minded men who drew up the new Furlough Regulations. They certainly never contemplated it. In fact, but for the amalgamation of the two armies the complication could never have arisen. When that measure was brought into action this point escaped notice. Experience alone,—the practical experience of the last six years,—has shown how injuriously the interests of the State and the interests of the officer are affected by it.

The remedy asked for is simple, and will cause no expense to the State. It is not sought to interfere with the proper control of the Government over the action of their officers. On the contrary, we would make that control more real than it now is. It is not asked to grant the officer taking furlough any portion of his Indian allowances. We are rather of opinion that, furlough being essentially a holiday, it is for the officer to consider whether he can afford to indulge in it. It is merely urged, as a measure of fairness to the officer and as conducive to the interests of the State, that furlough should be placed on the same footing as sick certificate with regard to the retention of appointment for twenty months. Such a measure would bring the Staff Corps system into harmony with the old regimental system of the Indian, and with the existing regimental system of the Royal Army. It would permit an officer to return to the regiment he had left. The changes so prejudicial to the existence of good feeling between officers and men would be lessened. A

great deal of the existing distaste for Indian military service, with its many uncertainties and the ever present chance of being forced some day to become a "doing-duty" officer, would thereby be obliterated.

We have said that no practical man would ask more of the Government than the Government would be likely to concede. One change, simple, feasible, and costing nothing, we have already indicated. But there is another connected with it, and second only to it in importance, and equally for the interest for the Government to grant. By the new Furlough Rules an officer is compelled,—no matter what his length of service may be,—to remain six years in India after his return from medical certificate, before he can take furlough. How injuriously this rule affects an officer in many cases it is not difficult to imagine. We can picture to ourselves a conscientious officer who may have remained at his post twenty years without taking furlough or leave of any kind. Suddenly he is taken ill and forced to proceed to Europe on medical certificate. It is but seldom that he can enjoy such leave. During the greater portion of it, certainly, he continues under the influence of the sickness which sent him home. But the sight of old faces and the renewal of old associations awaken within him feelings which may have been long dormant. He returns to India, his mind full of the wonders of Europe, anxious for the time when he may return in full strength to devote himself to the following up of ideas, to which, during his sick furlough, he was unable, from ill health, to devote himself. He finds, however, that the new Furlough Rules interpose six years of service between his return to India and his furlough. Although according to the letter of the law, he is allowed one furlough after ten years' service, and another after twenty, yet, because he has been so unfortunate as to fall sick, he is denied both of those furloughs; in fact, the furlough due to him after ten years' service he cannot take till he has served nearly twenty-eight years. For, to his previous twenty years' service he must add eighteen months spent on sick leave, and six subsequent years to be passed in India. Now, we say, this is an anomaly that was never contemplated by those who framed the new Furlough Rules; it is an anomaly that appeals for alteration;—an anomaly, which, we believe, the enlightened government of Lord Cranbourne will no longer allow to continue.

If we might presume to suggest the shape which these two necessary reforms might take, we would submit that every end would be attained by the simple promulgation of an order that for the future the Government will be prepared to

grant furloughs to all officers, without reference to the length of their service or to any period that may have elapsed subsequently to their last visit to Europe, but solely with reference to the ability of the Government to allow them, without inconvenience, to proceed to England; that such furloughs should be of twenty months' duration, and should carry with them retention of appointments. This change would in fact supplement and seal amalgamation by placing the two divisions of the Army on the same footing with respect to leave,—a consideration of itself of no small importance.

If such a plan would not content every man affected by the present system, it would at all events satisfy every reasonable desire; it has besides the advantage of being a plan which would bring officers more directly under the control of the Government, which would conduce more than any imaginable measure to attract the better class of officers to enter the Indian service, which is attended with no expense, and which the Government, therefore, would probably not object to grant.

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2. *The Progress of England*, a Poem; to which are appended Notes on the Organization of the British Empire, on British Policy in India, on the Foreign Policy of the British Empire, and on the Organization of the United States. Indian Edition. Calcutta, 1866.

THE author of this "Song of Triumph" is a bold man. Not only has he the hardihood to assert in his Preface that he has published his work without revision, but he aspires to bolder conceptions than the proudest and most arrogant monarch would dare to acknowledge. Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, Napoleon I., such men in their struggles for universal dominion have usually placed some limit to their wildest schemes of conquest. In their loftiest flights there has been some obstacle beyond which their ambition dared not soar. But our author aims at carving the whole world to suit his fancy, and suffers neither mountain barrier nor rolling ocean to stop the impetuous current of his schemes. Not content with re-organizing the British Empire under such high sounding though somewhat pedantic names as Hochelaga, Hesperida, Cabotia, and Vascovia, he is rash enough to digress beyond our

own frontiers, and attempt to cut the Gordian knot of continental politics. And though the weapon wielded in the struggle is the pen and not the sword, and these lofty conceptions only find a vent in poetic effusion, yet these considerations serve perhaps to enhance the sense of their utter impracticability, and to justify our assertion that the writer is, to say the least, a bold man.

To our own mind there seems something harsh and discordant in the attempt to combine and reconcile the material dictates of State policy with the soft conceptions of poetic imagery, to clothe the stern precepts of Machiavelli in the graceful drapery of the Muses. We have been accustomed to regard poetry as the spontaneous outburst of swelling emotion, the inspired creation of human passion and fervour. Statesmanship, on the other hand, presupposes a calm and mature judgment, capable of exercising a wise and sober discretion. Pitt and Burke were by no means greatest among politicians, when they ranked greatest among orators. The creations of fancy which are the chief charm of the one art, are the chief impediment in the way of the other. An unimaginative poet is no poet at all, but, as in the book before us, we may have a little too much imagination in politics.

"Too long thy bards have cast their glance behind," writes our author, but we must confess ourselves to a predilection for Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome* above *The Progress of England*. Macaulay did not allow his statesmanship to trespass on his poetry, nor his imagination to make havoc of his statesmanship, and the consequence was that he wrote some excellent verses as well as gained great administrative success. We could wish in the same way that the writer of *The Progress of England* had elected to be tried either as a poet or as a politician. In endeavouring to combine the two characters, his identity is lost, and Proteus-like he eludes our grasp. But the double character is preserved throughout. To the poem itself are appended Notes, couched in more intelligible, if not less impracticable prose. And indeed we are not sure that, if a trifle less extravagant, these notes would not be the best part of the book.

Nearly one-fourth of the poem relates to this country, and as the author has published a special *Indian* edition, we shall content ourselves with sketching this portion of the work as a fair sample of the whole. The subject is introduced by an appeal to English adventurers to help to "weave The threads "of that Imperial garment wide That England robes with." Our rule in India is compared with that in a native State.

“ where all alike  
 “ Must bow to one, who fears himself the sword  
 “ With which despair her tyrant foes does strike,  
 “ Where blood still falls in petty quarrels poured,  
 “ And all that wealth is in the palace stored  
 “ Which through the land should circulate, and power,  
 “ Capricious ev’n in justice, reigns adored ;  
 “ Where unseen woman, with an unsafe dower,  
 “ Dreams of no hope nor sphere beyond her nuptial bower.”

And after enumerating the evils of the native government of those “robber kings, who, govern not, but prey Upon the states they shadow,” the writer asks:—

“Deem ye that conquest is a nation’s sin  
 “ When such as these are brought beneath a rule  
 “ That raises all; that progress still should pin  
 “ Her faith to old traditions, that no fool  
 “ Must ever ’gainst his will be sent to school?  
 “ But apathetic slaves should still be free.”

And thus declaring and defending the doctrine of annexation, the author bestows a graceful and not altogether unmerited tribute on its greatest master, Lord Dalhousie :

“ the resolute strong heart,  
 “ The judgment calm, the soul no cares could tame,  
 “ Or slights induce to waver or depart  
 “ From the clear course laid down by conscience on her chart ;—  
 “ That knew both what to claim and what concede,  
 “ That sought not conquest for itself, nor feared  
 “ To crush for ever all that dared make bleed  
 “ One British bosom ; he who earliest reared  
 “ O’er India as a whole that flag, endeared  
 “ To more than Britons now, that yet shall wave  
 “ As dear to Indian eyes, when time has cleared  
 “ Away their fear, that heirloom of the slave,  
 “ And England weeps in shame beside Dalhousie’s grave.”

India’s future is then discussed :—the star of hope that shines upon her under England’s enlightened Government. Peace and prosperity, social progress and intellectual freedom, these are the blessings promised to the country, while England sends forth her thinkers, “mind-creating mind.” Statesmen and poets are to dwell together in the Himalaya, and colonise Cashmere,

“ Buy back the soil that, in an hour of fear,  
 “ Cold prudence bartered to unworthy hands ;  
 “ And thence defend her plains, and settle where she stands.’

The suggestions in the Note on our policy in India are valuable, except so far as they are based on that impracticable re-arrangement of territorial divisions of which we have already spoken. It is indeed the greatest defect of the book before us that the writer, instead of accepting the realities around him, will ever be striving to create a Utopia of his own. India, for instance, he would divide into three new Presidencies, Hindustan, East India, and the Deccan, each with its own subordinate administrations. The capital of Hindustan is to be situated in the Dehra Dhoon, and of the Deccan at Bangalore. We are not told where the capital of East India is to be, and it would be contrary to our experience of the author to imagine that for that reason it is to remain at Calcutta. But it is obviously a loss of time to waste further words on this impracticable scheme.

As for the poetry of the book, the ample extracts we have already given, afford a fair specimen of the writer’s style. We could certainly have wished that it had had the advantage of that careful revision which the author determined not to give it, for in some places not only is the style slipshod, but the sense is barely intelligible. Take for instance such lines as these :—

“ in the grandest land  
 “ *For which the soils of ocean court the winds.*”  
 “ To that unfettered sin the charlatan extols.”  
 St. 48.  
 “ With which despair her tyrant foes *does* strike.”  
 St. 50.

The insertion of the “but” in the following seems to us to spoil the sense of the passage entirely.

“ And, half-disarmed, ev’n caste binds with *but* slackened chains.”  
 St. 56.

Nor can we account for the construction any more than for the obscure meaning of these lines :—

“ Though England grieves over *unhidden* sin,  
 “ The greater surface to reflect the light  
 The greater shade behind ; her larger side is bright.”  
 St. 65.

One stanza has a line in excess, and the fault did not escape the author’s notice ; but he would not correct it, he tells us in a footnote, as the removal of the line “ would spoil a stanza

"which is better than the average of others in the book." Now we object to these attempts to disarm criticism. If a thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well; and if *The Progress of England* was worth publishing, the writer was bound to see that it conformed to the rules of prosody and syntax. There is no excuse for the man who sees his error and persists in it. When an author trespasses on the attention of the public, the public has a right to expect that he will give of his best; and it is an insult to that public for the author to admit that it might have been better. No excuse whatever can palliate the offence in such case. He would be rightly served, if the public, taking him at his word, were content to wait for a *revised* edition. That our readers, however, may judge of the estimate, at which the author of *The Progress of England* rates the merits of his own work, we shall conclude this notice by giving at full length the objectionable stanza which has led to these remarks.

"Grand in not causeless vanity, that seeks  
 "On all earth's coins her images to stamp,  
 "And rule, if not by force, by fashion's freaks:  
 "France loves the flash of steel, the column's tramp  
 "Marching to music, the wide-stretching camp;  
 "Bright painted war-ships, that with sails and steam  
 "Breasting the wavelets proudly, shade the deep;—  
 "All that can feed a hope no doubts can damp;  
 "The thirst for fruitless fame, that will not sleep,  
 "But ever spurs her on, to conquer but not keep."

St. 110

3. *The History of the British Empire in India from the appointment of Lord Hardinge to the political extinction of the East India Company, forming a sequel to Thornton's History of India.* By Lionel James Trotter, late of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers. In two Vols. Vol. II. London. Wm. H. Allen & Co. 1866.

THE first volume of Mr. Trotter's History was noticed in our pages not a year ago, and we have now to announce the publication of the second. The present volume treats of Lord Canning's Government, and is mainly occupied with a narrative of the stirring events of the mutiny; but confined as it is to the mere relation of facts, it merits no more than a passing notice at our hands. A more intricate and exhaustive criticism on that portion of Indian history we reserve till the publication of the next volume of Mr. Kaye's *Sepoy War*.

The harrowing scenes and complications of the mutiny, the cruel terrors of that unhappy time, and the cruel campaigns of the avenging army, are fully, faithfully, and graphically described in the volume before us. It is in fact one series of battles, of sieges, of assaults, and unfortunately of massacres also. And the author's estimate of the great leaders in that fearful crisis is generally as fair and impartial as the description of the scenes in which they participated is accurately portrayed. Poor Sir Hugh Wheeler is not branded as a knave and a coward, because he suddenly found himself placed in an emergency for which his advancing years unfitted him. On the other hand, there is no attempt at palliation of the lamentable want of timely energy, proved to have been exhibited by Lord Canning and his advisers at the outbreak of the mutiny. "Mischief was everywhere brewing; but the great men of Calcutta, lapt in the languor of a tropical summer and official self-complacency, mistook the faint sounds that sometimes fell upon their ears for the farewell rumblings of a storm already past." "By the middle of May however, even Government House had been shocked into healthier action by the tidings telegraphed down from Agra." Yet "all excuses fairly weighed, it seems absurd to believe that the whole strength, all the vast, the varied resources of a great Eastern Government were employed in the raising of results so pitifully small." "A Neill, a Lawrence, or an Edwardes would have made short work with those other difficulties which debarred the Indian Government from doing its duty at the rate of more than twenty soldiers a day." "A wiser, quicker statesman than Lord Canning would have begun collecting his reinforcements some weeks sooner; at any rate after the news of the mutinous 7th Oude Infantry had reached him on the 4th of May. Yet even had he acted with proper boldness from the middle of the month, what scenes of black disaster might never have taken place at Cawnpore, Allahabad, and other stations neighbouring Lucknow! But the Governor-General was always by nature slow to move out of his regular orbit."

There are some few points, however, in which we are unable to endorse the opinions expressed by Mr. Trotter. We think his estimate of Sir Henry Havelock's character, not more ungenerous than unjust. We cannot regard it as a sin that he assumed his proper command in the army at Allahabad, even though in doing so he had to displace a Neill. His conduct indeed was the most usual and the most fitting to pursue. Outram's noble generosity in allowing Havelock to lead the relief column against Lucknow, after having thrice attempted



to advance in vain, is an exceptional case and cannot fairly be compared with Havelock's conduct at Allahabad, and if it could, there are few men who would abide the test by such a standard of self-denial. It may be true that Havelock was extravagantly worshipped in those days, but it is a thankless task to set to pull down the hero from the altar of popular affection. History will no doubt rate the merits of both the man and the general at their true worth, but no historian is justified in needlessly maligning one whom he acknowledges to have been both a great general and a good man.

It would appear however, that Neill is the hero whom Mr. Trotter worships with almost blind admiration. This is the manner, for instance, in which he speaks of what must always remain the greatest blot on that great General's fame,—a stain indelible, which no number of Brahmins and Rajputs could ever succeed in washing out. "The slaughter-house itself, in which " the blood of the Nana's victims still lay two inches deep, was " cleansed in part at least by some of those who had evidently " borne a share, active or passive, in the cruel butchery of the 15th " of July. Each of the rebel ringleaders as he fell into Neill's hands " was forced by way of prelude to his own hanging, to clean up a " certain space of the blood-reeking floor. If any high-caste " scoundrel demurred to this piece of natural, fair, if somewhat " startling revenge, on the plea of lasting ruin to his own soul, " his scruples were soon relieved by the threat of a sound flogging. " Neill's aim being to strike a wholesome terror among 'these " 'rebels' by this mode of punishing men concerned in 'a " 'revolting, cowardly, barbarous deed,' he cared as little for the " sufferers' private superstitions, as for the mawkish wailing of " those English critics who charged with needless cruelty one " of the bravest, least cruel, of a brave and merciful race."

It is satisfactory to find that the campaign of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India has been reckoned at its true worth in the volume before us. In comparison with the more exciting, because more personal, scenes of Delhi and Lucknow, there has always been a fear lest the exploits of the Central India Force should fail to receive their full meed of praise. In that memorable year when every column, flushed with success, covered itself with glory; when every individual Englishman not merely did his duty, but fought like a hero; it is no less difficult than ungracious to institute comparisons between different men and armies. But as regards the Central India column, all, we think, will agree in the justice of the following remarks upon its campaign: "A campaign," writes Mr. Trotter, "which for the quick succession of telling blows, for the completeness of the victories, the

“greatness of the odds encountered, of the difficulties overcome, for the skill, the hardihood, the untiring pluck displayed alike by officers and men, takes rank among the finest master pieces of modern warfare. If the conquest of Delhi was a miracle of heroic daring, if the final capture of Lucknow, in attesting the triumphs of bold engineering and skilful gunnery, seemed almost to justify the popular belief in Lord Clyde’s strategic prowess, Sir Hugh Rose’s triumphant march from Bombay to Gwalior, while it trod close on the former achievement in respect of soldierly endurance raised its leader at one bound far above the generalship of Lord Clyde on to a level with some of the first names in the military annals of all times.”

The following summary of Lord Canning’s character will probably be generally acquiesced in. “In the six years of his Indian Government, Lord Canning had gone through a whole life-time of experience, at once strange, awful, unforeseen. Few men so circumstanced would have come out of the ordeal with greater credit, many would not have come out half so well. While he was yet new to his work, before he had learnt to swim without help from his official bladders, the successor of Lord Dalhousie had to battle with a storm which even the might of a Dalhousie could not have easily overcome. If none of them around him saw what was lowering, his own blindness, however unfortunate, need not be reckoned much to his dispraise. After the storm had burst indeed, a quicker, clearer intellect would at once have felt the danger, have risen to the occasion. Dalhousie would have checked the mutiny in its spring, but Lord Canning was no Dalhousie, only an upright, high-minded English gentleman of average talent, very slow perceptions, and unbending firmness. No man could cleave more tightly to a purpose once framed, but few men were ever slower in mastering the preliminary details. Once let him see the way he ought to go, and nothing mortal could make him swerve from it. There is no finer scene in Indian history than that where the last of the Company’s Viceroys stands forth calm in the strength of his righteous purpose, stately in the pride of place and patrician training, amidst a roaring sea of hostile criticism lashed into ever wilder rage by the blasts of an armed rebellion. Against that seeming marble the whole strength of popular ill-feeling, the maddest utterances of British fury burning for a boundless, blindly heathenish revenge, fret and worry themselves in vain. Like the captive tied to the stake, he may feel but will never flinch under the blows and taunts of his savage persecutors.”

4. *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, by Francis Bernier. Translated from the French by Irving Brock. In two volumes. Calcutta, R. C. Lepage & Co.

THIS is a welcome re-appearance of an old friend. Clothed in a couple of neat handy volumes, composed of good paper and a clean type, Bernier is, if possible, more charming and attractive than ever. In his elegant cover, he seems to invite the reader to choose him for a companion in the railway carriage, the steamboat, or in the after-dinner easy chair; and we recommend those who have not yet made his acquaintance to accept the invitation.

Bernier's *Travels* have never failed to interest the general reader since their original publication two hundred years ago, while for the purposes of history they can scarcely be over-estimated. An eye-witness for the most part of the events he describes, the author may be relied on as an accurate and instructive chronicler of his own times while in India. His account of the struggle for the empire between the four sons of Shahjehan, even during the life-time of that infirm and unfortunate monarch, and the narrative of Aurungzebe's expedition to Cashmere, in which Bernier was attached to the *suite* of a high noble of the State, are life-like representations of what actually took place. They further possess this peculiar merit that being written by a foreigner totally disconnected with any political party, the information we derive from them is not more interesting than it is—a point of special importance in the East—impartial and authentic. Besides the above, the present volumes also contain Bernier's letter to the French minister Colbert "descriptive of the "government of India, its pecuniary resources, its military "strength, and its immense expenditure;" another letter containing a description of the great cities of Delhi and Agra with details illustrative of the Mogul Court; and a brief account of the customs and superstitions of the Hindus. The whole is rendered even more attractive by a style at once simple and lively, richly interspersed with quaint anecdote.

We are glad to find Messrs. Lepage and Co. so ready to follow the example set by Mr. Higginbotham of Madras in re-producing some of the early standard literature connected with the history of this country. We trust that the present volume will soon be followed by other similar works, many of which are well worthy of re-publication. The enterprising publishers will perhaps, however, forgive us if we suggest that future editions should be more carefully edited than Bernier's *Travels* would appear to have been. There is scarcely a single

page in the book free from some gross typographical blunder, which tends to disfigure the otherwise elegant appearance of the book. It was no doubt quite proper to preserve the antiquated spelling of the original translator, and this is not the point with which we find fault. It is however after all but a slight defect, and we sincerely trust that Messrs. Lepage and Co.'s enterprise will receive the hearty and substantial support of the public, and that they will be thereby encouraged to extend this new library of standard Anglo-Indian literature.

5. *The Eastern Hunters.* By Captain J. T. Newall. Author of "John Neville: Soldier, Sportsman, and Gentleman." With Illustrations. London. Tinsley Brothers. 1866.

As a narrative of adventure and sport, this book is superior to the average of its class, though by no means free from the faults that usually attend that style of literature. It does not affect an exaggerated and unreal strain; it is pretty free from ridiculous bombast; and it is written for the most part in tolerably good English. It is moreover well got up in a thick octavo volume (far too heavy for such light reading) with a large clean type, and some illustrations.

The subject treats of the adventures of three officers during a month's leave among the wilds of Rajputana or Central India. As is usual in James' novels, the three heroes are introduced to us on horseback, riding in the gloam of the evening and having of course lost their way. But fortunately they find their camp before the end of the chapter, and the work of destruction begins in the following morning. To give any idea of the various expeditions made by the hunters day after day, we should have to transcribe a great portion of Captain Newall's book. Their bag is perhaps not inmoderately large for a work of fiction, though 450 pages are occupied in the recital. For the several adventures are mixed up with so much extraneous matter that they swell to an unusual, not to say tedious length. Each incident leads to a wearisome amount of conversation, relevant and irrelevant, among the actors; a conversation moreover couched in a conventional slang which, we suppose, is popular among officers of Captain Newall's stamp. We really have very little interest in the colour of Miss Verney's hair, when accompanying our heroes on the track of their first Bruin: nor do we care to be pulled up by a dissertation on buried cities, which does not

pretend to teach us anything. There may be readers of the class who devour railway novels with avidity, and never seem as if they could satisfy their maw, to whom Captain Newall's style of writing may seem the perfection of literary ability. But for ourselves, we should prefer to have had the adventures told more in the style of Sir Samuel Baker, in fewer sentences more pithy and more graphic. In the present volume the spirit is so diluted that the mixture is to our taste weak and insipid. The anecdotes too with which *The Eastern Hunters* is plentifully and agreeably interspersed, might yet have had a larger measure of originality.

Some of the adventures are no doubt well worth telling, more particularly as their accuracy is vouched for by the author. We extract the following exciting incident as a specimen of Captain Newall's style.

"His rifle was quickly brought to bear, and he let drive  
"both barrels in rapid succession, rolling the tiger over; but  
"it immediately recovered itself, sprang up roaring with rage  
"and pain, and catching a sight of his adversary on the  
"rock-faced bank above, came bounding towards him over the  
"boulders and stones at the foot of the low cliff on which  
"Hawkes stood. The hunter seized his second gun, and poured  
"in its contents as the tiger came on, but without the effect of  
"stopping its headlong charge. The beast reached the base of  
"the rocky height, and making a desperate spring managed to  
"gain a hold with its fore-paws on the top, but its flat and  
"slippery face presented nothing on which to fix his hind-feet,  
"or give it purchase to assist in dragging itself bodily to the  
"top. As Hawkes turned to seize his third gun from the atten-  
"dant, he perceived that individual some distance in the rear,  
"racing with full power on towards the nearest tree. It was  
"too late for him to follow suit: retreat was now out of the  
"question: so he clubbed his gun and brought it down with  
"force on the head of the tiger as it rested snarling between its  
"paws within a few feet of the striker. The beast winced, but  
"did not let go hold; indeed, appeared to re-double its efforts to  
"effect a lodgment. The stock flew into splinters as it came in  
"contact with the hard skull of the tiger; but Hawkes conti-  
"nued to belabour him with the barrels. He laid on with a  
"will, but the result was yet doubtful. Despite the desperate  
"blows, the beast maintained his position; and had he not been  
"weakened by his wounds, would probably have made good  
"his object.

"All this time it had been growling, with rage depicted  
in every line of its countenance. Suddenly it emitted a

“ short low roar, a quiver seemed to run through it, its jaws  
“ relaxed, its eyes lost their fire, its hold of the rock gave way,  
“ and it fell back crashing among the boulders of rock and  
“ bushes into the nullah below, a distant rifle-crack accompany-  
“ ing its downfall.

“ ‘ Hurrah !’ Hawkes shouted in mad excitement, brandishing  
“ his gun barrels. ‘ Hurrah ! He’s cooned. Yoicks ! Tally-ho !’

“ ‘ Run for it. For God’s sake, get into a tree !’ shouted  
“ Norman from the other side of the nullah, in eager anxious  
“ tones. ‘ He may get up, and be at you again by some path.’

“ ‘ No, no, it’s all right. He’s cooned. Tul-lul-lul-laietee !’  
“ and Hawkes continued to make excited demonstrations as he  
“ stood on the rock and looked over.

“ ‘ Get back, man, get back. Are you mad !’ Norman again  
“ shouted with much anxiety. ‘ Perhaps he’s only stunned. I  
“ can’t answer for hitting him again. Run off, confound you,  
“ run away, will you !’

“ ‘ It’s all serene, old fellow,’ was the reply. ‘ I see him lying  
quite still and dead as a door-nail. There he is under the tree.’

“ ‘ Ah ! I twig him,’ ejaculated Norman, and again the rifle  
“ spoke. But this time there was no responsive roar.”

Well-worthy of recital are such deeds of heroic pluck and presence of mind, but there is to our mind something melo-dramatic and ludicrous in Captain Newall’s narration of them.

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*'No man, who hath tasted learning, but will confess the many ways of profiting by those, who, not contented with stale receipts, are able to manage and set forth new positions to the world: and, were they but as the dust and cinders of our feet, so long as in that notion, they may yet serve to polish and brighten the armoury of truth, even for that respect, they were not utterly to be cast away.'*—MILTON.

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BEFORE his departure from Pondichery, Dupleix had laid before his successor a detailed account of the military and other operations that had taken place in the Dekkan, in the Carnatic, and before Trichinopoly, and had indicated at great length the measures which he, had he continued at the head of affairs, would have adopted, in order to ensure the triumph of the French arms. He advised him to maintain Bussy at the court of the Subadar, Moracin in the ceded districts, Mainville at the head of the army before Trichinopoly. He counselled that to this last the reinforcements then landing should be sent without delay, and that he should be instructed to use them effectually before Admiral Watson's fleet, then shortly expected, should arrive off Madras. He laid special stress on the retention of Mainville at the head of the army, not only because he had shown energy and capacity, but likewise because he had gained the complete confidence of the French allies,—the Regent of Mysore and Morari Rao.

For some time Godeheu made no sign. To Governor Saunders indeed, he forwarded proposals of accommodation, and as an earnest of his sincerity, restored to him, that they might be used against France, the Swiss soldiers captured by Dupleix during the previous year. But neither to Bussy, to Moracin, nor to Mainville, did he give the smallest indication of his policy. He contented himself with cutting off from Mainville those supplies of money with which he had been till then liberally furnished by Dupleix for the maintenance of his army.

This policy of negation, if indeed it was a policy at all and not, as we believe it to have been, the natural inaction of an undecided mind, had the worst possible effect. The air was at once filled with rumours, all injurious to the French. The English, flushed with joy at the recall of Dupleix, made no secret as to the means by which that recall had been obtained, and as to the

consequences that were to follow from it. Their stories, spread everywhere by their agents, were universally credited, and their effect exaggerated tenfold. The partisans of the French alliance were everywhere overwhelmed with shame, with mortification, and with fear.

At the court of the Subadar these feelings shewed themselves in the fullest strength. "Your nation," wrote Salabut Jung to Bussy, on the arrival of messengers from Pondichery informing him of the arrival of Godeheu, "your nation has supported and succoured me till now. I have recognised to the utmost of my power the services it has rendered me. I have given to my uncle, M. Dupleix, the government of the Carnatic, and I have ever hoped that he would gain the upper-hand over his enemies. It is with the greatest chagrin that I have heard of his recall. To the messengers who were entrusted with my letters for him the new Governor said: 'Tell the Subadar, your master, that I am sent here by my Sovereign, who has forbidden me to interfere with the Mogul Government, and that he must defend himself as best he can.' They have also reported that the prisoners have been restored to Mahomed Ali, that Morari Rao and the Mysoreans have abandoned you. All this proves to me that the English have gained completely the superiority over your nation." The Dewan, Shah Nawaz Khan, writing to the Mahomedan governor of Hyderabad, thus expressed himself: "I cannot recover from the surprise which the news of the recall of the Governor Baladoor has caused me. I cannot imagine what the French are at; but by that act they will lose their honour and their territories. I cannot conceal from you that we can arrange nothing with the new Governor, who has not the least knowledge of our affairs. Besides, it appears that the French are neither so powerful nor so generous as they would have us believe, and that the English have the absolute mastery over them. I will not hide from you then that I am about to negotiate with the English and Mahomed Ali."

The letters of the French officers themselves were not at all more cheerful. "I foresaw," wrote Moracin to Bussy from Masulipatam, "in the same sense as yourself, what would be the effect of the arrival in India of the King's Commissary. I wrote to him a fortnight ago, and I believe I gave him an opinion similar to your own. It is fit that I should inform you of the contents of the letters from Madras which our native bankers have shewn me. In these it is stated that the King of England has forced the King of France to recall M. Dupleix from Pondichery, under a threat of war; and that

" the King of France, in sending out the new Governor, said  
 " to him : ' go and make peace in India ; restore to the Nawab  
 " ' the territories which he has given to the Company ; I will  
 " ' not keep them, because to do so would annoy my brother,  
 " ' the King of England'." Both Bussy and Moracin felt at  
 this time the utter hopelessness of their position so completely,  
 that nothing but the earnest exhortation of Dupleix to them  
 to continue to serve France, no matter by whom she was  
 represented, induced them to remain at their posts. The  
 answer of Bussy to this earnest exhortation deserves to be  
 recorded. " I reply," he wrote under date the 23rd August,  
 " to the letter with which you favoured me on the 4th. Your  
 " departure for Europe is a thunderbolt which has confounded  
 " and alarmed me. You, who are leaving, exhort me to conti-  
 " nue to serve the nation, and to support a work which is on  
 " the brink of destruction. Do you sincerely believe that  
 " I shall not be enveloped in the same disgrace as yourself?  
 " The blow is perhaps deferred, or suspended only to be struck  
 " with the greater force. But however that may be, I have  
 " ever considered it my duty to defer to your counsels, and to  
 " follow your reasoning. Under no circumstances shall I ever  
 " depart from that respectful and inviolable attachment, which  
 " has been till now my happiness and my glory, and which will  
 " always remain so. I await M. Godeheu's replies to deter-  
 " mine myself, although, like you, I am persuaded that I ought  
 " to await in India the replies of the M. de Conflans. If  
 " nevertheless in the post which I occupy I am not to be  
 " allowed liberty to act, if they shall endeavour to fetter me by  
 " the ideas of ignorant people and men without experience, my  
 " work will perish in my hands, and it will be concluded, either  
 " that I have destroyed it in pique, or that it was neither so  
 " splendid nor so well established as you and I have declared  
 " it to be. On the one side I declare that if the confidence  
 " with which you have honoured me is continued by M.  
 " Godeheu, I shall not refuse to devote myself to the service of  
 " the nation and the Company ; it is not that I expect that my  
 " services will be recognised or even acknowledged ; but I shall  
 " have, like yourself, the advantage of having served my country,  
 " without any emolument but the glory of having been useful  
 " to it, and the consolation of attributing its neglect and in-  
 " gratitude only to the factiousness of the envious, themselves  
 " too wanting in merit not to seek to obscure that of others.  
 " \* \* \* \* \* Do me the favour to inform me if you can of  
 " the views of M. Godeheu regarding the Dekkan.\* Personally  
 " I am disposed to abandon all and to retire to France. But I

“ wait your answer and your advice. I am so overwhelmed that I cannot apply myself to business. The army is crying out from hunger;—no one pays,—and I am forbidden to act.”

Such was the state of matters in the Dekkan and in the ceded districts. Before Trichinopoly it was worse. We left the French army under Mainville occupying the Five Rocks, completely shutting in the city; Lawrence absent at Tanjore, with the king of which country Dupleix continued up to the last to be in secret communication. Very shortly after the arrival of Godeheu the 2000 troops that sailed with him from France landed at Pondichery. These should have been sent, as Dupleix strongly urged, to reinforce Mainville, who could then have made sure of the city for which the French had been so long struggling. But, far from so acting, Godeheu sent only petty reinforcements; he cut off also from his army the supplies of money it had been in the habit of receiving; he stopped the transport of provisions, he sent no orders; the letters and remonstrances of Mainville he left unanswered. The consequence was that a portion of the army mutinied, and the emeute was only suppressed by the loyal exertions of the officers. The letter written by Godeheu to Dupleix on hearing of this outbreak serves to illustrate the character of the new Governor,—to shew in a striking light the crime committed by the French Government in sending out such a man to supersede Dupleix. “ What resources would you have” wrote he, “ in the same case? You were in a position to make advances from your purse and on your credit: I can do neither one nor the other.”

But this was not all. The new Governor seemed determined to sacrifice not only the territories acquired by Dupleix but even the honour of France to the one great object of making peace with England. So transparent was this intention, so patent to all, that it produced in the French settlement and in the French army, a discouragement and a despondency fatal to the life of a people. It is not too much to affirm that had Governor Saunders himself been appointed successor to Dupleix he could not have more effectually injured French interests than did this nominee of the French Direction and the French Crown. He began by changing the superior command of the army. Mainville having been recommended by Dupleix as the most capable officer, as the man of all others the most acceptable to their native allies, Godeheu took an early opportunity of superseding him, appointing in his stead M. de Maissin,—a man remarkable for his little capacity and his want of resolution. Not the less however did he suit the purposes

of Godeheu. It would not be credited were there not evidence to prove it,\* that, at a moment when the English garrison in Trichinopoly was sorely pressed by famine; when the French army had only to hold the position at the Five Rocks and the dependent posts to prevent the possibility of the ingress of any convoy; Godeheu instructed his new general to connive at its revictualment, to offer no real obstacle to the retention by the English of that all important city. As, at this time as before, the result of the negotiations with the English still depended on the fortunes of the campaign, we can easily conceive how the interest of France suffered in the hands of her representative. To that campaign we purpose now to refer.

Mainville made over command of the French army to Maissin on the 16th August 1751. It had long been known that the English commander, Major Lawrence, had been waiting only the conclusion of an arrangement for native assistance with Maphuz Khan, elder brother of Mahomed Ali, to endeavour to escort supplies into Trichinopoly. Of the movements of this convoy Mainville had had the most certain intelligence, and he had made all his arrangements to cut it off. Only three days after he had delivered up his command to Maissin he learned that the convoy, escorted by 1200 English troops, 3000 Sepoys and fourteen field pieces, with a native contingent of 5500 men and several guns, had arrived at a village six miles to the east of Elmiseram, and that it would endeavour to force its way the next morning between the Sugarloaf and the French Rocks. Mainville, who had employed the previous two months in reconnoitering this ground, at once informed his successor of the intended movement, and strongly urged him to move out at once, and take possession of a watercourse running out of the Cauveri, the nearer bank of which commanded the country beyond. He indicated to him also the names of two officers, MM. Gaudart and Aumont, who were thoroughly acquainted with the country, and to whom Mainville himself, when in command, had confided his intentions. Maissin listened to the communication with apparent pleasure, and set out with the avowed intention of putting it into execution. No sooner, however, had he reached the Sugar-loaf Rock, than, obedient to his secret instructions, he drew up his army close to a tank in front of it, and, leaving the watercourse unguarded, waited the approach of the enemy. When Lawrence did appear,—his convoy defiling on his right,—marching as much

\* Mainville's Report—Letter from Nunderaj, Regent of Mysore to his agent at Pondichery. Vide also Orme.

at ease as on a field day, and opened fire from a battery he had erected on the high bank of the watercourse, Maissin declined an action, and retired without even firing a shot.\* Whilst this was going on, a Mysorean officer, named Hyder Naik, (the Hyder Ali afterwards so famous,) moving round the English force, fell upon the rear of the convoy, and captured thirty-five carts all laden with supplies and stores. This attack diverted the attention of Major Lawrence from the French, and offered them a good opportunity to assault with advantage. In vain did the Regent urge Maissin to use it; in vain did he point out that one charge would finish the campaign; Maissin was deaf to every representation; reposing on the secret instructions of his superior, he moved quietly back to his position at the Five Rocks. Meanwhile, not only Lawrence's convoy, but others from different parts of the country, poured into Trichinopoly.

A few days later, Maissin retired to Motachellinore on the Cauveri, abandoning his posts around Trichinopoly. He had not the firmness to remain even here, when, some few days later, Lawrence appeared before the place,—which nevertheless was strongly fortified,—but retreated precipitately into Seringham. The English, satisfied with this success, proceeded to house themselves for the rainy season in the Warriore pagodas, nearly due west of Trichinopoly.

Meanwhile, Godeheu, by his unskillful efforts to bring about peace at any price, had been working the most effectual damage to French interests in the eyes of the native powers. His lieutenants were everywhere left in a state of the most painful uncertainty. After wavering long as to whether he should withdraw his support from Salabut Jung, or leave Bussy with diminished influence and restricted powers at his court, he wrote on the 16th September that he was convinced of the necessity of not abandoning the Subadar. To Moracin, however, he threw out hints in the same letter regarding his projected renunciation of the territorial acquisitions of the Company, on the ground that “he preferred a safe and extended commerce to any other advantage.†” It was in vain that Moracin assured him in reply that whoever had persuaded him that the peace and security of one part of the French possessions would be best maintained by the abandonment of another part could know nothing either of the map of the country, the locality, or the interests of the Company. It was to no purpose

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\* M. de Mainville says; “il se retira sans qu’il y eût une amorce de fusil brûlée.”

† Letter to Moracin, 16th September, 1754.

that he warned him that such an act would be but the prelude "to our total and proximate expulsion from this part of the Dekkan.\*" Godeheu's mind was made up. To undo the work of Dupleix, to make peace with the English, the honour and interests of France were but light sacrifices.

Negotiations had meanwhile been pending with the government of Madras. Mr. Saunders had indeed been recently re-inforced by the arrival of Admiral Watson's fleet, having on board Her Majesty's 49th Regiment and several recruits for the Company. This advantage was however to a certain extent counterbalanced in the mind of Mr. Saunders by the fact that Colonel Adlercron, who commanded the 49th, superseded the tried and gallant veteran who had so often led the English forces to victory. As the French had just before received re-inforcements certainly not inferior in number, it was still a question as to which of the contending parties, in the event of a continuation of the war, would have the advantage. But the folly of Godeheu had given Saunders a moral superiority of which he did not fail to make the fullest use. The wise forethought, likewise, of the English Government, in despatching a fleet to influence the negotiations for peace, produced a wonderful effect. Saunders was not insensible, however, to the advantages to be derived from the feverish impatience of Godeheu, and he readily acceded, on the 26th October, to a truce for three months, during which commissioners should meet at Pondichery to discuss the conditions of a permanent peace. The principal articles of this truce declared, that, till the 11th January, 1755, no act of hostility should ensue between the French and English, or between their allies; that commerce should be free to both nations in the Carnatic; that there should be a mutual, but *ad valorem*, exchange of prisoners; and that commissaries should be appointed on both sides to see that the conditions of the truce were not infringed.

Two months later a treaty of peace was agreed to, so far only provisional, that it required the ratification of the East India Companies of France and England. The first condition of this treaty laid down that the two companies should "renounce for ever all Mogul dignities and governments, and should never interfere in the differences that might arise among the princes of the country;" the second and third, that the English should possess Fort St. George, Fort St. David, and Devikottah; the French, Pondichery and a limited settlement at Nizampatnam, it being arranged, that to the French should be allotted either a

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\* Reply of Moracin, dated 9th October, 1754.

territory between Nizampatnam and the river Gondeama, to compensate for the inferiority of Karical to Devikottah ; or that the districts of Pondichery should be made equal to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David, the French in that case abandoning the country about Nizampatnam. The fourth clause abandoned for the French their claims on the ceded districts, it being arranged that equal territories should be there assigned to the rival Companies. The fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses regulated the navigation of certain rivers, and the possession of certain other minor territories, on the same principle. The eighth provided for the prolongation of the truce till the confirmation of the treaty should arrive from Europe. The ninth for the non-building of any ports or obtaining any new grants of territory during the truce. The tenth, for the principle of *uti possidetis* till the treaty should be confirmed from Europe ; and the eleventh for some future plan of indemnification for the expenses of the war.

When we commented on the conditions of peace which the agents of Dupleix submitted to the Conference of Sadras in the autumn of the previous year, we noticed that the French proposals were remarkable more for their omissions than for what they contained. The same observation is applicable, in one particular point, to the treaty of which we have here given an outline. No mention is made of Mahomed Ali ; not a single reference to the Nawabship of the Carnatic. It was not however the less clear from this omission, that the English had gained, in this particular, all for which they had been contending. The clause which forbade either nation to accept office or government from the native authorities was an unmistakeable renunciation on the part of Godeheu of all the dignities and governments which the Subadar had conferred upon his predecessor. The French competitor for the office of Nawab having thus resigned his claims, on whom but on the rival competitor, Mahomed Ali, would the vacated government devolve ? For five years had the French and English battled for this single point ; to maintain the French view Dupleix had risked and lost his semi-regal seat in the Council of Pondichery, he had refused substantial offers of territory which did not include this concession. His successor tamely renounced it, without however obtaining those substantial advantages which alone could make it palatable.

But the third and fourth clauses, and especially the fourth, contained concessions not only damaging to French interests but disgraceful to French honour. The third, under the pretext of giving to each nation equal possessions on the Coromandel coast, kept indeed ' the word of promise to the ear,' but only



‘to break it to the hope.’ Karikal was not the equivalent of Devikottah as a place of commerce. But,—what was worse, what was even insulting,—to bring about on another part of the coast this declared equality, the English proposed, and the French agreed, to take a district which actually belonged to the French, which was their own, their property, and to give them only a small portion of it, restoring the rest to the native powers. We allude to the agreement to form a settlement to be confined rigidly to the country between Nizampatnam and the river Gondeama, at a time when the entire coast from Nizampatnam to Juggernath was French,—French by gift, French by actual possession. The alternative proposal, to make the districts of Pondichery equal to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David together, was even more dishonouring and insidious, for the effect of it would be to agree to abandon for ever, though without special mention of them, those ceded districts or Circars which the genius and policy of Dupleix had gained for his country.

But of all the clauses the fourth was the most directly injurious to French interests. This actually proposed that the city of Masulipatam with certain districts round it, and the island of Divi, both actually French property, should be divided between the rival powers. The carrying out of this proposition would alone entail a sacrifice on the part of the French of a fixed annual revenue of 4,000,000 francs (£120,000). The fifth, sixth, and seventh articles dealt likewise with French territory to the advantage of their rivals.

The remaining articles of the treaty, especially those which referred to the native allies of the two powers, were equally one-sided. The English had but one ally, the king of Tanjore,—for Mahomed Ali was but their helpless tool, the puppet in whose name, and under the shadow of whose usurped authority, they had endeavoured to overthrow French influence. The French, on the contrary, had the Mahrattas, the Mysoreans, and the Subadar. These knew not a word of the treaty. The effect of it, therefore, was to impose English law, not alone upon the French, but upon the independent princes of India, to force Salabut Jung to accept as Nawab of the Carnatic a man whom he had frequently declared to be a rebel and an outlaw; to compel the Mysoreans and Mahrattas to desist from their views on the city which they already regarded as their own! As a climax to this condition, the French, the allies of these princes, were to guarantee that they would execute it!

Such was Godeheu’s treaty,—a treaty in which he renounced all that the French had been contending for. He gave up

the Nawabship of the Carnatic; he gave up the Circars; he gave up his allies; he gave up French influence and French honour. Could there have been a greater contrast to Dupleix! To him the English had offered to guarantee the possession of all his territories, provided he could give up the position and office of Nawab of the Carnatic. His successor not only renounced that office, but with it those material advantages which France had secured, the undisputed possession of which would still have left her, under any circumstances, infinitely more powerful than her rival. It is certainly not too severe a sentence, not too extravagant a criticism, to pronounce such a treaty to have been, in a French point of view, disgraceful. It was disgraceful to France, disgraceful to the man who made it. To his timorous love of peace, fostered by the mean and unworthy desire to undo the work of his predecessor, Godeheu sacrificed, and sacrificed knowing what he was sacrificing, the very foundations of an Indo-French empire.

For, indeed, great as were the material advantages given up, they were less important than the abnegation of moral influence, of the prestige of superiority which their renunciation implied. The treaty in fact was an announcement to the native princes of Southern India, that thenceforth France was not strong enough to contend with England on the soil of Hindostan; that she gave up the struggle; that she abandoned her allies to their fate. The impression produced by the arrival of Godeheu upon the bankers of Masulipatam has been already quoted. Damaging as that was, this confirmation of the views then entertained, and declared by Moracin and others to be exaggerated, was a hundred times more injurious. We shall see, as we proceed, the fatal effects produced upon the princes of India by this policy of abnegation.

In striking contrast to the conduct of the French governor was the action of the Englishman, Saunders. If the empire of Hindostan is an appanage of which the English have reason to be proud, if the possession of India has brought with it solid advantages to Great Britain, then do his countrymen still owe to the memory of Mr. Saunders a debt which was never fully acknowledged to himself. It was his constancy and resolution; his determination, when the English fortunes were at their lowest, to support Mahomed Ali, in order that through him he might stop the progress of Dupleix; that more than any other circumstances changed the face of events; that tended by a slow but certain procedure, to lower the pride of France, to exalt the fortunes of England. Never did he despair, never did he hesitate in his determination to oppose those pretensions,

which, if submitted to, would, he felt, have overwhelmed the English settlement in ruin. True it is, that he was fortunate; true, that he enjoyed the rare advantage of having a Clive and a Lawrence under his command. But it is not too much to affirm, that but for his stubborn policy even these advantages would have availed nothing; that but for his promptitude in recognising and employing merit, Clive might even have languished in obscurity. Nor was his tact inferior to his determination. He would have treated with Dupleix, Dupleix being absolute master of his Presidency, on better terms than he offered Godeheu; for he could not but feel that if France were to support Dupleix, a prolongation of hostilities must end in an increase of French territory. He was prepared, therefore, to give up everything but that one point he considered necessary to the safety of the English, *viz.*, that the Nawab of the Carnatic should not be a French nominee. But with Godeheu he pursued a different treatment; he saw that from the fear and malice of such a man he could wring almost anything; he squeezed him, therefore, to an extent that left him powerless and exhausted.

That, whilst doing justice to the merits of Saunders and vindicating the policy of Dupleix, we have not wronged the memory of Godeheu, is clear from the recorded sentiments of this functionary. What, indeed, but a feverish desire for peace at any price, and a mean jealousy of Dupleix, could have prompted him on the 11th January to sign the ignominious treaty to which we have referred, when, on the 17th December preceding, the terms of the treaty having been virtually settled and the truce still existing, he had written these words to Moracin at Masulipatam: "Prepare everything with all promptitude to the extent of your ability, so as to make yourself safe from a *coup-de-main*, for it is quite possible you may be attacked before the end of January. It is by such sudden enterprises that the English begin to declare war!" He thus prepared Moracin for an attack on the Circars at the end of December, and yet, on the 11th January following, virtually resigned them up to the English!

Not long did he remain in India to watch the working of his treaty. On the 16th February, 1755, after holding office little more than six months, he embarked for Europe, leaving the affairs of the French settlement to be administered by a secret committee, composed of M.M. Barthelemy, Boileau, and Guillard, until the arrival of the officer nominated to be his successor, M. Duval de Leyrit. His departure was hailed by the colony as a national benefit. That alone of all his acts produced a good

effect for French interests throughout Southern India, for it gave rise to the rumour, artfully encouraged by Bussy, that it was but the prelude to the return of Dupleix.

But the recall of that statesman had had more than a transient effect. The members of the secret Committee, having before them his example, and ignorant of the political views of M. de Leyrit, would do nothing. Writing to Bussy, who pressed the Pondichery government for instructions as to the course of conduct he should adopt in the difficult circumstances we shall have to record, they could only reply that they had received all the letters he had addressed to M. Godeheu; that he himself had not replied to them, because certain points in them were of too delicate a nature to allow him to arrive at a fixed decision; but that M. de Leyrit, on his arrival, would probably explain himself fully upon all the questions at issue.\* The same conduct was pursued in every other subject of importance, the consequence being, that from the 16th February, the date of the departure of Godeheu, to the arrival of de Leyrit on the 25th March of the same year, the government of French India was but a blank.

De Leyrit, though a very ordinary man, was an improvement on the secret Committee. He too had been trained in India in the civil branch of the service, and had been a contemporary of Dupleix. At the time of the expedition of La Bourdonnais, he had been the French agent at Mahé, and he had succeeded Dupleix as Director-General of Chandernagore in 1741. He would have made probably an excellent head of a purely trading corporation, for he was well versed in mercantile operations; but he was most unfit for the conduct of the delicate policy by which the relations of Pondichery with the native chiefs required to be guided; equally was he wanting in the firmness of purpose and determination of will by which alone the aggressive policy of the English could be stayed. In a word, though well-meaning and honest, he was slow, undecided, wanting in forethought and energy.

Yet at that time, if at any, French India required other qualities in her chief ruler. Godeheu had not even quitted the scene of his inglorious labours, scarcely dry was the ink with which he and the English Commissioners had signed the treaty,—one clause of which provided that the English and French “should never interfere in any difference that might arise between the princes of the country,”—when the English began to equip a force to assist their ally, Mahomed Ali,

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\* M. Barthelemy to Bussy, 28th February, 1755.

in his endeavours to coerce the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly, his right over whom was simply the right of the strongest. Although the English were actuated in this policy by purely mercenary motives, hoping to obtain from those districts the means of re-couping themselves for the expenses of the war just closed, there can be no doubt but that it was a glaring infraction of the treaty. That it was attempted is a clear proof of the contempt in which the power of the French on the Coromandel coast had come to be regarded.

In the beginning of February, under orders received from Madras, an English force under Colonel Heron, of H. M.'s 49th foot, was detached from Trichinopoly on this service. Whatever might have been the apparent success of this enterprise, —and Colonel Heron did succeed in occupying both Madura and Tinivelly,—it must not the less be regarded as a failure. The English soldiers, commanded by an officer ignorant of the country, were allowed to insult the religion and to deride the prejudices of the people; the money gained in the foray was not sufficient to pay the expenses of the expedition,\* and, worse than all, an example was given of the little respect entertained by the Government of Fort St. George for the most solemn engagements, when their own interests were concerned. De Leyrit had not been an inattentive spectator of this action on the part of the English. No sooner had he landed than he addressed to the Madras Government a strong remonstrance on the infraction of the treaty. It was replied to him, however, that Colonel Heron's expedition was not an act of war in any sense of the word; that the Nawab was simply engaged in the collection of his rents. However specious this reply might have appeared, de Leyrit was for the moment forced to be content with it; for Admiral Watson was on the coast, and de Leyrit, new to the scene, felt that it would be impolitic to inaugurate his career as Governor by a renewal of hostilities. He determined, therefore, to rest satisfied with his protest, inwardly resolving, however, to follow the example so imprudently set him. Accordingly, when, some few weeks later, he found that the rents due from the lands west of Ootatoor and south of the Valaru river, known by the name of Terriore, and in which the French had been empowered to act as agents of the king of Mysore, were not paid in to the Pondichery treasury, he sent Maissin at the head of 500 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys to make arrangements which should be satisfactory for the future. The English made no opposition to

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\* Colonel Heron, on his return to Trichinopoly in June, was ordered to Madras, tried there by a Court Martial, and found guilty of malversation.

this movement. But when the French, succeeding in Terriore, were tempted to move against the more eastern lands nearer Palamcottah, and stretching almost from the Valaru to the Coleroon, and which the English chose to regard as feudally dependent on the Nawab, orders were sent to Calliaud to oppose the movement, if necessary, by force. If the French had persisted in their pretensions, war was then inevitable. But de Leyrit, still unprepared, yielded, and withdrew his force. Nevertheless a precedent of interference had been established on both sides, and before Godeheu reached Europe, the treaty which he carried with him had been violated in that part which was alike its main principle, and its only possible justification,—by the English in acting as allies of Mahomed Ali, by the French as agents of the Mysoreans.

De Leyrit indeed had not been long at Pondichery before he became convinced that the theory of non-interference, on which Godeheu had based his policy, was, in the actual state of India, simply impossible. Both the rival powers on the Coromandel coast having armies and strong places, both brought constantly into contact with possessors of territory whose weakness they had proved and who were continually tempting them with offers, it was impossible that either should have the virtue on every occasion to abstain, always to restrain their hands. Excuses were to be found to justify, at least to their Directors in Europe, every infraction of the treaty. It is clear from the correspondence of de Leyrit with Bussy and with Dupleix,\* that this feeling on his part grew stronger every day, and that he became more and more convinced of the insensate folly of Godeheu in consenting to divide the five Circars with the English. Of these, however, the French still held possession, and were empowered to hold possession, till the ratification of the treaty should arrive, that is, till about the middle of 1756. As de Leyrit saw clearly that war would then be inevitable, all his foreign policy was directed to nurse the resources of Pondichery, to avoid committing himself to a contest, until his own private knowledge of the confirmation of the treaty would render it advisable for him to provoke hostilities on other grounds. Should the treaty not be confirmed, war would naturally ensue.

This exposition of the policy of de Leyrit will enable us to comprehend and account for the cautious policy he continued for some time to follow. We shall understand why it was he continued to support Bussy at Hyderabad, why, when the

\* De Leyrit to Bussy 29th July and 17th August, 1755; to Dupleix 16th October, and others.

English again infringed the treaty, he confined himself to threats and to protests, until, learning that the treaty had been confirmed by his Directors, he made the aggression of the English a pretext for renewing hostilities, endeavouring thus to retain for France permanent possession of the five Circars. It was undoubtedly, in theory, a sagacious and able policy, but to succeed it required the possession of greater energy and vigour in action than de Leyrit and his subordinates, always excepting Bussy, possessed.

Opportunities for protesting were never wanting to either party. In the autumn of the same year, 1755, the French having taken possession of some lands contiguous to Sadras, midway nearly between Pondichery and St. Fort George, the English remonstrated, and the dispute only terminated by an equal division of the contested territory.\* But in the following year affairs took a turn which could not fail to embroil the two nations.

The English had always been jealous of the position held by Bussy at the court of the Subadar. The influence which thus accrued to the French could not fail to make itself felt on both sides of the continent of Hindostan, at the court of the Peshwa, as well as with the various petty chieftains in the Carnatic. Although, in the treaty made with Godeheu, no special reference had been made to Bussy, there had been a tacit understanding that it had no reference to the affairs of the Subadar, who indeed had never committed hostilities against the English. Unable then to demand as a right the expulsion of Bussy, the English were yet desirous to weaken the influence he was able to exercise by his position at Hyderabad, either by undermining him with the Subadar, or by gaining new possessions for themselves on the western coast. The manner in which the first was attempted, and how it succeeded, will be related when we have to refer to the operations of Bussy. But, before that, the return to India of Clive, with the commission of Lieutenant-Colonel and Governor of Fort St. David, gave the English an opportunity of trying the second. Clive, under orders from the Court of Directors, had been sent in the first instance to Bombay, in order that he might be ready to co-operate in an expedition which they contemplated in concert with the Peshwa against the northern parts of the Dekkan. Colonel Scott, the officer appointed to command the English contingent, dying in Bombay, his place was at once occupied by Clive, and it needed but the orders of the Bombay government to enter

\* A truly European mode of settling a dispute,—the lands in question having belonged to native princes who were parties to the treaty!

upon the contemplated movement. The members of that government, however, regarding Godeheu's treaty as prohibitory of any such undertaking, hesitated to embark in it, until at least they should have received the opinion on that point of the Madras authorities. These had no such scruple. And, although they were ignorant of the views of the Home government regarding the disposal of Clive's force; although, indeed, they were not destined, at the time, to be enlightened,—the ship which conveyed the despatches of the Bombay Government having been wrecked,—yet no sooner had they heard of the arrival of Clive at Bombay, than they sent to suggest the mode in which his force could be best used,—a mode almost identical with the plan of the Court of Directors. But, before their despatch could reach Bombay, the Government of that Presidency, more cautious than that of Madras, had determined to employ Clive's force and Admiral Watson's fleet, for the reduction, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, of the fort of Gheriah, the principal stronghold of the famous pirate Angria.

It forms no part of this history to give the details of this expedition, unconnected as it was with French interests. It will suffice to say that it was attended with complete success; that Gheriah was taken, Angria's fleet destroyed, and the ten lakhs of prize-money captured divided on the spot amongst the English,—the Mahrattas being excluded\* from all participation therein, notwithstanding that it was to them, and not to the English, that Angria surrendered.

This expedition terminated, Clive and Watson returned to the coast of Coromandel, the former taking up his government at Fort St. David, the latter repairing to Madras. He reached this place on the 16th May, and began at once to concert with Governor Pigott† a scheme which the expulsion of Bussy by Salabut Jung seemed to facilitate for replacing French by English influence in the Dekkan. But just two months after his arrival, accounts were received of the capture of Kassimbazar, and three weeks later, of the taking of Calcutta, by the Nawab Nazim of Bengal. Clive was instantly summoned from Fort St. David to take part in the deliberations having for their object the recovery of the English settlement in that province. In the

\* Before the expedition left Bombay, the English had agreed amongst themselves that the Mahrattas were to be excluded from all participation in the prize-money; nay more, although it had been previously agreed that Gheriah should be given up to the Mahrattas, the English determined to keep it. This was not perhaps the most effectual mode of inducing a hearty co-operation against the Subadar.

† Governor Pigott succeeded Governor Saunders at Madras,



presence of such a calamity it appeared advisable to give up the projected expedition into the Dekkan, even to allow Madras to shift for herself, in order to concentrate the undivided energies of the Presidency on the recovery of Calcutta and the punishment of the Nawab Nazim. After some discussion, Clive was appointed to the command, with independent and practically unlimited powers. On the 16th October he sailed, having with him 900 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy, on that enterprise to which, in so far as relates to its connection with Chandernagore, we shall have presently to refer.

Meanwhile the English had not been idle in the Carnatic. Their protégé, the Nawab, being still in want of funds, and being thus unable to settle the claims they had against him, it was determined at Madras to make another attempt to extract money from some of the subordinate princes of the Carnatic. Mortiz Ali, Governor of Vellore, was selected for this purpose. It will be recollected that Mortiz Ali had been set up by Dupleix, on the renunciation of his claims by Chanda Sahib, as Nawab of the Carnatic. As soon, however, as the fall of Dupleix appeared imminent Mortiz Ali had hastened to disclaim all pretensions to the title, and had made his submission to Mahomed Ali. By this means he hoped to be allowed to remain unmolested in his possessions. But it was not to be. He suffered under the great misfortune of passing for the richest man in the Carnatic, a crime that could only be atoned for by the surrender of his property. It was easy to find a pretext to attack him. Some old story about arrears of tribute was raked up; and, almost without warning, a force of 500 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy, under Major Killpatrick, appeared before Vellore on the 30th January.

Vellore had the reputation of being the strongest fortress in the Carnatic. Its walls were built of large stones, and were strengthened by bastions and towers. It was surrounded by a deep and wide ditch cut out of the rock, and always filled with water swarming with alligators. It commanded the high road to Mysore, and was in other respects the most important position in the upper Carnatic. De Leyrit would have been weak indeed had he allowed such a place to fall into the hands of the English. Nor did he. No sooner then had he heard of the movements of Killpatrick, than he despatched a messenger to Madras to intimate that he would regard an attack upon Vellore as an infraction of the treaty, and that he should oppose it with all his available force. Not content with that, he ordered 300 Europeans and 300 sepoy to march instantly in the direction of that fortress, supporting them two days later by

a reinforcement of 400 of the former and 1,200 of the latter, the whole taking up a position between Gingee and Chittaput. This demonstration so far succeeded that it prevented an attack upon Vellore. There was no Dupleix, however, at Pondichery to improve the occasion to the advantage of France; no persuasive eloquence to induce Mortiz Ali to admit French troops into Vellore. That chieftain indeed feared his allies probably as much as his enemies; and, after a negotiation of three weeks, he was glad to purchase the retirement of the latter by the payment of 400,000 rupees.

The departure in the following October of the English armament for Bengal, and of 320 French to aid Bussy in the July preceding, the circumstances relating to which belong properly to the account of that officer's proceedings, left the rival powers in the Carnatic almost too powerless to cause one another effectual injury. The English however experienced, to its fullest extent, the inconvenience of having placed at the head of the affairs of the Carnatic, a man without personal resources and without ability. In January 1757, they found themselves once more compelled to levy contributions from Madura and Tinivelly; and Calliaud, who then commanded at Trichinopoly, was directed to proceed with the greater part of the garrison into those districts. He accordingly marched at the head of 180 Europeans, 1,000 sepoys, and six pieces of cannon to Tanjore, to endeavour to obtain from the king succours for his purpose. The king, however, and his ministers, tired of contributing to successes which brought only advantage to his allies, practically refused his aid; whereupon Calliaud, hearing that some of the insurgent Polygars were ravaging the district, moved without delay to Tinivelly. Here he was detained for some time by difficulties regarding supplies and money, and it was not till the 10th April that he was able to march towards Madura. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 1st May, he attempted to take this city by surprise, but, being repulsed, took up a position on the south-east face of the town, there to await the arrival of two 18-pounders he had sent for from Trichinopoly. Instead of these guns, however, he received at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th the startling intelligence that the whole French army, taking advantage of his absence, was attempting Trichinopoly! Intelligence of the same nature recalled to Madras Colonel Forde, who at the head of 100 Europeans, 56 Africans, 300 sepoys, and 10,000 auxiliaries had, till then unsuccessfully, been attempting the reduction of Nellore held against Mahomed Ali by his brother.

The time had indeed arrived when de Leyrit felt himself empowered to put into execution the schemes he had been long

meditating. On the 17th May, war, which for two years previously had been impending between France and England, was formally declared. Intelligence of this event reached de Leyrit at the end of 1756, accompanied however by the intimation that France was about to make a tremendous effort to recover her waning influence in India, and that he was to attempt nothing till the armament then fitting out should arrive. But de Leyrit, knowing that the few English troops in the Presidency were occupied before Madura and Nellore, having himself, too, just welcomed the annual detachment from Europe, under the command of the veteran d'Auteuil, thought the moment too opportune to be neglected. On the 6th April therefore, 200 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys were despatched into the interior, their commander, d'Auteuil, having secret instructions to feign to be entirely occupied by an attack upon the fort of Elvasanore,—a few miles north of the Goudelour river and on the high road between Gingee and Trichinopoly, —and other strongholds in its vicinity, whilst he should secretly collect all his forces for a combined attack upon the city which had so long bade defiance to French arms. De Leyrit justly argued that the English, engaged with their own plans, would care little about so unimportant a place as Elvasanore; that they would the rather on that account believe that no intention existed to attack Trichinopoly.

It turned out as de Leyrit had imagined. D'Auteuil was allowed, unmolested, even unsuspected, to capture Elvasanore and other places in its vicinity. His action there, tended, as de Leyrit had hoped, to make the English feel all the more secure regarding Trichinopoly. Suddenly, however, d'Auteuil massed his forces, amounting to 1,150 Europeans 3,000 sepoys and ten field-pieces, and on the 12th May occupied the island of Seringham. To enable him to collect so large a force of Europeans, not a single soldier, fit for duty, had been left in Pondichery.

The garrison of Trichinopoly at this time consisted of but 165 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and 1,000 native auxiliaries, the whole commanded by Captain Joseph Smith. But guarded within the walls were 500 French prisoners, and d'Auteuil naturally hoped that these, if they could not openly aid him, would, at all events, draw off the attention of a great part of the garrison. On the morning of the 14th, the French leader, crossing the river, took up a position at the Warriore pagodas, nearly three miles west of the city; from this place, he opened a fire of shot and shell, and continued it to the 20th, when he sent a summons to Smith to surrender. This summons was however answered by defiance.

It had been the intention of d'Auteuil to attempt an assault on the morning of the 21st, but he received during the day intimation that Calliaud, at the head of 120 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys, was in full march from Madura to relieve Trichinopoly. He deemed it, therefore, advisable to defer his attack in order the better to intercept this force. Instead, however, of massing the greater portion of his troops, leaving a few only to watch Smith, and moving out to crush Calliaud on the road, he resolved to follow the old plan,—dear, we must suppose, from its repeated failure,—of occupying the strong places to the south and east of the town. Like Astruc and Brennier before him, he marched to take up a position stretching from the Five Rocks to the French Rock, occupying, besides those two, in considerable force, the Fakeer's Tope and the Golden and Sugar-loaf Rocks. He thus shut out Calliaud from Trichinopoly on the only side on which he could hope to gain it; should the English attempt to force in their way between any of the rocks indicated, it would, he calculated, be in his power to crush them at a blow. The better to acquaint himself with the movements of the enemy, he had arranged that several spies should join them, and with these he had settled an efficient mode of communication.

But this was, after all, but a gouty mode of carrying on war. To sit still, and to depend on spies for information, was to give full play to the activity of an enemy who had hitherto shown himself not wanting in expedients. If d'Auteuil thought at all on the subject, he could not have believed that Calliaud was so wanting in ordinary perception as to run his head against the positions he occupied. A strong reconnaissance on the Madura road would have compelled Calliaud to fight. But if governments will entrust the command of their armies to gouty octogenarians, they must refrain from expecting that activity of movement, that watchful and daring vigour, which are almost always synonymous with success.

D'Auteuil, meanwhile, well satisfied with his arrangements, received information, early on the evening of the 25th, that Calliaud had just reached Aour, a village ten miles south east of Trichinopoly, and that he intended, a few hours later, to force his way between the Five Rocks and the Sugar-loaf Rock under cover of the darkness of the night. He instantly massed his forces about half a mile in front of the Golden Rock, denuding even the other positions in order to concentrate every available man against the enemy. All night long he remained in a state of anxious expectation; day dawned, yet there was no appearance of an enemy; at last, the sun itself appeared gilding the

horizon; still not a hostile soldier was to be seen; but scarcely had the entire disk become visible to the still expectant d'Auteuil when a triumphant *feu de joie* from the walls of Trichinopoly announced to him the terrible fact, that he had been out-witted and out-manceuvred, and that Trichinopoly was relieved!

It was too true. Fortunately for the English, their commander was still young, hale, and active, fully impressed with the necessity of using all his faculties, mental and bodily, when he had a great end to pursue. Breaking up from Madura on the 11th, Calliaud had marched at the head of the small force we have indicated, without tents, baggage, or artillery. On the morning of the 25th, arriving at Eliapore, nineteen miles from Trichinopoly, he had learned from Captain Smith the disposition made by d'Auteuil. The same evening, he marched, as truly reported by the spies, to Aour. Here he halted, giving out that he intended in half an hour to force his way through the space between the Five Rocks and the Sugar-loaf Rock. The time fixed for this march being so close, the spies instantly made their way to the French camp, and reported it to d'Auteuil with the result we have seen. Calliaud, half an hour later, did actually commence his march, but on arriving within two miles of the Five Rocks, he struck off to the right till he came opposite Elmiseram. The ground here being entirely under water on account of the rice cultivation, the French had supposed it impassable for troops, and had neglected to guard it. It was indeed heavy and swampy; but it was Calliaud's best chance, and, strictly enjoining silence, he attempted it. The distance was about nine miles. In seven hours, he had accomplished only seven. But by this time the day had dawned, and the sight of the city inspired the gallant band to new efforts. Still struggling on, Calliaud himself supported by two grenadiers, they entered the city in time to be welcomed by the rising sun. A salute was at once fired to convey to the Frenchman the notification of the defeat of his plans.

We will not stop to dwell on the mortification of d'Auteuil. So badly had his position been taken, all his troops concentrated upon one narrow point, that it would have been possible, as it turned out, for Calliaud to have marched in under the very shadow of the Sugar-loaf Rock. A body of sepoys he had sent to make a false march in that direction, in the hope to persuade the French that he himself was moving that way, were able to convert it into a real one, advancing under the lee of the rock without once having been challenged. The course followed by d'Auteuil after this check was not inspired by greater wisdom than his previous strategy. It is, however, always useless to

endeavour to analyse the motives of a man who is himself incapable of thinking. Had he been other than he was, d'Auteuil would have recollected that notwithstanding the reinforcement brought by Calliaud, he still out-numbered the English in his Europeans by four to one. But it would not appear that such a thought occurred to him. Utterly discouraged, he crossed the Cauveri the same evening, and proceeded next day to Pondichery.\*

Meanwhile the Madras authorities, not trusting entirely to the efforts of Calliaud, had ordered every available man into the field. These, forming a force of 430 Europeans and 800 sepoy under Colonel Adlercron, had already reached and captured Outramatore when they heard of the relief of Trichinopoly. As the French garrison of Outramatore had thrown itself into Wandewash, one of the most important towns in the Carnatic, sixty-four miles south-west of Madras, Colonel Adlercron marched forward with the apparent intention of besieging that also.

Meanwhile, de Leyrit had been neither unskilfully nor unsuccessfully employed in other parts of the coast. No sooner had the news of the fall of Chandernagore,—the account of which will appear in its proper place,—reached him, than he ordered Moracin to take possession of the English factories on the Godavery, and sent instructions to Bussy to attack that of Vizagapatam. Both these officers acquitted themselves of this service without any difficulty,—the garrison of Vizagapatam surrendering to Bussy on the 25th June. Whilst thus satisfying himself regarding his territories in the north, by a policy which gave him uninterrupted possession of the coast from Ganjam to Masulipatam, de Leyrit was not neglectful of the south. He had hoped to avenge the fall of Chandernagore by the capture of Trichinopoly; and though disappointed of that by d'Auteuil's unaccountable strategy, he still endeavoured to use the troops he commanded to some satisfactory purpose. On the return of d'Auteuil to Pondichery, therefore, he removed him from the command, and replaced him by M. Saubinet, a man of capacity and energy. To him he gave instructions at once to concentrate his army, which lay scattered at Gingee, at Tiruvadi, and at Pondichery, and to march to the relief of Wandewash, then threatened by Adlercron.

When Saubinet, at the head of 600 Europeans and about 200 sepoy, arrived before this place on the 1st June, he found Adlercron in possession of the town, and preparing to batter the fort. The approach of the French, however, combined with orders he received from his own Presidency to return, induced Adlercron

\* *Vide* Orme and Lawrence.

at once to quit this enterprise and to retreat towards Madras. Before doing this, he very barbarously and very unnecessarily set fire to the town, thereby injuring only the unoffending inhabitants. Saubinet instantly followed him upon the Chingleput road, whilst he despatched 200 Europeans and 500 sepoys to attack Conjeveram, a most important town with a strongly fortified pagoda, only forty-six miles from Madras. This detachment was however repulsed from Conjeveram, and retired after following the example of the English, by burning the town. The main body, after recapturing Outramatore, retired to Wandewash, and intrenched themselves about a mile in front of that town. Here they were followed to within four miles by Adlercron, under whom Lawrence, now a Lieutenant-Colonel, had consented to serve as a volunteer. For six weeks the two armies, nearly equal in numbers, remained facing one another, the English anxious for a decisive action before the expected reinforcements of the French should arrive, the French on that account desirous to avoid it. Finding their efforts to force a battle unavailing, the English army broke up on the 26th July, retiring, the greater part to Conjeveram, the remainder to Chingleput and Carangoly. Saubinet, thus left master of the campaign, remained at Wandewash till the middle of September. Learning then that a considerable squadron, having on board the *Chevalier de Soupire* with the Regiment of Lorraine, fifty artillery men and twenty siege guns,—the advanced guard of the force destined for the conquest of India under the Count de Lally,—had reached Pondichery, Saubinet made a sudden attack upon Chittaput. Capturing this after a desperate resistance, he moved against Trinomalee. Not this only, but several other forts in the Carnatic fell into the possession of the French, who were thus enabled to collect contributions from all parts of the province. It was not, however, until the arrival of Count Lally, on the 28th of April in the following year, that the French ventured to carry out the scheme originally intended to be commenced by de Soupire,—a scheme beginning with the intended capture of Fort St. David, as a preliminary to the entire rooting out of the English from the Carnatic. We shall see, when we come to that exciting portion of our history, how it was that de Soupire delayed this attack; we shall notice likewise the prompt and energetic action inaugurated by Lally himself. We leave the Carnatic, on the eve of his arrival, overrun by French troops; all its strong places, with the exception of Arcot, Vellore, Conjeveram, Chingleput, and the two English seats of government on the coast, in their hands; the English shut up in Madras and Trichinopoly, sensible of the storm about to burst over their heads, and conscious of having no efficient

means to protect themselves against its downpouring. We leave them thus, whilst we proceed to trace, on the one side, the fate of the French settlement in Bengal, on the other, the still eventful action of Bussy, ever gathering new triumphs, till recalled by the new Lieutenant-General of the armies of France from the scene of his brilliant successes to take part in the enterprise that, he fondly hoped, was to sweep the English into the sea.

Chandernagore, after the departure of Dupleix in 1741 to take up the Governor-Generalship of French India, had not long continued under the influence of the impulse which he had given to it. Whether it was that his successors were restricted in his powers or were too indolent; that the duties on commercial enterprise amounted almost to prohibition of trade; that it was neglected by the Home Government; or, more probably, from a combination of all these causes; it is certain that its once flourishing trade had decreased; that it was burdened with debts, and that it was being maintained at a loss. In 1756, the Director-General of the settlement was M. Renault de St. Germain, whilst the dependent factory of Kassimbazar came early in the year under the charge of M. Law. The garrison in the former place consisted of 146 Europeans and 300 sepoy.\* Law had with him about a score of European and sixty native soldiers.

The calamity which had overwhelmed Calcutta in 1756 had left Chandernagore uninjured. When the first-named city was threatened by Suraj-ood-dowlah in that year, the English, despairing of assistance from their own people, had invited the Dutch of Chinsura and the French of Chandernagore to make common cause with them against the enemy. Whilst

\* All the English historians give the number of the French garrison as at least 300 Europeans and 300 natives. That Clive and Watson believed this to have been their numbers we cannot doubt, nor equally, that the same impression prevailed amongst the English in India generally. It is nevertheless incontestable that the numbers given by us in the text are correct. In the official despatch sent by M. Renault to Count Lally regarding the events connected with the loss of Chandernagore we find the following statement: "In every letter we used the strongest and most touching language to demonstrate the absolute necessity of sending us such assistance as would place this settlement beyond the chance of similar misfortunes" (such as had happened to the English). "We received 67 sepoy and a detachment of 61 Europeans, of whom 45 were invalids, which added to the 85 Europeans we then had, made 146 Europeans. We expected then every day to learn that war had been declared against England, and there was preparing at the time a considerable armament to re-take Calcutta." This extract is decisive as to the number of Europeans.



the Dutch had positively refused, the French, more courteous, had offered the English protection within the walls of Chandernagore. This offer, which would seem to have been made in good faith, was however regarded as an insult by the English, and declined. Certain it is that when themselves threatened with the full weight of the Nawab's anger in case they should refuse to assist him in his operations against the English, the French resolutely declined to aid him,—and this, although they knew well that the extermination of the English, if unavenged, would probably be only a prelude to an attack upon their own settlement. It happened, indeed, that after the capture of Calcutta and the flight of the surviving English to Fulta, the Nawab, recognising the loss of revenue caused by their expulsion, appeared disinclined to take hostile measures against the other European settlements on the Hooghly. Contenting himself with quelling the disaffection which had appeared in other parts of his government, he apparently forgot his European enemies and lulled himself into a too confident security.

Such was the state of Bengal, when the fleet and army under Watson and Clive, which had arrived at Fulta at intervals between the 2nd August and the 20th November, left that place on the 27th December with the intention of recovering Calcutta by force of arms. But the instructions given to these two leaders permitted them to look to something more than the mere recovery of Calcutta. They were directed, should they deem it necessary, to attack the Nawab in his own capital; especially were they exhorted, in case the news of the declaration of war between France and England, then expected, should reach them whilst they had so strong an armament in Bengal, not to fail to use it for the destruction of the rival settlement of Chandernagore.\*

The surrender of Calcutta on the 2nd January, 1757, and the capture and sack of Hooghly eight days later, are incidents which belong solely to the history of the English settlements; it will therefore be sufficient here to record the bare facts. But it was during the march to Hooghly that Clive received the long-looked-for intimation of the declaration of war by France against England. To him and to all the members of the Calcutta council it seemed that this intelligence reached them at the most opportune moment. They could not but congratulate themselves that the French had not learned it before the success of the operations of Clive and Watson against Calcutta had

been assured. It came to them just after the difficulties of the river navigation had been overcome, when Calcutta had surrendered, and when they did not doubt that the attack upon Hooghly would produce a strong moral effect on the natives of Bengal.

Still, however, the situation of Clive, in itself one of great difficulty, could not bear to be compromised by a too early manifestation of hostile intentions against the French settlement in Bengal. He could not but feel that the Nawab would not leave unavenged the expulsion of his troops from Calcutta, and that he would not easily pardon the raid against one of the principal stations of his province. He could not shut his eyes to the possibility that the French, learning that war between the two nations had been declared, might yet unite with the Nawab, and, by this union, not only baffle his designs on themselves, but crush the attempt permanently to re-occupy Calcutta. It was not, therefore, the time to publish to his enemies all that he had in his heart. It was his part rather, under such circumstances, to temporise, to watch carefully the course of events, and to suffer no opportunity to escape him.

The Nawab, meanwhile, furious at the loss of Calcutta and the destruction of the town of Hooghly, hastily assembled an army of 10,000 foot and 15,000 horse, and marched to recover the retaken city of the English. He sent at the same time to the French chief, M. Renault, and invited him in the most pressing terms to join with him in crushing the nation that was as much the enemy of the French as of himself.

Renault, for his part, was in a situation of very great perplexity. He too knew well that war had broken out,\* but

\* Professor H. H. Wilson conjectures that the French may not have known that war had been declared. His conjecture, however, is entirely unfounded. Through the courtesy of M. Derussat, the present chief of the French establishments in Bengal, we are able to present to our readers an extract from the registers of the proceedings of the 'Conseil de Fabrique' for 1757, which is decisive as to the fact that the French knew of the declaration of war on the 2nd January, 1757, the date on which it was first known to the English. The minutes of the proceedings run as follows: "Thus things remained till the beginning of January, 1757. Then M. Renault and his council, *learning that war had been declared between France and England*, fearing to be attacked and to lose the place by means of the church and the parsonage which commanded it, assembled a council of war on the 2nd January, in which it was resolved and decreed to begin the demolition of both on that very day, and that until the new house and the new church should be fit for use, they would, &c. &c." There cannot then be the shadow of a doubt that the French knew of the declaration of war on the 2nd January, 1757.

it was a question, and a most difficult one, whether with his 146 Europeans, of whom 45 were invalids, he should aid the Nawab, or endeavour to arrange a treaty of neutrality with the English. The former course would lead, in the case of the Nawab's failure, to the certain capture of Chandernagore; he had, besides, received the most positive orders from de Leyrit in no case to attack the English. Would it not then, he argued, be a sounder policy to endeavour to win from the fears of the English, who had then a great respect for the power of the Nawab, and greatly dreaded his junction with the French, the neutrality which should place Chandernagore beyond the reach of danger? After much deliberation, feeling keenly the loss of the opportunity which the indolence and want of enterprise on the part of de Leyrit\* compelled him to forego, Renault sent a proposition for neutrality during the European war to the council in Calcutta.

To Clive and Watson, believing as they did that the European troops at Chandernagore amounted to 300 men, and that Law had nearly 100 at Kassimbazar, this proposition was like a messenger from Heaven. From their previous experience in forcing their way up the river Hooghly, they had been inclined to rate the soldiers of the Nawab as infinitely superior, in fighting capabilities, to the levies of Mahomed Ali and Chanda Sahib. They knew that the Nawab, full of anger, was marching against them, and they looked upon the result of a battle with him alone as by no means certain. Were he to be reinforced by the 300 French soldiers whom they believed to be at Chandernagore, they would have but little hope of success. Great, therefore, was their relief when they received this message from Renault proposing neutrality during the war with Europe.

Instantly they acceded to it; the French Director-General was requested to send deputies to Calcutta to arrange regarding the conditions. This was at once complied with. The French deputies came to Calcutta; the conditions were discussed and agreed upon; the treaty itself was written out fair and was ready for signature, when instead of signing it, Clive and Watson intimated their intention of proceeding with their whole force for the reduction of the settlement whose representatives they had been thus amusing. Events, in fact, had effaced

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\* De Leyrit excused himself vaguely by asserting the difficulty of sending reinforcements into Bengal at a time when he expected the arrival of an English fleet: yet Law with his 61 Europeans, who did not leave the ceded provinces till November or December, arrived there in safety; why then could not 300?

from the minds of the English commanders all fear of the Nawab, and had left them free to act as they wished.

There can be no question, in fact, that Clive had accepted in good faith the proposition of M. Renault in the first instance, solely because he saw in that a means of preventing the dreaded junction of the French with the Nawab. But, on the 4th February, he attacked the army of the Nawab before Calcutta, and inflicted upon it a blow that utterly disheartened its leader; on the 9th he concluded with him a treaty. Thus free from his principal enemy, the thought came into his mind that such an opportunity for crushing those French at Chandernagore would probably never occur again; that it would be feeble policy to neglect it; that there was yet time to do it, as notwithstanding that he and they were mutually agreed upon the terms of the treaty, the treaty itself had not been signed. There was but one obstacle. He did not deem himself strong enough to attack the city whilst there should yet remain a chance of his being attacked by the Nawab. He, therefore, on various pretexts, detained the French deputies in Calcutta, whilst he should endeavour to obtain the permission of the Nawab to assail their settlement.

The Nawab refused it. Nevertheless Fortune favoured Clive. Satisfied by the Nawab's refusal that an attack upon Chandernagore would be too dangerous to attempt, he prepared to sign the treaty. When, however, on the point of so doing, he met with an unexpected scruple on the part of Admiral Watson, who declined to sign on the ground that the settlement of Chandernagore not being an independent settlement, but under the orders of the Pondichery authorities, the treaty would require ratification at that city. The Calcutta government, he argued, was an independent Presidency. For it to agree to a treaty with a dependent settlement was to agree to a treaty liable to be upset. He therefore refused to sign. Clive placed before him the only other alternative, that of attacking Chandernagore. This, however, he refused to attempt without the consent of the Nawab.

But it was written that Chandernagore was to fall. The very next day a messenger reached the Nawab with the news that Ahmed Shah Abdalli had taken Delhi. Seeing in his own mind the Affghans marching upon Bengal, the terrified Nawab at once wrote to Clive offering him 100,000 rupees a month if he would march to his assistance. Two days later a boat from Hidgellee arrived off Calcutta with the intelligence, that three English ships of war with three companies of infantry and one of artillery were at its mouth, and that another, the *Cumberland*, was off Balasore. These two items of intelligence removed any

apprehensions that Clive might have had regarding an attack from the Nawab's army; they appeared likewise to silence the scruples of Watson.\* Was it considered that in giving them this increased force, and in paralysing for the time the movements of the Nawab, the voice of Providence had spoken out too clearly to be misunderstood?

Meanwhile, Renault, having heard from his agents the acceptance of the terms of the treaty, had regarded the matter as settled, and had ceased to disquiet himself as to the possible movements of the English. His surprise then may be imagined when his deputies, returning, brought him, instead of a signed treaty, the terrible intelligence that the English fleet and army were on their way to Chandernagore. However indignant he might have felt, however much he may have reproached his superior at Pondichery for exposing him to such a danger, Renault yet prepared, on its approach, to meet it with courage and vigour. Chandernagore possessed many capabilities of defence. The square fort, called Fort d'Orléans, situated at an equal distance from either extremity of the town, immediately on the river bank, mounted ten 32-pounders on each of its bastions. On the ramparts, at regular intervals between the bastions on the river and southern faces, were 24-pounders; the south-western curtain angle was covered by a ravelin, on which were eight 32-pounders; whilst the flat terrace of the high church within the fort, and which over-topped its walls, had been converted into a battery and armed with six guns. An outer ditch and glacis were being constructed, though all the houses on the proposed glacis had not been demolished at the time. Beyond this glacis however, especially on the river and southern face, several batteries had been thrown up, commanding all the approaches to the fort. The garrison consisted, as we have said, of 146 European troops and 300 sepoys, but nearly 300 Europeans were collected from the inhabitants and sailors, and were armed for the defence. Prominent among these last was Captain de Vigne, the commander of one of the French ships, to whom the defence of the bastions had been consigned by Renault.

But it was not alone in their fortifications that the French confided. The river Hooghly at Chandernagore was not, even in those days, easily navigable by ships of heavy burden. There

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\* We are aware that Watson based his final acquiescence on a letter from the Nawab, abounding in oriental imagery, and which was interpreted as a permission to act as he chose. But the receipt of a letter the next day from the Nawab, positively forbidding him to attack Chandernagore, whilst it revealed to him the real mind of the Nawab, did not stop his preparations.

was in fact but one practicable channel, and this could be blocked up by sunken ships. Here, accordingly, Renault ordered several ships to be sunk, about a hundred and fifty yards south of the fort, and on this point the guns of one of the batteries outside the fort were directed. In this operation an artillery officer named Terraneau co-operated.

The English force, numbering 700 Europeans and 1,500 natives, marched from Howrah on the 7th March, 150 artillery men with their guns following in boats, escorted by Admiral Watson's fleet.\* On the 14th, Clive came with his little force in sight of Chandernagore. Avoiding the batteries in front of the western and southern faces, he took possession of the high road on its northern side, and then changing direction towards the fort, occupied the houses on the north-west, the French skirmishers retiring, as he approached, to a battery on the road commanded by the north-west bastion. From the houses he kept up all night a strong fire, which compelled the French to evacuate the battery and to retire within the fort. The abandonment of this battery necessitated the abandonment of all the batteries, except those on the river face. The following day the English strengthened their position in the houses, suffering but little from the fire of the fort. On the 16th, the guns were landed, and for the next five days a mutual cannonade was kept up, on the whole to the advantage of the garrison, the fire from whose heavy guns told with tremendous effect on the brick-built houses which the English had improvised as batteries.

It was not however, Renault well knew, on the shore, that the fate of Chandernagore was to be decided. Could he but beat off those powerful men of war, who were making their way slowly and cautiously through the intricate channels of the Hooghly, he would care but little for all the efforts of the English troops on the mainland. He could at least hope that the Nawab,—to whom he had sent a pressing appeal for assistance, and part of whose army was then marching towards the town of Hooghly,—would speedily operate on their rear. Meanwhile, however, the English ships approached. On the 20th, they neared the place where the ships had been sunk. This however did not stop them. The French artilleryman, Terraneau, to whom we alluded as

\* This fleet was composed of

<i>The Kent</i>	64	guns.	Captain Speke ;
<i>The Tiger</i>	60	"	Captain Latham ;
<i>The Salisbury</i>	50	"	Captain Knowler ;

and other smaller vessels.

co-operating in this work, had in consequence of some quarrel with Renault, deserted to the English, and had sold them the secret that the channel had not been entirely closed by the ships, but that there was way for a passage round them.\* This information proved to be correct. The task was then easy. On the morning of the 24th, the *Tiger*, having Admiral Pooek on board, sailing up till opposite the ravelin, compelled its evacuation; she then proceeded on and anchored opposite the north-east bastion. Admiral Watson's ship, the *Kent*, was not so fortunate. Assailed by a tremendous fire from the south-east bastion when about to anchor opposite the ravelin, her captain was killed, and the ship, drifting down, anchored, stern foremost, below the bastion. One consequence was that the *Salisbury* was unable to come up, and could exercise but a slight influence on the attack.

The French, by this time, had abandoned all their outside batteries and were concentrated within the fort. Here they were under the orders of de Vigne. But, with a limited garrison, many of them civilians, exposed for the first time to fire; having, too, to defend the land face against Clive, whilst he returned the fire of the ships from the river front, even his energy and courage were of but little use. It very soon became apparent that resistance was hopeless. After defending the place with great spirit† for three hours, and having lost 110 men, including the inhabitants, in killed and wounded, Renault determined to surrender. The white flag was therefore hoisted, the firing at once ceased, and at 3 p.m. conditions of capitulation were agreed upon.

By these it was arranged that the Director-General of the settlement, his councillors and civil officers, should go where they would, taking with them their effects; the Jesuits were

\* It may not be generally known that this Terraneau sent a portion of the price of his treason to France, for the use of his father, who was poor and old. It reached the old man safely, but as soon as he learned the means by which it had been acquired, he refused to touch, or to make use of, it. This information is on record at Chandernagore. The same story is also related by the translator of the *Saïr Mutakherin*, who adds that in despair at the style of his father's letter, Terraneau hanged himself at his own door with his own handkerchief.

† Dr. Edward Ives, surgeon of Admiral Watson's ship, and who was present at the attack, writes thus in his journal regarding the behaviour of the French: "It must be acknowledged that the French made a gallant defence; for they stood to their guns as long as they had any to fire. We never could learn how many of their men were killed and wounded on the whole; though they confessed they had forty dead carried from the south-east bastion. The north-east bastion was also cleared of its defenders twice."

permitted to take away their church ornaments, but the garrison remained prisoners of war. A few days after, the party at Kassimbazar under the command of Law, reinforced by some fifty of the garrison of Chandernagore, who had managed to escape when surrender was no longer doubtful, retired to Bhagulpore. Thenceforth they may be regarded rather as adventurers taking service under native princes than as an integral portion of the French power in India. It will be sufficient only to state that, to the last, Law remained true to his character for feebleness; that he remained at Bhagulpore whilst Plassey was being fought; that when a forward movement after that battle would have saved Suraj-ood-dowlah, he did not make it; and that finally, he was taken prisoner after the battle of Gyah in 1761, fighting gallantly it is true, atoning to some extent by his personal valour for his many faults as a general and a leader.

The capture of Chandernagore was not less a seal to French dominion in Bengal, than it was the starting point of British supremacy in that province. It was necessary for the schemes of Clive. With the example he had had before him of the constant warfare between the French and English in the Carnatic, he dared not hesitate, when he had the means in his power, and when the occasion was propitious, to prevent for ever the possibility of similar contests in Bengal. He crushed Chandernagore, just as, we believe, had Dupleix been at that settlement, Dupleix uniting with the Nawab would have striven to crush him. It was unfortunate for France that at such a crisis her interests were so feebly appreciated, that her representative at Pondichery possessed neither the foresight nor the energy to provide Chandernagore against a contingency that was always possible. The misfortune was fatal to her. Clive, freed from apprehension as to French rivalry, speedily overthrew the native powers in the country, not pausing till he had completed the conquest of the richest province of Hindostan; till, from Calcutta to Allahabad, the law of the English ruler was undisputed. Chandernagore, on the contrary, received her death-wound. Though restored to France, it has only been that she might drag out an existence replete with memories of former greatness; that she might witness, powerless to prevent it, the exaltation and supremacy of the nation with which, for eighty-one years, from 1676 to 1757, she had contested the trade of Bengal. This was but one result of the policy of a nation which could remove a Dupleix to replace him by a man who succeeded too surely in infusing his timid and feeble spirit into his subordinates.

We left Bussy at Masulipatam, engaged in settling the affairs of those four Circars, which the policy of Dupleix and his own



great ability had added to the district of Guntoor, previously ceded to the French. There he was, and there he continued till the close of that year (1754.) Godeheu, after many hesitations, had resolved to walk in the steps of Dupleix so far as to maintain Bussy and the French contingent at Hydrabad. "I feel," he said in a letter to Moracin, "all the necessity of not abandoning Salabut Jung in the position in which he now is, and I have, therefore, ordered M. de Bussy to rejoin him as soon as "possible." It was in consequence of these instructions that Bussy, after settling the revenue administration of the ceded districts, and seeing French authority enforced from their most northern to their southern point, returned to Salabut Jung, and resumed his old position at his court.

It very soon appeared, however, that the recall of Dupleix and the substitution in his place of one so imbued with *doctrinaire* principles as was Godeheu, had made a profound impression upon the Mahomedan nobles in the Dekkan. To them, up to this point, the very name of Dupleix had had a magic sound; they had regarded him with respect, with veneration, with a sort of dread. He had combined in their eyes all the energy and daring of the Northern race with the tact, the subtlety, the management of the Eastern. Feeling that he was their master, they yet had not chafed under the yoke. Affection was mingled with their respect, and reverence with their dread. The Subadar himself had always addressed and spoken of him as his uncle. By all he was regarded as the leader who could not fail. And now, suddenly, he was dismissed—dismissed too with every mark of ignominy—dismissed to be replaced by one who openly declaimed against warlike enterprises, and declared that the mission of the French nation in Hindostan was purely commercial! This declaration sounded strange, indeed, in the ears of the proud nobles of the Dekkan,—the descendants of the men who had followed Akbar, who regarded commerce as the pursuit of an inferior race and of inferior men. Little likely were they to consent to remain subordinate for long to the representatives of such a policy! When we recollect too that with these accounts came also details of the triumphs of the English both on the field and in negotiation, we shall be able to understand how it was that a feeling of doubt and distrust began to undermine the confidence and regard which Bussy till then had known how to evoke towards himself and his nation.

Nor was this feeling lessened by the communication made by Bussy to the Subadar, almost immediately after his return to Hydrabad in January, 1755, of the details of the treaty concluded between Godeheu and Saunders at the end of that month. In

the course of an interview granted for the purpose of hearing this communication, the Subadar, instructed beforehand by his advisers, inveighed bitterly against the new policy that had been inaugurated at Pondichery. "Your sovereign," said he, "promised to support me against my enemies, to establish my authority, and to make it respected. Of this you yourself have given me assurances on which I have always depended. Yet, I now hear everywhere that it is the king of England who specially concerns himself with the affairs of India, even with those which affect me." Bussy endeavoured to put the best possible gloss upon the proceedings of Godeheu. The Subadar and his ministers heard him but without being convinced. They were indignant that the fate of the Carnatic should have been settled without reference to the Subadar, its liege lord. "You have put me," said Salabut Jung, "in the balance against Mahomed Ali; you have allowed to be placed at the head of one of my tributary provinces a man whom I have never employed, who has always rebelled against my authority. Nay more, if I were to proceed to the Carnatic to drive him out of it, the English would support him, and you, on account of this truce, would hold back; you, who are engaged to support me on all occasions, would aid me neither against the English nor against Mahomed Ali." The Subadar concluded with these significant words,—words the more significant in that they were prophetic; in that the necessity for the ruler of the Dekkan to lean upon a stronger power, clearly seen then, has been admitted by all his successors, and has shaped the policy which has preserved to the province they have governed a vitality and a force, such as has rarely been witnessed when those conditions have been neglected. "You know," he said, "that the state of my affairs necessarily demands the support of an European power; on this condition I am able to govern; either you must remain here, or I must enlist the English in my interest. Are you disposed to render me the services which you have rendered hitherto? I must do you the justice to say that I am grateful for them; but it would appear now that you have neither the power nor the inclination."

To these questions, the natural result of the impressions produced on the native mind by the abnegation policy of Godeheu, Bussy could only reply generally. He declared that the French nation possessed the power, and would ever be influenced by the ardent desire to be of use to him; and that he would promise him beforehand that he would be as much satisfied with the future services of the French, as he had been with

those he had so cordially acknowledged. An opportunity soon presented itself to Bussy of giving a practical indication of his sincerity, endeavouring by these means to chase from the mind of Salabut Jung the thoughts regarding the English to which he had given utterance. As representative of the Mogul, the Subadar of the Dekkan possessed, in theory, feudal authority over all the countries south of the Vindya range. This authority never embraced, and never was intended to embrace, more than the right of levying an annual tribute, the token of the supremacy of the Delhi emperor. Its execution, even its recognition, depended solely on the power of coercion in the hands of the Subadar. Thus, theoretically, the rights extended over the Mahratta country; yet, so far from being exercised in any of the territories occupied by them, that free-booting people not only kept their own revenues to themselves, but were in the habit of extorting one-fourth of the yearly revenue due to the Mogul government from many villages and districts in the Dekkan. Mysore was equally liable in theory to the imposition, yet it was never acknowledged or paid, except when the Subadar was able to enforce it. For many years prior to the date at which we have arrived, Mysore, aided by the Mahrattas, had been comparatively strong, whilst the Dekkan, torn by internal factions and foreign invasions, had been powerless for aggression. But in 1755, Salabut Jung found himself undisputed master, at peace with his neighbours, and with a body of French in his pay. Mysore, on the contrary, had sent all her available forces to Trichinopoly, which her regent had pledged herself to reduce. It was nothing to the Subadar that the Mysoreans were also allied with the French; Bussy was bound to support him in all his enterprises. The opportunity likewise was too tempting to be foregone. A few days, therefore, after the interview we have recorded, the Subadar intimated his plans to the French leader, adding that he should require his co-operation.

Bussy felt all the difficulty of the situation. To march against the Mysoreans might be to dissolve their alliance with the French; to augment immensely, by throwing them into their hands, the influence of the English. To refuse to march, would be to annihilate French influence at Hyderabad, to impel the Subadar to summon the English to his aid. But in this crisis, the tact and ability for which Bussy had ever been remarkable did not fail him. He entered with apparent heartiness into the scheme of the Subadar, whilst he wrote at the same time to the regent of Mysore, warning him of the danger, and advising him to satisfy the claims urged against him. Meanwhile, the army

marched, Bussy at the head of his 500 French really directing the operations.

Deo Raj, brother of Nunderaj,—the regent who was conducting the operations of the Mysorean army before Trichinopoly,—would willingly have paid the tribute demanded by Salabut Jung, but his treasury was empty, and he was unable even to promise compliance. Trusting, therefore, to the anticipated slowness of the movements of the Mogul army, he despatched a messenger to his brother before Trichinopoly, requesting him to take the enemy in flank whilst they should be marching upon Seringapatam. The celerity of Bussy's movements, however, rendered such a manœuvre impossible. His very name struck terror into the Mysore soldiers, and disposed them to regard opposition as hopeless. The only fort that did not at once open its gates to him, Kongul, he stormed. Between that place and Seringapatam, a distance of fifty-four miles, there was nothing to oppose his progress. He rapidly traversed it, and appearing before Seringapatam on the third day, summoned it to surrender. It deserves to be recorded, that throughout this march, rapid as it was, he carefully guarded the interests of the Mysoreans, protecting them as much as possible from plunder and damage;—the main object he had in view being to paralyse, by the celerity of his march, all chance of opposition, and to bring the operations to a close with the least possible delay.

An event happened soon after his arrival at Seringapatam, which tended very much to bring about this desirable result. The Peshwa, Ballajee Bajee Rao, had not witnessed unmoved the Mahomedan invasion of Mysore, but he had deemed it more advisable to endeavour to share in the spoils of that country, rather than to send his squadrons to be repulsed by the invincible Bussy. He accordingly invaded Mysore from the side of Poona. No sooner did intelligence of this invasion reach Deo Raj, than to avoid the danger of being entirely swallowed up, he determined to agree to the demands of Salabut Jung. After some discussion it was arranged that the king of Mysore should acknowledge himself a tributary of the Mogul, through his agent, the Subadar of the Dekkan, and that he should pay to that officer, as arrears of tribute, five million two hundred thousand rupees. Salabut Jung, on his side, engaged to rid Mysore of its Mahratta invaders. To carry out his part of the contract, his treasury being empty, Deo Raj was compelled to strip the Hindoo temples of their ornaments, and to give up all the jewels of the royal family. Even then he collected but one-third of the amount demanded; for the remainder the

Subadar was forced to accept bills.\* Bussy, on his side, persuaded Ballajee to retire with the booty he had collected. The army then quitted Seringapatam, in April, and returned to Hydrabad in the July following.

For the remainder of that year peace and quietness reigned in the Dekkan. Whilst de Leyrit was occupied in endeavouring to maintain in the manner we have described, and not wholly unsuccessfully, French influence in the Carnatic, Moracin in the ceded districts and Bussy at Hydrabad found their position easier than at the beginning of the year they had dared to anticipate. This was no doubt owing to the success that had attended the French arms against Mysore. In a letter† to Dupleix, alluding to Bussy's conduct on this occasion, de Leyrit had written as follows: "The position of M. Bussy in the Dekkan is as brilliant as ever. It may even be affirmed that since the expedition to Mysore his influence has increased. He escorted Salabut Jung into that country, and he managed matters so well between him and the king of Mysore, who was also our ally, that even whilst extorting fifty-two lakhs of rupees from the latter, he satisfied both. He is even now in correspondence with the Grand Vizier, and has lately received very flattering letters from the great Mogul." In the same letter may be traced the determination of de Leyrit to have recourse to any expedient rather than carry out the partition system agreed to by Godeheu. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this determination and these favourable reports, it soon became evident that the recall of Dupleix, the triumph of the English, as evinced by the installation of Mahomed Ali as Nawab, and the policy of non-interference announced by Godeheu, had been working with a fatal effect on the minds of the proud Mahomedan chieftains of the Dekkan. Of those who regarded the late occurrences as surely indicating the predominance of the English, the most considerable was the prime minister, Shah Nawaz Khan, a man who owed his elevation to Bussy, and upon whom Bussy believed he might surely count. But this chieftain had another reason for his action. Like Syud Luskhur before him he had become jealous of the influence exercised by Bussy in the councils of his master; he could not but see that in all important matters, the wishes of the French were consulted, their advantage was

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\* These bills were never paid; the bankers who were securities for them mostly languished and died in prison.—*Wilks.*

† Dated 16th October, 1755.

mainly studied. In his quiet oriental manner he took care that every transaction tending to bring out this feature should come under the notice of the Subadar, nor were insinuations wanting as to the drift of all the public measures proposed by the French statesman.

An opportunity soon offered which enabled him to confirm in the mind of the Subadar the vague impressions to which his insinuations had given birth. In the month of February, 1756, the Hydrabad government resolved to send an expedition against the Nawab of Savanore, the successor of one of the four Affghan chiefs who had conspired against Nazir Jung at Gingee, and against Mozaffur Jung at Kuddapah. This Nawab had steadily refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Salabut Jung, relying on the friendship of the Mahrattas. At the same time Morari Rao, the Mahratta, had occupied the state of Gooti, and maintained it against his superior, the Peshwa, relying upon the protection of Salabut Jung. But in 1756, the Subadar and the Peshwa, being on good terms, resolved each to renounce the protection of the dependents of the other, and to compel them to submission to lawful authority. In accordance with these views, the armies of both nations, Bussy accompanying the Subadar, moved against Savanore.

Morari Rao showed on this occasion that he united to the capacity of a warrior the spirit of a statesman. Knowing that an attack on Gooti would inevitably follow the reduction of Savanore, he resolved to make common cause with the Nawab, and to defend his own possessions behind the walls of the chief city of his Mahomedan ally. He accordingly threw himself into Savanore. But he no sooner beheld Bussy and his French, backed up by the army of Salabut Jung, with that of the Peshwa ready to follow, than he recognised the futility of resistance. Having made his own terms with the Nawab, he secretly opened negotiations with Bussy. It happened that for his services before Trichinopoly he had received from the French authorities a bond which the policy of Godeheu had deprived them of the power of redeeming. In his communication to Bussy, he now proposed to give up this bond, on condition that Bussy would use his good offices to obtain for him from the Peshwa the cession in perpetuity of the district of Gooti, in subordination, however, to the chief of the Mahrattas,—the Nawab of Savanore at the same time acknowledging the supremacy of the Subadar. Bussy, who had received from Salabut Jung full powers to treat, accepted these conditions, and did effectually carry them out,—he, according to the secret agreement, receiving back the French bond. It was impossible, however, to keep such

an arrangement long concealed from the watchful enemies of the French leader. The transaction had scarcely been concluded before all the details connected with it were in the possession of Shah Nawaz Khan. The Dewan instantly communicated them to Salabut Jung ; he painted in its blackest colours the " crime " committed by Bussy ; pointed out that he had deprived the Nawab of the treasures which the capture of Savanore would have gained for him, merely to put this bond into his own pocket ; called attention to the fact that notwithstanding that a Frenchman had been appointed Nawab of the Carnatic no rents had been received from the French ; he intimated that now was the time for their expulsion, now, when he was at peace with the Mahrattas, when Ballajee himself would support him in his action, now, when Bussy was on the borders of the Mahratta country, cut off from the ceded provinces, from Hyderabad, and Pondichery. All these arguments, artfully inflamed, and supported by a large party amongst the nobility, so worked upon the feeble mind of Salabut Jung, that he was at last prevailed upon to sign an order dismissing Bussy and his corps from his service, and directing them to quit his territories without delay : to this was added a proviso, not intended to be kept, that they should not be molested on their way, except in case of their commencing hostilities.

The blow once struck, Shah Nawaz prepared to follow it up effectually. He instantly despatched a special messenger to the Madras government, giving full details of the operation, and requesting that the English would at once send a body of troops to aid in the expulsion of the French ; to the Peshwa the proposition was of a different nature ; he suggested the assassination of Bussy.

Both these applications failed, though from different causes. The English, who had nothing more at heart than the expulsion of the French from the Dekkan, who, in the early part of this very year had sent a force to the Bombay coast with the hope that it would be employed with Ballajee against the Subadar, received, indeed, the application of Salabut Jung and his minister with extraordinary pleasure, and at once transmitted to him a most favourable reply. A force of 300 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy were ordered into the field ; they were on the point even of setting out, when there arrived from Bengal that disastrous intelligence of the capture of Calcutta, which compelled them to send every available man in that direction. From the English, therefore, Shah Nawaz received no aid.

Nor was he more successful with the Peshwa. Ballajee, indeed, received the project for assassination with disdain ; but he did not the less, for his own secret ends, encourage Shah

Nawaz to procure the dismissal of Bussy. The real reason was, that he felt that as long as the Subadar should have in his service a leader so capable and troops so brave and disciplined, so long would the Dekkan be proof against the ambitious designs he had formed against it. He was anxious, therefore, not only that the Subadar should dismiss Bussy, but that, the dismissal having been effected, he might secure his services for himself. He, therefore, urged on the Subadar up to the point of dismissal, but aided him no further.

The conduct of Bussy on receiving this abrupt and contemptuous dismissal from the service of the Subdar deserves to be studied and admired. Of all the courses open to him, he chose the wisest and most prudent, that which marked him as a man who knew thoroughly how to keep all his passions under efficient control. He was well aware of his own strength. He knew that with the 600 European infantry, 200 European cavalry, and the 5,000 drilled sepoy of whom his force was composed, he could bid defiance to all the efforts of the Subadar; that he could force him to dismiss from his service, and submit to condign punishment, all those who had plotted against him; he knew that it needed but the faintest whisper to Ballajee to pour a Mahratta army into the Dekkan. But he was guided by other considerations than by a mere desire for vengeance, or by an anxiety to replace himself by force. He could not forget, in fact, that his position at Hyderabad had been the consequence of the earnest requests of the Subadar; that he had thus ever been regarded, at least, by the outer world, as conferring a favour by his stay; he could not forget that, though he might forcibly reinstate himself, that very resort to force would entirely change his position: that from being the invited protector, he would become the hated subjugator; nor that, sooner or later, under such circumstances, his fall would be inevitable. He knew, on the other hand, the facile disposition of the Subadar; he knew that he was acting merely from the influence of others; that in a little time he would feel the want of the counsels to which he was accustomed, the worthlessness of his new advisers. Under these circumstances he felt that it was his policy to act, as he had ever before acted, as the faithful servant of the Subadar; to obey his orders and instructions, leaving it to time to bring about that change which he distinctly saw looming in the future. No sooner then had he received the order dismissing him, than he prepared to march by way of Hyderabad to Masulipatam, there to await the course of events.

No sooner had he set out, (the 25th May), than he received a messenger from Ballajee, conveying his congratulations on having



quitted 'so perfidious and ungrateful'\* a nation as the Moguls and offering him at his own court the same position, the same emoluments, and the same allowances to his troops that had been granted at the court of the Subadar. But Bussy knew well the difference between acting as auxiliary to an able and capable leader, the head of the rising power of India, and being the moving spring of all public matters in the Dekkan; to have accepted it would have been to isolate himself from his own people at Pondichery, and to throw the Subadar definitively into the hands of the English. Pleading, therefore, the necessity of first obtaining orders from Pondichery, Bussy, though with many expressions of friendship and good will, declined the proffered alliance and continued his march. Ballajee, however, to ingratiate himself still more with one whom he so highly honoured, knowing too the hopes and intentions of Shah Nawaz Khan, despatched 6,000 horse under the command of one of the greatest of the Mahratta leaders, Mulhar Rao Holkar, to escort the French troops until they should be out of reach of pursuit on the part of the Subadar. In this, doubtless, he had a double object, for any attack made on the French whilst Mulhar Rao should be with them, would give him just grounds for interfering in the affairs of the Dekkan, and he would then find himself fighting side by side with the French.

But Bussy was not to be entrapped into hostilities. He accepted the escort, but at the end of eight days he dismissed it with many presents and protestations of regard. Scarcely, however, had the intelligence of this occurrence reached the camp of the Subadar, than Shah Nawaz, who, from the fear of embroiling himself with the Mahrattas, had hitherto restrained his longing desires, despatched 25,000 men, under the command of one of his best generals, Meer Jaffier Ali, with orders to attack and destroy the French. Instructions were, at the same time, expedited to all the governors and the officers of the provinces to obstruct in every possible manner the retreat of the French; to hover around them; to remove all supplies from their path; to make, in fact, their march through the disturbed country, with an enemy hanging on their rear, absolutely impossible.

The position of Bussy had thus become both difficult and dangerous. From the south-west extremity of the Dekkan, he had to make his way to Hyderabad in its centre, thence, possibly, to the ceded districts on the western coast; this too, through a hostile population, in a difficult country, with the Kistna to cross, and pursued by a large army. He was not, however,

\* Orme, who says, "these were his expressions."

appalled by any one of these considerations. His great object was to push on so as to reach the Kistna whilst it should be fordable. He did not doubt then that he would gain Hydrabad.

Fortune favoured him, as she always does favour those who are bold, self-reliant, and courageous. Arriving on the banks of the Kistna, though after many skirmishes with the levies that sprung up on the order of the minister all around him, he found that the rains, though threatening, had not fallen, and that the river was fordable. No sooner, however, had he crossed it than the waters commenced to swell, and for fifteen days imposed an impassable barrier between himself and his pursuers. At ease regarding his men he marched then leisurely to Hydrabad. There he resolved to make a stand. Policy counselled no further retreat. At Hydrabad, he was in the centre of the kingdom, at no impossible distance from Pondichery, within easy communication with Masulipatam; to have retreated to that place would have been to abandon the Dekkan. Time also was with him; for he could not doubt that the Subadar, a man of a fearful and timid nature, surrounded by men whom he distrusted, would soon feel the want of that firm support that had never failed him in the time of need. Urged by these varying considerations, he resolved to await at Hydrabad the reinforcements which, he doubted not, would be sent him from Pondichery. As, however, the city was in itself too extensive to be defended by so small a force, he took post in the vice-regal garden of Char Mahal, a walled enclosure about 500 yards square in the north-west angle of the town, on the banks of the river Moussi. This garden contained buildings capable of lodging his soldiers, it had a tank in its centre, and Bussy had well supplied it with provisions. It is a signal proof of the influence he possessed with the natives of the city, that, before even he entered it, when the governor had notified everywhere his hostility to the French, and when it was known he was being hunted out of the province by order of the Subadar, he was able to raise from the native bankers, on his own credit, a sufficient sum to settle the arrears of his army, and even to have a supply in hand. It deserves to be noted, that upon his sepoy, even thus early, he found he could place little dependence, for they began, after his arrival at Hydrabad, to desert him in great numbers. Bussy nevertheless remained in the open plain near the city, continually skirmishing with the enemy, whose detachments arrived fifteen days after him, till he had completed his arrangements regarding the Char Mahal. He then moved into it, but slightly molested, on the 5th July.

Four days after his entry into the Char Mahal, Jaffier Ali and the bulk of his army arrived, and for the following five weeks Bussy was exposed to their incessant attacks. His sepoy almost entirely abandoned him. Shah Nawaz Khan had hired a native soldier of fortune, one Murzuffer Beg,—who in previous campaigns had commanded the sepoy under Bussy, and who had obtained over them very great influence,—to debauch them from their allegiance. He succeeded only too well; on the occasion of every sortie, whole bodies of them went over to the enemy. Their conduct at length determined Bussy, notwithstanding that he had gained several brilliant successes in the field, to confine himself to the defence of the garden.

Meanwhile, intelligence of some of these events had reached de Leyrit at Pondichery and Moracin at Masulipatam. The action of both of these officers was prompt and energetic. De Leyrit at once detached 320 Europeans, 400 sepoy, and six field-pieces in the ship *Favourite* to Masulipatam. But before they could arrive Moracin had collected the scattered garrisons of the ceded districts, amounting in all to 160 Europeans and 700 sepoy, and placing them under the orders of M. Law, had directed him to force his way to Hydrabad, there to effect a junction with Bussy.

This was the same Law whom we met, six years earlier, combating against Clive and Lawrence before Trichinopoly, and forced, through his own bad generalship and incapacity, to yield himself and the greater part of his force prisoners of war. Exchanged in due course by the English, Law was at once placed under arrest for his conduct pending orders from France; but he was ultimately released, though with the intention of not employing him again in important military commands. On the arrival of Godeheu, he had been sent into the Dekkan to act under the orders of Bussy, who, on his own departure for Savanore with the Subadar, had sent him to Moracin. It thus strangely happened that the measures which had been taken to prevent his being employed in command, were the actual cause of his being placed at the head of so important an expedition as the relief of Bussy.

Law set out from Masulipatam at the head of his 160 Europeans, 700 sepoy, and five guns, on the 16th July, and reached Beizwarra, a town on the north bank of the Kistna, on the 20th. The excessive rains and the inundations of the Kistna fortunately detained him here several days, for, meanwhile the *Favourite* had arrived at Masulipatam, and the troops she brought with her, under the command of M. d'Arambure, a most capable officer, were able to join him before they

were in a position to move forwards. Law, as the senior officer, at once assumed command of the whole party, and leaving Beizwarra on the 3rd, arrived on the 10th at Mognapara, about fifty-two miles from Hydrabad.

Up to this point Law had met with no enemies. But his troubles were only now to commence. Salabut Jung himself had reached Hydrabad on the 1st August, and it was believed by the French in the Char Mahal that his arrival would be celebrated by an attempt to storm their position. Wiser counsels, however, prevailed near the Subadar; and it was resolved, instead of storming the place, to adopt the surer plan of intercepting and destroying the party marching to the relief of Bussy. This, it was believed, would render his destruction inevitable.

Under ordinary circumstances, due consideration being had to the character of the officer commanding the relieving party, this might have been quite possible, and considerable credit is due to Shah Nawaz Khan for preferring such a plan to the more showy scheme of an assault upon the Char Mahal. But in dealing with Bussy he had to do with a man who was not accustomed to be foiled, and whose resources were inexhaustible. It must not be supposed that when Shah Nawaz persuaded the Subadar to dismiss Bussy, he was supported by the entire voice of the nobility of the Dekkan. He had, indeed, at the moment, from various causes, a considerable party at his back, probably a numerical majority, but there were many, some of them very considerable men, who had remained thorough partisans of the French connexion. These were unable at the time to show their sentiments in any other manner than by communicating to Bussy all that passed in the camp of the Subadar. But there were others who were able to render him still greater service. In the service of Salabut Jung, were two Mahratta chieftains, tributaries bound to follow him in the field, Ramchunder Jadow and Janojee Nimbalkur; they commanded 6,000 horse, and, up to the time of which we are writing, had been conspicuous for the efficiency and gallantry of their action. On one occasion, indeed, Janojee had intercepted a corps of 600 Arabs and Abyssinians on their way to join Bussy from Surat, and, killing fifty, had made the rest prisoners. But with both these men Bussy had come to an understanding. He arranged with them that in the projected attack upon Law, they should only feign to take a part, and they had promised to hang out distinctive banners as an indication to the French leader that from them he had nothing to fear. Due intimation of this was at once despatched to Law.

Meanwhile, that officer, ignorant as yet of the means taken by Bussy to save him, had moved on the 11th from Mognapara, and entered a country, hilly and wooded, full of defiles, offering abundant opportunities to an enemy to retard his progress. In advance were 400 sepoys under the command of Mahmood Khan; then came the main body of the French, with the remainder of the sepoys in the rear. After marching nine miles, some parties of the enemy appeared on the road; upon which the 400 French sepoys, who had been already corrupted by the intrigues of Murzuffer Beg, went over to them in a body. The French were immediately attacked by the enemy, who harassed them by constant firing and desultory charges as they threaded their way through the defile. At length, however, they came to an open plain in which the French drew up and halted for the night. The enemy, whose powder had been damped by a heavy rain that had fallen, retreated to a little village at the foot of a hill. Before daybreak, the French marched against this village, and though surrounded by the Mahratta cavalry, they pushed on,—the body of horsemen commanded by Janojee and Ramchunder acting against them only in appearance. Another chieftain, however, not in league with Bussy, made a sweep upon their cattle and baggage-carriage, and carried them all off. This was a serious loss; nevertheless, as their only hope lay in advancing, Law pushed on to the village, and resting there all day, forced his way in the night to Meliapore, through a very difficult country, every inch of which he had to contest by the enemy. During the day he received from Bussy the letter sent to inform him of the arrangements made with the Mahratta chiefs. At Meliapore, which was about seventeen miles from Hyderabad, he put up in a ruined mud-fort near the town.

Hitherto Law had shown an amount of dash and energy, such as those who had studied his previous career would not have given him credit for. So long as he was moving on, the mere action of advancing, and the example set by his lieutenant d' Arambure, sustained him. But he had scarcely seen his men safely within the mud-fort of Meliapore before the old Seringham spirit came over him. Not that his losses had been heavy; only two men had been killed and but three wounded; but they were all exhausted by fatigue; the Mahratta cavalry had swept off their bullocks; and their carriage had been rendered nearly useless: the next march too was more difficult than any of the former.\* Law decided, therefore, to halt where he was, till at least the men should have

\* Orme, from whom the details of this march are mainly taken.

recovered from their fatigue. It was not a wise resolve. Asiatic troops can bear anything but the onward march of Europeans ; that at once unnerves them ; but let the Europeans halt and the power of the Asiatic is increased by one half ; let the Europeans falter or show a disposition to retire ;—then, man for man, the Asiatic is his equal. The greatest European generals who have served in India have succeeded because they understood this, because they never hesitated to act upon it ; Law, who was not a great general, neither understood nor conformed to it.

Law halted. With that halt, the dangers of his position, on which, in action, his mind would have had no time to dwell, became exaggerated tenfold to his mental vision. He began by degrés to lose sight of the great end for which he had set out from Masulipatam. His mind fell gradually under the conviction that it was for Bussy to relieve him, not for him to relieve Bussy. His situation assumed the most deplorable hues ;—all appeared lost. The other officers caught the infection from their leader ; and in a council of war it was resolved to send a letter to Bussy intimating the impossibility of further advance.

Bussy received this letter on the night of the 12th August on his return from a successful night attack on the enemy's camp, made solely by his Europeans. It perplexed him exceedingly, but knowing that the detachment was strong enough to force its way to Hydrabad, neutralised as had been the opposition of two of the Mahratta chieftains, he sent Law a despatch conveying, ' in the name of the King,' a categorical order to march forward at once and under all circumstances. At the same time, to paralyse any further movement on the part of the enemy, he marched out of the Char Mahal at the head of 150 Europeans and 300 sepoys, crossed the bridge over the Moussi, and pitching his own tent, known to every one in the Dekkan, on the other side, encamped there.

This single act on the part of Bussy showed not less courage and daring than a profound and intimate knowledge of the native character. He knew the impressionable minds, the light and credulous nature, of the people of the Dekkan. He knew that the fact of his tent being pitched outside the Char Mahal would of itself be sufficient to magnify tenfold the number of men by whom he was accompanied ; that it would keep the entire force of the enemy on the *qui vive*, expecting an attack, not daring to make one. He knew that it would have the effect of preventing a single man being sent to reinforce the party that had been detached against Law. The result proved the clearness and excellence of his judgment. Not only did Shah Nawaz Khan make every preparation against attack, but he even

recalled the troops that he had detached the previous day to assist in the destruction of Law.

Meanwhile, that leader, on receiving Bussy's letter, had given the order to march. At 9 o'clock on the evening of the 14th, he set out, leading the advance himself, leaving the rear, the post of honour, to d'Arambure. The country between Meliapore and the little river Cingoram consisted of a long and difficult defile of four miles in length,—which, during their four days' rest at Meliapore, the enemy had considerably strengthened. This defile led into a thick copse, between which and the river the country was comparatively open; between the river and the town of Hyatnuggur, a distance of six miles, the country bore the same open character. Once arrived at that place, nothing could prevent their effecting a junction with Bussy.

During that long night, the French laboured vigorously to burst through the four miles of defile. In endeavouring to effect this movement, the brunt of the action fell upon d'Arambure; for Kandagla, the Mahratta chieftain who had not been gained over, entering the pass with his cavalry and infantry, took every opportunity of harassing and charging their rear-guard, whilst the party in advance, slowly and with difficulty, surmounted the obstacles in front of them. These obstacles consisted of felled trees, strong positions occupied by the enemy, sharp turns in the rock round which the guns had to be moved amid a continued fire; so great were they, that when day dawned, the French had advanced but three miles.

There remained now only one mile more of the defile. But with break of day the attacks of the enemy redoubled in intensity. D'Arambure plied the two field-pieces he had with him, no less than the small arms of his Europeans, with unabated vigour, but the enemy rode right up to the muzzle of his guns, and attacked with unwonted daring. At last as the sun rose the French emerged from the defile into the plain. Then, forming up, they allowed a party of the Mahrattas to follow them, but no sooner had these appeared in sufficient numbers than they opened out a heavy fire from all their pieces in the direction of the mouth of the defile. This had the effect of dispersing the greater part of the cavalry. Many, however, rode round to gain the river before the French to dispute with them its passage. This little river runs in a deep clift between two high banks, the further of which was occupied by the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, that Law should keep the nearer bank in his own possession, till with a part of his men he should have driven the enemy from the further. It was arranged accordingly that whilst he crossed with the infantry, d'Arambure with all the guns,

should at the same time cover his passage, and keep off the enemy, who were collecting in large bodies in the rear. This service was performed by d'Arambure with great skill and gallantry. From the eastern bank of the river, he maintained a simultaneous fire on the enemy on the western bank, and on the enemy behind him. Having thus ensured Law's safe passage, he crossed his guns one by one, still keeping up a fire on the enemy,—the guns as they crossed being placed in position on the other side to cover his final movement. In this manner he effected the passage in safety, the Mahrattas never daring to come very near him.

The river crossed, the way was comparatively easy. Hyderabad was in view, and the sight cheered the hearts of the tired soldiers. Though surrounded and harassed, they pushed on, favoured considerably by the merely feigned action of Janojee and Ramchunder. It was not, however, till 5 p.m. that they reached the town of Hyatnugger, having thus marched twenty-two hours without intermission, overcoming obstacles which alone were most difficult, but which were increased tenfold by the unceasing attacks of the enemy. Their losses had not been light: 25 Europeans, two of them officers, had been killed, 65 wounded; the sepoys, who were more in number, had likewise suffered more. Of the enemy it was calculated that upwards of 2,000 were killed: no wonder, when we find that the French fired 40,000 musket cartridges besides their field-pieces.\*

Four hours later Bussy heard of the arrival of the detachment at Hyatnugger. He at once sent out a party he had before organised, consisting of 110 Europeans, 1,000 sepoys, with a large proportion of carriage for the sick and wounded, and with provisions, to bring them in. To prevent any attack being made upon this party, he availed himself of the opportunity to beat up the Subadar's camp with his remaining forces. Everything turned out as he had wished, and at ten o'clock the next morning, Law's detachment entered Hyderabad, without having seen an enemy between that place and Hyatnugger.

The arrival, an hour later, of a messenger from the Subadar with proposals for an accommodation, showed Bussy that he had not ventured in too sanguine a spirit to maintain his post at Hyderabad. He felt again, as he had felt before at Aurungabad in 1753, that he was absolute master of the situation. Again too he evinced his unsurpassed tact and judgment in not insisting too strongly on concessions, which his position as master would have enabled him to enforce. He wished to return to his post on the invitation of the Subadar, to efface by his own dutiful conduct every recollection of the past three months.

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\* Orme. *Vide* also the *Sâir Mutakherin*.



that alone excepted which fixed in the mind of the Subadar the conviction of French invincibility, of the absolute necessity of their presence as supporters of the vice-regal throne. He, therefore, imposed no terms beyond the abandonment of Murzuffer Beg and the deserter Mahmood Khan; he did not even stipulate for the removal of Shah Nawaz Khan; he himself was to be received only in his former position, as the officer in the Dekkan whose authority was second only to that of Salabut Jung himself. On these conditions a reconciliation was effected, and on the 20th August, just three months after his dismissal, Bussy was publicly reinstated by the Subadar in all his titles, dignities, and honours.

Never, perhaps, had any statesman been subjected in a similar period to a harder trial. It is scarcely too much to say that one false step would have ruined him. Yet, however narrowly we may examine all the movements of Bussy in this critical period, we shall be unable to detect the faintest impress even of a turn in the wrong direction. From the very first, he did what was right, though exposed to numerous temptations to do what was wrong. His refusal alike of the Mahratta alliance and the Mahratta aid; his march on Hyderabad; his determination to wait there instead of moving on to the ceded provinces; his requests to the governments of Pondichery and Masulipatam to order the reinforcements, not to cover his retreat to the latter place, but to meet him at Hyderabad; his positive order to Law to move on; his own choice of the Char Mahal; the means he adopted to employ the main army whilst Law should be approaching; his firm consistency in refusing every offer to treat, except upon the condition of absolute reinstatement,—all these acts stamp him as a general and a statesman of the very first order. We can no longer wonder at his great influence, his greater reputation; we cease to be surprised that his name should have been invoked by all the principal opponents of English progress in Bengal as the name of one who was invincible, who would paralyse their onward march, and at some unexpected moment hurl them into the sea. We can but admire the tact, the judgment, the coolness, the address, and the valour, displayed, not in the heyday of prosperity, but under circumstances most difficult and most trying,—not when he had leisure to deliberate, but when the pressure of events was at its strongest, when upon the decision of the moment depended glory or shame.

Yet, successful as he was, triumphing as he did over difficulties almost unexampled and dangers apparently overwhelming, it is impossible that a critical observer should fail to remark the

immense importance to England of the events of those three months. When we recall to mind that the English were at that very time preparing for the re-conquest of Bengal; that their operations against Calcutta did not have effect till the end of December, nor against Chandernagore till the middle of the following March; that meanwhile Madras was denuded of troops, and all the strong places in the Presidency were left to fall into the hands of the French; that the news of the declaration of war reached Pondichery in November; we can easily imagine the effect which Bussy, trusted by the Subadar and his court, secure of his position at Hyderabad and in the ceded provinces, could have produced either in Bengal or at Madras. There would have been nothing to prevent him from co-operating with the Pondichery authorities against Madras itself, or from moving rapidly with 800 or 1,000 veteran Europeans through Orissa into Bengal. From making one or other of these attempts he was prevented by this three months' campaign in the heart of the Dekkan, and by that alone. Though victorious in that campaign, his confidential intercourse with the Subadar and his ties with the other chiefs had been, in the interval, rudely shaken; and not only that, but the officials established by himself in the ceded provinces, seized the opportunity to endeavour to rid themselves of the rule of France, and to establish their independence. Instead, therefore, of operating against the chief possessions of the English, and of crushing them in Bengal or at Madras, the events consequent upon his sudden dismissal from the service of the Subadar compelled Bussy to forego that grand opportunity, in order to devote all his efforts to the re-establishment of French power in the provinces ceded to Pondichery. Who shall say then how much the English are not indebted to that abortive effect of Shah Nawaz Khan?

From the 26th August to the 16th November Bussy continued at Hyderabad, interfering as little as possible with the affairs of the Subadar, but engaged in arranging for the prevention of the possibility of being subjected in any future time to a similar danger. Having effected this, so far as it was possible for him to effect it, he proceeded on the last-mentioned date towards the ceded provinces, at the head of 500 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys, there to re-establish his authority. With the Subadar, who was about to proceed to Aurungabad, he left 200 Europeans and 500 sepoys under a trusted officer.

It is unnecessary to enter into minute details regarding the successful march of Bussy throughout these provinces. His principal object was to reward those who had remained faithful to the French, in their hour of dilty, to punish the chiefs

who had evinced disaffection or who had rebelled. Nowhere, except at Bobilee, did he meet with any real opposition. At this place, however,—the Rajah of which had a private quarrel with one of Bussy's most trusted feudatories,—the resistance was so determined, that the defenders stabbed their wives and children, and then threw themselves on the bayonets of the French, rather than surrender. From these districts, by order of de Leyrit, he had despatched Law with 61 men into Bengal, to strengthen the garrisons at Chandernagore and at Kassimbazar. It had been his own intention to follow him so soon as the pacification of the ceded districts had been concluded. This, however, could not be brought about until April; he was then preparing to set out, when the fatal tidings reached him of the surrender of the French settlement on the Hooghly.\* Considering it too late then to start upon such an expedition, he proceeded to the reduction of the English factory of Vizagapatam. This he accomplished, the garrison surrendering at discretion, on the 25th June. The English factories of Madapollam, Bundermalanka and Ingeram, situated on the three arms of the Godavery near its mouth, surrendered likewise to his detachments. Whilst thus engaged, however, the intrigues of Shah Nawaz Khan had once more brought affairs of the Dekkan to the verge of a revolution. Intelligence of this reached Bussy at the end of the year, just after he had completed the pacification of the ceded provinces, and forced him to set out, without any delay, for Aurungabad. It will be necessary, before we accompany him, to give a brief outline of the events which thus called him from his post.

It will be recollected that the former Dewan, Syud Lushkur Khan, had endeavoured to instil into the mind of the Subadar suspicions of Bussy, and had persuaded him to imprison his two brothers, thinking that the French leader, interceding on their behalf, would convert those suspicions into certainty. We have seen likewise how the conduct of Bussy completely frustrated this intrigue. The confinement of the princes did not long follow the fall of Syud Lushkur, for the Subadar, completely reassured as to Bussy, and following his advice, almost immediately released them, giving them each a liberal income, but without any administrative or political power. Thus they continued till the period of Bussy's dismissal in May, 1756. Then it was that Nawaz Khan, dreading the facile

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\* It is clear from this that but for the three months' campaign, the events of which we have recorded, and their consequences in the ceded provinces, Bussy would have marched to Bengal in time to prevent the capture of Chandernagore by the English.

character of Salabut Jung, and fearing that he would recall the French, hoping more from the determined character of the next brother, Nizam Ali, persuaded the Subadar to confide to him the government of Berar, and to Bussalut Jung, the younger, the government of the province of Adoni. The possession of some power would not fail, he knew, to induce them to aspire to more.

The success of Bussy at Hydrabad delayed for some time the plans that Shah Nawaz had formed, but as the French leader did not interfere after his own reinstatement with the arrangements made by Salabut Jung regarding his brothers, Shah Nawaz took advantage of the subsequent march of Bussy to the ceded districts to renew them. In the month of May following, affairs appeared to him ripe for a movement. He took advantage, then, of the death of his predecessor, Syud Lushkur, to summon the fortress of Dowlutabad, in which the treasures of the deceased minister, computed at nearly a million sterling, and which of right reverted to the Subadar, were stated to be concealed, and which the governor refused to deliver up. At the end of a month Dowlutabad surrendered, and was immediately taken possession of by Shah Nawaz, the office of governor being bestowed upon a dependent of his own. His object was to take an early opportunity of confining the Subadar in Dowlutabad, of then proclaiming Nizam Ali, and of expelling the French from the Dekkan. The more effectually to carry out this plan he invoked the assistance of the Mahrattas,\* who, the better to aid him, were to appear under their ordinary guise of enemies.

No sooner was it known that the Mahrattas under the son of the Peshwa, Wiswas Rao, were approaching Aurungabad, than Shah Nawaz, under the pretext of massing all the forces of the province to oppose him, summoned Nizam Ali to that city. Bussalut Jung had preceded him. Immediately there was let loose a whole network of intrigue, which, balancing now to one side now to the other, ended in the investiture of Nizam Ali with the administrative work of the province, the title of Subadar only being left to Salabut Jung. Bussalut Jung was at the same time appointed keeper of the great seal. So entire was the transfer of power that but for the presence of the 200 French troops, the life of Salabut Jung would probably have been sacrificed; certainly he would have been effectually deprived of his liberty.

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\* Grant Duff considers it probable that the Peshwa himself designed the plot.

Such was the state of affairs when Bussy, marching quickly from the ceded provinces, arrived at Aurungabad. Nizam Ali in command of the army, Bussalut Jung his nominated minister, Salabut Jung a cypher, Shah Nawaz Khan in possession of the fortress of Dowlutabad,—all waiting for the movement which should deprive Salabut Jung of even the shadow of power. It is curious to notice how all these intrigues were disconcerted by the presence of Bussy. Having by a stratagem possessed himself of Dowlutabad, he imposed his law upon the brothers of the Subadar. Bussalut Jung he proposed to attach to the interests of Salabut Jung, Nizam Ali to invest with the government of Hyderabad, where he would be easily accessible to the French. All these arrangements had been concluded, when, on the eve of his departure for Hyderabad, Nizam Ali enticed the Dewan of M. Bussy, by name Hyder Jung, into his own tent, and caused him to be assassinated. In the tumult that followed, Shah Nawaz Khan was killed, whilst Nizam Ali fled for his life to Burhanpore, one hundred and fifty miles north of Aurungabad.

The flight of Nizam Ali simplified the arrangements that had been proposed, and which were in no other way altered than by his removal from the government of Hyderabad. An attempt, indeed, was made to pursue him, but it was speedily countermanded, and Bussy, more secure than ever in his position, prepared to accompany the Subadar and his new minister to Hyderabad. Here he arrived on the 15th July, and found waiting for him a letter from the Count de Lally, dated the 13th June, ordering him to repair at once to Arcot, leaving no French with the Subadar, and only so many in the ceded provinces as would be sufficient to maintain them. He was instructed to make over the command of these troops to M. de Conflans, an officer recently arrived from Europe, and who had but just joined him on the march, and to bring with him Moracin, who had hitherto administered the affairs of Masulipatam.

This letter was like a thunderbolt to Bussy as well as to Salabut Jung. It called upon the former to renounce at once the work of the past seven years and a half, to give up the province to maintain which Dupleix had not hesitated to risk the loss of the Carnatic, and Bussy had devoted, to an extent bordering on the superhuman, his never-tiring energies. He had however only to obey.\* But the Subadar, who had leant so long

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\* In his reply, dated the 15th July, Bussy writes: "I reply at once to the letter you have done me the honour to write to me on the 13th June last, which I received yesterday evening at 9 o'clock. There is one thing, Sir, which I have always known how to do better than anything else; it is to obey; and although your orders throw me into the

upon Bussy, who had so recently experienced the advantage of his alliance, could not but regard it as a fatal blow. "He took leave of Bussy," writes Mr. Orme, "with the utmost despondency, called him the guardian angel of his life and fortune, and foreboded the unhappy fate to which he should be exposed by his departure." But there was no help for it. Bussy endeavoured, indeed, to cheer him up by the promise of a return in which he himself, at the time, really believed. Five days later, at the head of all his troops, he set out, and reached Weyoor on the north of the Kistna on the 3rd August. Here having been joined by Moracin, he made over the government of Masulipatam to M. de Conflans, then,—most fatally for French interests,—turned for ever his back on the provinces he had gained for France, to join, with 250 Europeans and 500 sepoy, the new commander whose exploits we purpose to record in our next number.

"greatest perplexity, considering the fearful situation in which I am, "I proceed to execute them with the utmost promptitude." The remainder of his letter is taken up in explaining the state of affairs as they affected him and the projected movement.

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- ART. II.—1. *Report upon the Forests of the Punjab and the Western Himalaya*, by H. Cleghorn, M.D., Conservator of Forests. 1864.
2. *Reports upon the Deodar Forests of Bissahir*, by D. Brandis, PH.D., Deputy Inspector-General of Forests; Dr. J. L. Stewart and Captain Wood, Officiating Conservators of Forests. 1865.
3. *Report on the Deodar Forests on the Bías*, 1865. *On the Chenab and Ravi*, 1866. By Dr. J. L. Stewart, Conservator, Punjab.
4. *Annual Reports of Forest Administration in the Punjab*, 1863-4, 1864-5, and 1865-6.
5. *Ladak*, by Alexander Cunningham, Brevet Major, Bengal Engineers. 1864.
6. *Hoffmeister's Travels*. 1848.
7. *Major Madden on Himalayan Coniferæ. Journal Agricultural Society of India. Vols. IV. VII. VIII.* 1846-49.

WHEN, in a late number of this *Review*, the subject of Forest Conservancy was dealt with, it was merely in relation to its general principles, and without special application to particular parts of India, or even as a rule to India at all. We now propose to treat this important subject with reference to a particular province of the empire, and in choosing the Punjab for this purpose, we have been guided by various considerations.

Firstly, then, the Punjab has special necessities as regards forest conservancy, and in it certain measures have been or are being adopted to meet these necessities. Then it so happens that numerous reports relating to forest conservancy have been printed, and so rendered easily accessible, in the Punjab. These present a mass of matter which is frequently intensely statistical or technical, and which contains nothing very lively or sensational, but which has been put together with intelligence, and is calculated to give full information on the various subjects treated. Partly because these reports have been pl

at our disposal, and partly from other causes, we are in a better position to deal with the subject in that province, than perhaps in any other part of India. And, lastly, the recently established Punjab Forest Department has lately been exposed to floods of comment in several of the less influential up-country newspapers, in which the line is often not very clearly defined between fair criticism and interested objugation, between an intelligent statement of facts and an ignorant or one-sided representation of fancies. Thus it seems to us that it may be well to attempt to enlighten the minds of those, whether in or out of the Punjab, who care, or ought to know something of the truth on this subject, some parts of which, indeed, may not prove uninteresting to the general reader.

A remark made by the Secretary to the Punjab Government in the Public Works Department, that previous to the annexation of the province by the British, the chief supplies of Himalayan timber were derived from the drift-wood brought down by the various rivers, is probably tolerably correct. For it is not likely that up to that time much timber was felled in the interior for export to the plains. Still there were doubtless exceptions. For example, we know of considerable felling for export upon the Ravi and Biás years before annexation. And it ought to be kept in mind that Greek historians record how the great Macedonian conqueror built fleets of boats from pine-wood on at least one of the Punjab rivers.

But it may be conceded that practically the first great impetus given to felling deodar for export to the plains occurred soon after annexation, when the British began to settle down in the land of the five rivers, and barracks were wanted for the soldiers, and bungalows for the officers. It was soon found that the supply of deodar brought down the great rivers, was by no means adequate to the demand for these purposes. And at that time it does not appear to have been appreciated, that the chief cause of its scantiness was the want of organizing power of the hill-chiefs in whose territories most of the forests lie. Be that as it may, in 1850, Mr. E. A. Prinsep (now Settlement Commissioner, Punjab,) was sent by Government up the Chenab, in order to arrange for a larger supply being brought down. Although his visit is said to have been successful, yet in the following year, Major Longden (now Adjutant-General of H. M's troops in Bengal) was deputed to examine into the timber resources of the Sutlej, Ravi, and Chenab. This duty occupied him for the next two years, and he finally was appointed to the charge of the "Government Timber Agency," first on the Ravi and then on the Chenab.



The general result of the investigations of these and other earlier explorers as to the extent of deodar forest on the Punjab rivers, was that every one became imbued with the idea that these forests were "inexhaustible," and the word was for long a favourite in this relation. We know better now, but, as we shall see, the epithet has accomplished its mission and done its worst. Even so thoroughly scientific an observer as Dr. Falconer, appears hardly to have appreciated the necessities of the case as to timber.\* The Punjab Government have well observed that the phrase "inexhaustible" is very generally applied to large forests, until some more or less exact enumeration or estimate of actual extent and numbers has been made, but that in almost all countries alike, where an immense demand has arisen, especially for great public works, unless some system of conservancy has been adopted, the "inexhaustible" has speedily become exhausted. It might safely have been added that in most cases the exhaustion precedes the conservancy, for in almost no important matter connected with the material welfare of the race, is there such a tendency to let the steed be stolen before shutting the stable door. Forests may be called—in a somewhat Irish figure of speech—a loan we have from posterity, and in this matter we, still oftener than debtors generally, ignore the claims of the lender.

In the meantime, the people of the Punjab had found peace and security under the ægis of a strong civilized Government, and these bring the desire for material comfort. With this came the knowledge that a decent house is not now to be exposed to the frequently recurring risks of being burned down by bands of raiders from without, or of furnishing to rulers within—still worse robbers—an index to the existence of wealth which may be extorted. Mahajans, bnyas, and others of the wealthier inhabitants began to affect better houses, in the construction of which much deodar was used. So the price of timber rose, native traders crowded round the rajahs of the forest-bearing hill-states, begging, praying, and bribing for licenses to cut trees—felling, launching, and pilfering with an amount of energy which is rarely to be seen in orientals, except when money is to be made. When to the demand indicated above was added, about 1859, the enormous necessities of the railway for deodar sleepers, the competition for timber became still more eager. The name even of conservancy had not yet been heard in the land, and Government on the Chenab with rajahs and contractors on that and the other rivers, contended

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\* In a Memo., dated 1853, quoted by Dr. Cleghorn.

who should fell most trees in a year. And this in too many cases, regardless of the immense losses that might occur in the timber slide or in the river, so long as a moderate percentage of the timber came to hand in the plains.

Lord W. Hay, as quoted by Dr. Cleghorn (p. 17), thus gives the usual history of a forest in the Simla hills, in 1862: "The wood-cutter enters, fells many trees, and damages many others by the tree falling down the steep slope, the branches not having been previously cut off; a heap of chips and *débris* remains, which takes fire by accident or otherwise; the villagers send their cattle for pasturage, and in a very few years some scattered pines are all that remain of a once flourishing forest." If, in the case of a *deodar* forest, we multiply the felling by a hundred, add to the danger from fire proportionally, and remember that the native is none the more careful of a thing, because it is valuable—to others, that is,—we may conceive what was all this time going on in the "inexhaustible" *deodar* forests of the Punjab Himalaya. And we shall not be surprised that, as the truth began to dawn upon men, Government imbibed the conception that it might possibly be time to think of preserving these forests.

But we must now introduce to the reader's notice the *deodar* itself. In the north-west Himalaya, there are at least eight kinds of arboreous coniferous trees, but some of these are rare or grow in situations difficult of access. Of the whole, two only have ever been largely exported to the plains. One of these is *Pinus longifolia* or *cheel*, the timber of which although stronger, in some respects, than that of any of the others, is yet much less durable and valuable than the *deodar*. The tree also grows for the most part at low elevations in the outer hills, so that being easy of access, and comparatively cheap, by far the greater proportion of the available large trees have been felled. Of the other inferior conifers, some are either known to be valueless, or the demand has not yet become sufficient to test their relative value, or indeed to warrant the felling of large quantities of them. But the time is probably coming when they will be thoroughly tested. Several of the deciduous trees of the north-west Himalaya, such as the walnut and the ash, furnish valuable timber, but in such small quantities comparatively that we need do no more than allude to them here.

In this connection, therefore, we have in the main to deal only with the *deodar*, the "glory of the Himalaya," as it has been called. This tree appears first to have become known to science about the beginning of the present century, when

Roxburgh, whose knowledge of it was but scanty, named it *Pinus Deodara*. The scientific appellation of the tree, however, has for sufficient reasons been altered to *Cedrus deodara*. (Loud.) And although, to relieve the monotony of meetings of the the botanical section of the British Association and so on, there are still periodical discussions on the subject, yet the weight of scientific evidence goes to prove that the Himalayan cedar is identical with that of Lebanon and of Taurus in Asia Minor (*Cedrus Libani*, Loud.), which is so frequently mentioned in the Old Testament, as well as with the cedar of the Atlas in Northern Africa, (*Cedrus Atlantica*, Man.)

It is somewhat unfortunate that this tree originally became known to Europeans in a part of the Himalaya (Kumaon) where it is called by the natives *deodar*, for although a modification of this word, viz. *diár*, is in use in parts of the hills to the north-west, the tree is much more widely known by a totally different native name, viz. *Kelú*, or modifications as *Kilei* and *Killár*, and in some of the Tibetan dialects *Kelmung*. Further confusion and at times loud arguments have resulted with those inclined to pin their faith to vernacular names and the acuteness of the observant faculties of natives, from the circumstance that two of the other coniferous trees, the twisted cypress and the pencil cedar (which is really a juniper), are in various places called *devidiar* or *deodar*.

The deodar, when of full growth and in circumstances suited to its perfect development, is a magnificent tree, and to it may well be applied part of the language used by Lindley regarding the coniferous tribe, "gigantic in size, noble in aspect, and robust in constitution." Its trunk is straight and tall, with branches stretching out nearly horizontally on all sides, which probably gives the tree a better chance in the "struggle for existence" than its fellows. Its foliage is of a deep rich green. When the trees are close, the trunk frequently ascends clear of branches to a considerable height, but in the open, or in less dense forests, the horizontal boughs give a peculiar aspect to the tree, enabling it to be distinguished at a considerable distance.

Great differences occur in the character and habit of the trees in different localities, often without any cause as yet known to us, but the following remarks may be stated generally. At places near the limits and especially the upper limit of its growth, or on open, exposed, arid ridges, the trees are short and stumpy, and taper quickly, and, as a rule, they are drawn up taller in thick forests than when in the open. In some localities, especially when the deodar has been lopped or is subject to be broken off by wind or avalanches, it is apt to be distorted,

bent, and gnarled, while it frequently, at some distance above the ground, divides into several trunks, sometimes as many as seven or eight, or even eleven. The latter circumstance is supposed by Dr. Brandis always to result from the leading shoot having been broken off, and one or more of the side branches having taken its place. And doubtless this is frequently the case, but it seems possible that there is a greater tendency to this in certain localities than in others. The straight top of the tree is slender and very apt to be broken off by the wind or other causes, and when this occurs while the tree is yet small, (which, as may be supposed, is most frequently the case in open places or on the outskirts of forests) and no side branch takes the place of the broken top, the tree becomes "table-topped," retaining permanently the flat or "tabulated" appearance.

The deodar extends as far east as Kumaon. In the outer part of that province it is not indigenous, being only found in the immediate neighbourhood of temples and such-like places. Madden's argument, however, that where the finest trees are found at temples, there the tree is probably not indigenous, does not hold good. For by far the greater number of the largest measured trees on record throughout the north-west Himalaya occur near temples. Nor is it difficult to understand how this should be so, even when the tree is indigenous. In some parts of inner Kumaon (near Joshinath, Mulari, &c.) the deodar is not uncommon, and to the west large forests of it exist on the Bhagiratti and other branches of the Ganges. Still further west it grows in greater or less quantity on each of the Sutlej, Biás, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum. There is proof that the tree grows near parts of the intramontane course of the Indus, and it is common in places near the Swat valley on the southern flanks of the Sufed Koh, and as far west as Tezeen in Afghanistan. This last is the most western point to which the Himalayan cedar has been traced, nor is it probable that any cedar exists between Cabul and the Lebanon itself.

Madden, judging chiefly from the absence of very large trees at Simla, considers that the vicinity of the plains is inimical to the best growth of the tree, and he states that all the gigantic specimens are near the snowy range. But marked exceptions to both of these statements are now on record, although there is some truth in them. The tree, as a rule, like most other conifers, and indeed trees in general in the Himalaya, prefers the shady aspect which, from the general direction of the rivers, is for the most part on the left

bank. On it the deodar grows in greater numbers, as is indicated by the fact that on the Chenab, from 1859 to 1865, Government were able to fell 33,500 trees from shady, and only 22,000 from sunny aspects. The trees on the left bank also are of larger size; thus on the same river the trees obtained from 1859 to 1863 gave an average of 4·8 logs of sleeper length (about 12 feet), while those from the sunny side gave an average of 4·3 logs only.

Dr. Stewart has collected a number of data derived from the enumeration of the annual rings in hundreds of trees in many different forests, in order to elicit, if possible, the conditions under which the growth is most rapid, and many of his inductions derived from observations made in this way appear to be sound. It may be stated briefly that the tree grows with most rapidity at places well into the deodar-bearing zone, (*i. e.* not too near either the higher or lower limit of its growth) on the shady aspect, when the atmosphere is not too arid, in good soil, and on a low slope.

Dr. Brandis believes that the best trees grow on old cultivation terraces, often in all probability dating several centuries back. But it seems not unlikely, from evidence acquired subsequently, that as man prefers good soil for his crops, and deodar prefers it as well as a low slope for its growth, the occurrence of fine deodar on these ancient fields may be a mere coincidence. The general slope of the deodar forests on the Sutlej seems to be 25°—45°, on the Bías from a flat up to 30°, on the Ravi 25°—30°, and on the Chenab 10—30°. Flat spaces, which have not been cultivated, are rare in the deodar-bearing parts of the Himalaya, but there seems no reason to doubt that such places are, other conditions being equal, more favourable to the rapid growth of the tree.

Madden at one time thought he saw reason to believe that this tree avoided limestone formations, but observations over a wider field taught him that this was a mistake. And as a matter of fact, it does not appear to affect any particular rock. Thus on the Sutlej, where there is little limestone, there are good deodar forests over all the prevalent rocks, granite, gneiss, and quartzose schist;—on the Bías, the forests occur over blue shaly slate, chloritic schist, and clay-slate with or without mica;—on the Ravi most of the forests occur over some form or other of clay-slate, one forest being on the well-known Dhanla Dhár gneiss, and one on limestone;—while on the Chenab also most of the forests are upon clay-slate, but one or two upon micaceous schist, gneiss, or limestone, and trap occurs in some.

From the reports it appears that on the various rivers deodar grows in many different circumstances. Thus we find stunted single trees clinging to rifts over the face of mural precipices, high above the foaming river where but few other trees can get root-hold. Or the deodar are scattered in hundreds among thousands of other coniferous and deciduous trees forming a dense forest over miles of a sloping hillside, a mile or two from the water. Or, still again, there are pure and compact deodar forests with hardly a specimen of other conifers intermixed, and without a single deciduous tree. In these, one may wander in a great colonnade of massive straight boles, running straight up without a branch to 40 or 50 feet, with the boughs so completely closing in above, that a sombre shade is thrown over all, and but few of the smaller shrubs and herbs get light enough from above and soil enough among the masses of deodar leaves below, to enable them to sustain a precarious existence.

As a rule, these pure and compact forests, of which we have indicated the nature of an extreme type, are only found where there is a combination of several of the circumstances which tend to favour the reproduction and growth of the tree; when the soil is good and plentiful, and the declivity is gentle. A moderately good specimen of this kind of forest on the small scale exists at Kajiár, within a few miles of Dalhousie. It ought to be well known to visitors there, for a better place for pic-nics is rarely seen in the Himalaya. Annandale at Simla, for instance, cannot compare with it. Let our readers imagine a flat wide cup, as it were, hollowed out on the upper part of a great ridge, in the centre a small lake, encircled with a broad margin of fine turf, a picturesque wooden temple at one end, and the whole enclosed in an amphitheatre of grand old deodar. A fine wooded hill rises from the same ridge 2,000 feet higher to the south, and the pine-clad Deinkund, 2,000 feet higher still, is seen three or four miles off to the south-west. There may be men who cannot make an enjoyable day in such a place, with good weather, pleasant company, and a fair amount of comestibles and cheroots, but if there are, we pity them.

We may here notice shortly a few of the monster deodars that have been observed, with some observations on the general size of the trees, premising that Drs. Brandis and Stewart measured at 6 feet from the ground, except when otherwise noted, while measurements by other observers have been made at various heights. On the Sutlej, the size of the trees varies very much. Thus, the trees felled in 1864 in one of the fine

forests (Nachár) on the lower part of the river, gave an average of six logs of sleeper-length,—the largest tree felled being 20 feet in girth and 200 in height. The trees higher up again on the Baspa, a large tributary, only averaged about two or three logs. Hoffmeister appears to have measured no trees, but stated in his loose way that individual trees were seen of 40 feet in girth but this is over the mark. One of the largest deodar on record is that at Sungri, close to the main road up the valley, which has been measured by at least three observers, Madden, Thomson, and Cleghorn, the two latter making it  $35\frac{1}{2}$  feet in girth, the first  $36\frac{3}{4}$  at 5 or 6 feet from the ground. This remarkable tree, which is well worthy of the place it holds in one of Bourne's fine photographs, divided (before part of it fell from old age) into eleven trunks at some distance from the ground. Only two other very large trees are recorded on the Sutlej proper, one of 36 feet in girth by Madden at the tank below Chini, and another of 34 feet 4 inches at Purbui close by the remains of two other giants, measured by Dr. Brandis, and estimated by him at 900 years old.

Most of the very large deodar in the Sutlej basin are recorded on or near its largest tributary, the Baspa. Here, at Kunai, Dr. Brandis, out of five giant trees standing round a temple, measured four, and found them respectively 24 feet 9 inches, 24 feet 4 inches, 23 feet 2 inches, and 17 feet 9 inches in girth at 6 feet high. At Buran, P. Gerard measured one of 34 feet girth at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet from the ground, and A. Gerard, at Shoung, measured one of 30 and another of 33 feet girth. A tree at Chanso was found by Erskine to be 30 feet, and is supposed by Madden to be the same as that estimated by Inglis some years before at 36 feet 8 inches. Madden mentions a tree at Sildes, near Looloot, on the western side of the Changshed range as 36 feet in girth at 4 feet from the ground. Almost the only very large tree, east of the Sutlej basin of which we can find the measurement, is one mentioned by Moorcroft, under Nái in Kumaon, of 180 feet in height with a girth of 27 feet at 4 feet from the ground.

On the Biás the deodar is not an abundant tree, and it does not appear commonly to reach a very large size in any forest. A tree 140 feet high and of 15 feet 6 inches in girth at 6 feet, is recorded by Dr. Stewart, and another of 18 feet in girth at the same height, both in the Boni forest on the Parbatti tributary. Major Longden gives, in a corner of a forest map of the Biás, a sketch of part of the trunk of a monster tree at Solang, which is miles away from deodar and considerably above the present upper level of its growth on

that river. He found this tree to be 35 feet in girth at 4 feet from the ground in 1853, and when measured by Dr. Stewart at 6 feet in 1864, its girth was 36 feet one inch.

The deodar has been abundant on the Ravi, where there are or have been many of large size. Dr. Stewart mentions (of trees or stumps) fourteen between 15 and 20 feet girth, with six between 20 and 30, and two above 30 feet as seen by himself. The two last were a standing tree at Kuarsi of 36 feet 4 inches at 6 feet from the ground, and 44 feet 2 inches at the ground, and a fallen one at Chaun (with a native distiller living in its hollow!) of 31 feet 6 inches girth. In 1864, a tree on the Boodil had a timber length of 197 feet, and gave 14 sleeper logs. But this number of logs was exceeded by a tree (with five trunks however) on the Tuna which yielded 29 logs. A log of very large dimensions, *viz.* 44 feet long and 25 in girth, is spoken of as lying in a tributary of the Ravi, but its existence and size do not appear to be certified by any European officer's inspection.

The number of very large trees recorded on the Chenab is but small, considering the immense quantity of deodar there is or has been on that river. Dr. Stewart mentions that he saw only eleven (trees or stumps) between 15 and 20 feet in girth, with only three above 20 feet. Of these, one at Kagal was 25 feet 6 inches, and another is well-known as adorning the magnificent Chaugán at Kishtwar. He found it in October, 1865, to be 28 feet 8 inches at the ground, 24 feet 6 inches at 4 feet higher, and 23 feet 8½ inches at 6 feet. In February, 1839, this tree was found by Vigne to be 23 feet girth at 4 feet from the ground. The comparative paucity of monster trees on this river, Dr. Stewart is inclined to attribute more to the fact that the country on the upper Chenab is very sparsely peopled and with but few villages and temples, near which only these giant deodar are for the most part found. That the general size of the deodar on this river has been great is shown by the circumstance, that 12,500 trees, felled in 1862, averaged 7 feet 9 inches in girth at felling height, as many as 336 of these being more than 12 feet in girth, with seventeen of more than 20, of which three were of 26½ and one of 30 feet.

The largest single log on record was one on the Chenab, 32 feet long which contained 360 cubic feet of timber. Strange to say, it accomplished the distance from the forest to the catching dépôt near the *débouchement* in a single season, which is not at all common. But when it got there, it proved somewhat like the elephant the king presented to the fakir, for having lodged in a hollow, it cost 100 rupees to get it out again into the water-way.



Considering the length of time during which deodar operations have been in progress in some parts of the Himalaya, it seems wonderful how few direct observations upon the rate of growth of the tree are recorded in these voluminous reports. We are only told of two instances. A deodar seedling of a foot and a half high and probably about a year old, had a knot tied on its slender top in 1845, and in 1865 was found to be 12 feet high (5 feet shorter than neighbouring trees of similar age), with a girth of 11 inches at 2 feet from the ground. In the other case, some deodar which are understood to have grown from seed sown by Major Longden in 1853, having been silted up in 1865, sections of two of them were made and showed 12 and 14 rings of annual growth.

This brings us to consider the value of these annual rings in determining the age of a deodar, as upon this depends the worth of most of the observations, on which, in the absence of direct evidence, is built our present belief as to the number of years taken by this tree to reach a certain size. Drs. Brandis and Stewart appear to believe thoroughly in the value of observing these rings. And although "practical men" doubt their worth as indicators of age, it appears to us that there is a considerable body of evidence in favour of the former view, while there is no very weighty argument and no direct proof against it. As at the same time no other test of the age of the deodar has been proposed, we may, until direct observation has settled the point, place some confidence in the rings.

It does not seem to be always easy to count these correctly, especially if the section be very resinous or very old, nor would it do to strike the average for the rate of growth on a certain river from enumerating the rings in a few trees. But the two officers named above, have, on several of the rivers, counted these rings in hundreds of trees, chosen in many localities over great areas and under very varying conditions as to aspect, soil, elevation above the sea, &c., so as to be able to strike what are in all probability fair averages. It may be observed that, as one would naturally expect, the rings near the periphery are generally thinner than those towards the centre, but even in this respect exceptional cases are not unfrequent. The *ad interim* conclusions come to us to the average time required by the deodar on some of the Himalayan rivers to reach the 2nd class and 1st class sizes, *i. e.* 4½ feet and 6 feet in girth, are as follows: On the Chenab 81 years and 113 years, from 128 trees examined; on the Ravi 29 years and 84 years from 121 trees; on the Biás 51 years and 72 years from 60 trees; and on the Sutlej 90 years and 125 years from 122 (?) trees.

For certain reasons given, the Biás figures are probably a little under, and those for the Sutlej rather over, the true averages. The largest numbers of rings actually counted in single trees are, in a tree on the Chenab, 364; in one on the Ravi, 575; in one on the Biás, 335; and in one on the Sutlej, 550 rings. The Purbui tree on the last-named river (as mentioned above) was estimated by Dr. Brandis at 900 years of age from the rings on a portion of its section.

But in so far as the evidence from these rings is of value, still further information has been derived from classifying the trees in which they were counted according to the conditions of growth as to soil, aspect, &c. On these points Dr. Stewart has, as already hinted, arrived at some interesting conclusions which are, for the most part, in accordance with deductions previously drawn from general principles. Thus it has been found that, judging from the annual rings, a tree requires 15 per cent. longer time to reach 1st class size on the sunny than on the shady side, on both the Chenab and Ravi. On the Chenab 50 per cent. longer is required to reach 1st class size over than under 7,000 feet above the sea, and on the Ravi 46 per cent longer over than under 6,500 feet. On the Chenab 15 per cent. longer is needed to reach 1st class size on a slope above than on one below  $15^{\circ}$ ; and on the Ravi, 60 per cent. additional is required in forests on the higher slope. In the less arid region of the Chenab (*i. e.* nearer the plains), the tree takes 23 per cent. longer to reach 1st class size, and in the moister tract of the Ravi, 51 per cent. longer than in the drier parts of the basins of the rivers respectively. Again, where trees grew sparsely on the Chenab, the 1st class size was found to take 67 per cent. longer than in close forests, while on the Ravi the difference was 51 per cent. But in this case there is more of coincidence than sequence, as the conditions of the trees in close forests are generally very favorable in several ways, irrespective of mere closeness.

It will at once be evident from the nature of the case, that these figures are not intended even to indicate the degrees of difference, but only to show that some attempt has been made to work out the conclusions drawn as to the rate of growth of deodar statistically, as well as by reasoning from other data. With respect to the sapwood of deodar, it has been found on both the Chenab and Ravi that it is not only thicker, but has a larger number of rings in larger and older than in smaller and younger trees. But no difference has been found in the thickness or in the number of rings of the sapwood, either

according to the aspect facing which the tree grew, or on different aspects of the same tree.

In default of regular surveys of the forests and enumeration of the trees, which would require much more time, labour, and expense than can yet be dedicated to this purpose, two methods of what is called "Forest Valuation Survey" have been applied to determine approximately the number of deodar trees in the forests on the Punjab rivers. One of these methods, by measuring squares, counting the trees in them, and estimating for the whole area of the forest, is but little adapted for mountainous regions, and has only been tried in a few instances. The other method, called linear survey, consists in measuring along a line, counting the number of trees of various sizes to an estimated distance on either side, and estimating for the total area of the forest.

Although the latter method requires some training of the eye in order to get at tolerably correct results, it is the best adapted for rough hill-sides. Thus it has been largely put in practice in the Punjab deodar forests. The results of the surveys there made are as follows :—

	1st Class Trees counted.	2nd Class Trees counted.	Acres surveyed.	Average No. of 1st Class Trees to an acre.
Sutlej ... ..	3,743	4,099	652	6
Bias ... ..	1,721	1,111	125	14
Ravi ... ..	811	748	206	4
Chenab ... ..	511	488	75	6

It has also been found that when the slope and the lights are favourable, a fair approximation may, with certain precautions, be made to the number of trees in a forest by counting from the opposite side of a narrow valley. The estimates to be given by and by of the number of deodar now left on each of these rivers, have, for the most part, been arrived at by one or other of the above methods.

A certain interest attaches to the length of river upon which the deodar flourishes. The following are the results which have been attained in calculating with reference to the main stream and branches of each of the four rivers. Those parts are excluded where the tree only grows in inconsiderable and

widely scattered patches. On the Sutlej, main river 40 miles, branches 25; on the Biás, 18 miles, and branches 12; on the Ravi, 68 miles, and branches 86; and on the Chenab (including the Kashmir territories) 115 miles, with 131 miles of branches. This gives a total of nearly 500 miles in length of tolerably continuous deodar-bearing tracts in the basins of the four rivers. The data for the Jhelum are insufficient to enable us to include it.

There seems to be very considerable variation with respect to the highest and lowest levels at which deodar is found in any quantity, as well as of the height of the bed of the stream at these points on the various rivers. The extremes seem to be these;—On the Ravi the tree grows lowest of all, *viz.*, at 5,000 feet, where the river bed is 2,000, and on the Sutlej the lower level of forest is given at 7,000 feet, where the river bed is 5,000. At the upper limit of growth of the deodar on the Sutlej, the lower edge of the forest is 8,000 feet, the river bed being 7,600, while the tree on this river is occasionally found in considerable quantity up to 10,000 feet above the sea. As to this upper limit of growth the Ravi is at the other extreme, the lower edge of the uppermost forests there being close to the bed of the river at 8,500, while deodar is rarely seen in any quantity above 9,000 feet. It is noted generally that on the lower part of the deodar-bearing portions of these rivers, the tree is most frequently found within the glens of small tributaries, whereas towards its upper limit it is most common on steep or precipitous ridges overhanging the main river or its larger affluents.

We will not here enter into any lengthy details as to the properties of the timber of the deodar, but may state generally that for a combination of good qualities, *viz.*, strength, ease of working, and durability, it is probably the most valuable timber furnished by any coniferous tree. It varies very much in colour and appearance being sometimes almost black with oil, which is believed to render it more than usually lasting. The oil itself is, in some parts of the hills, extracted from chips of the wood by destructive distillation, and is applied to various purposes. It is not yet clear under what conditions of growth this oily timber is most apt to be produced. On the other hand, it seems tolerably certain that on open exposed rocky ridges the tree is, as a rule, more apt to produce a resinous timber which is considered less durable. The term “imperishable deodar” was originally applied to the wood of this tree by Moorcroft, chiefly from his observation of it in the Kashmir bridges, where, however, there is no great strain upon it. And although the phrase is somewhat hyperbolic, yet the timber is exceedingly

durable under ordinary circumstances. Even when exposed to all the vicissitudes of the weather in bridges, buildings, or rivers, it will keep sound for many years. And in these reports instances are given where logs remained buried, or lay in a damp forest for a very long time without detriment to any but the sapwood. In general also the latter alone suffers from white ants, a circumstance which renders the deodar very valuable for railway-sleepers. Curiously enough the deodar, which was first introduced into England 30 or 40 years ago, seems to grow much more rapidly there than in its native mountains, and to produce a vastly inferior wood.

Hitherto the timber of the deodar has generally been water-seasoned, and it has been assumed that this is the best possible method of seasoning. But it appears by no means certain that its being generally followed does not simply result from the fact that it is usually most convenient to launch the logs within a short period after the tree has been felled. To us it seems not very creditable to the European officers who have had such ample opportunities of settling this very important point, that it should not have been demonstrated long ago whether deodar timber is most effectually seasoned dry or in water.

Nor does the usual process of seeding in this tree appear to be so well understood as it might be. But it is believed that the young cones begin to be formed in spring, and only ripen in the autumn of the year following, so that two seasons are required for the full development of each cone. It is supposed that on each seed-bearing tree there are generally cones in their first and second years. But after each few years, at uncertain intervals, there is a very bad crop of seed. For example, last season (1866) the failure was so complete that it was difficult to supply the small demand for seed to be sent abroad. Normally the cone does not fall whole, as in the case of some conifers, but each scale with its seeds drops off separately. The seed rots easily and is said to be greedily devoured by certain birds. Of the comparatively small number which escape these and other perils and germinate, many are killed by frost, dried up by the sun, or scorched by forest fires. Of the remaining plants, the greater proportion are browsed down by various animals, especially goats. The pasturing of large flocks appears to constitute one of the chief obstacles to the natural reproduction of deodar, and in forests near which there is much population with many grazing animals, young deodar are but sparsely scattered over a large area.

Having said thus much of our cedar, we may well add a word or two regarding that of Lebanon. There seems no

sound reason to doubt that the tree, of which only a few scattered specimens are now found, is really the same as that which 2,800 years ago is said to have given employment to 40,000 fellers in providing timber for Solomon's temple, and which is so frequently alluded to in the Old Testament as a type of size, luxuriance, and beauty, the "glory of Lebanon" of Isaiah. For a very long time within the modern period only one clump of these trees was known, notes of which appear to have been taken by nearly 20 observers, from 1550 when Peter Bellon found the large trees to be 28 in number down to 1820, when they are said to have numbered only seven or eight, and 1860 when they were stated by Dr. Hooker to be about 400 in number, 17 being over 12 feet in girth, and *all* the remainder between that and 18 inches. Some years ago a second and much larger clump was discovered to the north of Lebanon, and within the last few weeks a third of considerable extent has been discovered. The trees in this last had just been sold to a Sheikh, who had destroyed many in an unsuccessful attempt to make resin from them.

From drawings and the accounts of the Abbé Binos (1778) and others, it is evident that many of the older trees, in the original clump at least, branch low on the trunk, which again frequently becomes divided into several stems above, so that these trees would probably not be much valued by our Himalayan timber-merchants. Maundrell, in 1699, mentions that one of the largest was  $36\frac{1}{2}$  feet in girth, and that the "spread of its boughs" was 111 feet; the Maronite Sionita states that five men could hardly fathom one, which would make the girth nearly 30 feet. Binos gives the girth at about 30 feet, and Billardiére (1789) estimates it at about 26 feet. From Dr. Hooker's observations it would appear that the rate of growth on Lebanon is very much slower than in the Himalaya.

Throughout the reports before us, especially those of Dr. Cleghorn, there is scattered much information regarding the general vegetation in the deodar region of the Punjab Himalaya, and particularly as to the more notable trees which occur there. Many of these are of European genera, such as walnut, birch, elm, ash, maple, &c., but the timber of only the ash and walnut have hitherto been found to be of much value for practical purposes. We may, therefore, pass over the whole of these as being of more botanical and general interest than of economical value, and after so much of preface come to the more immediate subject of our remarks, commencing with a short sketch of past forest operations on each of the Punjab rivers.

To begin then with the Sutlej, the eastern boundary of the Punjab in what a naturalist would call its "limited sense." Its intramontane course is divided by General Cunningham into two portions, the upper of which, comprising 280 miles from its source in distant Tibet to its junction with the Spiti river, does not interest us. The second portion of 180 miles, with a fall of 39 feet per mile, extends, mostly within the territories of the Rajah of Bissahir, from the mouth of the Spiti river to Belaspore in the low outer hills. On the upper part of this portion, as well as on a large affluent, the Baspa, lies most of the deodar in the Sutlej basin, which is of much importance in an economical point of view. The lower part of this portion of the Sutlej passes through and among the territories of various petty Rajahs.

Much of the deodar now left on this river grows in small side-glens where it is not very easily available, and the forests on the main river are, as a rule, on rather steep slopes. But the Sutlej carries a large body of water (a minimum of 5,500 cubic feet a second at its *débouchement*), and has on the whole a clear channel, well adapted for floating timber. Under these circumstances it is not very evident why felling of deodar on the large scale should only have commenced about 8 or 9 years ago, although various experiments in felling and launching from the Upper Sutlej forests had been made by the Deputy Commissioner of Simla and native traders several years before.

When felling fairly commenced, however, no time was lost, and we find that 20,000 trees are *recorded* as having been felled in the five years, 1859—1863, so that, as the records are not complete, we may safely assume that not less than 30,000 trees had been cut in these forests up to 1864, when the lease to the British Government first came into operation. Even the trees, as liberally estimated by Dr. Brandis at 58,000 of first class size now remaining (and available without great difficulty), would at that rate have been all felled in other 20 years. Nor was the mere exhaustion of the forests the only evil to be feared. For a considerable proportion of the forests examined by the inspecting officers had been felled so recklessly, and cleared so thoroughly by the native timber-merchants, that there is no chance of their reproduction by natural means within a conceivable period.

Dr. Brandis sketched a plan upon which 3,000 trees a year would be felled for each of 16 years from those forests which can be easily worked, while for the remainder of the 35 years, during which it is estimated that a second-class tree becomes a first-class on this river, the necessary fellings, probably on a reduced scale, would be effected in the more difficult forests.

But circumstances have occurred to alter this programme, for it has been found that the proper supervision of such large fellings cannot, along with other necessary work, be undertaken by a single officer. Besides this, the resources of these forests for Government purposes are being curtailed, and the operations of the forest officer hampered, by the fact that the Government of India, for certain reasons, granted the right to remove 8,000 trees to a private individual, who parted with his permit to Messrs. Brassey Wythes and Henfrey, contractors for the Delhi Railway.

The chief difficulties in working this forest Division are these:—1. The existence of several principalities and equally numerous claims to waif on the lower portion of the river, coupled with the omission in the lease of any proviso, that the British Government should have the Bissahir waif and windfall on certain fixed terms;—2. The Poari forests with certain smaller ones in Sukit territory, on the lower part of the river, are as yet beyond control of the Forest Department;—3. The very high rates for labour, and the chronic existence of a quasi-famine in the Sutlej valley; and—4. Besides the presence of much timber belonging to native traders still in the river, the existence of the large permit above alluded to. No doubt such a permit is infinitely more manageable when in the hands of Europeans than if held by Orientals. But it is still objectionable, not only because it by so much lessens the stock in hand, but because it is hardly in the nature of things, that without strict supervision any private trader will pay so much heed to leaving a sufficient number of trees standing as ought to be paid. And such supervision prevents a proportionate amount of attention being given to other duties. On the whole, as things are, it is doubtful if the Sutlej is now likely to furnish to commerce for Government, on the average of a series of years, more than 1,500 deodar trees annually, yielding 75,000 cubic feet of timber in dépôt.

Considerable interest attaches to the Biás as a source of timber-supply from the circumstance, that it is one of the only two deodar-bearing streams within British territory in the Punjab. Its forests are, however, far from extensive, and they need not detain us long. This, which is the smallest but one of the Punjab rivers, has an intramontane course of 250 miles in length, on the upper part of which, and on a large tributary, the Parbatti, the chief forests are situated. This portion of the river has a fall of about 40 feet, the lower portion having a slope of about 10 feet per mile. The minimum discharge of water at the *débouche-ment* is about 3,000 cubic feet. Besides the defective floating



powers on account of the small volume of the stream, many parts of its bed, both in Kulu, the loveliest of Himalayan valleys through which it at first winds, and among the low Siwaliks through which it afterwards pursues its devious way to the plains, are embarrassed by shallows and islands on which timber is exceedingly apt to strand or get entangled.

During the supremacy of the Sikhs, one of their Sirdars, Lena Singh, is said to have felled some deodar for export, and a story is told of his experience, which illustrates the difficulties of floating in this river and something else. A considerable number of trees had been felled, logged, and launched in a certain year, but for a long time no flood came to carry down the timber. After waiting for three or four seasons, the Sirdar bethought him of the aid of the Brahmins. So he fed them and feed them largely, and they went through invocations and *muntras* to a proportionate extent, and, as they doubtless put it, with proportionate effect. For, as luck would have it, a heavy flood came soon after, and swept the whole of the stranded logs down to the plains.

So great are the difficulties of realizing timber felled on this river, that there appear to have been only two or three attempts at felling on the large scale since the time of the Singi, as the Sikhs are generally called by the Kulu men from Sing, their favourite and distinctive cognomen. Most of these attempts were made by the Wazeer Goshaon of Mundee, and by Mr. Aratoon, an Armenian trader, who were for some time the chief deodar *exploiteurs* in the province. Thus of the few good forests on this river, some had remained untouched for export when the Forest Department commenced operations. But others again, having been left to the tender mercies of the inhabitants, had been terribly mangled. Through the mistaken benevolence, *insouciance*, or ignorance of the officer under whose charge the original settlement of Kangra was effected, it was then laid down that, though forest trees belong to Government, the whole of the *land* and its rights pertain to the villagers. This sage regulation, as may easily be conceived, is not likely to further any efforts at conservancy of trees, and if it is allowed to remain undisturbed it will effectually bar any effectual progress in this direction.

It is conjectured that within the Biás basin in the historical period not more than 5,000 deodar trees have been felled for export, and the number of trees of 6 feet girth, still remaining in 1864, was estimated at twice that number as a *maximum*. From the position of the forests, and other causes it does not appear likely that more than one-half or at most two-thirds of that

number can become available for export, even if the majority of the trees are converted into sleepers on the spot. Deodar operations here may well be supplemented by felling some of the inferior kinds of the pine-tribe. Most of the available *cheel* appears to have been felled many years ago, but there are still some forests of the lofty pine (*Pinus excelsa*) in accessible situations. The paucity of available deodar, however, and the exceedingly unfavourable character of the river for floating, are the chief difficulties in the way of working this river profitably.

On the Biás there is not much trouble from waif and such like claims of native states, the only one which has a considerable frontage on the river being Mundee. That its inhabitants, however, are not indisposed to take advantage of their position, the following little fact may show. In 1863, between six and seven hundred logs of deodar were launched in the Upper Biás by the civil officer of the district. The clever rogues in immediate charge suggested that it would be well to put the timber into the river *unmarked*, as then the want of a mark would indicate at once that the timber was the "*Sirkar's*"! So no doubt it did, for this representation being acted on, the natural consequence was that not a single log ever came into the hands of Government in the plains.

In favour of the Biás again as a permanent, though certainly not a continuously prolific source of deodar, are the facts that a fair proportion of its forests grow in situations whence timber can be easily launched, and a certain number of them on nearly level ground, where circumstances tend to promote the rapid growth of the tree, while the rate of growth generally in its basin is, as noted above, quicker than on any of the other rivers. The fact that the Biás deodar is situated within our own territory *ought* to be in their favour, but we doubt if at present it is so. For as the case stands just now, the Forest Department have practically more power over the forests we have leased from native states, than over those within the British red line. The experience of a year or two will determine whether it is better to effect considerable fellings on this river within a short time and then give the deodar a long rest, or fell very sparingly but more continuously. At present the latter would appear to be the preferable policy to pursue.

The Ravi which has 130 miles of an intramontane course, almost entirely through the hill-state of Chumba, is the smallest of the Punjab great rivers, having a minimum discharge of only 2,700 cubic feet of water. The fall per mile of that lower

portion of it within the hills, which is most important in connection with the floating of timber, is estimated at 57 feet per mile. And upon the whole, the bed of the main river (except near its issue in the plains) is better adapted for the conveyance of timber, and the floods are more effective than those of the Biás. But unfortunately a large proportion of the Ravi deodar forests lie upon small shallow and rocky tributaries. From these, unless in the case of exceptionally large floods which only happen after intervals of some years, the logs can only be got out with the aid of manual labour, when in certain places they stick fast sometimes to the number of several hundreds piled over each other in hideous and apparently inextricable confusion.

Partly, no doubt, from these circumstances it resulted that felling was not pushed so vigorously as on the Chenab to the west. But the fact of labour being tolerably abundant, and the out-turn of timber in the plains being easily supervised led to operations being commenced early here. Accordingly, we find that felling has been tolerably continuous on the Ravi from so long ago as 1839 or 1840. In 1851, was established near its *débouchement* the "Shahpore Timber Agency," for obtaining deodar from the agents of the Rajah of Chumba at certain fixed rates to supply the Government works in the plains. This arrangement having failed to fulfil its purpose, was put a stop to in 1854, and for several years longer native traders alone felled on this river. But the supply obtained through them was intermittent and unsatisfactory, and, in 1861, a Government officer commenced felling on the Ravi. In 1864, a lease of the Chenab and Ravi forests was obtained from the Rajah of Chumba, which put the forest operations on both rivers on a more satisfactory footing.

During the five years, 1861—5, upwards of 16,000 trees are recorded as having been felled for Government on the Ravi. The operations have, on the whole, been well supervised, so that there has not been such total clearing of hill-sides as in certain other cases. The river is, however, not a good one for floating, so much so that in certain seasons not a log reaches the plains within the season of felling. Government operations have been hampered also by the presence in the forests and river of much timber belonging to private contractors, as well as by boundary and waif difficulties with the Jummoo authorities near the *débouchement*. For these reasons chiefly, the working of the forests by Government has not been so successful as might have been expected, and at the present time the stock of deodar still standing is probably nearer exhaustion than on any of the other rivers.

The Chenab, one of the largest of the rivers of the Punjab, rises in the British province of Lahoul, flows through part of the Chumba and Jummoo territories, and again comes within the British boundary in the plains after an intramontane course of 380 miles. Having so long a course and draining as it does a very large basin, this river has very effective and continuous floods. One of the largest Chenab floods on record occurred in April, 1865, in consequence of land-slips from both sides having completely dammed up the river for a month previously in the lower part of Lahoul. When the dam at last broke, the discharge of water was so enormous that a bridge at Kilar, 50 miles below, and 123 feet above the river's ordinary level, was carried away. Thirty miles still further down at Gulabgurrh the water is stated to have reached a height nearly as great.

The minimum discharge of the Chenab is 4,550, and its maximum 51,000 cubic feet, and the flood is generally very regular and steady during the season of the melting of the snow. This is more favourable for floating operations than even larger floods occurring suddenly and of short duration. Its bed is, on the whole, very favourable for floating also, with an average fall on the portion with which we are most concerned of about 30 feet per mile. The deodar-bearing tracts extend for more than 100 miles along the main river, as well as on several tributaries, but we have chiefly to do with the upper 50 miles of the former within Chumba territory in Pangri, which is included in the forest-lease obtained from the Rajah.

Soon after annexation, it seems to have become known that this river was able to supply deodar largely, and so early as 1850, Mr. E. A. Prinsep (now Settlement Commissioner) then a young assistant, was sent up to Pádar to arrange for an increased quantity of timber being sent down by the Maharajah's agents. Within two or three years after this, the Armenian merchant, Aratoon, made an arrangement with the Rajah of Chumba, and commenced felling on the upper, or Pangri portion of the river. In 1854, Government also began operations there, which have since been continued annually except during the mutiny year and that following. Sultan, a great Punjab contractor, also felled largely in some of the later years, but the initiation of the lease arrangements, in 1864, put a stop to all private felling.

The deodar forests on the Pangri portion of the Chenab are of great extent, and have contained a very large quantity of timber, situated on ground whence, for the most part, launching into the main river could be accomplished without great

difficulty. The consequence of this and of the good floating character of the river, as well as of the fact that several interests were operating at the same time, has been that the fellings here were for years out of all proportion to the resources of the forests. Between Government and private traders no fewer than 23,000 deodar trees are *said* to have been felled in one year (1863). We write "*said*" advisedly, for under the circumstances anything like decent supervision was physically impossible, and it is more than probable that many of the trees paid for as felled, logged, and launched, never had an existence except in the accounts. But we can hardly estimate what margin should be left under this head, and need only state generally that in Pangri up to the end of 1855, no fewer than 82,000 trees are recorded to have been felled.

Dr. Stewart's report on this river, based on an examination made in 1865, goes to show that so far as our present knowledge of the rate of growth, &c., extends, instead of upwards of 6,000 trees a year being felled, about a third of that number would probably have been the most that the Pangri forests, as they originally were, could have stood permanently and continuously. As things now are, with only ten or fifteen thousand trees left fit for felling, and many of these, as may be supposed, on the most difficult sites for cutting and launching, the number of trees felled ought to be reduced to the very lowest number compatible with supplying the public wants. With the Public Works Department crying out for timber, and the timber-dealing middlemen crying out about prices, it will require some moral courage to adhere to this line, so long as even a thousand trees remain standing, but we trust the Punjab Government will not prove wanting.

In passing westward with our sketch of the deodar-bearing rivers of the Punjab, we will omit the portion of the Chenab and its tributaries, which lie within the territories of the Maharajah of Jummoo. A problematical estimate of the trees available on them will, however, be inserted in the general summary of the deodar still remaining. We must deal in like manner with the deodar-bearing portion of the Jhelum river (between Baramala and Uri), as well as with the Kishengunga, the largest tributary of that river, both lying within the Maharajah's territory also. Our information as to the whole of these is at present much too scanty to permit of our treating them otherwise.

To the west of the Kishengunga the Jhelum is joined by a considerable affluent, the Kunhár or Nainsookh, which rises in and flows through the British valley of Khágán. On this stream

there appears to be a considerable quantity of deodar, and so early as 1852 proposals were made to get timber thence for the Public Works Department. These were, however, over-ruled on the representation of the Deputy Commissioner that our hold on the valley was but slight, and that the Pathan Syeds, the chief men there, would probably be irritated by any attempt on our part to fell within their bounds. In 1855-6, however, the demand for timber having become greater, a number of trees were felled, under the orders of a new Deputy Commissioner, but the results were "not satisfactory." In 1860, under a third Deputy Commissioner a thousand trees were felled, but some of the details would appear not to have been perfect, and only partial success resulted.

In the meantime, in 1856-7, some attention began to be directed to the forests generally. of Huzara (in which district Khágán is situated), rules were made and an establishment sanctioned. After some years' working of these, a Deputy Commissioner stated his opinion that expenditure had been thrown away in attempting to guard wide-spread, scattered, and inaccessible tracts. In 1863, the Commissioner declared that it was essential even in Khágán to guard against the ravages of the inhabitants, and the numerous herdsmen who annually visit the valley. And later still, the Executive Engineer, who knew the district well, asserted that there was no check whatever in the the way of conservancy in these forests.

In 1863-4, a fresh effort was made in felling on the Nainsookh, but this time an officer was detained to manage operations under the Executive Engineer. He was allowed to fell 800 trees on his own account, and also felled 800 for Government. Upon the latter, with a similar number in 1864-5, there was realized a net profit of Rs. 13,000, exclusive of the cost of European supervision. Since then there has been no felling in Khágán on Government account. But it has been found that the river, though having certain disadvantages, was much better adapted for floating than was at one time supposed, the average size of logs received in depôt being, in fact, considerably greater than the average on any of the other rivers. It was also seen that, contrary to the forebodings of the "political," who, in 1852, wanted to keep the district a "close borough," the Syeds had a true Pathan relish for the pickings that came their way from the thousands of rupees that were spent in the valley in connection with these forest-operations. Accordingly, they would only be too glad that they should be continued. And as the demand for timber still continues, and will be much heavier when the Peshawur Railway comes to be constructed, its

sanction is only a question of time; Government has at last decided that this source of deodar should not remain unutilized, and we believe an officer is to be appointed to the Jhelum Division of Forests in connection with the Forest Department.

In the present very imperfect state of our knowledge as to the number of deodar trees of felling size remaining on the various rivers whose circumstances we have attempted to sketch, it requires some courage to assume any definite figure as representing the aggregate still left on the whole of these rivers. But some sort of valuation is absolutely necessary, in order to form anything like a proper estimate of the present position of forest matters in the Punjab, and we must attempt it. For the Sutlej experience has already shown that the estimate given in Dr. Brandis' report is considerably over the mark, and the actual number of trees in forests whence they can easily be removed (after deducting those to be felled by Brassey and Co.) is probably not more than 21,000. To these must be added the trees in forests on small tributaries, &c., to launch which, in log or converted, considerable expense and trouble will have to be incurred. These last do not, in all probability, amount to more than 20,000, which give an aggregate of 41,000 trees on the Sutlej.

On the Biás we cannot reckon on more than 6,000 trees, with 5,000 on the Ravi, and 8,000 on the Chenab actually available without destroying still more forests. Any number given for the Kunhar tributary of the Jhelum must be a guess rather than an estimate, but taking into account the limited deodar-bearing area, and reasoning by analogy from what we know of the other rivers, one can hardly put it down at more than 10,000 trees. This would give a total for all forests which are, or are likely to be, in the hands of the Forest Department, of about 70,000 trees. Assuming even a quicker average rate of growth than the observations as yet made warrant us in doing, and also assuming that a second class tree is growing up to replace each first class one felled, one thousand trees would at first sight appear to be the utmost number that could with safety be annually felled in all these forests. Even if we assume each tree to give the logs of sleeper length by which the size of trees is generally computed on these rivers, and each log as containing 25 cubic feet, and calculate that four-fifths of the timber launched will ultimately be realized in dépôt, and it must be remembered that all of these are exceptionally favourable averages, the annual yield of timber in the plains would be only about 100,000 cubic feet.

In order to get a rough survey of the whole, we may now make a guess at the number of deodar trees still remaining in the Maharajah's forests. These, for the Bhutna and Marroo-Wardwun rivers (tributaries of the Chenab), may be put at 3,000 and 15,000 trees respectively; for the main Chenab in Padar, &c. 15,000; for the Jhelum, 8,000; and for its tributary, the Kishengunga, 8,000; giving an aggregate of 49,000. Calculating as before, 700 trees a year might be felled continuously from which 70,000 cubic feet of timber might be expected to be realized.

As against the above estimate for Kashmir territory, it may be noted that, as the Maharajah generally accomplished his felling and launching operations on a rough and ready system through the agency of villagers and local labour, without organization, a very large proportion of the easily available trees have already been felled in his territories. The great majority of those left will, from their position or site, be more difficult to realize as timber, without the expenditure of much skill, labour, and money on the preparation of slides, conversion into sleepers on the spot, and aiding the logs down the smaller streams. Indeed, it seems more than probable that much of the deodar, now standing in Kashmir territory, will never be utilized until the forests come under European agency likely to bring into play such means as we have indicated.

But on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that for each first class deodar, now standing in those forests which are in the hands of the Forest Department, at least three first class trees have, in all probability, been felled within the last 20 years. And although a considerable number of forests have been very much injured, and some ruined by past operations, yet with the increased attention which is now being paid to conservancy, it may be hoped that at least one tree is growing up to replace each one that has been felled. And we may perhaps assume that in the same way 50,000 additional trees are in process of attaining first class size in the forests in the Kashmir territory, in the place of those that have been felled there, besides those coming up throughout the forests generally. If this be the case, then the 1,700 trees to which we have alluded is, as it were, a *minimum* maximum of trees within which the number to be felled annually need be kept. And this for only a certain number of years, even if the worst view of the case were taken and acted upon.

Again, when the forests have once more come into fairly good condition, it seems probable that with proper conservancy not less than 6,000 or 7,000 trees a year could safely be felled continuously and permanently from the Sutlej to the Jhelum



inclusive. In the same way we may assume that, had the fellings been kept within these limits and even moderate conservancy measures adopted, a supply of from 600,000 to 650,000 cubic feet of timber in the plains might have been kept up continuously. But instead of some 6,000 we have probably been felling not less than 15,000 trees a year without conservancy, and thus running through our stock much faster than the rate of reproduction would warrant, have nearly come to the end of it.

Let us now see what till within the last few years was the general method of procedure in working the forests on the various rivers at present in the hands of the Punjab Forest Department, beginning with the system adopted by native traders. The first thing to be done was to get a *parwana* or *chop* to fell a certain number of trees from the Rajah in whose territories they were. At his court, probably, much less was known of the nature and extent of the forests, than by the astute traders who crowded round the potentate begging for the mystic document. All the arts of Eastern intrigue were applied to the Rajah himself or his *wuzeers*, with whom persuasion, bribery, and, it is even whispered, the brandy bottle were not without their weight. The practice in this respect was very much the same all over as on the Sutlej. There it is officially stated that a bag of rupees properly administered, would at any time procure a *chop* to fell an indefinite number of trees in indefinite forests, although the Rajah himself in many cases saw little or nothing of the colour of the seignorage-money.

As may be supposed, forest operations in the Himalaya are, from their very nature, always difficult of control, even with European supervision, and a full regard for conservancy. And in the times of which we write, there was but little attempt at supervision of any kind. The contractor's object was to make money, so he ordered his men to cut every tree on a hill-side that was worth felling. The object of the labourers again was to get the work done, so they cut down the trees somehow, crushing the seedlings, smashing the young saplings, and felling those somewhat larger to clear a road for the logs. In a forest originally containing a large proportion of well-grown trees which had thus been operated on, it would frequently be found that only a few half-grown deodar, and a number of mangled saplings and young trees were left, many of which would be irretrievably ruined by the forest fires of the next year or two. And if the ground were suitable for cultivation, the destruction of the forest would be completed by the

zemindar who found the ground cleared of its heavy timber ready to his hand.

So much for damage to the forests, nor was that to the timber less considerable. No money or care was expended on the preparation of slides by which to remove the logs to the river from the forests. These latter often lay at considerable distances from the stream, and with very broken or precipitous ground between, and the damage done was in many cases greater than would readily be believed, unless its results had been seen by outsiders, and indeed confessed by the traders. Both Cleghorn and Brandis show the immense percentage of timber which, under this system, was frequently destroyed. Dr. Brandis describes logs of 6 feet girth split longitudinally in the mere process of rolling to the river, and mentions that 1,000 splitted logs and pieces were counted at the foot of one slide, and 250 in only a part of the course of another. Dr. Cleghorn again states that so far as he could gather from the contractors themselves, more than one-third of the timber never reached the water.

But the logs were exposed to other dangers in their transit down the river to the plains. Injury to them by dashing against rocks or against each other cannot be avoided, and a proportion of them will always be damaged in this way. There is also the detriment they may undergo from alternate wetting and drying in the sun in the process of floating down for days, and then being stranded for months in the course of a three or four years' passage to the depôt. The passage can generally be considerably hastened by sending clearing parties down the river to push off the stranded timber. But the traders, as a rule, spent little or nothing on such operations.

The chief difficulties, however, attending the passage of the logs arose not from nature but from man. The system of pilfering timber was so wide-spread and deliberate, with so little chance of detection, that some of the rivers were spoken of as *khula khizana*, open treasuries. The villagers along the bank annexed what timber they could lay hands on, each trader preyed upon his fellows, even rank giving no guarantee for fair dealing; the Rajahs or the men about them either worked their rights of waif themselves, or sold them to be worked in such a way that waif was largely manufactured by obliterating marks. In the meantime, there was no European supervision to keep down these frightful plunderings, and the traders could hope to keep going by a system of reprisals only. As means of offence and defence, the timber marks in use were multitudinous in number, and often complex in structure. Dr. Cleghorn gives drawings of 41 in

use on the Ravi by only two parties—the Rajah and a single firm of traders. And Dr. Stewart mentions that in the course of a walk round one of the depôts on the same river he noted no fewer than 30 marks. It is stated also that as many as 35 different marks were found on the timber swept into the head of the Bari Doab Canal by a single flood.

The object of each trader appears to have been, not to have one good, definite mark, registered, and so well put in as to be difficult of obliteration but to have a whole host, so that if one proved easily defaced another might perchance escape. Sometimes a good deal of ingenuity was displayed in inventing a mark which would easily embrace in some part of its structure some of the marks of other traders. Thus one clever person assumed as his mark the rude resemblance of a human figure. The face could easily be made out from the sun of another trader, while the trident of a second might be absorbed without difficulty into the hand and so on. These defacers became so dexterous at their art, that we are told of a civil officer having quietly watched the process of one mark being substituted for another, and on going up found the former had such a look of age and genuineness, that he could hardly believe his eyes. One is not very sorry to learn that the chief men engaged in this honest business, have not, as a rule, prospered. Nemesis may sleep, but does not die, even in the timber-trade.

We may now review the errors and short-comings which have been committed in connection with the operations of Government in the forests of the Punjab Himalaya. A considerable proportion of these have arisen primarily from the belief in the "inexhaustibility" of these forests, and may proximately be attributed to the attempt to do far more than could be efficiently supervised. The chief evil resulting from this confident acting on the phrase "inexhaustible" has been felling on such a scale and in such a way, as seriously to imperil the very existence of many of the forest-tracts. To so great an extent have the exhaustion and the system of selling cheap been carried, that to use the words of the Secretary to the Punjab Government in the Public Works Department, the resources which should have been husbanded for succeeding generations, have been expended in a few years, unknown to Government or the public, and Government has not only been getting insufficient remuneration for its past operations, but has still the prospect of making large future payments in order to ensure the conservancy of the forests.

As the forests were "inexhaustible" no plan whatever was laid down, but "an army of moonshees, mates, and contractors"

was turned adrift over a tract of fifty miles in length in one of the most difficult parts of the Himalaya. No detailed supervision could have been put in practice, and the contractors naturally chose those trees that were so situated as to be most easily felled and launched. Year by year in many cases they went over the same forests, where as a matter of course the trees to be felled were year by year further from the river, and more difficult to launch. The necessary consequence is, that only the more difficult forests or more difficult parts of certain forests have been left unfelled, and much more money and labour must be expended on their removal than the average expended formerly.

But this is hardly the worst. As the essential conditions for successful reproduction were not cared for or understood,—and indeed it was hardly necessary to pay much attention to such a point in “inexhaustible” forests,—no precautions whatever were taken, that natural reproduction should have a fair chance. The rule appears to have been to “fell every full-sized tree that can be “launched,” and of the trees in individual forests fulfilling these conditions, the contractors, of course, selected those which were nearest the river, from which they were annually working their way further up the hill.

It would have been difficult to devise a better system than the above for giving the fullest possible scope to the circumstances adverse to reproduction, which are mentioned by Dr. Brandis as apt to follow indiscriminate felling. The ground has often been over-cleared, so that the deodar seedlings have not the shade and shelter, which are almost essential to their welfare. Scrub has, as usual, followed the axe, and helped to choke the weakly plants, and fires have had full swing. Forest fires of weeks' duration are recorded on the Ravi. We need hardly say that while the inexpediency of obstructing the natural reproduction of deodar was not appreciated, no systematic or continuous efforts were made to determine the best method for its artificial reproduction. The success of such attempts as were made, was in proportion, and the sowing experiments of forest officers were for the most part as uncertain and unlucky as those of outsiders. One of the earliest of the latter on record may be given as illustrating the generally unsuccessful results of all. In 1845, 20,000 deodar are mentioned as having been planted out, of which after eight months only 800 were alive, and even of these it is believed that none now remain. Dr. Stewart states that so far as his knowledge goes, no experiments in the artificial reproduction of deodar have as yet succeeded on any other than a gardening scale.

The management of the depôts, including the stoppage of the timber at the upper or catching depôts, its rafting from these to the lower or selling depôts, with its receipt, manipulation, and sale there, is a complicated affair. This is especially the case on the Chenab, where for the longest time the largest Government operations have been carried on. And it is to the credit of the officers concerned that the mere system of management and record is reported to be, on the whole, complete and satisfactory. But here laudation ceases, for as to the mercantile part of the matter, the system appears to have been arranged and worked chiefly for the benefit of the buyers.

The order from the beginning seems to have been to get down abundance of timber and sell it cheap, and too low prices have been the rule up to nearly the present time. Three or four years ago a tariff of selling rates was approved, the chief results of which appear to have been, to facilitate the work of the officer in charge, in dealing with cantankerous railway employés, and to let the wood go cheaper than its actual value. There seems no question that Government have lost largely by these tariff rules, which appear hardly to have been sufficiently elastic, so as easily to accommodate themselves to the rising price of deodar timber. And that they were invariably lower than the normal rate, is sufficiently clear from the fact that the rates of the Maharajah of Jummoo, (the other chief timber merchant of the western Punjab) were always higher than those of Government, and yet he sold his timber readily. Only the supposition that the tendency to sell too cheap has not yet been quite extinguished, can account for the fact that quite recently selected sleepers on the Ravi were being sold by Government on the large scale at Rs. 2-8 each, while within a hundred miles the Railway Company were paying Rs. 4, and it is said as much as Rs. 4-8.

Another serious evil, which seems to have largely pervaded the system, was the almost total absence of record except such as the accounts demanded. This want is of much more consequence than the mere statement of the fact would indicate. A young officer joining for the first time is left to pick up the *whole* of his knowledge from tardy experience owing to a want of careful record, and many years of opportunity have been lost for working out some problems of importance. Amongst these is the determination of the average time necessary for logs to complete the passage from the forests to the depôt. The elaborate system of marking and record applied by Messrs. Brassey Wythes and Henfrey in their operations on the Sutlej in 1866, put to shame all attempts of the Government officers in

this direction, and if the system of the former appears somewhat too elaborate to pay, in all its details, yet this is an error on the right side.

And the cloud of past shortcomings of Government forest officers has not been unrelieved by gleams of genius sometimes emitted by men from whom we might have expected common sense at least! Thus we have had an elaborate plan with drawings and estimates for a magnificent and safe timber-slide, to remove the logs from a single forest, and only to cost ten thousand rupees! Then it was proposed and urged that the logs should, in certain cases, be launched over the snow, as is done in some other countries. It must be presumed that their conditions are very different from those existing in the Himalaya, for in the one or two cases in which this method was attempted on our rivers, the logs merely flopped through the snow and stuck in the ravine beneath. A proposal was also made that, in order to prevent the logs rushing down a steep slide with violence and detriment from dashing against rocks, they should be slid down before they were cleared of branches. As against this plan, the labourers not unreasonably objected that if it was attempted to launch logs in this way, they would either not move at all, or when they did slide, they would sweep along with them the whole of the men employed on the work. But the brightest gleam of all was that emitted by an officer who found that logs were apt to be stranded in masses behind rocks, in ravines, and small streams, and accordingly he proposed that they might advantageously be heaved over the obstacles by means of balloons!

Notwithstanding the errors, however, which have been committed in the conduct of the past operations of the Government Forest Agency, it is well to remember that it has on the Chenab and Ravi hitherto cleared its own expenses, while it has, to a large extent, fulfilled the purpose for which it was instituted. This purpose was to get down abundance of timber, and that not too dear, for great public works. From the Chenab and Ravi the immense supply of timber necessary for barracks, bridges, and other buildings, public and private, throughout great part of the Punjab, has been supplied at low rates for many years. Nor did the system as regards supply break down, when to the former demand was superadded that for the Punjab Railway, which, in the period from 1st May 1859 to 1st May 1865, received the enormous quantity of 1,350,000 cubic feet of deodar from the Chenab alone.

It was in 1861 that the Government of the Punjab saw the necessity of taking action in the matter of forest

conservancy. Dr. Cleghorn, who had been conservator of Forests in Madras for some years, was deputed to the Punjab to investigate the whole question, and spent two years in the province. The result of his labours is contained in the Report presented to the Punjab Government in 1864, and which is now before us. It is not too much to say that his investigations have paved the way for what is being and still must be done for forest conservancy in the province, and the Report contains a store of valuable information bearing on this subject, in a form suitable for reference.

It was seen that in forests like these, situated on rivers running along narrow valleys and following a long course among several principalities out into the plains, the existence of different interests in connection with forest operations causes endless wrangling, leading to lax notions on the subject of property in timber, and dishonest practices in the case of natives, or to violent procedure in the case of Europeans. It was also evident that if Government could get into its hands the forests on several of the great rivers, coincident advantages would accrue, such as the experience derived on one river being brought to bear on others, and the gradual formation of an uniform system with the necessary local modifications. In this way not only would the work be more systematically and satisfactorily performed, but Government would necessarily be in a far better position for knowing the timber resources of the province, and how these resources were being utilized.

Accordingly, during and in consequence of Dr. Cleghorn's investigations, arrangements were made for obtaining long leases of the forests in the Chumba and Bissahir territories, and for working, besides the Chenab and Ravi in the former (which had been partly worked for Government for several years), the Biás in British territory, the Sutlej in Bissahir, and the Jhelum tributary, the Nainsookh also in our own territory. The whole of these operations were to be under a conservator, (to which office Dr. Stewart was appointed) who, besides seeing to the general administration of forests proper, should act as technical adviser to the local Government on all matters connected with timber, fuel, and arboriculture.

We may here refer to a few of the minor improvements which have been introduced of late years, since more attention was directed to these matters, and since the organization of the Department. The area in which felling takes place is being contracted, and the number of trees felled is being gradually brought lower so as more nearly to approximate to the present capabilities of the forests. For years the same rate appears to

have been paid for felling each tree of whatever size, and the consequence was that the contractors and labourers were tempted to fell the smaller trees in preference. Within the last few years a tariff of felling rates according to size has been introduced, which, with increased attention to selection, has almost entirely prevented under-sized trees from being felled. Cross-cutting the logs by saw instead of axe-cutting is being introduced in certain cases, and greater care is also paid to marking the logs according to the years of felling. When possible, also, a branded mark has been introduced, which is less liable than an axe-mark to erasure by accident or to designed alteration.

As much of the timber as can be got down of large size, is being cut up into long beams and logs (long timber commanding a much enhanced price in the market) with good effect, as is shown by the increased sizes of the logs received in dépôt. Great efforts have been made to launch the timber formerly left lying in the forests, and along with this more careful enumerations have been effected of the logs so left. No labour or expense has been spared in adapting to their purpose the slides made of late years. Most of these have been very successful in enabling the timber to be launched from difficult places, and one of them is characterized by the conservator, as "probably the best timber-slide ever constructed in the Hima-laya." Considerable trouble and money is also being spent in some of the forest districts on roads and bridges, which are likely to be useful not only in forest-operations, but for the inhabitants at large.

Operations have for three seasons been in progress on the Biás and Sutlej, (as well as the Chenab and Ravi), and although there has not yet been time for much of the timber to reach dépôt, there is every reason to hope for successful results. An officer has been sanctioned for the Jhelum Division, under whom operations on the Nainsookh will probably commence in 1867. And along with all the executive work done, perhaps not the smallest result arrived at of late years is that the imminent state of exhaustion of the forests on some of the rivers is now fully appreciated, if not quite gauged. So that having arrived at a fairly approximate estimate of the stock of timber still left standing, the extent of felling operations on all the rivers can now be modified in accordance with the number of trees left, and the average rate of growth of deodar.

In order to exclude other interests from the forests to be worked by Government, leases for long terms were, in 1864, completed for the whole of the forests in the Chumba and



Bissahir States, which gives to the British Government as lessee tolerably complete command of the timber resources of the upper part of the Chenab, of the Ravi, and of the Sutlej. Since these leases were obtained, it has been found that in several respects advantageous modifications might be made, if the work had to be done again. Thus the Chumba lease is for 20 years, and is renewable on the same terms by the British Government for four more successive periods of similar length, which is probably sufficient. But the lease of the Bissahir forests is only for fifty years with no proviso as to renewal. And as the average period of growth of a first-class deodar there is considerably over that period, there is no great temptation for the Government to undertake large measures for artificial reproduction.

In these leases there are some superfluous matters, such as the insertion of a seignorage rate for Birch, the wood of which is almost useless on the spot, and is not likely to pay for export to the plains. Several of the defects which have been discovered in working the leases, have arisen from a want of definiteness which, to a certain extent, was perhaps unavoidable under the novel circumstances of the case. Thus, it is evident that the lessee should have some power of demarking and specially reserving some of the more valuable forests, where the reproduction of young trees is apt to be interfered with. But in the leases there is no proviso as to reserving and fencing even plantations made at the expense of Government, far less such forests as those alluded to. In neither lease are the rights of the inhabitants to trees so clearly defined as they should be; nor is it laid down what power of check the Forest Department shall have over the indents sent in by the Rajahs for what trees they want; nor is it clearly defined *what* aid the Rajahs are to give forest officers in the apprehension of criminals. In the Chumba lease it is specially laid down, that a certain proportion of the seignorage paid shall be spent on conservancy and forest roads, but there is no such proviso in the Bissahir lease, and both would have been much more complete, had it been stipulated that the British Government was to have the waif and windfall on all the rivers each year at certain rates. The last omission has already led to difficulties, and will be apt to lead to more.

One of the most delicate questions with which forest officers have to deal is in regard to felling the trees of forests or clumps in which temples are situated. As is well known, the original form (*debi-diar*) of the best-known name of the deodar, is derived from the supposed sacredness of the tree. This name, however, is not restricted to the *cedrus*, which

indeed is not held equally sacred among the Hindoos throughout the tract where it grows. Towards the east where the tree is rare, it seems to be held in considerable sanctity. Madden mentions that during the Goorkha invasion of Kumaon, some men of one of their detachments felled deodar trees in a temple-grove, in consequence of which, as the people affirm, a fatal epidemic broke out among the troops, and the wrath of the deity was only appeased by the presentation to her shrine of two golden models of a deodar tree. But in the west, where the tree is much more common, its sanctity is not nearly so high. Even in so-called temple-groves and temple-forests, *i. e.* where a temple has been built among or close by deodar, as affording a pleasant shady site, the inhabitants refrain from felling the tree (except for temple purposes) only in the immediate vicinity of the temple itself,—and this because as they state, they fear the vengeance of the deity falling on *them* if they fell close to the temple. In a recent case in Chumba, however, where the relations of the depôt with the people were complicated by circumstances of a personal and peculiar nature, the inhabitants assembled to the number of some hundreds, and obstructed a young forest officer on his way with a working party to fell in a certain forest. The officer himself was hustled, and some of his men were nearly killed. It is needless to say that the trees were eventually felled. Only a week or two previously an analogous case had occurred in a neighbouring part of the Chumba State, when the inhabitants objected to a certain forest being felled. They, however, took the legitimate step of representing their objections to the Rajah, through whom and the Forest Department the matter was amicably settled.

The chief error which has been committed in connection with one of these leases is, that a minimum payment of Rs. 20,000 annually is assured to the Rajah of Chumba, irrespective of the number of trees that may be felled. This sum is equivalent to the seignorage on about 5,000 deodar trees, the local Government equally with the Supreme Government, as is stated, being unaware at the time of making the agreement that the number of trees left in Chumba territory is quite insufficient to permit any thing like that number being felled during each of the next twenty years. Probably 1,500, or at the utmost 2,000 only, can be felled on the average annually during that period, inclusive of those which will attain first-class size within twenty years. It is asserted that the Government could not have got the lease on any easier terms. But although it was worth something to rescue the remainder of these forests from the destruction which awaited

them, and to get them thoroughly in hand, so as to be able to do something for their conservancy and reproduction, the price is undoubtedly extravagant. And had Government, at the time the negotiations were in progress, known as much of the exhaustion of the Chumba forests as we believe we now do, it might have been a question whether it would not have been preferable to let the work of devastation go on for five or six years more, and *then* to have got the lease on infinitely lower terms. As it is, there is a strong inducement for the British Government to exercise the greatest possible economy as to the deodar still standing in Chumba, and for the Forest Department to try to introduce more largely the use of the inferior pines, which are abundant and almost untouched in many parts of the State.

Under the two leases, there are now in the hands of Government officers all the deodar tracts of the Punjab Himalaya of any great moment, excepting those which belong to the Maharajah of Kashmir. We have already alluded to the probable amount of timber still standing in his dominions. His deodar-bearing rivers comprise, 1, the Siawa and Uj, two small tributaries of the lower Ravi; 2, the lower part of the main Chenab within the Himalaya, (in Pádar and Kishtwar districts) with two considerable tributaries, the Bhutna and the Marroo-Wurdwun; and 3, the Jhelum or Behut for some miles below Baramula, with a large tributary, the Kishungunga. The Ravi tributaries are of no great importance, but the existence of large tracts of deodar in the Chenab and Jhelum basins in the hands of the Maharajah, has been and must be a source of difficulties. Some day it may be deemed advisable to get a lease of these also, the more especially because, as we have already hinted, much of the timber now left standing will be removable only by methods and systems not likely to be put in practice by His Highness's agents.

A new system of forest accounts has been put in force for the Punjab, which will probably produce good results, not only in checking expenditure, but in keeping the Government and the conservator thoroughly informed of the progress of work. The system has, however, hardly had a fair trial as yet, seeing that soon after its initiation, the audit of forest accounts was made over to the Accountant-General. It seems doubtful if the audit may not have to be re-transferred to the Controller of accounts in the Public Works Department, whose establishment is accustomed to deal with a system much more akin to that of the Forest Department than is that of the Accountant-General. The travelling allowances of the Department in the Punjab,

as throughout India, have been remodelled on a fairly liberal scale, the Government of India conceiving that liberality in this respect "would best serve the interests of Government and of the forests." The pay of the Department generally, however, has hardly come under the operation of this principle yet, and much remains to be done before the officers will be satisfied with their position and prospects. Such satisfaction is hardly to be looked for until with more liberal rates of pay, and larger powers, the Department for the whole of India shall have been organized into one body, so that inter-provincial promotions can readily be effected, and the Department acquire a union and stability which it at present wants.

It is now time to touch lightly on some of the difficulties which the Department has met and still must meet. And we may commence with those which are more strictly connected with conservancy, than with timber felling or timber dealing. Conservancy difficulties in the regions with which the Department has to deal, result chiefly from the inveterate tendency of the inhabitants to waste and maltreat the deodar in all possible ways. This tendency again arises from the circumstance, that in time past there was abundance of deodar with no restriction on its use. But all that is or must be changed. No sooner has the deodar seedling shown above ground than its trials commence. People whose interests lie the other way, or whose observation is not acute, will deny that these are grazed down, but ocular demonstration, the existence of thousands of cropped plants with the otherwise unaccounted for disappearance of millions more, are sufficient to prove that cattle, and especially sheep and goats, are very destructive to the deodar. If any one doubts that the domestic quadrupeds browse on deodar, he has only to inspect those young trees which were planted out by the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab near his house at Dhurmsala, and his scepticism will vanish. There is no point in connection with forestry in Europe on which more stress is justly laid than the damage done to young trees by cattle.

Still greater injury is done by forest fires. Dr. Falconer stated that, so far as his observation went, these are almost always wilful, and in this we quite agree with him. Even in the outer Himalaya, as in the plains, miles of country may at certain seasons be seen in a blaze, or with all the lower vegetation charred and scorched from recent conflagration. These fires are lighted by the people chiefly in order that the old grass being burned down, the new crop may get full scope to come up. We have, however, been assured by a tea-planter of large

experience, that grass comes up much more abundantly and richly, though perhaps not quite so early, in places where fires have not been permitted, as they destroy a large proportion of the seed with the dry grass.

The old trees also are much injured by these fires which often serve to check vegetation for a time. And whole hill-sides may be seen on which every tree has the fire-scar, a peculiar mark generally observed on the upper side of the tree where fires have been frequent. Sometimes even the larger trees are killed by these quasi-accidental fires, and large patches of dead trunks are frequently seen in the Himalayan forests, arising from this cause.\* When the object is to cultivate the forest-land, branches, &c., are heaped up round the trunks of the trees, in order that the fire may effectually kill the latter. Where timber is plentiful with no restriction on its use, it would be too much trouble to fell and stub out these, and the Charred remains may be seen standing for many years, gaunt memorials of what may once have been a magnificent forest.

When the deodar saplings have attained some size, the inhabitants, as a matter of course, cut them for the most trivial purposes in preference to any others, and near villages, considerable tracts may be seen with nothing but small saplings and sapling-stumps. Of the larger trees again, the smaller branches are often unmercifully lopped for litter, &c., until in some cases, as may be well seen at places in the neighbourhood of Simla, the trees resemble attenuated brooms, and as a bough of sufficiently large size is more easy to fell and dress than a trunk, the large branches are in some places lopped off so severely, that the conservator speaks of certain forests where the trees are "more like old gnarled mulberry-trees than the generally shapely deodar." The trunks again are stripped of their bark to make shielings, and are hacked for fire-kindling or torches, after either of which processes the forest fires injure them more easily. The tree is very patient under this mangling, and one of 15 feet girth is mentioned of which half the trunk had been cut away piece-meal, and only two strips of bark, each of less than a foot broad, remained, but still the tree was verdant on that side.

The timber of the deodar is employed by the inhabitants in the most lavish way, giant-trunks being often employed as bridges over tiny rills, and it is often used for purposes, such as making tubs and the manufacture of charcoal, for which the wood of the inferior pines or other trees would do equally well. The use of the saw is unknown, and although there is probably little or no waste when the timber is slivered up into thin

shingles, yet the expenditure of timber is great when small beams or thick planks, such as are employed in native house-building, are hacked by the axe out of the trunks of large trees.

Certain of the obstructions in the way of the Forest Department are connected with the locality and the climate of the places where the forest work lies. The mere geographical difficulties are by no means trifling, as they involve troublesome delays and mistakes in correspondence, orders, accounts, and the transmission of cash. Population and cultivation are generally scanty in these Himalayan valleys, and famines are normally of common occurrence. In almost every case not only the labourers employed in forest-operations, but much of the food for them also has to be imported from a distance.

Heavy snow sometimes occurs so early as to interfere with the due termination of the work. In these parts of the Himalaya, above 6,000 feet, the snow-fall is in most places exceedingly heavy. In order to avoid the danger from snow-slides and avalanches on the steep mountain, the people very often build their villages on ridges rather than in hollows. Even heavy snow-storms, however, have their compensation for the people, since if they knock down the houses, they also bring down plenty of windfall wood with which to repair them. The snow-fall in the winter, 1864-5, was exceedingly heavy on all the rivers, and avalanches very frequent in some parts. On the Pangi portion of the Chenab no fewer than 160 lives are said to have been lost by avalanches in that winter. Fifty people were overwhelmed in one hamlet, of whom twenty were dug out alive from under many feet of snow after being entombed from 2 to 9 days. The destruction of timber was very great, as many as 30,000 logs of windfall having been launched in consequence.

One of the most fruitful sources of trouble arises from the possession of waif-rights by the various Rajahs. Government has decided, and rightly, that all "unmarked timber" in our territory is waif, and as such belongs to Government. And the same rule must of necessity hold good in regard to the various small feudatory states along the great rivers. These waif-rights are either managed direct by the somewhat unscrupulous agents of the chiefs, or are leased to still more unscrupulous traders of the class above alluded to, who wish for their own purposes to retain a footing of some kind on the rivers. The terms on which these waif-rights on the Sutlej have been offered to Government are too exorbitant to be met. For it is not yet fully appreciated, that in future, with more careful working of the forests, and in particular

more attention to correct marking of the logs, the annual amount of waif should comprise but little except a few wind-fall trees. The fact that the aggregate paid to the chiefs for these waif-rights on this river was formerly equal to the price of some 2,500 or 3,000 good logs, indicates that the demoralizing practice of manufacturing waif by obliterating marks was not unknown. ●

Notwithstanding such obstructions to its operations from without, it might be expected that the Department would at least have reasonable scope within our own territory. But so far is this from being the case, that the Forest Department has had no control whatever over any forests in British territory, until within a very short time, when a beginning was made upon a most limited scale. The Secretary of State has laid it down that the Department should not be stinted in power, and the local Government has fully endorsed that principle, so that the fault must lie elsewhere. One reason of the reluctance to make over charge of forests or local powers to the Department is a belief that its operations must tend to oppress the people. Oppression, however, will not necessarily follow such transfers, and the best check upon it is that the forest officers work as much as possible in concert and consultation with civil officers. But it is not easy to reach the stage of amicable co-operation while a feeling prevails, that is exemplified by the remark of a Commissioner in respect to the management of waif-timber, that he "doubted" if a separate officer could do the work so well as the district "officers." As if, because the Punjab is a non-regulation province, the principle of the division of labour must be a mistake! And yet it is not an unquestioned fact that district officers can do all kinds of forest work in the best possible way, for we find a high civil authority stating that they want the aid of a forest officer (subordinated to them of course!) in making out classified lists of the various kinds of forests (in which they had failed) in doing the same thing for the kinds of trees, in arranging scales of seignorage, and in order to supply the want of special knowledge in thinning, pruning, &c.;—a goodly list, almost sufficient to indicate the necessity of instituting a special Department.

In order to exemplify the necessity that for the protection of hill-forests within our territory some other arrangements are necessary than those now prevailing, we may give one or two statements made by civil officers within the last few years regarding the hill-forests of Rawul Pindee, in which district there is a considerable extent of wooded hills. Several officers

concurred in the belief that the members of the large Forest Establishments were by no means confined to their regular duties. It was asserted to be absolutely essential that an endeavour should be made to *interest* the zemindars in the work of taking care of the forests, and this at a time when they were enjoying what we must call "black mail" in the shape of a considerable percentage on all receipts on "condition of aiding conservancy," *i. e.*, in order to prevent forest-offences by themselves! And the Commissioner stated that the native officials cannot be made to comprehend the importance of forest-conservancy, European officers have no time to attend to it, nor are they sufficiently long in the place to do it justice, and "nothing more unsatisfactory than the present state of things can be conceived."

Concerning the forest of Kangra again acres of foolscap must have been covered. In that district a most elaborate system for the conservancy of the *whole* of the immense forest area was introduced. There also the same "black-mail" system was in still more luxuriant force, and we find that in a single quarter there would be several hundred cases of breach of forest rules tried, a circumstance, as we conceive, quite sufficient to condemn the system. There have, no doubt, been an ample sufficiency of forest rules framed, and plenty of establishments sanctioned in the province. And in certain districts since the demand became heavier, and more attention has been directed to the subject, much larger sums have been collected for seignorage. But not rules, nor establishments, nor receipts, imply conservancy, with regard to which it does not seem evident that there has, of late years, been any improvement whatever. We find the conservator stating that in the Salt Range, on every hill where felling and fires were nominally prohibited, he either saw them going on, or observed their recent marks, while the top of one "preserved" hill had been denuded of most of its few trees, to burn lime for the district officer's bungalow. *Quis custodiet!*

Nor do the experiences of district officers with European timber dealers seem to have been happier, even since increased attention was directed to forest management. For we find it stated that within the year 1865, as many as three permits to fell deodar on the large scale had been granted by district officers, contrary to the wish and, in some cases, the direct orders of Government. Is it asking too much that the management of these valuable forests should be put entirely in the hands of officers whose whole attention is directed to such subjects, and who will be judged by results as



to *conservancy*, and that no district officer or superintendent of a State should have the power to grant permits to fell deodar?

We are tempted to give one more example of management under different circumstances, *viz.*, by the so-called local committee of a hill-sanatorium. Close to Dalhousie lies the large forest of Kálatop, which at one time contained a considerable quantity of deodar. For several years after the station of Dalhousie was established, *viz.* up to 1861, the contractors and others who built houses there had a "good time" in Kálatop. They appear to have felled trees at random, and bought and sold them to each other, without reference to the Rajah, or the payment of any fixed seignorage to him. But the Rajah began to bestir himself on the last point, the cry arose that deodar was getting scarce, and an effort was made to shut the stable-door by which the steed was being stolen. The deodar was estimated at eighteen or twenty thousand trees, (when in reality they did not exceed a fourth of that number), and no limit was put on the number to be felled each year in the rules which were promulgated. Each applicant still got as many as he wanted, so that nearly 500 trees a year were being felled, on payment of a small seignorage fee for each. Of this part went to the Rajah, but much under what he said was his due, and below what the Government were paying to His Highness for a deodar felled in the wildest part of the Ravi with no local demand whatever. The remainder was ordered to be applied to making roads to and through the forests, and to the conservancy of the latter. But after paying for a chuprassy or two, the whole was absorbed into the general Dalhousie Fund whence it has not been disgorged. Recently, however, the Lieutenant-Governor has interfered, and ordered the rate per tree to be more than doubled, so that the Rajah may get his proper seignorage, and some adequate provision may be made for the care of the forest. Rules have also been prepared under which may be ensured a continuous and permanent supply up to the limits of its capabilities, unless it be again made over to the tender mercies of a quasi-municipal committee, consisting of greedy householders who are always too apt to say with Sir Boyle Roche, "Never mind posterity, what has posterity done for us?"

Nor are some of the circumstances of a forest officer's existence calculated to make men take kindly to it. Many of them have to spend an isolated, nomadic kind of life, far from their fellows and from all the resources and amenities of civilization, at times shut out from intercourse with Europeans by snowy passes across which a post only finds its way after the

interval of a month or two. They have much to suffer from the elements, exposed under canvas to heat, cold, and wet for many weeks at a time, so much so, indeed, that none but the best constitutions aided by temperance can stand it. During the present year no fewer than five officers have been ill, some of them seriously so. Then there is much climbing in *pulas* (sandals) up dangerous slides, where men are "expended" every year, frequent crossing of twig and swing bridges, a great deal of travelling on, perhaps, the worst thoroughfare paths in the world, varied by occasional floating on *mussucks* and rafts. Nor are other dangers unknown, for not many months ago a labourer was attacked by a bear almost at the side of a forest officer to the imminent risk of the life, and the abolition of the nose of the former. So great altogether are the risks to life, that it has been found difficult or impossible for a forest officer to initiate a Life Assurance policy.

Then the expenses of living far in the interior are by no means light. There have been officers in the Punjab forests capable of wonderful endurance and frugality, said to be able for "twenty coss a day" and a week's journey, dressed in a *Guddie's* coat, and without tent, bed, or any kit beyond a blanket and a teapot. But those were the early days of forest work in the province, and the pioneer-period is long past; most of the necessities of life are now very dear and almost every luxury from the plains costs fifty to a hundred per cent. additional for carriage. Extra servants have to be kept as there are extra duties, such as making grass sandals, and each man receives much higher pay than in the plains. For his expenses also are greater owing to the scarcity and dearness of food, and the necessity for warm clothes, not to mention that he also feels the isolation of a life where he has no bazar to go to, in which to retail the *gup* he delights in.

There is, however, much that is enjoyable in the life of a forest officer. Most of it is spent by great rivers amid beautifully picturesque or stupendously grand scenery, including some of the finest "peaks, passes, and glaciers" of the old world; and there is frequently good shooting within reach. Then the work is invigorating and the climate generally bracing, so that if the constitution is sound, the physique gets "as hard as nails." There is much independence, and something of a picnic feeling pervading the mode of life, and the surrounding circumstances are such as to teach self-reliance and readiness of resource. From the geographical and other conditions of the work, one enjoys a considerable amount of official independence, which suits most men very well, although even in the Forest Depart-

ment there is quite enough of "*nuksha*" to satisfy the cravings of any one.

We shall now review shortly the future duties and prospects of the Punjab Forest Department. As these, to a considerable extent, depend upon the correctness of the estimates made of trees still standing, it may be remarked that even if a margin of a hundred per cent. additional be allowed, the case is still sufficiently serious. The Punjab Government appear fully to understand and appreciate the imminent exhaustion of most of these forests, but they have observed that "with increased experience it may be expected that expenditure will diminish." Now it appears to us that if the work is to be properly done, any such deminution is nearly hopeless under present arrangements. The minimum seignorage payment of Rs. 20,000 to the Chumba Rajah, and the excess of expenditure on canal arboriculture, press heavily on the Department. What timber is available must even with the increased cost of launching, &c., which is now inevitable, be supplied for great public purposes. And, above all, within the next few years much has to be learned and done for conservancy proper, for which considerable establishments must be kept up, if we mean to do our duty to these forests.

Supposing the amount of the deodar resources to be at all near what we have estimated them, there seems no probability that the requirements will diminish much in the future, for a considerable time at least. There is a larger demand than heretofore by well-to-do natives for building purposes, there is as yet no tendency to a diminution in the wants of the Public Works Department and as, for most localities, pot-sleepers are not looked upon with favour, wooden-sleepers must be supplied for the projected lines, and for renewal on those already constructed. Even if the unprepared timber of *cheel* (*Pinus longifolia*) had been found to answer for sleepers, we do not believe that the numbers of that tree now remaining are sufficient to warrant our expecting much aid from it. It is true there are abundant stores of *Kail* (*P. Excelsa*) and the other inferior pines still standing, but these are generally so far in the interior, that they would probably, on the average, cost as much as deodar has done to bring them down to the plains, excepting in the item of seignorage. When some system cheaper than kyanizing, and yet as effectual for preserving timber, shall have been discovered, this aspect of the question will be somewhat altered, but at present we can hardly calculate on that contingency.

The only tree growing abundantly in the plains of the province, whose timber has yet been found to furnish good and

durable sleepers is the *kikkar* or *babool*. It is, however, nowhere to be found of very large size in the Punjab, as the trees are in demand for agricultural purposes. And it is stated that sleepers of this wood imported from Sind, the nearest source of supply, will cost considerably more than deodar sleepers as yet do. Doubtless in forming and managing fuel plantations of *kikkar*, the possibility that a proportion of the trees when they have attained sufficient size may come into use for sleepers, will be kept in mind, but this is a contingency which the present generation of officials can hardly trust to.

In regard to the measures to be taken in behalf of conservancy, one of the initial steps to be carried out by degrees is to demark all the more valuable deodar forests, and to reserve part of them, particularly those where young trees are numerous, or when planting out or sowing has been done. Such measures for artificial reproduction need hardly be undertaken on a large scale, until there is greater certainty as to the best methods to be followed. The results of recent attempts, however, have been so far encouraging, and these should be continued and extended, pending the arrival of a skilled officer from Europe whose appointment has been sanctioned. The attempts at growing larch also should be carefully continued, though it is probable that deodar will continue to be the mainstay of timber supply from the north-west Himalaya. It is especially the less necessary to make very great efforts at the artificial reproduction of deodar, as it is agreed by many authorities, Messrs. Edwards, Barnes, and Batten, and Drs. Cleghorn and Stewart, that conservancy of forests already existing, with care that natural reproduction in them has fair play, is preferable to attempting to form new forests by planting or sowing. When operations for artificial reproduction come to be undertaken on a large scale, the conservancy share of the seignorage will be of great use as far as Chumba is concerned, in the forest-lease of which only the proviso of one rupee per tree for this purpose was introduced.

At some future period or in some special cases, it will be well to have recourse to some of the more advanced and elaborate systems pursued in Europe. And when means permit, the "improving fellings" of the French, by which the inferior kinds of trees are removed so as to give the deodar full scope, will probably be introduced. With these last may be combined the felling of the inferior pines, in order to supplement the supply of, and lessen the drain upon, deodar. Of the former only, a few hundred *kail* have as yet been felled (chiefly on the Ravi). And although a considerable quantity of this timber comes down as windfall, yet the logs are generally not in good

condition: It will thus be advisable to fell the inferior pines tentatively on a considerable scale, in order fully to test the market-value of clean, sound logs, and, if possible, as the price of deodar rises, to get the timber of the former into use for many purposes for which the latter alone is now employed.

Efforts must also be made to get down a larger proportion of the more remunerative long logs, to attain more perfect marking so as to lessen the quantity of waif and the probability of annexation *en route*, with a greater number of distinctive marks of the year of felling, the class of timber (felled or windfall), so as gradually to attain a larger knowledge on various points of importance than we yet possess. As we mentioned above, the practice of Messrs. Brassey Wythes and Henfrey has already thrown into the shade the past doings of Government forest officers in some of these details. For the future also it is both necessary and expedient that much greater attention should be paid to the formation of slides for the timber than heretofore, the problem being, especially as to the more difficult forests in which alone much standing timber now remains on the older rivers, to get down the greatest quantity of wood *safe* at a minimum cost.

It will now be advisable also to test more fully certain methods, which hitherto there has been no great occasion to bring into play, owing to the comparative ease with which the timber could be launched in logs. On the Ravi, a good deal of timber has recently been converted into sleepers and beams before launching, and it will by and bye be necessary to saw up many trees into sleeper-pieces and small logs in the forests, where the launching is very difficult, or the stream not very full. A portable saw-mill was projected for the upper Chenab, but the scheme was given up as not likely to be remunerative. A large saw-mill driven by water, situated at Madhopore at the *débouchement* of the Ravi, was for some time in the hands of forest officers. But the supervision of such work is hardly the most legitimate duty for them, and the Deputy Conservator stated that it did not pay. The Canal Department contended that it had paid, and undertook to prove it, so to the satisfaction of both parties it was made over to the latter two years ago.

On the rivers again the practice ought to be much more frequently followed of sending parties, with an officer when possible, down or up the stream, in order to note stranded timber, and float it off when possible, as well as to show the people that the establishments are on the alert against purloiners. Keeping down misappropriation of timber and fraud is, in truth,

one of the most important duties which the establishments of the Department in its present stage have to perform. And in order to aid in this, Government should, if need be, *insist* on the chiefs, major and minor, along the rivers, whether we have leased their forests or not, allowing our forest officers to exercise the same magisterial powers as they may possess within our own territories. This is an object of sufficient importance materially and morally to warrant the Government in something other than a milk and water policy in carrying it out. These native chiefs should also be induced to make and carry out a decent set of waif-rules, and to give leases of their waif to the Forest Department, in which case it may be feasible to get them to aid in keeping down crime by putting small guards at the easy catching reaches of the rivers.

Attempts must also be made to elevate the character of our native subordinate forest-agency, on whom so much will depend in carrying out the many reforms still to be accomplished. We do not suppose that they are more venal than are other natives in similar circumstances of temptation. But many of them are miserably paid, and a considerable proportion are only employed for part of the year, a most unadvisable system, as we think. Many of these men are exposed to considerable hardships, not to mention dangers, their food is often bad and dear, and warm clothing is essential in places where the forest-work lies. The consequence of all this is, that a forest officer within the last year or two reported that each fresh check upon peculation and corruption only rendered it more difficult to get good men. Without trusting this statement in its entirety, we consider that it is almost hopeless, without giving fairly liberal pay, to expect natives to be honest in such temptation.

Among the benefits accruing from the operations of the Forest Department, we must not forget to note one which, though not obtrusive, is real. It consists in the fact that even the mere introduction of organized labour upon a considerable scale, guided by European honesty, energy, and skill, will, in those remote Himalayan valleys, do something to show, if not to teach, the people some of the elementary principles of a higher civilization than they have hitherto seen at work. We might crowd our pages with illustrations of the depths of ignorance and superstition in which they are at present sunk, such as the fact that until lately the officers were obliged to compromise with paganism by allowing the men a goat for sacrifice at the commencement of felling operations. Again, a forest officer who had his wife along with him, was directed, with a view to certain work, to winter in one of these secluded valleys, a

proceeding to which the people of the place for some occult reason or other objected. After many fruitless entreaties that he would not remain there during winter, they wound up with the solemn threat that if he attempted to do so, they had learned that the local deity would lift the lady across the lofty pass towards the plains, and deposit her on the other side. To this he merely replied that he would be very glad if by any such process he could be relieved of the trouble and expense which, judging from past experience, he would have in getting her along the twig-bridge and out of the valley.

Throughout the work there must be great improvement on the practice of the past in record and registration, so that any one, especially officers new to the Department or the locality, may be able readily to gather good general ideas as to past operations from written records. Various improvements connected with organization also are desiderata, such as some sort of manual of rules for conservancy and other work, for the guidance of officers and establishments. It is likewise to be wished that officers of the several divisions should be in the habit of consulting each other on many matters common to all, in order that a portion at least of the experience of each may become available for the benefit of the others. Such reforms, however, are not the work of a day, and it will probably be long before the whole crystallizes into the well-organized and effective scientific system which it ought to be.

When Dr. Brandis visited the province in the latter part of 1864, one of the things which struck him most strongly was, that the timber was being sold much too cheap, especially as the principle of selecting the best logs by purchasers was largely carried out. And since the smallness of the present stock of standing timber has been fully appreciated, as well as the difficult positions in which much of it is placed, it has become evident that that stock could not be sold remuneratively at present prices. It has likewise been found that the rates at which Government timber in the Punjab has recently been selling, are not much more than one-half those paid for *sal* in Meerut and Calcutta. It was also seen that the firm of Messrs. Brassey Wythes and Hensfrey, although paying the equivalent of eleven rupees a tree for seignorage for the deodar they had acquired on the Sutlej, find it remunerative to convert them into timber for their works in the plains, while the seignorage payable by the Forest Department, all the rivers included, does not average three rupees eight annas per tree. Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, Government have recently ordered the minimum

selling-rates for the various lengths of timber on the Chenab to be raised to nearly double the former averages. This measure will probably render sales less ready for some time at first, but we are convinced it will lead to the best results eventually, not only by raising the price of the timber to more nearly its proper level, below which it has been artificially depreciated, but by tending to cause a greater economy of deodar, and the gradual substitution for it of the timber of the inferior pines, for certain purposes to which the latter can be equally well applied.

Although most of the work of the Punjab Forest Department will for some time to come be connected with the felling of trees and the sale of timber, it must be kept in mind that these are not strictly legitimate duties either of Government or of a Forest Department. By and bye when the timber trade has been rendered more secure on these rivers by some years' management under Government officers, and the conditions of profitable working, and of the reproduction and growth of the deodar, are better known than now, inducements should be offered to European capitalists to work these forests. Restrictions will always be necessary, especially in respect to the selection of trees for felling, for, as Drs. Brandis and Cleghorn have remarked, the selection and marking of trees by purchasers is subversive of all conservancy. European permit-holders of a kind could doubtless be got now. But although the methods of Europeans are, as a rule, better, and their energy greater, as well as their willingness to spend trouble and money in getting timber out safe, yet all past experience demonstrates that, unless bound down by strict rules, so great is the bias of self-interest, that they are apt practically to have but little more regard than Orientals for the conservancy proper of forests.

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## ART. III.—THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THE subject which heads this article is one to which India cannot be indifferent, and which may properly be treated in this *Review*. We now respond to the touch of public feeling at home, nothing happening there is indifferent to us, we hear all important news in three days by telegraph, and perhaps it is true that the Englishman in India, whose tastes lead him that way,—and the nature of our employment fosters such tastes,—is both better informed and has a more active sympathy with European public affairs, than the ordinary denizen of provincial England. And in this question of the army India has a direct personal interest. It is on the force and prestige of the army that our empire in India rests, and we feel that it will neither do to apply the theories of Mr. Goldwin Smith to this country, nor to adopt the notions of the *Times*, that the spread of railways, or of anything else, will warrant a reduction of the English army in India.

The first thing is to consider for what purposes we require an army. As far as Great Britain is concerned, it is not required for purposes of internal administration, and, therefore, the Crown can organize it there in unhesitating reliance on the loyalty of the people. Ireland is unhappily differently situated, and we regret to come to the conclusion that provision for possible disturbance there will have to be part of our scheme. But Ireland is none the less capable of contributing her fair share to the defence of the common country. We require an army to defend the country against foreign invasion, to keep our place in Europe as a first-class power, to be partially stationed in Ireland as a precautionary measure, and to defend our numerous possessions scattered all over the face of the globe, and we must be prepared to do all this at the same time, if necessary. Our army, as at present constituted, is adequate to the last of these objects, and the third may be considered provided for in any scheme which embraces the first and second. But it is in these two objects, and more especially in the second

of them, that our system is felt to be inadequate, and it is to the solution of this problem we propose to address ourselves.

It is an old and, we believe, a healthy tradition of the English Foreign Office that, when our independence is threatened by a continental power, the struggle must be fought upon the continent. Three times has such a struggle occurred in history;—once with Roman Catholic Ultramontanist incarnate in the person of Philip the second of Spain;—once with absolute monarchy and the divine right of kings in the wars with Louis XIV;—and once with the spirit of democratic aggression as developed in the ambition of Napoleon. On none of these occasions have allies been wanting on the continent with common interests to ours, and we see no reason why, with good management, they should be wanting in future.

The services rendered to us by our allies on these occasions were hardly less important than those rendered by us to them. When the English fleet was destroying the Spanish Armada, the Dutch fleet was keeping the Spanish flotilla and the Prince of Parma's 30,000 veterans closely blockaded in the inland waters of Flanders, where they were all ready to start for England ten days before Queen Elizabeth made her celebrated muster of volunteers at Tilbury fort. It is not to be admitted that even Alexander Farnese could have conquered England, but many of the Catholics in the country were disloyal and the danger was great, while the loss and suffering, had this force reached the shores of England, would have been terrible. Our militia certainly could not have stood before Parma at first, and England was a rich country and none of its towns were fortified. Although Louis XIV. never actually proposed to invade England in force, yet during the reigns of the two last Stuarts he kept the country in a position little better than a French pro-consulate, as far as its independence went, while he supplied our kings with the means of crushing our liberties. After the revolution he could merely intrigue and assist an abortive rebellion, for in William's time we kept his armies fully employed on the continent, and in Anne's we fairly beat him there. It is true that the attempt to invade England in 1805 was frustrated by the swift sailing of a ship from the West Indies, and the consequent putting to sea of Sir Robert Calder's fleet, which, meeting Villeneuve off Corunna, disconcerted Napoleon's plan for the concentration of an overwhelming naval force in the channel to convoy the flotilla across. The subsequent destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar put an end to all idea of invasion for the time being. But the ministry saw the nearness of the danger, and after Austria had been struck

down at Austerlitz, Prussia at Jena, and Russia at Friedland, England entered on the war in Spain, and managed to keep no less than 350,000 French veterans fully employed there. We found in this policy at once safety, glory, and ultimately a satisfactory peace.

We believe a like policy to be equally sound now, but the facilities for an invasion, by France for example, have greatly increased since the last war, and it is necessary to show foreign governments that we are both able and willing to hold our own place, to induce them to seek our alliance. But foreign governments have, during the long peace, been carefully studying the question of military efficiency, and they have brought their institutions up to a mark never before attained. The complete manner, and, above all, the very short time, in which Austria has been struck down, by so much smaller a State as Prussia, is a terrible lesson to us, for we can no longer depend upon the "long run," and it may be safely said, that unless we can put and maintain an army of 100,000 men, in the highest state of efficiency upon the continent of Europe, whenever we please, no power will care about our alliance at all.

The state of the navy is not within the province of this article, and we shall only express our concurrence in the general opinion that it must be maintained on a scale equal to the united navies of Europe.

With regard to the army, it is in the recollection of all men how the French dropped the idea of invading England after the petition of the Colonels to the Emperor, when the answer was the embodiment of the volunteers, and there is no doubt whatever that the present talk of England being nothing on the continent, will likewise vanish, the moment the means of her self-assertion are apparent.

The English army consists of about 212,000 regular troops about 150,000 militia, and 167,000 volunteers. Including the pensioners and the Irish constabulary, the whole may be put down in round numbers at 600,000 men. The regulars, as far as they go, are first-rate troops, and they have a splendid and very efficient artillery, though not in proportion of numbers to that of continental States. The cavalry is also inferior in point of numbers, but, as heavy cavalry, is probably unequalled in quality. The principal defect of the army is the want of knowledge of their profession among the superior officers. But not above 50,000 men are available at home, and of these a goodly proportion are composed of *dépôt* battalions, an organization which every soldier will admit is greatly inferior to that of a regiment. The militia and their cavalry,

the yeomanry, are totally without organization. When embodied, they become *in time* as good as regiments of the line, but time is just what will not be given us. If called out on an emergency, they would be next to useless. The volunteers are much better. They are drawn from a superior class of society, and they get far more drill than the militia, as well as at more frequent intervals. They would be very valuable troops in the event of an invasion, in which case alone they are available. It is moreover in such an event only that the pensioners and Irish constabulary can be used.

The regular army is raised by voluntary enlistment and bounties; the militia, according to law, by the ballot, but in fact by voluntary enlistment. The volunteers are what their name implies. The regular army is, of course, regularly paid, the men being enlisted for ten years in the infantry, and twelve in the cavalry and artillery. The militia are only paid when embodied, or called out for exercise, for fourteen days in each year, we believe. The volunteers are not paid at all. The regular army is the only part of the force bound to serve out of the United Kingdom. If the militia was in a state fit to take the duties of the regular army within the kingdom, the whole available force of the regular troops might be sent to the continent if required, but it is not in such a state. Time is required to put it in that condition, and time is just what we cannot have. Our ally, who required our assistance, would be in the meantime overpowered, and we could not keep the status of a first-class power. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that, to keep our place in Europe, we must, if we retain our present organization, maintain a standing army of about 280,000 men, and organize the militia so as to take the place of the regular army in the United Kingdom at once, or we must remodel our army from the beginning. There is, however, a difficulty about the men. It is hard for Government to keep up 212,000 regulars. How are they to enlist and maintain 280,000?

Before seeing what can be made of our own system, we will take a glance at those of other nations. There are three great armies at present in existence, raised in different ways:—the American, the Prussian, and the French. The American army has been raised, at a cost but little short of our own national debt, by enormous bounties and very high pay. It is true it is now disbanded, but the Prussian Landwehr has shown the efficiency of hastily called out troops who have once been properly trained, and America has done that for her soldiers of this generation. They could be got ready long before anything,

with a chance of opposing them, could be got together on that continent. The American system, however, succeeded, only because the enemy was no more prepared than themselves. This would not be our case, and, therefore, it would not answer for us, as no one could be insane enough to propose raising troops in time of peace, by such costly means, solely to train them for an emergency.

The Prussian system, by its cheapness and efficiency, has astonished the world. But it is not difficult to see that it would never do for England. By the Prussian system every man has to serve in the army for two years. After that he is drafted into the Landwehr. Here he is a sort of militia-man, but bound to serve where and when required. A second reserve, called the Landsturm, of men of the Landwehr over a certain age, also exists. Prussia is, however, a country by itself. It has no foreign possessions: it is not maritime, and has no occasion for distant expeditions; and the late war did not last above a fortnight. Yet the bone of contention between the King of Prussia and his Parliament was, the proposal to extend the period of service in the regular army to three years. It is easy to conceive how little the English people would submit to such a system, when the consequence would be foreign service for years.

The French system is a conscription with liberty to purchase exemption at a fixed sum. These sums are formed into a fund to give bounties to soldiers, who have served their time (six years) to re-enlist, and this force, now, we believe, about 120,000 strong, forms the flower of the French army. France is a maritime power and has foreign possessions, but they are small, and the proportion of the army abroad is trifling, except in Algeria, and that is within an easy furlough distance of France. It is the conscript, not the enlisted soldiers, who do the duty in the French possessions abroad, as the latter are too valuable; and, consequently, reliefs must be very numerous, and heavy cost incurred in that way. At the same time the French system is the least costly that would do for us, and, could the country be induced to accept it, would, we think, be the best. But at the same time we are of opinion that it would be futile to propose to Parliament to raise an army for general purposes by conscription at all, and, therefore, we are driven to take up our own system and see what can be made of it.

In making a proposal for the reorganization of the British army, we are fully sensible of the painful disadvantages under which we labour. While we know the proposal will involve a large cost, we are totally unable to give any idea of what that

cost will be. Even in the details, represented here as facts, there may be error, for they are given from memory; but we believe they are sufficiently accurate to answer our purpose, and we trust that trifling inaccuracies will be overlooked, seeing that we write from an Indian up-country station where no statistics are to be obtained. Some may think that, under such circumstances, we should not undertake such a task; but we are desirous of giving the public the benefit of our ideas, such as they are, towards the solution of the leading problem of the day.

It is not to be supposed that the efficient organization of the army can be completed without cost. Under our proposal it will not only be cost of money, but also of personal liberty to a certain extent, and we cannot see how it is to be done without such sacrifices. We think the efforts of reformers, therefore, are most likely to be practical, if they set clearly in the front what is necessary to our position, and then point out the means of their realization at the least possible charge. We therefore propose to raise and maintain an army by voluntary enlistment to do all the military duty of the nation abroad, to reform the militia so as to enable it at once to take the place of the regular army, ordinarily stationed at home in time of peace, on its being wanted elsewhere in time of war, and to bind the whole military force of the country together in one system, so as to utilize every part of it.

The organization we propose is, for the infantry, that each regiment should belong to its own county, and have its headquarters stationed in a healthy cantonment within it. It should consist of five battalions—

1st Batt. Service.	} Belonging to the regular army.
2nd Batt. Reserve.	
3rd Batt. Militia.	
4th Batt. Volunteers.	
5th Batt. Veteran.	The pensioners of the regular army.

Of course the larger counties, such as Yorkshire and Lancashire, would have more than one regiment, and the smaller and more thinly populated ones, as in Scotland in many instances, would have to be grouped two or three together.

The Service Battalion, it is intended, should do the ordinary foreign service of the army, that is, India and the colonies, and it would consist of the young soldiers. The Reserve Battalion, it is intended, should be formed of men who have served a certain time in the Service Battalion, and should be stationed at the headquarters of the regiment. From the Reserve Battalion should be formed the army that may be necessary on the continent in case of war. The time a man should serve in the

Service Battalion before he is eligible for the Reserve is a matter of calculation, dependent on the requisite number of either, and the statistics of the mortality of the Service Battalion, and the proportion of men who would enter the Reserve Battalion, together with the casualty list of the latter. It is, however, a matter of no difficulty to calculate this with proper statistical information. It should, however, in no case exceed ten years, as it is in the advantages held out to the Reserve Battalion, that we chiefly look for the means of drawing recruits to the Service Battalion. This plan does away with *dépôt* companies, as the recruits would be received at the head-quarters of the regiment, and forwarded to the Service Battalion when ready. The officers should be common to both battalions, and take each his regular tour of foreign service.

It is part of our idea that the head-quarters of the regiment, at which the Reserve Battalion should be stationed, should be a little colony in itself. Every man in the Reserve should be allowed to marry, and should have separate quarters. There should be common schools for his children, and industrial schools also to teach them how to earn their own bread, especially by those trades required for the equipment of the army. The men should be encouraged to follow their trades, and the women to be industrious too, and as much as possible that was required by the regular portion of the regiment, whether Service or Reserve, should be made up by them. An asylum might be established for the widows who were infirm and could not work for their bread, and savings banks might be organized to induce the men to provide for their families. Of course the men would have to turn out under arms daily, but vexatious and long drills should be prohibited. The endeavour should be to make the position of the soldier as respectable and comfortable as possible, so that the better of the working, and more especially of the agricultural classes, might have that before their eyes, which would destroy their present idea that a lad enlisting was a lost man. We really think this would attract recruits, perhaps not just at first, but ultimately, and, in the meantime, it would, in all probability, secure to the service the greater number of the time-expired men, who are now leaving daily, and who are the flower of the army. It is always difficult to get Parliament to take a backward step in legislation, and, in all probability, there would be great opposition to restore the old term of service, which is the usual remedy of the smart colonel of a regiment for the present state of things; and, we think, that this scheme of a reserve honestly carried out, with the object of rendering the service attractive, might well be tried in the first instance under

the provisions of the ten years' bill. A month or two's furlough after the ten years' service might fairly be allowed, with pay, to any man it was desirable to keep, for of course only those should enter the Reserve who bore a good character. Moreover, county influence might be largely exerted to fill the ranks organized on this plan, though any gentleman with a conscience could hardly recommend a respectable labouring man to turn soldier as it is. The Lord-Lieutenant might with advantage be made Colonel-in-chief of the regiment, a certain number of the commissions might be placed at his disposal for the sons of the country-gentlemen, and, as others would be officers in the Militia and Volunteer Battalion, a kind of county feeling would pervade the whole regiment, and be no small power to keep up the numbers in the ranks of the regulars. The condition of the labouring man is improving, and his intelligence also, and, as the cottier population of Scotland and Ireland is going or gone, we must bid higher to fill our ranks with the men there are.

Of course we shall be met by the objection that, under such a system, discipline could not be kept up. To this we have a conclusive answer,—the work that has been done by the Prussian Landwehr. If a militia once properly trained and afterwards sent to civil life, can, when suddenly called out, strike down an army like that of Austria,—and the bulk of the Prussian army was so composed,—it is not to be feared that an English army cantoned, as we have described, will be found wanting.

With regard to the expense, it is to be observed that the cost of the increase of the numbers of the army to 280,000 men, to keep up our position, will have to be borne in any case, and the sale of the barracks and the valuable land in the large towns on which they stand, would go far towards the cost of the new cantonments. As to the cost of maintaining the various proposed institutions within those cantonments, it is not likely to be more than the army may fairly expect from the nation.

The Militia Battalion should be kept up by law to its full authorized strength, and perhaps the best way to do so would be to allow each district to make its own arrangements for supplying its quota of men. If bounties were to be paid to raise the men by voluntary enlistment, the district should provide them, or if they preferred the ballot and individual payment for substitutes, so be it; but the numbers should be kept up intact, and the ballot be always available as a last resort, while volunteers, who could produce a certificate from their commanding officer that they had attended a certain number of drills within the previous year, should be exempt from the drawing for the



militia. To make the militia fit for the duties assigned to it, we propose that every militiaman should serve for two years in the Reserve Battalion, after which he should be drafted into the Militia Battalion and serve out his time there, of course returning to civil life and joining his corps only when mustered. He would be paid as a soldier when serving with the Reserve Battalion and when called out. We do not think that with a less sacrifice than this, the militia could be kept in a state adequate to release all the reserve for service in the field, (except that portion it might be deemed requisite to station in Ireland,) or, with the volunteers and veterans as a reserve, to protect the United Kingdom. But the experience of Prussia has clearly shown that, under competent officers, this sacrifice of the individual liberty of the subject is enough.

The Volunteer Battalion we would not change further than to connect it with the county regiment, and to have its exercise at the head-quarters, but of this we would speak hereafter. The same remark would apply to the Veteran Battalion, though competent officers should be appointed to command such of the men as, in the event of an emergency, could handle a musket.

For the cavalry and artillery we would propose precisely the same organization, except that, as the regiments and batteries would be less numerous, they would have to belong to circles of counties instead of to single counties; and it would be hardly possible to unite the volunteers with them on the same plan, as the cavalry volunteers are but few, and the artillery are chiefly garrison companies for coast defence. But the yeomanry and the militia artillery should each serve two years with the reserve squadrons and batteries of the regiments to which they belonged, and afterwards become the militia squadrons and batteries of these arms. Such of the cavalry pensioners as were fit for service, should join the infantry Veteran Battalion of their county, and the artillery pensioners might, when called out, do duty in the forts and dockyard garrisons.

It is necessary to adapt our drill more to the requirements of modern warfare and new arms. It is true that the principles of strategy and tactics have remained much what they always were. The battle of Leuthen, the most instructive in modern warfare, for we have no proper account of Sadowa yet, was fought on precisely the same principles as that of Leuctra. But the details of the business are quite altered, and much larger armies are brought into the field, and, as the old rule of bringing superior force to bear on the decisive point still holds good, the rapidity with which troops can be got to move without falling into any confusion, has become a matter of greater

importance than ever. At the same time, it is of the highest importance not to disgust the men, which Aldershot and the Curragh are fast doing, and, therefore, we think the drill-book should be revised, in view to quicken the movements as much as possible, not by hastening the pace, for we have our doubts about teaching a whole army running drill, invaluable as it is to picked men, but by taking the shortest road to the new position compatible with keeping everybody's place in the battalion. Wheeling divisions of a battalion, except when an open column is to be changed into line or a line into open column, might with advantage be entirely abolished. Although it would not look so well on parade, a change of the front of a battalion by the file march of fours into their new places, the regulating division only being wheeled, would be a much more rapid movement. So, in brigade, in changing front the diagonal march of quarter distance columns might be generally used, instead of taking ground to the front or rear, and then to a flank, or *vice versa*, as is now too much the case. Direct echelon of battalions in brigade is a most useful movement, but direct echelon of divisions in a battalion is a most useless one, and only bothers the men with fruitless marching. For oblique echelon in changing front, as before observed, we would substitute the file march by fours, (and thus save the time spent in halting and dressing these echelons,) and in taking ground in column to the front and flank at the same time, the diagonal march. In all deployments the divisions should file by fours into their places in line, and they should, if possible, be conducted on the leading division, (as deployment on a rear division before an enemy is bad,) the front being changed to the rear, if necessary, for the purpose. The present mode of executing this manœuvre, by the successive march of divisions from the rear to the front by the reverse flank, or by fours through the ground of a wheeled up section is objectionable. Both movements should be cut out of the drill-book, and the column change front to rear, first by a countermarch by divisions, and secondly by the wheel and countermarch of subdivisions round the centre. This is not only quicker, but it is all done on the battalion's own ground, and, therefore, it does not interfere with others, whether the formation be in contiguous columns or in mass. Finally, with breech-loaders the men might be taught to load while advancing in line, to halt, deliver their fire, and immediately advance again. Indeed, when close to an enemy in an advance, we believe the front rank might fire advantageously from the hip on the march. It would have the effect of confusing the enemy and rendering his fire less effective.

We believe that the changes here indicated would have the double effect of rendering the movements more rapid, and of saving the men much *ennui* and fatigue, and this latter is a matter only of second consequence to the other. Men prefer India to home, in many cases, solely on account of the lighter parade work, and, when well commanded, a regiment is fully as good out here. But, though we advocate quicker movements, we are not of those who undervalue steadiness. For instance, formations to the reverse flank are often quicker and sometimes unavoidable, but they are not desirable, because they put men out of their accustomed places and are liable to cause confusion. If there is opportunity, it is better to change the front to rear, and some little time had better usually be given for the purpose, but, if it cannot be given, the movement must take place. We mean by this to put necessity first, steadiness second, and rapidity third, while we strive to unite the two latter, but we do not think that any military movements should be indulged in merely for show. We of course shall be told that steadiness is displayed in marching. Passing in review is enough for that, and shows it better than anything else except a good advance in line, and we shall never quarrel with any Commanding Officer who keeps his men up to the mark in that manœuvre.

With regard to musketry instruction, we confess that it appears to us that Hythe and General Hay are doing the army very questionable good. Of course, *cæteris paribus*, it is better that our soldiers should be good shots. First, however, we doubt whether musketry instruction really makes the bulk of the men good shots, figures of merit and Hythe returns notwithstanding; secondly, we cannot divest our mind of the notion that, by running this idea to death, we shall induce the soldier to believe in killing his enemy while out of sight, and have to remark that same disinclination to close with him, which Dr. Russell described as distinguishing the trench-bred soldiers in the Crimea. Thirdly, the battles fought since rifled arms have been in general use, *viz.*, Magenta, Solferino, Gitschin, and Sadowa, have all been won in artillery and close infantry fight; and lastly, we are sure there is nothing so distasteful to the ordinary soldier as this prolonged uninteresting musketry practice. Of the Hythe judging-distance drill we have a high opinion, and this familiarity with the use of his weapon, and plenty of blank cartridge on parade, with occasional platoon ball-firing at a target representing a body of men, is what is required for the ordinary soldier of the line. The single shot-firing we regard as principally valuable for the purpose of

selecting the men who have a natural aptitude as marksmen, and these men should be embodied in a company in each battalion to be called the light company, provided they are active enough for skirmishing and running drill, and they should have higher pay. We like this organization of our light troops better than any other. It suits best with the scattered condition of our army on ordinary foreign service, and accords with the county organization at home. It is easy to make these light companies into separate battalions in time of war, should this at any time appear more desirable.

With regard to equipment the present tunic is excellent, loose, but not baggy. Knicker-bockers, with leathern gaiters easily fastened after the manner of the Chasseurs de Vincennes of the French army, would be a great improvement on the present trowsers, which get wet and dirty in muddy roads and lanes. A good service helmet is a desideratum, one that will protect the head from the sun, and prevent the rain running into the soldier's neck-hole, as well as save him from a sword cut. Cork appears to us the material, for it answers all these purposes, and is light besides. It may perhaps also be found necessary to provide some means of carrying spare ammunition with a battalion, in consequence of the greater expenditure that may be looked for with breech-loading arms. The knapsack and cartridge boxes should be so arranged, that they will cause the least inconvenience to the soldier, utterly regardless of the appearance they may present.

The equipment of our cavalry should be made lighter, and the men enlisted for the cavalry should be lighter men,—not “dumplings,” short-thighed fellows that can never ride, but men formed to make horsemen and not too heavy. It is the pace of the horse that tells in a cavalry charge, and it is impossible, with over-weighted horses, either to charge at the pace which carries success with it, or to keep up any long and vigorous pursuit of a beaten enemy. Nolan's observations on the equipment of cavalry are much to the purpose.

We do not share in the current opinion that this branch of the service has become comparatively useless. No doubt the great improvements in fire-arms, both artillery and infantry, has rendered the proper handling of this arm a matter of greater delicacy and difficulty than before, but no victory can be rendered really decisive without it, and although the Austrian cavalry appears to have been handled badly in the late campaign, yet the retreat from Sadowa shows how valuable it may be in checking pursuit and covering the remains of a beaten army.

The English cavalry is essentially heavy. By that we mean that it is adapted for the actual duty of a battle and the succeeding pursuit, and for this it has no superior. But it is not light cavalry, and perhaps it would have been better not to have called the bulk of it Hussars, a description of soldier with whom it has nothing in common. But that is a slight matter. What we want to make out is that the English dragoon or hussar, as he is now, is not a light cavalry soldier and never will be, and it is a thousand pities to spoil him by trying anything of the kind. The true light horseman can not only cook his own dinner, but he can usually find it, as well as forage for his horse. He is pre-eminently a man of personal resource, is hardy and inured to fatigue, and his beast and himself live and thrive on the scantiest of fare. The Cossack is perhaps the type, but Turkey, Persia, Toorkistan, Affghanistan, and India all produce the man in numbers, and perhaps the best specimens existing are to be found in our own (so-called) Irregular Horse. The real light cavalry soldier should be quite independent when out on his peculiar duty. It is on his ability to keep out, without the assistance of army departments, that his excellence depends. His duties are never to lose sight of the enemy, and to keep his own general fully informed of their movements, to intercept, as far as possible, all attempts on the part of the enemy to obtain similar information, to harass him constantly, and to pounce on any stray soldiers, baggage, or stores that may fall into his hands. For this duty, a cordon of double videttes should be drawn out well on the front and flanks of the army feeling up to the enemy's posts, often many miles in advance, supported by small bodies of their regiments, and keeping up a chain of communication with head-quarters. For these duties we do not think the English cavalry soldier suited, and consider it better, in time of war, to raise special corps for the duty, attracting them by high pay. An officer who really understood the work would soon find suitable men who could ride, and they don't require much discipline. We would keep our regulars for their own duty, that of heavy cavalry, but think it as well to point out that they are none of them light horse, though it has pleased Government to call them Hussars.

Our artillery we believe to be first-rate, and if it has a fault, it is too much dependence on Woolwich arsenal. The batteries should be able to do more for themselves, and, if necessary and the battery does not contain good enough workmen, it would be better to attach one or two unenlisted artificers to it. We are not competent to go into the details of this subject, but

we think a less complicated gun-carriage, for instance, which admits of being repaired and its parts replaced in the field, is better than a more perfect article to which this cannot be done. A slight extra weight to attain such a desideratum is not a disadvantage worthy of much consideration. The late Bengal Artillery was organized on this principle, and was most excellent and serviceable. Its defect was shortness of complement. There was no margin for casualties either among horses or men, and during a severe action one or two guns of a battery often could not be properly served. There can be little doubt that spreading the artillery over the country, instead of concentrating it at Woolwich, would have a tendency to teach it self-dependence in its equipment. At present the artillery shares the great fault of the whole army, inability to do anything but fight.

The Land Transport Corps, Military Train as it is called, is, in our opinion, a mistake altogether. It was a dead failure in China. In India it was turned into a cavalry regiment, and did good service but not in the capacity for which it was raised. As the British Army will be employed across sea, it must look to the country in which it operates for means of transport, and the Land Transport Corps should be the means of organizing it. The British army would not be sent to the continent, except to assist an attacked ally, and might fairly look to assistance in this matter from him. In such case officers to organize the means available are what is required, and this corps ought to consist of officers only. They should be highly paid and required to qualify in French, German, and one other language, some taking Spanish, some Italian, some Dutch, some Flemish, and some Russian. On actual service one or two might be attached to each regiment, for the purpose of making arrangements for its carriage, acting at the same time under the Commanding Officer of the regiment and their own commandant at the head-quarters of the army in the field. These officers would be responsible that the carriage was properly paid and not overloaded, and in time of peace their duties should be to study the available resources of the countries in which it was possible the army might be called on to serve, and also the equipment and adaptation of the army baggage to the carriage available. In raising a corps on this principle, all honours, distinctions, and commands, open to the rest of the army, must be open to them. The successful performance of their occupation requires a thorough study of the duties of soldiers in all situations, and it cannot be expected that able men will come forward, if placed under disabilities. We think each regiment should supply its own guards and batmen, and those of the staff

departments would be part of the regular fatigue duty of the army.

Generally our army is too much department-ridden, and there is consequently too much dependence on departments. Such a matter as camp-kitchens, for example, is deserving of attention. No doubt they economise fuel and probably give better dinners than the men can cook for themselves, but then if anything goes wrong with the kitchen, they get no dinner at all. It is very desirable that the men should be able to cook for themselves, and money spent in employing professional cooks to teach the men, in the first instance, the elements of simple cookery, would be well spent, for afterwards it would be handed down in the regiment, especially under the system of exercise camps which we are about to recommend. We remember during the Crimean war it was made a great reproach to the Commissariat Department that it served out raw coffee. But there is no great mystery in roasting coffee, and it is much better when freshly roasted. In justice, however, to the critics, we must allow that it was also stated that there was a scarcity of wood, and the men were in a standing camp, not moving so that they could supply themselves. It is a great advantage to soldiers to be able to cook, and men must not take the sepoy as a type. He takes about four times as long for the operation as is necessary. We also think it would be a great advantage if infantry soldiers could cobble their own shoes, and if cavalry soldiers could put a shoe on their horses. Self-dependence is the great want in the army.

To carry out the system here proposed, camps of exercise are necessary. When the militia was turned out for its annual exercise at the head-quarters of the regiment, the volunteers might assemble also and there is an infantry brigade at once. But we want larger assemblies than this. It must be remembered that camps of exercise are mainly for the instruction of the superior officers. Up to the rank of captain of a company or troop, military duty in the field can just as well be taught on the regimental parade. It is for the instruction of field officers, staff officers, and, above all, of general officers, that camps of exercise are required. It is curious how our system ignores the necessity of knowledge of their duty by superior officers. We once knew an officer who commanded two regiments in succession at the same station. Each, while he was in command of it, was the best-drilled corps there, and the first was by no means so steady after he gave it up. He was very careful, never passed over a slovenly movement, and had what he wanted properly done before he dismissed his

parade. He did not bully his men, and let them go soon if they satisfied him. He was good fellow and well liked, and was thought a smart officer, his regiment always being most favourably reported of by general officers, and Government having a correspondingly high opinion of him. Yet, put him in a brigade and he was quite abroad, he did not know what to do or how to carry out the orders of the brigadier, and had to seek instruction from his own staff officers in every manœuvre. Now we don't say much could be made of such a man as this. He was simply unfit to command. We cannot forget Frederick the Great's remark, "*Si un mulet aurait fait vingt campagnes sous le Prince Eugène, il ne servirait pas meilleur tacticien pour cela,*" but even in this case, familiar practice would have made him better. The whole *répertoire* of brigade exercise is not very extensive, and he might have learned his possible position, so that as long as he stuck to his brigade and nothing abnormal occurred, he might have commanded his regiment in all ordinary occasions, even on service, with credit.

But the system pursued at Aldershot and the Curragh is opposed to that of the general instruction of the superior officers of the army, as the commands and staff appointments are given to individuals for five years; while the soldier loses the only real benefit, beyond bodily exercise, which he can derive from a camp of instruction, *viz.*, the acquisition of that personal experience and self-reliance, which will make him comfortable, efficient, and healthy in the field. In our camps the soldier is in bad barracks, being neither taught to cook his own dinner, to pitch his own tent, to manage so as to keep out the wind and the rain, nor generally to acquire familiarity with real camp-life.

Our idea, therefore, is that the camps should be distributed over the country, formed during the summer season only, and, if possible, that they should be changed now and then. Every body should be under canvas, and it should be as much an imitation of the real thing as possible. The troops should practise route marching in large bodies on the basis of the admirable rules on this subject laid down by the late Sir Robert Crawford, and the officers in command of the force, of divisions, and brigades, should be changed at short intervals, as well as the staff officers, so that the whole body of officers might enjoy the benefit of this instruction, and the military authorities might be able to see who their able officers were. Wherever the country admitted of it without damage to agriculture, military operations might be combined with a change of ground. The Quarter-Master General's department might make each change



of ground an opportunity of conducting a complete reconnaissance of the country, and the front and flanks might be felt by the cavalry as in actual war. Bodies might be detached to dispute strong positions in sham fight, and an interest would be given to the whole operations which we now seek for in vain. Scotland abounds in places where this kind of work could be carried on without inconvenience to the general business of the country, and neither England nor Ireland are wanting in suitable places; and, if they are somewhat apart from railway stations and large marts, and the consequent supplying of the troops becomes somewhat more difficult and expensive, the first is but a proper exercise for the Land Transport Corps, and the expense a consideration that the nation must be prepared to accept, if it means to have an efficient army. We need hardly point out how much more agreeable this system would be to both officers and men. Both would have had their share of foreign service, and look to a certain degree of of pleasant life in their quarters at home. At the end of the camp-season they would go to their own cantonment, and if leave at this time was freely granted, it would go far to render the service popular. The regular muster of the militia should take place at the time of encamping, and all its exercise should be in camp, and the volunteers should be encouraged to join their battalions with the head-quarters of their regiment in camp as much as their avocations would permit.

We feel bound here to say something on the subject of a recent proposal to employ the Sikhs at home. If we had another Crimean or Eastern war, we could get much valuable assistance from the Indian army, and we think the Government should freely avail themselves of it. We think, moreover, that Sikhs might with advantage garrison Singapore, our posts in China and Japan, and even the Cape of Good Hope. But we are utterly opposed to place them in any garrison where the population is English. The social disadvantages which would be sure to arise, would have the very worst effect on the good feeling and respect with which the people of England now regard the Sikh nation, and it would end in prohibiting the entire use of a valuable military resource, though not before a permanent trace had been left of the evil such measure would be designed to prevent. Use the Indian native army in the field anywhere if their services are wanted, but, when the war is over, send them home again. This would, we think, be the best in every way.

But we fear that no reform, such as we have indicated, is possible with our present Government, which requires new blood

to enable it to grapple with so great a necessity; and we fear there is little hope of the radical change that is required until some great disaster and humiliation overtakes the country. A recruiting commission has just given in its report, and, while it acknowledges the magnitude of our military shortcoming as fully as we do, it contents itself with recommending that something should be done to utilize the militia without indicating what, with recommending a lighter drill at Aldershot and the Curragh in summer only, and an increase of twopence a day to the pay of ten years' men. The Horse Guards at the same time issue an order that the whole infantry, without distinction, is to be exercised in running drill. Fancy a fat podgy man running 1,000 yards at the double: a fine efficient soldier he would be at the end of it: and yet, such a man may be a first-rate soldier at the quick-march; and, with our present success in recruiting, we can hardly eliminate from the ranks all that are unable to come up to this standard. Such measures are child's play. They spring not from the sound idea that the whole army must be the same in quality, but that it must be the same in each little detail, and they will not have a company or a regiment of real light infantry, but every regiment blowing like a grampus. We acknowledge the advantage of running drill to picked men, say the light company of each regiment, selected for activity and proficiency with the rifle combined, but this general order must be a failure.

It is no part of our purpose to make an attack upon established institutions, but we ask any man who has given thought to these matters, if he believes anything can be done by our double military government at all adequate to the occasion. We believe that it cannot, and that the only remedy is to sweep it away. There is no reason why the military chief should not be the Secretary of State for War and a soldier, if a fit man can be found, but it is not at all necessary that he should be a soldier. But he should hold his appointment on the same terms as the Governor-General of India does, for five years, and be eligible to re-appointment, and he might have a seat in Parliament, without a vote, *ex officio*. In this there is nothing unconstitutional, and it would brush away the main obstructions to any and all improvement. The Secretary of State for War should be a departmental not a political officer, and there is no earthly occasion to give him either a seat in the Cabinet or a vote in Parliament, though his presence there is desirable to afford the necessary explanations from his department. We can see no advantage in changing him, because a reform bill does not pass, or because Parliament disapproves of a stroke of foreign policy. He has, necessarily, nothing to do with such matters,

and he might take his orders from the Queen in the presence of the Prime Minister on all important occasions, if such a course was constitutionally necessary. But we think this officer, to whom we would entrust the whole management of the army, should have the rank and status of a Secretary of State.

With regard to the officers of the army, we want to see professional ability and fitness more liberally recognized. The purchase system, whatever may be its advantages, seems almost incompatible with this. One great argument in favour of the purchase system, *viz.*, its harmony with our constitution, would seem to be attained by the county organization we propose. An army under such influences could never become dangerous to public liberty. We are not prepared to offer a solution to this question, but probably a combined system of selection, purchase, and seniority up to the rank of Field Officer would be the best; and, after that, the military authorities should be authorized to select field and general officers. The compensation to vested interests involved in the change should and would be a small matter in the estimation of the people of England, if they saw their way to a good result. Some of the Horse Guards rules are so utterly indefensible, that men wonder how they could have been devised. One, of which Lord Hardinge has the credit, is that a subaltern should not be promoted for professional aptitude or for distinguished conduct in the field. Now every other grade, from Private to Sergeant Major, and from Captain to General, is eligible for such promotion. We can understand that young boys should serve a certain time before they are put in responsible situations, but we cannot understand why grey-headed men, and such we have seen as subalterns, should be told that no possible services they could render to the State would win them their companies.

We will conclude this article with two facts, illustrating our practice in the promotion of officers, and let the public say what they think of them.

During the Kaffir war, the attention of a resident at the Cape, a Mr. Lakeman, was directed towards the numerous failures of the troops against the Kaffirs. He saw that the regiments were neither organized nor suited to the bush warfare in which they were engaged. He raised, drilled, and equipped a body of 150 men after his own fashion, termed the Waterkloof Rangers. This body proved eminently successful. On one occasion they carried a position from which a whole regiment of the line had been beaten back; they became the terror of the Kaffirs who offered three bullocks for one of their dresses, which were of leather; and they showed the way towards those

operations which led to the pacification of the frontier. It was felt that their commander had done eminent service, and he was asked to name his own reward. He asked for a captain's commission in the army. The Horse Guards, however, said it was against the rules and offered that of an ensign. This was declined, as Mr. Lakeman was thirty years of age. Government subsequently knighted the gentleman, and when last we heard of him he was holding a consular appointment at Bucharest. There is no doubt that the army here lost a most promising officer, and it is not too much to say that in any other army in Europe he would have been made a colonel.

Just before the mutiny war, an officer, who had risen from the ranks, and, though bearing only the rank of lieutenant in the army, was actually in permanent command of a regiment of Sikh Infantry, petitioned the Court of Directors to grant him a captain's commission on the unanswerable ground, that if he was fit to command a regiment he was fit to bear the rank of captain of a company. Mr. Brasyer, (such was the officer's name) besides his long service, was then a commissioned officer of thirteen years standing. General Anson, at that time Commander-in-chief, declined to recommend compliance with the request, and the memorial went home in consequence to be refused. The ground given by General Anson for his determination was, that Mr. Brasyer would supersede so many officers in the army. In the meantime, the mutiny broke out, and the service done by Mr. Brasyer and his regiment in saving the fort at Allahabad with the large arsenal in it, was so conspicuous that Lord Canning, of his own accord, promoted Mr. Brasyer to a company, a proceeding which the Court of Directors subsequently confirmed. The Rubicon was now passed. *Captain* Brasyer was eligible for promotion for service rendered; and, before the end of the year, he was a lieutenant-colonel.

Comment on such things as these is unnecessary, but while they last, we may cease to wonder at such articles as appeared the other day in the *Pall Mall Gazette* about the officers of the British army, and we may well ask if we really mean to consider ourselves and to be for the future the England of yore, one of the five great powers of Europe, and the leading nation of the world.

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- ART. IV.—1. *A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, as administered in England and Ireland, with Illustrations from the American, and other Foreign Laws.* By John Pitt Taylor, Esq., Judge of the County Courts for Lambeth, Greenwich, and Woolwich. Fourth Edition. London. 1864.
2. *Best's Principles of the Law of Evidence.* Third Edition. London. 1860.
3. *Greenleaf on Evidence.*
4. *Starkie on Evidence.* Third Edition. London. 1842.
5. *Archbold's Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases.* Fifteenth Edition. London. 1862.
6. *Roscoe's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases.* Sixth Edition. London. 1862.
7. *The Law of Evidence applicable to the Courts of the late East India Company explained in a course of Lectures,* delivered by the Hon'ble John Bruce Norton, Advocate-General, Barrister-at-Law, late Professor of Law at the Madras Presidency College. Fifth Edition. Madras. 1865.
8. *The Law of Evidence as administered in England and applied to India.* By Joseph Goodeve, Esq., of the Inner Temple and Lincoln's Inn, Barrister, Acting Master of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, Member of Senate of the University of Calcutta, and Lecturer on Law and Equity in Presidency College, Calcutta. 1862.
9. *A Manual of the Law of Evidence of the Madras Provinces.* By J. R. Kindersley, M. C. S.; of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Madras 1865.
10. *A Lecture on the Law of Evidence in India,* delivered by the Hon'ble Justice Phear before the Bethune Society on the 8th March, 1866.
11. *Act II. of 1855 of the Legislative Council of India.*
12. *Act XV. of 1852 of the Legislative Council of India.*
13. *Act XIX. of 1853 of the Legislative Council of India.*
14. *Act VIII. of 1859 of the Legislative Council of India.*
15. *Act XXV. of 1861 of the Legislative Council of India.*

IT is nearly nine years since the able and learned Dr. Lushington, during the hearing of an Indian case in appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, remarked on the unfortunate habit which courts in India had of receiving documents without that just discrimination which would prevail, *were the rules of evidence known and established*. "Their Lordships," proceeded the learned Judge, "may lament the great latitude with which documentary evidence is received, but it would be contrary to justice, in any particular case, to visit upon an individual penal consequences, because the administration of justice was not more strictly conducted with reference to the admission of evidence." There are few who will refuse to subscribe to the broad and equitable principle enunciated by such high authority; but we fear that the penal consequences are daily visited on individuals, who suffer for the shortcomings of subordinate courts, in which the principles of evidence are as little *known and established* at this moment, as when Dr. Lushington regretted the *unfortunate habit* above alluded to. We have heard it remarked by men of practical experience who remember some thirty years of the *régime* of the "*Old Sudder*," that the same sound and substantial justice which that body were wont to distribute, is not obtainable under the present High Court. We ourselves should be very unwilling to admit the correctness of the remark, having seen with our eyes the multifarious good that has resulted from the union of legal training and practical experience—that practical experience, which, in proportion as a Judge possesses, so is his goodness as a Judge,—yet the remark has dwelt in our mind, and while unable, perhaps unwilling, to coincide with him who made it, we have been also unable to divest ourselves of the doubt that it has called into being, and a sort of lingering fear, that there might be some particle of truth lurking at bottom. We have heard it also said, that, were an edifice in a decaying and dangerous state, an architect would not commence its repair by gilding and painting the summit, while the foundations were unsound, but that the work of renovation would be begun from below and carried up to the pinnacle. Of the vast improvement effected in the administration of criminal justice in India within the last few years, not a doubt can be entertained by any one competent to form an opinion on the subject. And this improvement is due to the constant, close and *tangible* supervision exercised by the High Courts, which is admirably provided for by our present system of criminal procedure. Civil law, however, opens out a much wider and more difficult field than criminal law, and much less marked results have as yet been achieved

therein. It was doubtless right that the amending hand should place in safety the lives and liberties of our Indian subjects before providing for their temporal interests in property, and the due adjudication of all rights relating thereto. But this latter portion of the task is a far more weighty and onerous and tedious duty than the former portion, by reason of the vast multiplicity of the details with which it is concerned. Years must elapse before those entrusted with its performance can enjoy their Sabbath of rest, and contemplate with satisfaction the work of their hands and say of it, that it is good. Meanwhile, the most urgent and necessary portions of the work should be taken in hand first in order; and foremost among these we would rank the preparation of a Code of Evidence. It will readily be admitted that a Judge who has a peculiar knowledge of the subject-matter of a controversy, will be more easily informed of the facts of the particular case in hand, will more thoroughly comprehend them, and will arrive at a speedier and sounder decision on the merits, than a Judge who had for the first time to learn usages, practices, and details of business or science, upon which the entire case turned. *Quicquid agunt homines* is the business of lawyers. There is nothing with which men are concerned in their innumerable relations with each other, that may not become the subject of dispute and adjudication in a court of justice. A Judge, who had a knowledge of engineering or mining or of the usages of trade, would more readily comprehend the facts of a case involving any of these. And the greater the light with which he would come to adjudicate, the greater would be the probability of his arriving at a sound decision. Where the Judge knows nothing about any of these matters, it is necessary that such evidence should be produced, and that it be so arranged as to shed a light upon the subject which may enable the Judge to see without possibility of mistake. It is thus that counsel often have to study books of science, mercantile usage, and other matters to enable them to master the details of their client's case, and having done so, to set it before the court in its real state in all its bearings. Lately, the time, difficulty, and expense of doing this in special mercantile cases, have induced a movement at home towards utilizing the experience of those who are familiar with such matters for the adjudication of cases, in which they are involved. The *Old Sudder* consisted of men, who had all of them a practical acquaintance with the country, its usages, the habits and practices of social and domestic life, and all those details which are *postulates* in every civil and criminal trial. With little *law*, they were thus enabled to do *justice*, which

would not always be intelligible to a mere lawyer, who read the bare record without the light that the Sudder Judge enjoyed. Let us not be misunderstood, we do not speak of Judges importing their own knowledge into a case. We speak of those matters, which can properly be judicially noticed without proof. Were a French Judge to sit on an English Bench, he would require proof or evidence in order to understand many things which an English Judge would take for granted; the rule of the road, for instance, which in France is diametrically opposed to that which prevails in England. In order to enable a French Judge to do complete justice, he would require fuller and clearer evidence than would be necessary for an English Judge. Many little points would have to be brought out and clearly elucidated before the former which might safely have been passed over before the latter. He might be a much better lawyer, have a much clearer head, and greater ability than the Englishman, but in order to enable litigants to benefit by these qualities, it will scarcely be denied, that, until long experience had made up the deficiency we allude to, the very fullest evidence would be requisite in intricate cases. If our analogy hold good, we think we have now discovered the particle of truth lurking at the bottom of the disparaging remark on the present High Court. This Court has more law than the "Old Sudder," and all its proceedings are conducted with greater regard to, and a nicer observance of, the rules of evidence than was usual in that other Court whose place it has taken. Trained, and able, and experienced practitioners assist its proceedings; and mistakes, that might have passed unheeded before, are dragged to light and made the vantage ground of those who have had skill and perseverance to discover them. How often these mistakes are due solely to the incapacity of the lower courts, the frequency of remands is an unanswerable proof. *Actus curie neminem gravabit* is a maxim which has guided the High Court in directing those very frequent remands; and it has indeed earnestly endeavoured not to visit the *penal consequences* Dr. Lushington spoke of on those who were in no way answerable for the shortcomings of these subordinate tribunals. But it requires little experience to understand how often that earnest endeavour must fail. Where the lower court has admitted as evidence what was not evidence, or from want of acquaintance with the principles of examination, cross-examination, and re-examination has *spoiled* the evidence in recording it, the error is irretrievable and the mischief once done can never be undone. We ourselves knew a case in which the succession to a Ráj and



the possession of a large amount of real property, depended on the oral evidence of half a dozen witnesses, which could have been recorded in as many half hours. A Principal Sudder Ameen tried the case, and spent some two months over it. Some three cart-loads of documents were put in, which were *not* evidence, yet the oral evidence of the half dozen essential witnesses was recorded in such a manner that it told against the plaintiff, who lost his case in appeal before the High Court,—a case which, we believe, he could have gained and justly too, had the examination of those witnesses been conducted with even ordinary observance of the rules of evidence. The very improvement introduced into one part of the system by the establishment of the High Court, renders the shortcomings of the lower courts more dangerous to suitors. In order to secure to the public the full advantages of the reform that has been inaugurated, we assert without fear of contradiction that the next most urgent and necessary step is to secure due attention and regard to the rules of evidence in the courts of original jurisdiction in the Mofussil, which are the real tribunals upon which the due administration of civil justice depends. The preparation of a code would doubtless be the best way of securing this very desirable end, seeing the advantages that *have* resulted from those codes which have been already prepared. The task would not be a very difficult one. India has already considerable materials of her own, and these materials, as we shall endeavour to show in the present article, are by no means bad of their kind.

Before proceeding to the task, however, let us premise that we do not consider the remedy we propose to be a complete specific for the evil adverted to. We have no faith in patent medicines for the body politic; and those who promise a perfect cure from applications of their own often do harm by exciting hopes that can never be realized, where they might have done much had they been content to *assist* in doing good. Improvement in the law of evidence and its administration we believe to be urgently required, but only *among other things*, to carry on that judicial reform which has been commenced, and which if it be not carried out below as well as above, the creation of High Courts will have been very like putting new wine into old bottles, or repairing a tattered garment with new cloth.

The first question that arises in our present subject is, what *is* the Law of Evidence in India, whence has it been derived, and in what repertories is it to be found? Mr. Goodeve lays it down as a general proposition that the English Law of Evidence is that of India, as well in the courts of the Mofussil

as those of the Presidencies. Mr. Norton says—"It may be  
 "advisable to state once for all that at the present day the  
 "English Law of Evidence, with such exceptions as circum-  
 "stances necessitate, is the guide in the courts of the Mofussil."  
 He further mentions that, on the 28th May, 1829, the Madras  
 Faujdári Adálut stated to Government that they considered  
 themselves released from following the Mahomedan Law of  
 Evidence, and that they had accordingly turned to the Law  
 of England as their legitimate guide, and as the acknowledged  
 source of the provisions previously enacted in the Regulations  
 of the Madras Government for the conduct of judicial proce-  
 dure. "This," says Mr. Norton, "has never been questioned  
 "since, and Mr. Arbuthnot (formerly *Register* to the Sadr  
 "Adálut) expressly states in the preface to his Select Reports,  
 "that the English Law now generally obtains." So far there  
 seems to be some little authority for the position in the Madras  
 Presidency. In Bengal, however, since Mr. Goodeve wrote his  
 his work, the position has been greatly shaken. In a late  
 important case tried by a Full Bench of the Calcutta Court, the  
 learned Chief Justice, Sir Barnes Peacock, expressed himself  
 as follows:—"It is a general rule of English Law subject  
 "to certain exceptions, that in criminal cases a husband and  
 "wife are not competent to give evidence for or against each  
 "other. *But the English Law is not the Law of the Mofus-*  
 "*sil;*"—and again, "It is clear that the English Criminal  
 "Law was not the Criminal Law of the Mofussil, and that  
 "*the English Law of Evidence was never extended by any Re-*  
 "*solution of Government to Criminal trials there.*"—"A Code  
 "of Evidence has not yet been passed, and we have no  
 "express rule laid down by the Legislature in any existing laws  
 "upon the subject now under consideration. By the abolition of  
 "the Mahomedan Law, *the Law of England was not established in*  
 "*its place;*"—"In the case of European British subjects,  
 "who are governed by the Law of England, we must administer  
 "that Law. *But in the Mofussil where the law of England is not*  
 "*the law of the country, &c.*" We are inclined to think that the  
 learned Chief Justice is right, and that a sufficient distinction has  
 not been drawn between taking the English Law of Evidence as  
 a guide in matters of broad and equitable principle and being  
 bound by all its provisions, even in those points in which juris-  
 prudents admit that its technicalities are attributable entirely to  
 the system of things under which it sprang into existence, and  
 was in the course of a single century built up out of the  
 materials supplied by judicial decisions exclusively, save where  
 the Legislature interfered, not to make any addition, but to alter

a portion of the structure by relaxing some rule that had been found in practice too stringent and somewhat inequitable, and which *they* were unable to loose, who had power to bind. Whether the Law of Evidence should be left in India, as it was in England, to be constructed entirely of judicial decisions, is a point about which much may be said on either side. On the one hand, all that has hitherto been done in this way, (and much has been done within the last few years,) must be admitted to have been well done. On the other hand, the process is a slow one; while we believe that reform in this particular is urgently required. Moreover, there are so many High Courts and independent tribunals, that there is the danger of decisions clashing; and those usages having the force of prescription may arise, and interests may be permitted to depend thereupon, which could scarcely be disturbed in any future general measure of reform.

Turning now to our task, the first portion of it, which we shall deal with, concerns the principle of *Exclusion*. The grounds of *incompetency* were very numerous under English Law, but the enlightened and liberal spirit of modern legal reform has swept away many of them. Admissibility is now the rule, exclusion the exception, and in India the exception has been narrowed down to limits more confined than have yet been sanctioned at home. In abolishing incompetency from crime or interest, in rendering parties to civil cases and their wives admissible witnesses, and further in making them compellable to appear as such, Indian Law followed fast on the footsteps of reform at home. According to Mr. Taylor, there are yet *seven* classes incompetent to testify under English Law. Let us see if the grounds of exclusion yet held applicable to these classes would be allowed under Indian Law. *First* then, parties to suits instituted in consequence of adultery, and their husbands and wives are incompetent. The question of competency, as concerns this particular class of witnesses, has never been raised and decided in India. There is at present no tribunal in this country corresponding to the 'Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes' at home, but we entertain little doubt that when the question comes to be decided, this ground of exclusion will not be approved. The rule in England is a remnant of the old common law principle which excluded the evidence of parties to the record in all cases, and that it has not been already rescinded is due to the fact, that the tribunal for this particular class of cases stood apart from the regular tribunals and the improvements effected in the administration of justice therein. Even now where a petition is presented for the dissolution of a marriage on the

ground of adultery coupled with cruelty or desertion, the husband and wife are admissible to give evidence respecting the desertion or the cruelty, though they are not so admissible where merely a *judicial separation* is sought on the ground of adultery with cruelty. This curious anomaly has already been often commented upon. The hardship of the rule which excludes the evidence of the parties in these cases, was recently illustrated in the case of *Codrington v. Codrington and Anderson*, and we have little doubt that this ground of exclusion will before long be removed by legislative interference, and the parties made at least competent if not compellable witnesses. The Indian Evidence Act contains nothing that would lead to the conclusion, that this ground of incompetency would be sanctioned under its provisions and the whole tenour of the Section, which renders parties to a civil suit or other proceeding of a civil nature competent and compellable to give evidence, would seem to be in favour of the admissibility of this testimony.

The next class of incompetent witnesses consists of parties to an action for breach of promise of marriage. "The expediency of excluding the testimony of these parties," says Mr. Taylor, "is extremely problematical; for most persons, who have watched the working of the new law, must have come to the conclusion, that actions of this nature are precisely those in which juries ought to have the advantage of seeing the litigants, and of hearing what they have to say, on either side." We believe that the effect of the Section of the Indian Evidence Act, to which we have above alluded, would undoubtedly be to admit these victims of misplaced affection, and their inconstant *quondam* admirers, to the witness-box.

The third class of incompetent witnesses comprises defendants in criminal cases. It has been already pointed out in a previous article,\* that a vast innovation has been introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect. Defendants in criminal cases, though they cannot be examined on oath or solemn affirmation, can yet under the provisions of this Code be orally interrogated; and they have thus a full opportunity of explaining doubtful portions of their conduct, and of putting forward facts known to themselves alone, which may go far towards procuring their acquittal. It is to be regretted that the cases decided since the Code came into operation, furnish little or no information as to the manner in which this important provision of the law should be carried into effect. Does the admission

\* See *Calcutta Review*. Vol. XLIV, No. 87, p. 128.

of a prisoner as to any particular fact do away with the necessity of calling witnesses to prove such fact? For example, if property said to have been stolen from the prosecutor be found in the possession of the prisoner, and he admit the fact of possession, claiming the property as his own or accounting in some way for its having come into his hands, is it unnecessary to call evidence to the fact of possession: or must the whole case for the prosecution be proved, as under the rule of English Law? If the latter be the case, what must be done, if there be no evidence whatever forthcoming on the point, and the statement of the prisoner as to this particular be alone before the Court while he pleads "not guilty" to the charge itself? It is a rule at home that where several persons are jointly indicted, any one of them may be called as a witness for or against his co-defendants, except where he must have a direct interest in procuring their acquittal, as for instance in a case of conspiracy or riot, which requires the concurrence of more persons than one to create an offence. Whether this rule will apply in India has not, we believe, been ever decided, but there is little doubt that it would so apply, as the principles of exclusion are here less tolerated than at home.\* Whether in† petty cases punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months; in‡ enquires having a view to recognizance and security to keep the peace, and to§ security for good behaviour: in|| proceedings relating to the maintenance of wives and children; and in investigations into¶ disputes relating to the possession of land or the right of use of any land or water, the defendant can be examined on oath or solemn affirmation as a witness, are questions which may admit of discussion, but which have not yet been decided, as far as we are aware. In some of these cases we think there can be little doubt, looking to the civil nature of the proceedings. In affiliation cases at home the defendant is examined as a witness, and we feel assured that a similar practice would be adopted in the same class of cases in this country.

We now come to the *fourth* class of persons excluded from the witness-box by the Law of England. Husbands and wives

\* Since the above was written, this principle has been admitted and approved by the Calcutta High Court.

† See Sec. 266, Act XXV of 1861; also Note to p. 132, *Calcutta Review*, No. 87, Vol. XLIV.

‡ Chapter XVIII, Act XXV of 1861.

§ Chapter XIX, ditto.

|| Chapter XXI, ditto.

¶ Chapter XXII, ditto.

are precluded from giving evidence for or against each other in criminal proceedings. In declaring that this rule has no application in India to persons other than British-born subjects, the whole subject has been so ably and exhaustively dealt with in a recent important decision of the Calcutta High Court, that nothing is left us but to put forward the simple fact, that it has been decided, following the principles of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, that husbands and wives are competent witnesses for and against each other in criminal cases in which the parties are not European British-born subjects. This principle of exclusion has often been attacked in England, and many will remember the case in which a man was tried for wounding another in a common lodging house. The principal witness against him was the mistress of the wounded man, while his wife, who was present, could not be examined. Can the exclamation of the prisoner be wondered at? "You have heard that *woman*, and you will not hear my *wife*." Whatever doubt there may be as to the propriety of rescinding this rule of exclusion in England, where Christianity and monogamy prevail, few who have any right to be heard on the question, will deny that incompetency of this kind is less than anywhere to be tolerated in India having regard to the religions of the country, and the condition and circumstances of the married state, which are special local reasons, apart from those arguments amounting almost to demonstration, which have been urged in favour of admission by the framer of the Louisiana Code. The admissibility of this evidence has, however, been well approved with the precaution, that a wife should never be called as a witness against her husband, or a husband against his wife, unless where the circumstances of the case and the paucity of other evidence make it desirable, if not necessary, for the ends of justice. If this principle be acted upon, the strongest supporters of exclusion must feel themselves compelled to make thus much concession to the demands of justice.

The *fifth* class of incompetent witnesses consists of the wives of persons, who have been made respondents in suits for dissolution of marriage, or for damages by reason of adultery. "The extreme improbability of any woman thus unfortunately circumstanced being required to give evidence, renders needless any comment on this rule," says Mr. Taylor. Under the Section of the Indian Evidence Act already more than once referred to, those persons would clearly be admissible witnesses in this country.

The *sixth* class of individuals incompetent to testify includes witnesses of the Crown in cases of high treason or misprision of treason, who have not been included or properly described in a list duly delivered to the defendant. This ground of exclusion rests entirely on some technical provisions of the English law of treason, and, unless in the improbable case of a European British-born subject tried in this country for treason, could have no possible application.

The *seventh* class consists of persons insensible to the obligation of an oath. The safe-guards under which testimony is given in a court of justice are three-fold—*first*, fear of punishment at the hands of the Supreme Being; *second*, fear of punishment at the hands of man for perjury; and *third*, cross-examination. The form of the English oath calls God to be a witness that the deponent is speaking the truth and adjures Him to deal with the sin of perjury. *So help me God. So may God stand by me in my hour of need in this life or at the day of judgment as I now tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth—an awful adjuration, but a powerful safeguard against falsehood with the religious or the superstitious.* In England numerous sects at an early period entertained scruples of conscience about taking an oath; and the Legislature, guided by a feeling of religious toleration, relaxed the rules of the Common Law, and permitted all such persons to depose on a solemn affirmation or declaration that they would speak the whole truth. This provision of English law was imitated in India, but instead of excepting those Hindús or Mahomedans only who had a conscientious scruple to be sworn by the water of the Ganges or upon the Koran, the whole of the Hindu and Mahomedan population were declared excused from taking an oath, and were permitted to depose on solemn affirmation only. The relaxation of the rule was properly made in England, having regard to the spirit of truth that pervades the nation, and the character of those sects in whose favour the exception was made. But in India where the two remaining safe-guards are so very weak, was it wise to dispense with the first and most important one? The fear of punishment at the hands of man is remote and insignificant, as we have endeavoured to point out in a former\* article. The use and the principles of cross-examination are little understood and less practised in the courts of the Mofussil. We submit then that one of the most important tests and safeguards of truth has been sacrificed to a mistaken spirit of religious toleration, and a crude effort of unripe

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\* See p. 417, *Calcutta Review*, No. 86, Vol. XLIV.

reform in a country where the moral regard for truth is at a very low ebb indeed, and needs all the support that can be given it from other quarters. When oaths were abolished in India, as far as concerned the Hindu and Mahomedan population, it followed as a sort of necessary consequence, that defect of religious belief could not be retained as a ground of exclusion from the witness-box. Accordingly the Evidence\* Act admitted such persons to depose on simple affirmation. Being strongly in favour of competency and opposed to incompetency, considering that admissibility should be the rule and exclusion the exception, we approve of the provision that admits atheists, as well as others, to the witness-box, but we cannot approve of that other provision from which it emanated as a corollary.

The grounds of incompetency in India would, therefore, seem to be few indeed; and in fact the Indian Evidence Act† enacts that the following persons *only* shall be incompetent to testify, *viz.*, children under seven years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly: and persons of unsound mind, who, *at the time of their examination*, appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly. It will be observed that neither of these grounds of exclusion is absolute and unconditional, for there is nothing to hinder a child under seven years of age from being examined as a witness, if he appear *capable* of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which he is examined, and of relating them truly. Persons of unsound mind also may clearly be examined in their lucid intervals.

From the above sketch it will, in some measure, appear that the principle of exclusion has found small favour in the Indian Law of Evidence, that the question has been ably discussed in several judicial decisions, and has been partly provided for by a fragmentary Act. As far then as this one portion of the subject is concerned, materials for legislation are not wanting.

The rule that *evidence must be confined to the points in issue* opens out a wide field for discussion, a very small portion of which can be traversed in our present notice. That this rule is in conformity with strict equity, and conducive to the rapid and correct administration of justice, cannot be doubted, if only the points in issue

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\* Act II of 1855, S. 15.

† Act II of 1855, S. 14.



be properly chosen. In England the issues are fixed by the parties themselves through the means and with the aid of qualified legal practitioners. But there are no qualified and competent legal practitioners in the Mofussil. The parties ignorant, void of mental training, and without development of their reasoning powers, are utterly unable to perform the task for themselves. The law has, therefore, wisely made it the duty of judicial officers to ascertain the points in dispute, and fix the issues between the parties. Any one slightly skilled in the principles of pleading knows full well, that on the performance of this duty depends the doing of complete justice in any case. How can the evidence be confined to the issues consistently with a proper and adequate investigation of the case, if the issues be not properly chosen? The Judges of the Mofussil courts of all grades have been railed at over and over, because they have but little law; and we are of those who would gladly see the defect together with the cause of it removed by a separation of the executive and judicial departments, but the mere fact, that Judges in India have to fix the issues in all civil cases must, so long as this procedure is necessary, render it a very dangerous experiment to place on the Mofussil Bench men, who, however much law they may have, are yet devoid of that practical experience of India, its people, its special institutions, its peculiar habits, public, private, and domestic, which in proportion as any Indian Judge possesses, so is he capable of selecting the points in dispute, and fixing the issues in any case, and so is he fitted to decide upon *facts*, the opinion as to which of a mere *griffin*, though the griffin be a lawyer, would be wholly worthless. Under English procedure, as law and custom assign the fixing of the issues to the parties themselves, who fix them through their legal advisers, it is clear that, if they be improperly chosen, the parties have themselves only to blame. In India, however, where the task devolves on the Judge, the case is different, and the Judge is properly held wholly responsible for the due performance of the duty. So far has this principle been carried that it has recently been held that a client is not bound by the mistaken consent of his pleader to abide by issues of law erroneously fixed by the Judge.

The rules which indicate the party on whom the *burthen of proof* is to be thrown are little understood in the Mofussil, and what failures of justice take place in consequence! Even where justice is done, how very tardy is the process, and accompanied by how much expense that never need have been incurred. Many *hakims* always commence with taking the depositions of the plaintiff's witnesses, even when the whole burthen of proof

is on the defendant; and were the plaintiff to bring no witness, his case would be dismissed for want of proof! Again, the *right to begin* depending upon the proper allocation of the burthen of proof is totally unknown in the Mofussil. The particular advantage gained by the party, who obtains the right to begin, is perhaps of less importance in a country where as yet there is no *jury* in civil cases: but the recent Act, which has been directed to raise and improve the *status* of vakeels and mookhtars, has allowed these practitioners to *plead*, and *the* rules, or *some* rules of pleading will ere long have to be followed. There are many High Court decisions which have corrected mistakes as to throwing the burthen of proof on the wrong party, and seeing how very simple are the principles involved, it would appear no difficult matter to incorporate those principles in the provisions of a Code of Evidence.

The rule which requires the *best evidence* to be given of which the case is susceptible is of such vast importance, that to its being misunderstood and little acted upon are attributable not a few of those serious mistakes made by subordinate courts, for the correction of which so many grades of appellate authority are necessary in India, affording at the same time to the wealthy such chances of playing fast and loose with justice. That evidence is admitted without scruple every day in every court in the country, which evidence itself indicates the existence of more original sources of information, none acquainted with the principles of the rule and the practice of the Mofussil courts can deny. The distinction between *primary* and *secondary* evidence is little understood, and the important exceptions that have been grafted on the rule are in consequence misunderstood and misapplied. Oral evidence is constantly received in substitution of writings that ought to be and that could be produced. The new Registration Act is rendered inoperative by this violation of one of the first principles of the Law of Evidence. Written instruments, which ought to have been registered and have *not* been registered are by law inadmissible in\* civil proceedings, but oral testimony is daily admitted without hesitation to supply their place.

\* In *criminal* proceedings the want of a stamp or non-registration would be no valid objection to the admissibility of a document. We may here notice a distinction between the English and Indian Stamp Acts. Under the former any omission or insufficiency of the stamp may be cured as a matter of right in all cases by payment of the proper duty and penalty, but in India this can only be done, if the Court or the Revenue authorities are satisfied that the omission or neglect did not arise from any intention to evade payment of the stamp duty or defraud the Government.

Connected with the present portion of the subject there is no practice of Indian courts of justice, which stands in greater need of reform, and which could more easily be reformed by the appropriate provisions of a code, than the indiscriminate practice of receiving in evidence *copies* of all kinds of writings, public and private. This erroneous procedure has been often remarked upon by the Privy Council, but except in a few judicial decisions no radical attempt has ever been made at improvement. When the practices of the *amlah* and the venal habits of court officers in this country are taken into consideration, it will appear to most men, that in no country should the reception of this particular kind of secondary evidence be more carefully excluded.

With reference to the exceptions that have been engrafted on the rule of law, which requires the production of the best evidence, something has been done in India towards arriving at some settled principles. One of the exceptional cases allowed at home is, when the papers are voluminous and it is only necessary to prove their general results. A witness may then be allowed to speak as to the balance of a set of accounts or the general result of his examination of books and securities. Similarly, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, a commissioner may be appointed for the investigation or adjustment of accounts, and the result of his proceedings may be received in evidence.

The portion of the rule requiring the best evidence which excludes *hearsay*, is commonly neglected in the courts of the Mofussil, and yet it requires more than ordinary attention and watchfulness in a country in which ninety-nine out of every hundred witnesses, are totally uneducated and absolutely, with all honest intention, incapable of distinguishing between what they have seen and what they have heard. When it is remembered how often any matter touching which witnesses are required to give their testimony is discussed among them in their own village, on the road as they come in to court in a body, at the mookhtar's *basa* (lodging) and at the\* *Gách-tolla*, it will readily be understood that the most honest witness gets in spite of himself to mingle up what he saw, and what he heard, and what he thinks. Each witness knows the *whole* story, though he only witnessed one-twentieth part of the transaction, and with the greatest air of innocence he starts off at headlong speed to give the whole

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† *Place under the tree.* There are generally trees adjacent to the courts and under the shade of these the witnesses sit, while waiting for the case to come on.

of it with his own version of the matter. It requires a skilled and patient hand to get out of him what he actually saw with his own eyes: and, if he be stupid or nervous, once stopped in telling his own story in his own way, he is liable to get confused, and to be unable to tell what he did see. In England counsel have no communication with the witnesses before they are called into the box. In America, on the other hand, it is a common practice for practitioners to have an\* interview with the witnesses in order to ascertain what they really know: but in India the mookhtar considers it his duty, after ascertaining this, to instruct the witness what to say, how to say it, and what to suppress, telling him that the spoiling of the case will be the inevitable result of his directions not being followed. This is the ordinary practice in all cases, even where the party producing the witnesses means honestly and seeks just redress. It is their way of doing things, attributable, no doubt, to the former system of recording the evidence of witnesses out of the hearing and often out of the sight of the *hakim*, a *mohurrir* or native writer taking down their statements, which were read over to the judicial functionary when he had leisure to attend to the case. The practice has been\* changed, but the results of it still continue, and one of these results is the prevailing habit of drilling witnesses. Where the whole statement of a witness is utterly false, detection is easy enough, but where the witness intentionally or unconsciously mingles with the true portion, or with what he saw another portion false, or which he did not see, it requires considerable patience, skill, and knowledge of the language to divide the true from the false, what the witness really knows from what he believes on the information of others. Illiterate witnesses are more or less alike in every country, but there are in India special circumstances, some of which we have endeavoured to explain, which render this class peculiarly impracticable. We are not prepared to say that the whole of the law of England applicable to *hearsay* should be imported into this country, or that, if imported, it would be suitable. There are many points in which we think it would not be suitable, and many others, which, though difficult to alter in an old country where usage has made them sacred, should certainly not be allowed to find a place in a new code and on ground before unoccupied. The English rules of the Law of Evidence

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\* *i. e.* as far as the *letter* of the law goes. We believe however that few but Europeans heed the provisions of the law. The *Englishman* a short time ago contained a serious complaint on this score against a high native judicial functionary in Tirhoot.

applicable to hearsay have, however, already been considerably relaxed in India, and we think that further improvements might be made in the same direction. We proceed to notice a portion of what has been done up to the present time.

In questions of pedigree "the settled rule of admission," says Mr. Taylor, "is now restricted to hearsay, proceeding from *persons who were de jure related by blood or marriage* to the family "in question." The declaration of an *illegitimate* member of a family has been rejected. Under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act however, the declarations of *illegitimate* members of the family and also of persons, who, *though not related by blood or marriage* to the family, were intimately acquainted with its members and state, are admissible in evidence after the death of the declarant in the same manner and to the same extent as those of deceased members of the family.\*

Under English law declarations made against the interest of the declarant, and declarations made in the course of business, are admissible only when the declarant is shown to be dead. It was held not to be sufficient to prove that he had absconded in consequence of a serious criminal charge, and was unlikely ever to return, or that he was otherwise abroad or beyond the process of the court. In India, on the contrary, such declarations will be received, if it be shown that the declarant is incapable of giving evidence by reason of his subsequent loss of understanding, or is at the time of trial or hearing *bond fide* and permanently beyond the reach of the process of the court, or that he cannot after diligent search be found.† Few will be found to disapprove of this relaxation of the proviso that guarded the exception.

In the case of *dying declarations* there has been a yet more startling innovation made upon the principles of English law. The ground of the admissibility of this kind of hearsay evidence has been well put in oft-quoted language by Lord Chief Baron Eyre. "They are declarations made in extremity, when "the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this "world is gone: when every motive to falsehood is silenced, "and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations "to speak the truth: a situation so solemn and so awful "is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to "that which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of "justice." Not less forcibly have similar arguments been put

\* Act II of 1855, S. 47.

† Act II of 1855, S. 39.

by England's greatest dramatist into the mouth of the dying Melun.

"Have I not hideous death within my view,  
"Retaining but a quantity of life,  
"Which bleeds away even as a form of wax  
"Resolveth from his figure 'gainst the fire?  
"What in the world should make me now deceive,  
"Since I must lose the use of all deceit?  
"Why should I then be false; since it is true  
"That I must die here and live hence by truth?"

It is difficult to see on what principle or on what arguments the restriction of the admissibility of this kind of evidence to cases of homicide can be supported. Yet such is the rule of English law; and dying declarations can under it only be received where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declaration. They have been rejected over and over in other criminal cases. In the Statutory\* provisions of Indian law there was nothing to limit the admissibility of this kind of evidence to cases of homicide merely, and accordingly it has been settled by a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court, that dying declarations are admissible in other cases than those of homicide. We may notice a further distinction between the law of England and that of India connected with the same subject. Under the former the declarant must have believed that death was impending. If he entertained any expectation or hope of recovery, even though he died an hour afterwards, the declaration would be inadmissible. Under Indian law, however, the declaration will be admissible, if the deceased person at the time of making such declaration believed himself to be in danger of approaching death, although he entertained at the time of making it hopes of recovery.†

Turning now to the rules under which a witness may be permitted to refresh his memory, we shall find a more liberal spirit adopted in this country than at home. In England a witness may be permitted to refresh his memory by looking at a writing which has been made or its accuracy recognized, at the time of the fact in question, or, at furthest, so recently afterwards, as to render it probable that the memory of the witness had not then become defective. Under Indian law ‡ a witness may look at any writing

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\* Act II of 1855, S. 29; and Act XXV of 1861, S. 371.

† Section 371, Code of Criminal Procedure.

‡ Act II of 1855, S. 45.

made by himself or by any other person at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately afterwards, or *at any other time* when the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew that the same was correctly stated in writing. The distinction seems to be that in England the court takes upon it in all cases to decide what is a reasonable time within which it is probable that the memory of the witness has not become defective, while in India the witness would be allowed to look at a writing made at *any* time, if he could only declare that at the time of making the writing the fact *was* fresh in his memory. Indian law further allows a *copy* to be used, if the Court under the circumstances be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original. Whether this would be permitted in an English Court is a proposition about which considerable doubt may be entertained. Where a witness having looked at the copy was enabled to swear positively to the facts from his own recollection, the evidence was received; but it would doubtless be otherwise if the witness after looking at the copy had no personal recollection of the facts, but could only state that he remembered the facts to have been written down, and believed that they were then correctly stated. A witness might be enabled to speak from seeing his own signature or writing, and knowing his own usual habits; when a copy in another handwriting would recall nothing to his mind. In connection with the present topic we may notice the case of *experts*. Under English law witnesses of this class are permitted to refresh their memory by a reference to books. Thus a physician may refer to medical books; a foreign lawyer called to prove foreign law may refer to codes, text books, and statutes in which such law is to be found. The books themselves are not, however, evidence, and cannot be dealt with by counsel as such. Under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, however, the Court may on matters of public history, literature, or art refer to such published books, maps, or charts as the court may consider to be of authority on these subjects.\* And books printed or published under the authority of the Government of a foreign country, and purporting to contain the statutes, code, or other written law of such country, and also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of such country, and books *proved* to be commonly admitted in such courts as evidence of the law of such country, are declared admissible as evidence of such law.†

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\* Act II of 1855, S. 11.

† Act II of 1855, S. 12.

Under English procedure, a witness will not be compelled to answer any question, when such answer would have a tendency to expose him or the husband or wife of such witness to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. This is a very old rule of the English Common Law, and has been always respected by the Judges, even by the unscrupulous Jeffries when it told too against the prisoner. In India, on the contrary, a witness is bound to answer all such questions, but no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall, except for the purpose of punishing such person for wilfully giving false evidence on such examination, subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be used as evidence against him in any criminal proceeding. The rule of English law has been found so obstructive to justice, that it has been necessary to repeal it in many instances, and compel the witness to answer, giving him at the same time an indemnity for the offence, which he may disclose. Such a provision has been introduced into the Larceny Act of 1861 in so far as it applies to frauds committed by Bankers, Factors, Directors, Trustees, &c.; into the Poisoned Grain Prohibition Act of 1863; into the Exhibition Medals Act of 1863; and into the Act for inquiring into corrupt practices at Elections. There is, however, a great distinction between this provision and the enactment of Indian law. Under the former the witness cannot be convicted *on any evidence whatever* in respect of any act done by him, if he shall, at any time previously to his being charged with such offence, have first disclosed such act on oath. The having given evidence is a complete bar to a prosecution. Under the Indian Act, the answer given in any particular case cannot be used against the witness, but there is nothing to prevent a prosecution on other evidence. Mr. Norton remarks that, where a witness had made a self-criminative statement, it would be difficult in a small society like that which is found in most Indian towns, to exclude this fact from the knowledge of the Judge or Jury in case of a subsequent prosecution for the offence, and that it would be sure to tell against the prisoner. No doubt this is the greatest objection that can be raised against the provision, but, on the other hand, it may with equal fairness be urged against the rule of English law, that the Judge is not bound to warn the witness of his privilege, and if the witness do answer unwittingly when he might have claimed protection, his answer may be used against him.\*

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\* Mr. Norton, p. 143, seems to doubt this statement, but see Taylor, Vol. I., p. 78.



It was for a long time a moot point at home how far a party might cross-examine and discredit a witness called by himself. A Judge seems always to have had a discretion to allow leading questions to be put to a witness, who appeared obviously hostile to the party who called him, but it was not till 1854 that the principle was clearly admitted by the Legislature. The Common Law Procedure Act of that year provided that a party producing a witness may, in case the witness shall, in the opinion of the Judge, prove "*adverse*," that is, "*hostile*" and not merely unfavourable, contradict him by other evidence, or, *by leave of the Judge*, prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony; but before such last-mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such statement. This provision was borrowed in great part from the New York Civil Code. The Indian Evidence Act contains a similar provision, only more extensive and better-calculated to meet the requirements of a country, where the most important witness may generally be bought over by the other side. It enacts that the party, at whose instance a witness is examined, may, with the permission of the court, cross-examine such witness to test his veracity, in the same manner as if he had not been called at his instance, and may be allowed to show that such witness has varied from a previous statement made by him. It may be remarked here that the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act apply only to *civil* cases, but there is nothing in the Section of the Indian law, which so limits the application of its provisions. In Ireland they have been extended to criminal as well as civil cases.

Under English procedure the former statement of a witness is not admissible to *corroborate* his testimony by showing that he has been consistent throughout, and this even though the opposite side have given proof of contradictory statements. The Indian Evidence Act, on the contrary, ordains that any former statement made by a witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, shall be admissible in corroboration.\* There have not been wanting authorities to advocate the adoption of a similar principle in English law.

It was enacted by the Common Law Procedure Act† of 1854, that a witness in any case may be examined as to whether he

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\* Act II of 1855, S. 31.

† S. 25.

has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanour, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies the fact or refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the opposite party to prove such conviction. There is no similar provision applicable to criminal trials, and consequently though a witness in a criminal case may be asked as to a previous conviction, his answer will be conclusive, unless the question relate to relevant facts; for if it relate to those that are irrelevant, according to the usual rule, no further evidence can be admitted to contradict the witness's reply. The Indian Evidence Act contains a provision taken *verbatim* from the Common Law Procedure Act. "A witness in any *cause* may "be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any felony or "misdemeanour, &c."\* The use of the word *cause* and the fact of the Section having been borrowed from the English *civil* law, it has been contended, limit the application of the provision in India to civil cases. We would gladly see the point discussed. The Indian is certainly inferior to the English Act in not providing a summary mode of proving the conviction by a certificate signed by the clerk of the court.

Under the old rule of English law, neither a witness nor the jury, except under certain special circumstances, were allowed to *compare two writings* with each other, in order to ascertain whether both were written by the same person. Mr. Taylor characterizes this as a technical rule of the Common Law certainly *not* based on common sense. By the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, it was, however, enacted that comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the Judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the Court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute. This enactment applies to courts of civil judicature only, and, as Mr. Taylor remarks, the result is sufficiently absurd, two separate laws of evidence being administered at the assizes—one at Nisi Prius, and the other in the Crown Court. We have done better in India, for the corresponding Section of the Indian Evidence Act is in no wise limited in its application. It enacts that on an enquiry whether a signature, writing, or seal is genuine, any undisputed signature, writing, or seal of the party, whose signature, writing, or seal is under dispute, may be compared with the disputed one, though such signature, writing, or seal be on

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\* Mr. Goodeve (p. 244) seems to draw a distinction between English and Indian law as to a "*refusal to answer*" letting in proof of the conviction; but the two Sections are identical, and no distinction exists.

an instrument which is not evidence in the *cause*. There is another distinction between these analogous provisions of English and Indian law. Under the former, the writing, with which the *writing in the case* is compared, may be one *proved to the satisfaction of the Judge to be genuine*, but under the latter it must be some *undisputed* writing of the same party.

There are some points connected with the admission of secondary evidence in criminal cases in which Indian law is peculiar, such peculiarity being, however, a necessary consequence of the peculiar exigencies of the country. For instance, at a Sessions trial the Code of Criminal Procedure directs that the Court shall receive as *prima facie* evidence the examination of the Civil Surgeon or other medical witness taken and duly attested by the Magistrate. The Court may however, if it see fit, summon the medical witness to give evidence before it. To those who have never been in India, this might seem a provision of doubtful expediency. But when they are told that Surgeons or other medical witnesses are to be found only at stations fifty to a hundred miles apart, and that a Civil Surgeon is often from the exigencies of the service removed to some other station in the time intervening between his deposition before the Magistrate and the Sessions trial, the matter will appear in a very different point of view. In doubtful cases, however, this provision must tell with terrible effect against the prisoner upon whom is thrown the burthen of disproving the only medical testimony, which can be given from actual knowledge of the facts of the case. The opinion of the Civil Surgeon in such cases must actually decide the question of life and death. Yet that such opinion may be fallible, the trials of Donnellan, Palmer, Dove, Smethurst, and others abundantly prove. The consideration of this point should strongly impress upon Government the necessity of securing peculiar excellence in the Medical Service. In a similar way the report of the Chemical Examiner to Government is admissible in evidence, if it bear his signature, without any proof of such signature or of the person signing holding the office. Whether the deposition of a witness taken before a Magistrate can be used at the subsequent trial before the Judge, if the witness be for any reason non-producible, is a question which has been satisfactorily settled in India. The deposition is in England admissible, if it be proved that the witness is dead or so ill as not to be able to travel, and also if it be proved that the deposition was duly taken in the presence of the accused. The Section (11 and 12 Vict. cap. 42, S. 17) has however been so badly worded as to raise a doubt, whether the deposition could be

admitted in other cases than those expressly stated therein, as, for example, if the witness were proved to be permanently insane. The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure makes the deposition admissible, if the witness be *dead or the court be satisfied that for any sufficient cause his attendance cannot be procured.*

The law as to the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases differs considerably in England and India, and here again the distinction is wholly attributable to the peculiar circumstances and institutions of the latter country. A confession made to a Police officer is inadmissible as a general rule; and the reason of the rule is that the old Police resorted to torture and other obnoxious practices for the purpose of procuring confessions, not unfrequently from innocent persons, who were put forward to show the vigilance of the Police, or to screen the guilty from whom bribes had been taken. To the revelations of the Madras Torture Commission we are indebted for this measure which, though an extreme one, was yet rendered necessary by the universal prevalence of the terrible practices which were sought to be suppressed. Let us, however, hope that at some future day and with a purer and better-disciplined Police, the necessity of retaining a provision, which in many cases allows undoubted criminals to escape, will have passed away. There is, however, one exception to the general rule, that excludes confessions made to a Police officer or to any one else, as long as the accused person is in the custody of the Police. When any fact is discovered in consequence of a confession, so much of the confession as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be given in evidence. The discovery of some fact is a sort of proof, that the confession was that of a person who had some participation in the crime. It may be remarked that this exception is in accordance with the rule of English law, under which even when a confession has been unduly obtained from a prisoner, yet if property stolen, or the instrument of the crime, or the body of the person murdered, or any other material fact has been discovered thereby, so much of the confession as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may, says Mr. Taylor, according to the sounder doctrine, be given in evidence. There is a further distinction between the two systems. Under Indian procedure neither a Police officer nor a Magistrate is bound to give any *caution* to a prisoner to prevent him disclosing anything which he may wish to say.

In admitting the evidence of accomplices, the rule in India has followed that which has been adopted at home. It has

been decided \* that a conviction upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is valid in law, but that the Judge in summing up should advise the jury of the danger of convicting on such evidence merely. Connected with the question of corroborating a single witness is another point in which the case-law of India has followed that of England. It has been † decided by the Calcutta High Court in accordance with the rule followed in the latter country, that a conviction for perjury upon the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness is not legal.

We have already seen that the same *protection* from answering criminating questions is not extended to *witnesses* in this country as at home. With respect to the *protection* extended to *writings* however, the law of both countries, as far as it admits of comparison, is pretty similar. A witness is not in India bound to produce any document relating to affairs of State, the production of which would be contrary to good policy, ‡ nor any confidential writing which has passed between him § and his legal professional adviser. It would be well if the principle of the rule in the former case were better understood and acted upon. One notable violation of it is common in many districts. Copies of the diaries and of other papers connected with the proceedings of the Police are given to parties who ask for them. This is in singular contrast with the rule adopted in England, and unanimously laid down by all the Judges in the case of *R. v. Hardy*, that all questions tending to the discovery of the channels by which information was given to the officers of justice, were upon the general principle of public convenience to be suppressed. If such questions are not to be allowed, it is an untenable proposition, that copies of papers, which show all the steps taken by the Police authorities, should be granted to any one who asks for them. With respect to other privileged communications, made verbally or in writing, between husband and wife, lawyer and client, the rule of protection is the same in England and in India.

It is an unvarying rule of English law that parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from

\* *The Queen v. Elahi Bux*, 29th May, 1866. Weekly Reporter, Criminal Rulings, p. 80.

† *The Queen v. Lal Chand Kowrah Chowkidar, and others*, 7th February, 1866. Weekly Reporter, Criminal Rulings, p. 23.

‡ Act II of 1855, S. 21.

§ Lo. S. 22.

the terms of a valid written instrument. This rule has been followed in Courts of Equity both in England and America, and of its propriety there can be no doubt. In cases of accident, mistake, or fraud however, parol evidence has been always admitted in both countries to qualify, correct, and sometimes defeat the terms of the writing. In India, more especially in Bengal, there was a course of decisions which seemed to favour a departure from these acknowledged principles in the case of contracts of sale, oral evidence having been, on more than one occasion, admitted to show that a deed of absolute sale was intended to operate only as a mortgage. In a recent important decision\* of the Calcutta High Court however, the whole subject has been ably reviewed, and a fixed principle laid down for future guidance. The learned Chief Justice gave his opinion that in this country verbal evidence is not admissible to vary or alter the terms of a written contract in cases in which there is no fraud or mistake, and in which the parties *intended to express in writing what their words imported*. The case was accordingly remanded to try whether the plaintiff had ever been in possession and been forcibly dispossessed as alleged by him; and whether having reference to the amount of the alleged purchase-money advanced, and to the value of the interest alleged to be sold, and the acts and conduct of the parties, they intended to act upon the deed as an absolute sale, or to treat the transaction as a mortgage only; "for I am of opinion," added the Chief Justice, "that parol evidence is admissible to explain the acts of the parties."

Under English procedure where attestation is necessary to the validity of a document, the attesting witnesses *must* be called to prove it, and this formality will not be dispensed with, even by the admission of the *party*. This very absurd rule which requires that to be proved which nobody wants to deny, has been rescinded in this country, and the admission of a party to an attested instrument is sufficient *prima facie* evidence against him of its execution.†

It will appear from the above brief *resumé*, that, especially of late years and since the establishment of the High Courts, a considerable degree of labour has been expended on the subject with which this article is concerned, and that to him who will study the broad principles of the Law of Evidence, there are not wanting in India authorities and precedents to guide him in the

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\* *Kashinath Chakrovartti, Appellant, v. Chand Churn Bannerji, Respondent, 5th February, 1866.*

† Act II of 1855, S. 38.

narrower and more obscure bye-paths. Should no regular Code be prepared for India, doubtless a Law of Evidence suitable to the requirements of the country, will be created in the course of years by the decisions and precedents of the courts. Such case-law has, we know, many advantages. It is like a shoe made to the foot and less likely to pinch than one made from an ordinary last, yet we believe that the latter, if made after careful measurement, is better than a loose sandal which requires constant girding to the feet of the wearer.

"However different codes may vary widely from each other in matters of arbitrary positive institution and of mere artificial creation, the general means of investigating facts," says a distinguished writer on the subject, "must be common to all. Every rational system which provides the means of ascertaining truth, must be founded on experience and reason; on a well-grounded knowledge of human nature and conduct; on a consideration of the value of testimony; and on the weight due to coincident circumstances. The object of the law is identified with that of pure science; and all the means within the reach of philosophy; all the connections and links, physical and moral, which experience and reason can discover, are thus rendered subservient to the purposes of justice." The *instinctive* disposition to believe what others tell us, and to confide in their veracity, which is implanted in our natures, and which enables us to acquire knowledge in things beyond the limited range of our own senses, is the foundation and cornerstone of the law of evidence. "The knowledge acquired by an individual through his own perception and reflection," says Mr. Taylor, "is but a small part of what he possesses; much of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge having been acquired through the perceptions of others. It is not easy to conceive that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so conspicuous in all his works, constituted man to believe only on his own personal experience! Since in that case the world could neither be governed or improved, and society must remain in the state in which it was left by the first generation of men." From childhood up, we learn by believing in what others tell us, and *faith in human testimony is only limited by experience of its credibility*. In deciding then how far the Law of Evidence which is established in England, as the guide and rule of all courts, is applicable to India, having more especial reference to those portions of it, which define and declare the artificial value and effect to be given to evidence when admitted, it becomes a fundamental question, how far the experience of the credibility of testimony in this country assimilates to

similar experience at home. We believe that there are few indeed, of those who have had even a brief experience of India, who would venture to assign equal value to evidence of any kind in both countries. In England,

"All truth is precious, if not all divine,  
"And what dilates the powers must needs refine."

The love of truth is part of our national character, and though

"Falsehood and fraud shoot up in every soil,  
"The product of all climes,"

yet in some countries they are more indigenous to the soil than in others, and while progress, civilization, and Christianity have tended to root out these ugly weeds from the fair fields of Anglia, they yet flourish on the plains of India, like its native jungle which the hand of reclamation has never yet cleared. It has been observed with reference to India, that "a propensity to lying is more or less a peculiar feature in the character of an enslaved people. Accustomed to oppression of every kind, and to be called upon to render strict account for every trifle done—not according to the rules of the justice, but as the caprice of their masters may suggest,—it is little to be wondered at if a lie is often resorted to as a supposed refuge from punishment, and that thus an habitual disregard is engendered;" for no one knows where deviations from truth will end, and who will pretend to be able to trace their windings and turnings? There may be some who will ask, if there is any oppression now in India beneath the British rule. Even if there were not, the impress of former oppression and tyranny cannot be eradicated from a race in the course of a few generations. But there *is* at the present hour oppression that must bear the above fruit. Every native zemindar is more or less an oppressor, inasmuch as the ryot who would transgress his orders or his wishes, would be made, by ways and means that the initiated alone can understand, to repent his folly. If a zemindar throw his sheltering *egis* over an accused party, and make it known to his ryots that he wills it that none give information to the authorities or evidence before the Magistrate, regard for truth is scattered to the winds, and preternaturally clever would be that *hakim* who would draw from the witnesses more than the profession of faith made by the American sect of *know-nothings*. And if the zemindar himself stand in the criminal dock, and the only available witnesses against him be his own dependents and ryots, you might as well expect the retainer of a feudal baron to lift his sword against his own true lord as hope for evidence from those who have eyes but see not, and ears



but hear not, whose understanding is wilfully darkened, and who cannot, because they will not, comprehend. 'Tis thus when they are required to know nothing, but when the demand is for knowledge which they do not possess, though a story wholly false is not likely to find credence with any one who will take the patience and trouble to unravel the web of invention, yet falsehood is never so dangerous as when she baits her hook with truth.\* And when a witness mixes up what did not happen with what actually did occur, as, for instance, when, in order to prove an *alibi*, a real journey with all its incidents is described, the date only being altered, the labour of dividing truth from falsehood is not easy. In laying down rules or a Code of Evidence for India, the task of limiting the amount of faith to be placed in human testimony by experience of its credibility is no easy one, and upon the way in which it is performed will depend in no slight degree the success of the whole work.

\* Lord Brougham on the Queen's trial said—"If an individual were "to invent a story entirely,—if he were to form it completely of falsehoods, the result would be his inevitable detection; but if he build a "structure of falsehood on a foundation of a little truth, he may raise a "tale, which, with a good deal of drilling, may put an honest man's life "or an illustrious princess' reputation in jeopardy."

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- ART. V.—1. *A Memorandum written after a tour through the Tea Districts of Eastern Bengal in 1864-65.* By W. Nassau Lees, L.L.D. 1866.
2. *Memorial of Proprietors of Tea Estates in Eastern Bengal, presented to the Governor-General in March 1867.*
3. *Reply of the Governor-General thereto.*

HAPPY is the province of British India that finds favour in the eyes of the Governor-General, and enjoys a liberal expenditure in every branch of administration as the consequence of its good fortune. The most recent annexations, such as the Punjab, Pegu, and Oude, are instances of this, while it seems that nothing but misfortune will draw the attention of our rulers to other parts of the empire. Even the old districts of Nuddea and Jessore made more progress in the course of a few years immediately succeeding the break-down of the indigo system, than for many years preceding that event, as is testified by the present complete scheme of Sub-divisions, Small Cause Courts, and Feeder roads, and now the dire calamity under which Orissa still suffers, bids fair to cover it with a network of roads, to extend considerably the irrigation operations, and to lead to various other public benefits.

Though a good deal has been said latterly of the losses in tea speculations, whether it be that those whose interests are affected are not so influential as the sufferers in Nuddea, or that the losses are not yet sufficiently serious to command attention, certain it is that there are no signs of any progress being even contemplated in Assam, and it remains to be seen if the able Memorandum at the head of this paper will aid in raising “the Cinderella of the Empire” from her present position.\*

\* Since the above was written, a Memorial has been presented to the Governor-General by the tea-planters of Bengal, who now seem thoroughly aware of the necessity of taking active steps to save their interests from ruin, and in his reply to the Memorial, Sir John Lawrence mentioned that just double the amount hitherto expended in public works, *viz.*, seven lacs,

In the cold season of 1864-65, Major Lees devoted three months' leave to a tour in Assam, and recorded his views and observations in a Memorandum which was not printed till the end of 1866. Though the vast extent of the country to be visited and the great difficulties experienced in travelling, in addition to delay caused by an attack of fever, rendered his task onerous to accomplish within so short a period as three months, Major Lees has grasped with ability every question of interest connected with the province, and fully exposed all the shortcomings of its administration. It is well known, however, that instead of receiving the thanks of Government for his interesting communication, he has been treated in a manner that has been deservedly condemned by the public press, and still more in private society. Before considering the principal subjects discussed in the Memorandum, we propose to make a few remarks on the personal question, as the fate of Major Lees may serve as a warning to other officers of Government, and we believe that one motive that influenced the Lieutenant-Governor throughout the affair, has not been generally understood.

We believe there is no dispute as to the main facts. Hearing that Major Lees intended to make a tour in Assam, the Governor-General expressed (verbally it would appear) a general interest in the objects of his tour, requesting him to pay special attention to the coolie question, to obtain accurate information on the subject, and to report his impressions. Anxious to discharge the duty entrusted to him to the best of his ability, Major Lees in asking for information from tea-planters and others in an entirely non-official manner, mentioned that the information he obtained would be laid before the Viceroy, an intimation well-calculated to ensure caution and accuracy in the replies to his questions. This circumstance having reached the ears of the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Cecil Beadon called on Major Lees to explain why he had given out that he had been directed to make an official report on the province. The reply was that no such official position had been assumed. Shortly after this, a note from Major Lees to Mr. Barry appeared in the *Home News*, in which allusion was made to Major Lees' "mission" to Assam. The Lieutenant-Governor seized the word and boldly accused Major Lees of serious inconsistency. As the Governor-General did not even then come forward to

instead of three and a half, will be given to Assam and the other tea districts this year, and that some of the really objectionable provisions of the Coolie Acts will be rescinded. We are glad to see these indications already that Major Lees' labours have not been in vain.

explain the matter, it is fortunate that the facts speedily oozed out, and that Major Lees has not been the one to suffer in public estimation by this little episode.

Sir C. Beadon had of course one very obvious motive in the course he adopted. Having paid, as far as we can judge from results, but little attention to Assam during his tenure of office, and being aware that an unpleasant outcry might follow the publication of any account of the present condition of the province after forty years of British administration, for which he among others would be blamed, his equanimity was disturbed on hearing that a "chiel" was in the province "takin' notes", and he became anxious to prevent the issue of any publication if he could prevent it. But this was not, we think, the only motive. Sir Cecil was also desirous of bringing to a point the question as to whether direct interference in a province under his Government had been authorised by his superior. In this however he failed; and Major Lees was therefore unable to go through the farce of explaining to so experienced an official as Sir Cecil Beadon, that if he (Major Lees) had assumed an official position when making his enquiries, he would not only have written officially to every one, and especially to the officers of the commission, for information, but would probably have commenced every letter with some such phrase as, "Having been appointed by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council 'to enquire, &c., &c.'" There was surely no inconsistency in saying that he had not assumed an official position when he mentioned that the information he obtained would be laid before the Governor-General. With these remarks we now turn to the Memorandum.

The Memorandum begins with a description of the only route to Assam, *viz.*, by the Burhampooter, concluding with a remark that it takes longer to go from Calcutta to Gowhatty, the capital of the province, than from London to America! We have then a sketch of the physical features of the province, and of the divisions and characteristics of the people, followed by an interesting *resumé* of the history of Assam from 1780 down to the final occupation by the British in 1825.

During the stormy reign of Rajah Gourinath, the people were harassed by civil war, with only a brief interval of rest when Lord Cornwallis acceded to the Rajah's application for assistance on the ground, that "Hindoostanee sepoys and others" had enrolled themselves among the forces of his enemies." A single regiment under Captain Welsh quelled two separate insurrections, and with the full consent of the leading men among the Assamese, arrangements were made "for the

"retention of a brigade of British troops in the province." On Lord Cornwallis's departure from India, however, our troops were withdrawn, and Assam was again handed over to anarchy and misrule, that lasted for upwards of thirty years. The Burmese, at first called in to assist the Rajah in maintaining his throne, became the virtual rulers of the country, and remained so till, getting into trouble with the British Government about Cachar, they were expelled in 1825. The sufferings of the population throughout this period were indescribable, and culminated with savage excesses on the part of the Burmese, who, retreating from before our troops, laid waste the country, and carried off 30,000 labourers into slavery.

Major Lees in the following passage indirectly condemns the withdrawal of our troops in 1794, and considers that to Sir John Shore's policy in that matter must be attributed, to a great extent, the present backward condition of Assam. The allusion to the "enormous expense" evidently refers to the Burmese War as having been indirectly brought about by the withdrawal of our troops, in consequence of which the Rajah was left to apply for assistance to the Burmese, who but for that circumstance would not have come into contact with us about Cachar and Assam.

"I fear that I owe some apology for this tedious digression. I did not enter upon it, however, without a purpose. I desired to show that, though interference in internal affairs of independent native States is a thing to be especially avoided, there may be occasions where, to shrink from the responsibility which self-preservation, the first law of States as well as of individuals, forces on the Paramount Power in India, may not only involve us in enormous expense and incalculable trouble, but cause us to incur the odium, if not the criminality, of being indirectly instrumental in the devastation of rich and flourishing provinces, and the impoverishment and ruin, the suffering and misery, nay, even the slavery and death of their inhabitants. During the anarchy and misrule which followed the withdrawal of the British force from Assam in 1794, partly through the vain struggles of the Assamese to free themselves from the oppression of their Burmese allies, and partly through famines—the result of this state of things—the district of Luckimpore was almost wholly depopulated, and other districts suffered more or less severely from the same cause. 'The small remnant of the population,' to use the words of General Jenkins, 'had been so harassed and oppressed by the long civil and internal wars that had followed the accession of Rajah Gourinath Sing in 1780 down to 1826, that they had almost

“ ‘ given up cultivation, and lived on jungle roots and plants,  
 “ ‘ and famine and pestilence carried off thousands that had  
 “ ‘ escaped the sword and captivity. All men of rank, the heads  
 “ ‘ of the great Ahom and priestly families, had retired to one  
 “ ‘ district, Gwálpára, having, with little exception, lost the whole  
 “ ‘ of their property. With the nobility and gentry retired a  
 “ ‘ vast body of the lower classes; the former mostly returned to  
 “ ‘ Assam after our occupation, but large numbers of the latter  
 “ ‘ never returned, and their descendants form still a large part  
 “ ‘ of the population of the Hubbraghat and Koontaghat.’ I  
 “ ‘ further desired to trace to their origin the true causes of many  
 “ ‘ of the unsatisfactory circumstances of the present state of  
 “ ‘ Assam, the general scantiness of the population, its extremely  
 “ ‘ unequal distribution, and the enormous extent of rich and pro-  
 “ ‘ ductive land which lies waste and uncultivated.”

We do not understand this passage to imply that the British Government are responsible for what followed the withdrawal of the troops, but that an opportunity of doing great good was thrown away by the Paramount Power, and in this we concur. The reflection naturally suggests itself—Has the Government made the most of its second chance of improving the condition of the province since 1825? And we think the voice of the public will reply in the negative.

It was unfortunate that, beyond pacification of the country, the immediate effect of our occupation by no means improved the general condition of the province. Of course the very first measure was to abolish unpaid labour and slavery, and as the wealth of the higher and middle classes depended in a great measure on the number of slaves they possessed, the effect, Major Lees tells us, was “ to reduce the whole population to the “ dead level of the ryot,” and since then there has been no middle class in Assam, a circumstance brought to notice by Mr. Moffat Mills in 1853. Moreover, “ the abandonment of the “ right of Government to exact personal servitude in lieu of “ revenue” without the substitution of any systematic expenditure on public works, led to the decay of noble roads, bridges, and embankments constructed by native rulers.

Having thus brought his remarks down to the period of our first occupation, the author proceeds to describe the present system of administration and condition of Assam. The first point treated is the revenue system.

Of the six districts of Assam, Goalparah enjoys a perpetual settlement, and the remaining five, Kamroop, Durrung, Nowgong, Seebagur, and Luckimpore are under the *ryotwaree* system, like Madras. Settlements are, as a rule, made

annually, but a small percentage are for two, three, and five, with an occasional exception for a term of ten years. The settlements are usually made at the sudder station on the report of the Mouzahdar, or native fiscal officer, and only in cases of doubt or dispute is there any local investigation, which again is not conducted by the Collector or his Assistant, neither of whom have time for it, but by a civil court Ameen. Well may Major Lees observe that such a system leaves room for great abuses, which are not, we should think, diminished by frequent changes in holdings owing to abandonment for fresh lands, and subdivision among heirs. Turning to Mr. Mills' report of 1853 on this subject, we find first an expression of his opinion that, notwithstanding the hindrances to improvement in the apathy and indolence of the Assamese peasant, the increase of cultivation and revenue would steadily progress under a better regulated and uniform revenue system, and then the following passage occurs with regard to the manner of conducting settlements which we have described. The italics are ours.

"I have had considerable experience in making settlements, "and it appears to me that a settlement formed in this manner is "a misnomer; it is no settlement at all. *The practice of concealing land is extremely prevalent.* I have noticed some instances "of it in my District Reports, and though I am inclined to place every confidence in the supervision of the local authorities, yet "I cannot but doubt the accuracy of information which measurements conducted by persons most interested to be dishonest, and "so imperfectly checked are calculated to convey; *indeed there is "nothing to prevent the sacrificing the interests of Government to "almost any extent.*"

Mr. Mills then went on to recommend that settlements be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Board of Revenue, measurements being made by Ameens in presence of the Mouzahdars and ryots, and afterwards tested by the settlement officer, maps being prepared on the spot. Finally he recommended a twenty years' settlement with the Mouzahdars for several reasons, one of which was a desire to create an influential middle class, and another the impossibility of the superior officer bestowing that close and constant supervision by which alone a *khas* or *ryotwaree* system can really answer.

It does not require any special knowledge of a revenue officer's duties to judge of the extent to which Government is defrauded by such a system as Major Lees describes, but we are assured by those who have had practical experience in such work, that in making the temporary settlements in Bengal proper, with all the advantages of very fair survey maps, it requires the utmost vigi-

lance on the part of officers who actually go to the spot, to prevent deception by the Ameens in the measurement. How unlimited then must be the opportunities of the Mouzahdar and occasionally of the Ameen in Assam; considering the numerical weakness of the commission, the great size of the districts, and the difficulty in travelling about the country from the absence of roads, there seems to be no good reason why a Mouzahdar of a remote village should report more than half the real cultivation, and let the other half to the ryots at a reduced rental on his own account. At all events the Assamese must be very different to the Bengallees (and unhappily we are assured they are not, in this respect), if Government do not lose some lacs of rupees annually in this way, and a serious responsibility has been incurred by those who neglected to act on Mr. Mills' recommendation, when the evil was so forcibly brought to notice. Major Lees has borne full testimony to the inadequacy of the staff to conduct such local investigations in addition to other duties, but who can doubt that the additional revenue that might reasonably be expected would far more than defray the additional expenditure? It is to be observed, too, that if a twenty years' settlement with Mouzahdars is granted, as we trust it will be, any increase to the commission on this account will be temporary only, *i. e.*, while the settlements are actually being effected.

With regard to the rates of assessment, they appear extremely low in Assam proper, *viz.*, six annas a beegah for rice lands, and four annas for high lands. We observe that in 1853, several of the Collectors were in favour of raising the rates considerably above these figures. One officer proposed one rupee and another one rupee four annas for high lands, a third suggested eight annas for rice lands, and Mr. Hudson considered the low rate of assessment of the best rice land as an obstacle to the advancement of Assam, "as a small quantity of such land provides "the idle opium-eating peasant with means of subsistence, and "prevents his hiring out his labour." Major Lees thinks there is no difference of opinion, that the rates for high lands may be raised at once to those for low lands, but he forcibly points out that the Government revenue is paid direct by the lowest class, which is the only one whose condition has improved under our rule, and he advocates a general moderate increase simultaneously with a complete change in the revenue system. Our readers are aware that the rates in Bengal are much higher for the high lands producing the more valuable crops than for rice lands, and will learn with surprise that the contrary is the case in Assam. To the causes that have produced this extraordinary state of affairs we shall advert further on in connection with



another subject, and now leave that of land revenue with an earnest hope that the recommendations of Mr. Mills may be carried out without further loss of time, together with the increase in the rates recommended by Major Lees, unless the local administration can bring forward any reasons against the latter proposal. If a twenty years' settlement is granted and effected after proper local investigation by superior officers, the revenues will, in all probability, as we have already shown, be increased by the discovery of cultivated land for which the Government has never received a penny hitherto, but any increase in the rates paid for cultivated land will probably be trifling on the occasion of the first settlement, in order to allow of such a profit to the Mouzahdar, as will tend to create a substantial middle class. But on the other hand, the Mouzahdars will probably be willing to engage for large areas of uncultivated land at very low rates (which it would be good policy for Government to allow) on the chance of their being able to make a handsome profit in the course of twenty years by bringing it into cultivation. The additional revenues are sadly wanted for public works, but in any case it is to be hoped that Government will not allow a thoroughly bad system to be continued any longer.

Major Lees is opposed to the principle of selling waste land in fee simple, as sacrificing a future source of revenue, from which either the province must suffer owing to a deficiency in income, or the empire generally from an obligation to make it up. He has evidently thoroughly studied the working of the rules for the sale of waste lands, and considers them objectionable both from the Government and the planter's point of view. The objections of the planter are—1st, the uncertainty of obtaining the fruits of his labour in searching out land, by the chance of being outbid on the day of sale: 2nd, the difficulty of ascertaining the exact requirements of the officials as regards demarcation, and the different way in which the Collectors work this point: 3rd, the delay in surveying the grants: 4th, the delay in granting titles. The objections in the interests of Government are—1st, that the grant of large tracts of the best land which the purchasers are unable to cultivate has checked the reclamation of wastes, and thus frustrated the main object of the rules: 2nd, the encroachment on lands available for ordinary cultivation: 3rd, the endless litigation. Instances are given of lots being sold to two different persons, and of the difficulties in obtaining titles that would be amusing, were not the consequences so serious to the purchasers. As the rules have been modified in some respects 1864-65, it is unnecessary to discuss their provisions, since

but it would seem that some of the objections can only be remedied by a regular professional survey of the whole province.

The general bearing of the lower classes in Assam to the ruling race, and especially to the administration, is very remarkable. It is the only exception we have heard of to the rule, that the greater the distance from Calcutta, the greater the inclination to respect Europeans generally, but above all the European authorities; though good district officers will command respect anywhere, if fairly supported by their executive superiors. Major Lees says—

“It may be urged that, at least by freeing the people from oppressive and tyrannical conquerors, and bestowing on them perfect freedom, we have earned their gratitude, and it is true we have earned it, but unfortunately they do not appear to see it. The bearing of the Assamese towards the race who has conferred on them these inestimable benefits, not excepting Government officials, may be called independence by some; but accustomed as I have been to see Englishmen in other parts of India, as long as they conducted themselves like gentlemen, treated with respect and consideration, and Government functionaries with the utmost deference, by natives, I regret much to observe that *downright hostility* appears to me the only suitable term by which to define the rule of their conduct in Assam. This may partly have arisen from the inability of people, long accustomed to severe despotism, to distinguish between liberty and license, and partly from an erroneous impression prevailing very generally in Calcutta, and with a few officials in the province, that it is their special mission to interpose between the planter and the ryot, in order to protect the latter from ill-usage. But though my attention was especially directed to this matter, I altogether failed anywhere to discover that such interposition was in the smallest degree necessary, while everywhere I had the strongest proofs that the feeling I allude to is as general as it is mischievous, and that, in effect, it recoils on the Government with far more force than upon individuals, planters or others. From the Commissioner to the junior Assistant in Assam, there is not an official that has any personal influence in the province, a state of things that, in a country the people of which are in the primitive condition of the Assamese, seems almost incomprehensible, and which, as everything that has ever been done for the moral and social improvement of the people of India, has been brought about by personal influence, cannot but act as a bar to all progress. This statement possibly may be

“denied, and I beg to state that, in making it, I do not wish  
“to attribute blame to any one; but, short though my tour  
“was in Assam, the evidences of the fact were too abundant  
“and striking to leave the smallest doubt upon my mind of  
“its positive truth.”

He then describes and contrasts his reception by his tenants at Kangra in the North-West Provinces and by the Assamese, how in the former case a *perwannah* secured the respect of every native official he came across, and how the people met him on arrival with presents, while in Assam, though his tenants had been treated with great indulgence about their holding, grazing, and wood-cutting privileges, no one came near him, and he met with a positive refusal to sell him a cup of milk! We have, however, serious instances not merely of a want of personal influence, but of what we must almost characterise as dread of the people on the part of the officials, and of the contempt in which they are consequently held. In a journey of eighteen miles between Nowgong and Tezpore, the two chief civil stations of Central Assam, the traveller had to cross the Burhampooter, and at his request the Magistrate issued orders for his assistance, and sent an elephant to meet him on the Tezpore bank, but nevertheless there were no boatmen on the Nowgong side to ferry him across. On another occasion the elephant driver, though under the orders of the Magistrate, left the traveller prostrate with fever on the bank of a river, and went off! A Magistrate actually refused a European lady any assistance, and she had to walk under a burning sun on a road passing through jungles infested with wild beasts. But strangest instance of all, the wife of a Deputy Commissioner was actually left in a road-side village by her *dooly* bearers, who refused to proceed any further, and neither native officials nor any one else would assist her in procuring other bearers to continue her journey, so she had to walk ten miles into the station! (We wonder, by the way, if Section 490 of the Penal Code was applied in the last case.)

Now we think there is no one, however infatuated on the subject of governing the natives of India like the natives of England, who will deny that such an utter want of influence on the part of the administration, and such a disregard of their visible rulers on the part of an ignorant and uncivilised people, is an unwholesome state of affairs. In a time of trial the executive of Assam would be utterly useless, and this after a British occupation of forty years. Such feeling and conduct on the part of the working classes cannot fail to interfere materially with the progress of the province, even if more attention is paid to it henceforward by Government.

While Major Lees blames no one, we gather from what officers told him of the tendency to send petitions to Gowhatty, that this has been brought about by the Commissioner, who encourages it instead of supporting his subordinates. We can safely say that such a condition of things is unknown out of Assam, and as Major Lees bears testimony to the ability and efficiency of the district officers generally, we feel sure that in past years some very injudicious pressure must have been put on them with the result now brought to notice. We commend this subject to the attention of the present Commissioner, and trust that he will soon rectify so serious an evil.

We now come to the three subjects of the tea-planters' Memorial, *viz.*, the coolie question, the want of additional courts of justice, and of roads and other public works. Though the Memorandum before us refers exclusively to Assam, it would appear that the wants of all the other tea districts of Bengal are of a similar nature, and the Memorial of course referred to all.

Major Lees has a good deal to say on the coolie question. He asserts that the high rate of wages current among local labourers is in some measure due to philanthropic but mistaken views on the part of Government officers, who imagine that the higher the rate of wages, the more satisfactory will be the condition of the Assamese peasant, and it appears that not only has this tendency to refuse employment except at high and increasing wages been fostered by the authorities, but Government have entered into competition with the tea-planters by bidding high, when labour is necessary for whatever little is done in the way of public works, &c. Major Lees admits that the condition of the lower class—and that class alone—has improved under our rule, as regards such outward and visible signs as brass and iron cooking-pots, in place of earthenware, ornaments worn by the women, &c., but maintains that after reaching this point it stops, and additional wages are spent in opium. There is no such thing as healthy competition among the local labourers, and having cultivated some rice-land, the Assamese is master of the situation where labour is so scarce; he will only work sufficiently to purchase the opium he consumes. Thus while little or no real improvement results to the people by encouraging the demand for high wages, great injury, on the other hand, is done to the tea interest, owing to which the revenues of the province have increased so much. The planters are obliged to import labour from Bengal at great expense, and with all the difficulties and objections that have produced the Contract Law, and when the coolies arrive, they find that Government officers are paying

local labourers double the wages paid by planters to imported coolies, which has the natural effect of inducing the latter to break their contracts and run away. Another result of the high wages paid by Government is that fewer roads and bridges are made for the money. Major Lees, however, points out that Government are in one way gainers by the practice, as whatever excess wages they give is returned to the treasuries in exchange for opium. It is difficult to form an opinion as to how far the high wages are the result of Government encouragement and competition, and how far they are due to natural causes; but certainly the rates are very disproportionally high with reference to the cost of the necessaries of life, and if it is only to make the money spent on public works go further, we trust that Government will offer no higher rates than imported labour would cost, and that, if the Assamese do not want employment at those rates, the Government will import their coolies.

Major Lees thinks that, for the present, contractors and recruiters cannot be dispensed with, though every encouragement should be given to planters to engage coolies without the aid of third parties. The point in which the Contract Law is most frequently evaded, and which is of great importance to the coolie, is the provision for taking the coolie before the Magistrate of his district, but it is exceedingly difficult to insist on this, as a fair reason is always given why the coolies are encountered out of their own districts, and if the Magistrate releases them, they are the first to object. Major Lees condemns the system of numerous depôts in Calcutta, as they cannot be efficiently superintended, and is in favour of one large depôt which should, he thinks, be in or close to Calcutta, as the chief employers hire there, and would never be satisfied if they could not inspect the coolies before they are sent off. He further considers that with proper arrangements between the railway and the steamers no depôt at all is necessary at Kooshtea, and thinks with many others that the coolies are over-clothed and over-fed in the steamers, and that sickness and mortality arise from these causes more than from any others. Lastly, he advocates the establishment of rest-houses at the landing places on the Burhampooter, under the supervision of the local authorities, for the coolies to stay in until the planters can send for them. A special commission has just concluded its enquiries on all the points connected with the depôts and transmission to the tea districts, and the new Bill\* to amend the two Bengal Acts will contain provisions on these points, as well

\* The Bill has since been laid before the Bengal Council.

as alterations in the recruiting system, so we may hope for real improvement in all these matters before very long.

With regard to the treatment of coolies at the plantations, Major Lees quotes the opinions of all the principal officers in the province in support of his own that, with the exception of one or two particular instances to the contrary, the labourer is kindly and humanely treated. Those opinions were prominently put forward by Mr. Schiller in presenting the planters' Memorial to the Governor-General as the ground of a request that all exceptional legislation should be rescinded. There is, we think, no question now as to the general kind treatment of the coolies, which was admitted by the Governor-General himself, but in asking for the total abolition of the provisions contained in Acts III of 1863 and VI of 1865, we think the planters were decidedly unreasonable, and their assertion that their diminished prosperity was in the main attributable to those laws is quite unjustifiable. It is well known that deficiency of capital, over-speculation, competition, and in consequence a great increase in the cost of importing labour, together with the appointment of incompetent managers, have principally caused the falling off in the profits of tea plantations, and if there were no exceptions whatever to the rule of humane treatment, the necessity of several provisions of the Contract Law would be the same as ever. It is a question whether the exact nature of the supervision and precautions that the Government is bound to exercise in the interests of the imported coolies should be by means of a Protector, and we think it might advantageously take a different form, but though it is to the interest of the planter that the coolies should be well cared for, and justly as well as humanely treated, and though we have no doubt that in the great majority of cases the managers do their best, we are sure that without supervision on the part of some Government officer, there would be no efficient check over the selection of unhealthy sites for coolies' lines, and no adequate medical treatment would be secured, the results of which would be disastrous to planters as well as to coolies, and after the appalling mortality among coolies in transport to the tea districts, no moderate man will deny that the Government are bound to take proper sanitary precautions, though some of those now taken may be, and, we believe, are needless, and actually prejudicial to the health of people utterly unaccustomed to them.

On the remaining points, such as objectionable interference in regard to a minimum rate of wages, the price at which rice is to be sold to the coolies, and the hardship to the planters of allowing the labourers to break their contracts without paying adequate compensation, Major Lees and the

planters are in full accord. The first two points have been conceded by Government, but in regard to the last we are sorry to see that the Secretary of State and Government of India have directed a modification of the law that will increase the difficulties of the planters. The provision to be introduced in the new Act is to the effect that when a coolie has been twice convicted of desertion and has suffered imprisonment for sixty days, he is to be released from his contract. We are afraid that coolies will take advantage of this, even for the mere purpose of getting Government employ at higher wages, and the loss to the importers will be serious. We maintain that on the simplest principles of equity and justice, the coolie should not be freed from his contract, till he has paid compensation. The principle of compensation is admitted when a coolie wishes, as an honest man, to cancel a contract, and Mr. Eden stated in the Bengal Council that the amount would be fixed at Rs. 90 in the first year, Rs. 60 in the second, and Rs. 50 in the third. But what coolie will pay these sums when he can avoid it by undergoing sixty days' imprisonment? There will be a certain amount of punishment for him, but this will not benefit the planter, and we shall be surprised if Government do not find it necessary to rescind this provision within a year's time.

The want of sufficient courts of justice within reasonable distances is a serious inconvenience to the planters, and is forcibly dwelt on in the Memorandum. The prosecution of coolies generally involves a long journey to the nearest court, and the loss of five, six, or more days to the planter and the witnesses, all of whom are wanted at the plantation, which is without supervision in the meanwhile. We cannot, however, concur with Major Lees in his proposal to invest the planters with what would in reality be powers to decide their own disputes with the coolies. Speaking generally, the system of Honorary Magistrates has not been successful in this country, and has been in a great measure abandoned, while in the present instance, beyond an occasional petty squabble between coolies, all the judicial authority the planter would have to exercise would be in the settlement of his own cases. Government will, we hope, however, do something to remedy the inconvenience, and no better plan has been suggested for these plantation cases, than the Ceylon system of peripatetic Magistrates, though an increase in the number of subdivisions would of course be a benefit to the planters as well as to every one else. We understand that this plan, involving the union of the present duties of the Protector with that of Magistrate, meets the wishes of the planters, and if the duties of the Protector are maintained, there should be

no objection on the part of Government. The Governor-General said in his reply to the memorialists, that he was ready to take into consideration any specific requests for more Magistrates and more courts, so the sooner well-considered proposals as to locality and area of jurisdiction are laid before the Government, the better.

The condition or rather absence of public works is perhaps the most discreditable feature of our administration. Major Lees says—

“ Suffice it to say that, speaking generally, in Lower Assam there are no roads at all, and in Upper Assam, *i. e.*, from Golaghât to Debroghur, though there is a fair embankment, it is only now that a commencement at making culverts and bridges has been made. In some parts of Lower Assam, attempts at raised earth-works can be traced out, and that running for about twenty miles south-west of Tezpore, commonly called Vincent’s Road, might very easily be made a good *kutcha* road; but for the rest, the dâk even cannot be sent by the ‘ Grand Trunk Road ’ from Gowhatty, the capital of the province, to Nowgong, the nearest civil station; and it will suffice to indicate the condition of the remainder to state that, during last rains, a planter, who had the temerity to try and make his way along it to the next civil station, Golaghât, nearly lost his life in the attempt. The serious consequence of a want of roads in every country are too well known to need elucidation here. If a man cannot get his produce to a market, the result is not, as some persons think, that the cultivator will sell it cheap, but rather that he will not produce, and why should he? The ryot in Assam is a sufficiently astute economist to see that there is no sound reason for it, and he does not, therefore, produce more than is sufficient for the support of himself and his family. The results are, though attributable to other causes as well, that fifteen-sixteenths of the culturable land in Assam lie waste and pay no revenue to Government, and the physical energies of the people are not developed at all. But the most serious consequence of all, in a province in the present circumstances of Assam, is, that owing to the absence of roads, there is not a wheeled-carriage in the country. Some planters have introduced a few carts on their plantations, but, with this exception, the nearest approach to anything of the kind I saw during my tour in Assam, was a khîl-boat (a hollowed tree or canoe) drawn by two buffaloes.”

Mr. Mills urged the necessity of public works in 1853, recommending the construction of two main trunk roads—one on



the north, and the other on the south of the river—the restoration of old roads and embankments made by native rulers, and the construction of some new roads. Perhaps our greatest reproach is the manner in which old roads serving the purposes of embankments as well as roads, and thus reclaiming large tracts of land fit for rice cultivation, have been allowed to fall into decay when nothing but annual repairs were necessary. If the British Government had merely kept up what they found on taking possession of the country, without constructing any new works, there is good reason to believe that by this time the resources of this fertile province would have reached a very different stage of development. We have already noticed the remarkable fact that the rent of high lands is less than that of the low, and the reason of this is simply that, whereas the cultivators eat rice, they are unable for want of roads to convey the more valuable crops grown on the high lands to a market. This fact also appears in Mr. Mill's report, and it might have been expected that the mention of it would have roused the attention of Government, but in the matter of public works, as in all matters not of the pettiest detail, no action whatever has been taken on Mr. Mills' report.

It would appear that, excepting the repairs of roads in and near the civil stations and very partial repairs of one or two others connecting two stations, absolutely nothing was done in the way of public works till 1862-63, when Major Briggs was deputed to examine the repeatedly proposed main line of trunk road from Goalparah along the south bank of the Burhampooter to Debroghur. His report was submitted with a letter from the Commissioner, and in both communications the importance of the work was forcibly pressed on the Government. It is but justice to the Lieutenant-Governor to say that he supported the project more warmly than the Supreme Government received it. A certain sum has, however, been sanctioned every year since, and the work has been progressing slowly, but if the Government of India had been more liberal in their grants, and had not thrown cold water on Sir Cecil Beadon's proposal to import a large number of labourers, a great deal more would have been done by this time. The only other work that we are aware of is a bridle path, destined to be eventually made into a road, connecting the valley of Assam with Sylhet *via* Shillong. As seven lacs have been granted to Assam and the frontier districts for the current year, we trust the Government are determined to carry out these two important works as quickly as possible, and hope that not less than from five to six lacs will be allotted annually to them for the future, with additional establishments to ensure the most being made of the money.

But putting aside the construction of main roads with imperial funds, how much might have been done with local roads by means of local funds. In the allotment of the Local Branch of the amalgamated District Road Fund for 1864-65, we find that though the six districts of Assam had produced by means of various local funds Rs. 82,265 during the previous year, only Rs. 46,000 were allotted to them, the balance having been distributed amongst other provinces under the Lieutenant-Governor. In the following year, however, we are glad to see that Assam received nearly all she collected. With her increasing revenues from local sources, an allotment of the annual collections would probably suffice to keep in repair most of the old embankments, if once restored and handed over to the Magistrates in fair condition, but it would be quite inadequate to restore the roads to the state in which we found them originally. In 1863, the Commissioner recommended that Executive Engineers might be appointed to explore the jungles, and make estimates of the cost of restoring the fine old works, more and more of which, he said, were being discovered by planters stumbling on them occasionally. We think it not unreasonable to ask Government to appoint three Executive Engineers and to grant two lacs per annum towards what may be called reclaiming the works so systematically neglected.

In his reply to the memorialists, Sir John Lawrence objected to increased expenditure on the tea districts, saying that after paying for civil charges and cost of military occupation, no great surplus remained. Here we would first remark that the principle of charging each province with the whole cost of the troops stationed in it has long been rejected, and, as we have always understood, by no one more decidedly than the present Governor-General, at least with reference to military expenditure in the Punjab. The argument is, that besides forces to preserve order in the territory itself, an additional force must always be provided in a province on the borders of the empire, with reference to the neighbouring countries, and that such expenditure should be charged to the empire generally for the benefit of which it is incurred. If the contrary view is to be taken, however, then the Lower Provinces of Bengal are entitled to a very much larger proportion of the total annual grant for public works, as the military expenditure is comparatively trifling, and in that case Assam and the other tea districts would get a considerable slice of the cake. We have no complete statement of the cost of Assam to refer to, but the words of the Governor-General imply that there is a balance after every expenditure, military included, in the tea districts. Even if this were not the case,

scarcely any province has, as Major Lees observes, ever paid its expenses at first, while the natural fertility of Assam, her mineral treasures (favourably reported on by Dr. Oldham), and the suitability of the soil for the cultivation of so important an article of the world's consumption as tea, indicate a *prima facie* probability of all expenditure in developing her resources turning out to be a good investment.

But we maintain that there are more than ordinary grounds for the claim of the planters to administrative improvements in Assam, and in support of this we desire to refer briefly to the increase in the Government revenues within the last four years, an increase attributable almost entirely to the action of the tea interest alone. We see by the latest official reports that the amount realized by the sale of waste lands up to the end of 1865-1866, was Rs. 1,994,311, and the eventual maximum revenue to be derived from grants under the old rules will be Rs. 61,977. Major Lees shows that between the years 1859-60 and 1864-65 the opium revenue has risen from Rs. 214,044 to Rs. 1,435,426, (the returns exhibiting an increase in consumption in the face of an increase in the price of the drug), and he quotes the opinion of the Board of Revenue that, though this increase in the revenue "is due in the main to the prohibition of the native cultivation, a large element in it is also unquestionably the development of the agricultural prosperity of the revenue through the enterprise of the tea-planters." Then there are indirect receipts from such sources as increase in cultivation of waste lands by the peasants under the ordinary settlement rules of the province, and consequent increase of revenue under a *ryotwaree* settlement. There are of course no trustworthy statistics of population, but we believe that there is no difference of opinion as to there being no perceptible increase, owing, it is supposed, to the immoderate use of opium, and to the epidemics produced by the vast proportion of jungle and swamps to cultivation. The increased cultivation may, therefore, reasonably be assumed to be in consequence of the influx of labourers from Bengal and Behar, and the consequent increased demand for food. The only figures we have seen under this head are for the year 1865-66, when the increase in revenue was Rs. 37,777. Besides the above, it is unnecessary to point out the various indirect sources of revenue, and the advantages in the way of civilization, that follow the settlement of Europeans in an out-lying province, as we trust that we have sufficiently shown how much the Government owe to the tea interest. But though pressing the claims of the tea-planters, we do not ask the Government to grant what will be for their sole benefit. What is asked for

(always excepting the rescinding of the Coolie Acts) would be as beneficial to the whole native population as to Europeans. We think, therefore, that on every ground any reasonable applications for improved administration are entitled to special consideration in the case of Assam, and that an increased expenditure in extending the number of subdivisional courts, with a few peripatetic Magistrates, and in pushing forward the construction of public works has been fairly earned, and should not only be granted for reasons of sound policy to encourage an interest that has proved so beneficial to the province, but also as a measure of simple justice. The Government ought to be glad to have an opportunity of expending a portion of the revenue derived from so objectionable a source as opium, on works that would give the people a chance of moving about more, and of acquiring a taste for spending their earnings in a more satisfactory manner, than in lying down nearly all day in their villages under the influence of the pernicious drug, and which would, by generally improving their condition, render them fit subjects for indirect taxation in other ways that would compensate for loss in opium revenue. We do not mean to assert that such results would necessarily follow, but as long as the mass of people remain shut up in their swamps and jungles, there is scarcely a possibility of raising and improving them.

Many other subjects are touched on in the Memorandum, but our remarks have already extended to such a length that we can only refer to some of them very briefly. Though the difficulties of making cash remittances to so great a distance are the same as ever, the planters have latterly been deprived of the privilege of drafts, which were formerly issued at one half per cent premium on the local treasuries, chiefly on the ground that the practice would tend to prevent the establishment of banks, and interfere with private trade in money. We understand that the native Mahajuns are quite unable to supply the requirements of the planters, and it will be some time before there is likely to be enough business in Assam for a regular bank. Again, as Major Lees points out, a large portion of the silver expended by the planters is returned to the treasuries in payment for opium. The planters are willing to pay all expenses of remitting silver to this or that treasury, when the balances are insufficient to meet the expenditure on tea-gardens, and we think that under all the circumstances Government might unobjectionably make this trifling concession.

Education is as backward as might be expected, and the still more urgent necessity of public works will, we fear, prevent much attention being paid to the subject for some time.

Major Lees comments on the excessive cost of the new Police, which is not considered by the officials to be an improvement on that which it replaced, and he goes so far as to recommend its abolition. Now one of the great advantages expected from the new Police was effective supervision by means of European officers with only Police duties to perform, but owing to the want of roads and the great size of the districts the supervision is almost nominal; thus it would seem that the extension of the new Police to Assam was premature, and that it was injudicious to incur great additional expenditure when the object of it could not be carried out properly. At the same time considerable advantages may reasonably be expected from the change when the officers learn their work, and when Government give them the means of performing it properly, so instead of reverting to the old establishments we should prefer to see old roads restored to their former condition, and new ones constructed, so as to give the new system its best chance of success. Here again we see how the neglect of public works retards other branches of administration.

Major Lees concludes his Memorandum with recommendations of a very important nature. Remarking on the immense extent of the provinces under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the area and population of which exceed those of Madras by more than 50, and those of Bombay and Scinde by about 300 per cent., while the revenues of the Lower Provinces are double those of Madras and Bombay, Major Lees observes that instead of having a Governor and Council, there is one man on whom devolves the sole responsibility of administration without assistance, and he suggests that if the Lieutenant-Governorship is to be continued, it would both relieve the Lieutenant-Governor and benefit the eastern districts, if a Chief Commissionership were created out of the Bhootan Dooars, Cooch Behar, Assam, north and south Cachar, the Cossyah and Jynteah Hills, Sylhet and Mymensing, with three Commissioners, four more Deputy Commissioners, eight more Assistant Commissioners, and additional subdivisions, the non-regulation system being introduced as more suitable to the people and the present condition of the province.

We think that if the Lower Provinces are not to be made over to a Governor and Council, the necessity of relieving the Lieutenant-Governor of a considerable portion of his charge will not be denied much longer. The best way of doing this, with full regard for the greatest good of the greatest number, would be, in our opinion, to constitute another Lieutenant-Governorship with headquarters at Patna, for the Patna,

Bhaugulpore, Southal Pergunnahs, Chota Nagpore, and Benares Divisions, and the districts, south of the Jumna attached to the Allahabad Division. This would have the advantage of also relieving the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and it would be far more suitable to place the Behar under the same Government as the Benares districts, than to leave them with Bengal; the people, language, climate, and system of local administration being almost exactly the same in Behar and Benares, and entirely different to those of Bengal. But it would be less expensive and more decidedly beneficial to Assam to adopt Major Lees' suggestion of a Chief Commissionership, though the question of de-regulationising requires much consideration. Sylhet and Mymensing are so completely different in every respect to the North-east Frontier districts, that they should be excluded from the scheme, but three new districts should be formed out of Luckimpore, Sebsaugor, and Nowgong with north Cachar, and these with ten new subdivisions, that we hope will be speedily asked for, would give plenty of work to the additional Commissioners proposed by Major Lees. In any case some addition to the number of Deputy and Assistant Commissioners in Assam is absolutely necessary, as they are so much overworked as to be unable to pay more than very cursory attention to any one branch of their multifarious duties.

But it may be said "this expenditure in public works, in providing additional courts and in strengthening and re-organizing the commission would no doubt be beneficial, and would, in all probability, be ultimately remunerative to Government, but where is all the money to come from?" To this we unhesitatingly reply that, besides giving Assam the whole of the local funds collected in the province, the proceeds of sales of waste lands cannot be better employed than in developing the resources of the country, from which they are derived; and lastly that there is a certain moderate standard of administration to which after forty years of British rule every province should be brought, instead of being allowed to fall away in some respects from the standard of native rule, and that the further necessary expenditure should come out of the Imperial Funds, or rather that Assam should for a few years be exempted from contribution to those funds, and allowed to spend her own revenues on herself. The principle, that irrigation works are to be carried out by loans, has now been established, and in the present year a similar principle has been partly admitted in regard to the building of barracks for European soldiers, the cost of which would otherwise be a serious drain on the annual allotment for public works. We trust that the balance of the sum required to

complete the barracks will also be provided by loan. Here we may be considered to advocate extravagance, but we will relieve ourselves of this imputation by the additional proposal, even in regard to these exceptional works, that a Sinking fund (not on Mr. Pitt's principle, but on the sound basis that a pound of money will repay a pound of debt and no more) be made an annual charge on the public works grant to repay all loans for the above purposes in the course of a series of years. The average grant for public works is about £5,000,000, and, as it will henceforward be relieved of one, if not of both, of the above-mentioned exceptional charges, we think it is not too much to ask for a fiftieth part of the amount for so large a province, say for the next ten years, in addition to the funds from local sources already referred to. When so promising a division of the empire is in so backward a state, such works as building new cutcherries, colleges, and, above all, police stations, in the place of old buildings that will be quite serviceable for many years to come, should be postponed, if necessary, in order to restore Assam to the condition it was in as regards public works before our occupation, and thus remove a serious blot on our administration.

Before concluding our remarks we cannot help observing how injudiciously the Lieutenant-Governor has thrown away a chance of doing something to efface the remembrance of past neglect. Instead of annoying an officer engaged in doing good service to the State, and of making him the victim of a question of etiquette between the Supreme and Local Governments, Sir Cecil Beadon might have laid the Memorandum before the Governor-General in Council and asked for such assistance from the Imperial funds as might be necessary to wipe off the reproach involved in the existing state of mal-administration. The responsibility of "masterly inactivity" would then have rested with the Supreme Government, and Sir Cecil Beadon would have done his duty, though somewhat late in the day.

We commend the Memorandum to the perusal of all who take an interest not only in Assam, but in the general results and responsibilities of British rule. Major Lees has roused the planters effectually to a sense of their position, and the Governor-General has promised to repeal some of the really objectionable Sections of the Contract Law. The great increase in the grant of the current year for public works is fairly attributable to Major Lees' exertions, and must be a matter of special congratulation to him. He has done good service, and merits, though he has not received, the thanks of Government. He has earned the special gratitude of all who are interested in tea-planting, and the broad and statesman-like views expressed cannot fail, if

adopted, to benefit the natives equally. We trust that the Memorandum may lead, at no distant date, to the province being treated in the liberal manner that her natural advantages and undeveloped resources justly demand.

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ART. VI.—*Unpublished Journal of Captain Musafir.*

WE left our friends the Musafirs at Golling, the last town of any note in the direct route between Hallstadt and the König's See. This direct route consists however but of a pathway across the mountains, involving an ascent of upwards of 6,000 feet and a walk of seven hours. This walk is justly celebrated; inasmuch as from the summit of the Königsberg there is a most lovely view of the König's See, with the snow-capped Watzmann rising in all its glorious majesty from its very surface, the Untersberg frowning in the distance. In the descent there is much that is picturesque and beautiful, not to speak of a fine waterfall. But to enjoy this walk fine weather is absolutely necessary, and as this condition was wanting on the occasion we are referring to,—the rain falling in torrents and showing no symptoms of cessation,—the Musafirs determined not to attempt it. The same reason deterred them from trying the alternative mountain route across the Rossfeld Alp, a height of about 5,000 feet, a charming walk of about six hours. They were driven, therefore, to the choice of the third and least interesting route to Hallein by the road, thence across the Dürnberg,—but little over two thousand feet high,—to Berchtesgaden. The drive to Hallein was not very interesting, but it lasted only an hour. The town itself is famous for its salt-mines which penetrate deeply into the Dürnberg, but after the natural wonders of Adelsberg, our travellers did not care to inspect the artificial caverns of Hallein, but pushed at once across the mountain. The ascent from Hallein is extremely steep, but once on the top of the plateau there is a continual though gradual descent towards Berchtesgaden. About half an hour after leaving Hallein our travellers crossed the Bavarian frontier, the only perceptible difference being that, whereas in Austria the subordinate officials wore a uniform of black and yellow, in Bavaria they donned a light blue and white.

From the Bavarian frontier to Berchtesgaden is a drive of about an hour, over a pretty undulating country, surrounded by lofty mountains, conspicuous amongst which is the

Watzmann, 8,578 feet high, and covered with eternal snow. The shapes of all the mountains in this part of the country are very grand and picturesque, and the beauty of the scene is greatly heightened by their many points of difference from one another. The town of Berchtesgaden, which our travellers were now approaching, is one of the prettiest in Germany, being situated on an undulating plateau, green, smiling, and very cheerful, on the banks of the little river Albe, which runs out of the König's See, three miles south of the town. Seen from a height, this cheerful town, with its pretty wooded foreground, and the mountains towering behind it, forms a picture which none who have seen it will easily forget, which remains imprinted for ever on the memory of those between whom and it exists the all but impassable barrier of six thousand miles of black water.

It formed, however, no part of the intentions of the Musafirs to stop at Berchtesgaden, beautiful as it is. When at Ischl they had formed the acquaintance of an English gentleman and his wife, who had spent the previous autumn and part of the winter in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden, and who had indicated to them a place far better suited to their purposes than any of the inns, none of them good, of that town. This place was a small country inn in the little village of Unterstein, about two miles nearer the König's See, kept by a land-lady who had herself written a cookery book, and who also possessed the faculty of making her guests feel, whilst in her house, as if they were in their own home. It is necessary, as we shall be in his company for a few days, to give some short account of the English gentleman who had pointed out this resting place to our travellers. We will call him, as he calls himself, Wild Hunter. He was, as his name signifies, an inveterate sportsman, and, though a barrister by profession, he had abandoned the glories of the circuit and the witticisms of the robing room, to indulge in his favourite pursuit of seeking the feathered and finny tribe all over Europe. He had ransacked Brittany, had exhausted Austria, and was now directing all his energies against the rivers of Bavaria. And not alone against her rivers. We have said that he had passed the previous autumn and part of the winter in the neighbourhood of Berchtesgaden, but we have not yet mentioned the purpose. That will show, more than anything, the absolute devotion of Wild Hunter to sport. It happens that between the countries of Austria and Bavaria, is a mountain called the Untersberg, about 6,500 feet high. This mountain, thus situated between the two countries, forms a kind of debateable land, to which the Austrian and

Bavarian sportsmen think they have each equal right. The consequence is that, whilst on every other mountain the game is carefully preserved, in this it is hunted by all classes, with the result that not only have the animals hunted become few in number, but those that remain are so wild as scarcely to be approached. Their numbers, however, have been accurately ascertained by the sportsmen of the neighbourhood, and in the winter of the year of which we are writing it was known that nine chamois yet remained on the mountain. To get a shot at one of these nine was at that time the great object of Wild Hunter's ambition. To this end he located himself and his wife in a little inn at the foot of the mountain, and seized every opportunity of ascending it for the purpose we have indicated. He made friends with the royal Jägers, and in their company made frequent campaigns against the chamois. The Untersberg is in many places a difficult, and in some, even a dangerous mountain. But neither difficulty nor danger daunted Wild Hunter. After a little practice he was able to climb the most rocky and precipitous ascents, and to follow wherever the sons of the mountain would lead. But all his exertions were vain. He never, we believe, once approached within shooting distance of a chamois. Rendered wary by frequent pursuit, these agile animals always managed to anticipate the hunter, and the sight of one of them bounding across a distant chasm, was the sole return received by Wild Hunter for his all but solitary life and his repeated toils. A chance was, however, afforded him, as we shall have occasion to show, of attaining the object of his ambition before finally taking leave of Bavaria.

Wild Hunter had spent the remainder of the winter, the spring, and part of the summer, elsewhere, but he had returned to the little inn near the König's See to indulge in the excellent trout-fishing in the Albe, and he and his wife had arranged to meet the Musafirs at that place, to enjoy together the beauties of the surrounding scenery, and a few casts in the tempting waters. That is the reason why the Musafirs drove through, instead of stopping at, Berchtesgaden, and put up at the little house in the village of Unterstein, kept by the authoress of the cookery book.

Though not striking in outside appearance, the place was within a model of everything that was clean and comfortable. There were no other guests but the Wild Hunters, so it was to all intents a private dwelling place. Its situation was very pretty. Underneath the Watzmann, in a smiling valley, full of orchards and gardens, two minutes' walk from the river, and but fifteen from the König's See, it was a site for a king. Indeed, so much

had it been appreciated, that close to it, Count Arco,\* the most famous sportsman in Bavaria, and, perhaps, in Germany, had built a country seat, adorned with the many products of his never-failing rifle. The little inn was just as favourably situated as the seat, and our travellers found here, as in Austria, that kindness and consideration have taken strong root in the nature of the German housewife.

It was, we have said, within fifteen minutes' walk of the König's See, of all the lakes in Germany the most famous, and challenging comparison in some respects with the glories of Switzerland and North Italy. More grand even than the lake of Hallstadt and much more bright and sunny, possessing much of the wild beauty of the gems of Langbath, and of the little lake of Töplitz, yielding only in soft and enchanting beauty to the Grundl-See, it is yet more striking even than that. Imagine a piece of water, bright green in colour, and clear beyond comparison, very deep, surrounded by lofty mountains rising perpendicularly from its surface to a height of upwards 8,000 feet, some of them bare rock, so smooth and rising so directly, that a boat's crew touching at that point would have no means of landing, some of them covered with rich and picturesque foliage. Round the lake is no pathway, no means to make a circuit on foot; one must traverse its surface to see all its glories. More known and more renowned than any of the other German lakes we have referred to, it is much more visited by the tourists; and the firing of guns made by members of this class to cause an echo, is apt perhaps to interrupt the intense feeling of delight with which the lover of nature gazes at it for the first time. It is not very large; in length it extends about six miles, and its average breadth is perhaps a mile and a half; yet it is so winding, that the end is not seen from the embarking place, and it has this advantage, that each turn brings some new beauty into view. About two-thirds of the distance from the starting point a little island, called the St. Bartholomew, is reached, famous for the lake-trout, which, caught in the lake, are preserved here in ponds for the consumption of the traveller. On this little island is the king's hunting box, but the Jäger in charge of it acts also the part of host, and an excellent thing he makes of it. On the walls

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\* The name of this nobleman is familiar to everyone in Southern Germany. One of his feats, the climbing up a mountain-rock to capture two young eagles in their nest whilst the old birds were flying about, on ladders which when tied together did not reach up to the nest,—a task which the boldest Jägers had declined,—has formed the text of a ballad known all over Bavaria.

of the entrance room of the little inn are pictures of lake-trout and charr of enormous size, some of them about 60 pounds, which from time to time have been taken from the deep waters of the lake. Another picture represents a bear attacking a boat as it is crossing the lake in the middle of winter. This is interesting inasmuch as it is the true representation of an actual fact, and as the bear in question,—which was then killed,—was the last of its species seen in the mountains round the König's See. This event occurred, if Musafir was correctly informed, some forty years ago. To see the island of St. Bartholomew and the mountains behind it in their greatest perfection, the traveller should land at a point on the opposite side of the lake called the Wallner island. The view from this is glorious. There is the little island of St. Bartholomew in the foreground, and the splendid Watzmann with his rugged wall of rock rising up to an unseen height behind it. It is difficult to decide whether it is most attractive in fine bright sunshine, or when the mountains and foliage are under the alternate influence of cloud and sun. The varying tints caused by the latter, the dark angry appearance of the Watzmann suffering under the frowns of Heaven are perhaps more striking, though infinitely less cheerful, than when the sun pours forth its mightiest power on its double head of snow. Beyond the König's See at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, is another though a much smaller lake called the Unter-See, which partakes of the grandeur and wild picturesqueness of its companion.

But not alone the lakes of this lovely district challenge admiration. In every direction its mountains invite visits from the lovers of nature. On the eastern side of the lake, from the Wallner island, there is a most glorious walk to the Gotzen Alp, an ascent of about three hours. The view from the summit of this is very fine, and not only that, but during the ascent the traveller is compelled many and many a time to linger and even to stand motionless, in order to gaze at the everchanging scenery offering itself to his view. Then again on the south-western side of the lake the Salet Alp invites the adventurous traveller to scramble up its grassy and moss-grown sides to show them on the summit the bright green Obersee, a lake situated as it were in a marble-lined basin, and swarming with trout. The Watzmann, the Königsberg, and the Untersberg are likewise well worthy of being attempted, especially the first-named, as from its summit (8,578 feet) a splendid view may be obtained of those giants of the Central Alps, the Venediger and the Gross Glockner. It would take up too much of our space to describe other and more distant excursions, to make which the little

hostelry at Unterstein formed excellent head-quarters. One of these, Reichenhall, is known and appreciated by every traveller. Ramsau and the little lake some two miles beyond it, the Hinter See, the delight of the painter, constitute an extremely pretty drive. The scenery at the Hinter See is so different from the scenery on the other parts of the district; there is more foreground, the mountains are not so near, and yet there are two in the vicinity, the Reiter-Steinberg and the Mühlsturzhorn, the forms of which are most picturesque.

It was in the midst of this scenery, sometimes on the bosom of the König's See, now making an excursion to a distant mountain, now to an enticing lake, ever enjoying the glorious mountain air, and the bright sunniness of smiling Bavaria, that the Musafirs in the society of their friends spent some eight or ten days of their holiday. Nor was fishing entirely neglected. The very first morning after their arrival at the little inn, Musafir was fortunate enough to capture, with very light tackle and a fly, a trout upwards of two pounds and a half in weight, and which was destined the next day to contribute to the table of the ex-king Louis, who arrived that morning at Berchtesgaden. As reference has been made to fishing, it may be as well to point out the method necessary to be adopted by an Englishman fond of the sport, and who may be desirous of enjoying it. The rivers are all rented to individuals, most of them inn-keepers. These have the exclusive right to all the fish in the water they rent, and no one else can try for them without their permission. Now trout and grayling are looked upon, both in Austria and Bavaria, as very great delicacies, and they command a proportionate price. The plan, therefore, adopted by the inn-keepers is to have attached to their hotels two or three tanks kept filled by a constant supply of running water. Into these tanks all the fish caught in the river are thrown, and fed and kept till required for the use of the passing guest. Under these circumstances it becomes an object to each inn-keeper to have a fresh supply of trout and grayling constantly brought in from the river. Hence they, in general, scruple not to give free permission to the Englishman to fish, provided he engage to bring home alive all that he may catch. Means and appliances to this are not wanting. It becomes only necessary for the fisherman to hire a man, at the rate of about eighteen pence a day, to accompany him. This man carries on his back a sort of barrel, with a small opening on the upper side and air-holes. Into this barrel all the fish caught are placed, and it is the business of the man to see that they are supplied with water, and that this water is constantly changed. In this

way the engagement entered into with the landlord is easily kept. The system has this advantage, that the sportsman is under no obligation to any one, for, if he be anything of a fisherman, his indulgence in sport is of great benefit to his host. Indeed, Musafir records that at one place where he stopped, the landlord offered to put him up for the entire season, and give him the best of the house for nothing, provided only he would keep the kitchen well supplied with the produce of his rod. But this was in an out-of-the-way place, in which no fish tanks had been introduced.

But to return. It had been agreed upon between Musafir and Wild Hunter, that whilst the ladies enjoyed a rest after a trip made to Ramsau and the Hinter See, they should ascend the Untersberg, sleep in an Alm-hut on its summit, and either in the cool of the evening, or in the early grey of the morning, make an attempt on the roebuck, of which there were a few. In pursuance of this resolve they left the little inn at mid-day, and walked eight miles to the village of Schellenberg, just under the Untersberg. Here they dined, and here they were joined by a Bavarian Jäger, who had accompanied Wild Hunter in many of his excursions to the same mountain the previous autumn. At 5 P.M., they started to ascend the mountain. To do this they had to climb first a smaller range called the Ettenberg, extremely well-wooded, and considered the most likely place for roebuck, then to descend a little till a junction was formed with the Untersberg. The ascent of the Ettenberg took about an hour; but not a roebuck was seen; then, after descending, the three commenced the more difficult task of the Untersberg. After an hour and a half's hard work of constant ascent, the Jäger called a halt, as this was also considered a good place for roedeer. But after beating about for half an hour no sign of them appeared, and the ascent was continued. From this place to the Alm-hut was an hour's stiff pull: indeed some parts of the ascent were very trying indeed. At length the Alm-hut was reached. Arrived there, the Jäger at once knocked at the door, but receiving no answer after repeated knockings, he came to the conclusion that it had been left by those in charge of it, and that the ascent to a hut further off would have to be resumed. Fortunately, however, his last knock met with a response, and it appeared that the old couple who pastured the cows were not absent but asleep. The three travellers at once groped their way through the cowsheds, and found themselves in a little room in which were an old man just out of bed, and an old lady in the act of getting out. These did not at all feel the gravity of the situation, but giving our travellers a hearty welcome, they

briskly began to light the fire, to bring seats, and to dry their wet clothes. They then went into an adjoining room, and brought out a bowl or two of the richest and most refreshing milk. Then kneeling before the fire they set themselves to work to make some *schmarren* or mountain cake, the composition of which has been described in a previous number. Of this Musafir and the Jäger partook heartily, but Wild Hunter did not much relish it. He, meanwhile, had recognised in the old couple acquaintances of the previous year, under whose slender roof he had often enjoyed a nights' lodging on the mountains. It is difficult to describe their pleasure at seeing him again; their welcome was most hearty, and showed how much these simple people value those strangers, who do not consider it as derogating from their own importance to regard and treat them as men formed of the same clay and shaped in the same mould. The conversation soon became general; the narrow escapes, the wildness of the chamois, the exploits of the poachers, the relative merits of the Austrian and Bavarian climbers, were topics which came easily to the surface, and were discussed with interest by all. At length it was time to turn in, and the three travellers were shown into a loft piled up with fresh hay. Taking off their shoes, they threw themselves on this, and slept soundly and comfortably till the small hours of the following day.

As they still hoped to get sight of a roebuck, the travellers were roused at half-past two in the morning. Putting on their shoes they went outside, had a good wash at a pump that was found there, drank a good draught of the delicious milk that was offered them, gave some small remuneration to their kind hosts, and started off. Their way lay for some time along the side of the mountain, alternately ascending and descending. After walking about three quarters of an hour, they came upon another Alm-hut; immediately after leaving which they found themselves amongst the *latschen* or brushwood, so useful to the climber. They still walked carelessly on, rather ascending, when suddenly the Jäger, who was in front, stopped, and put his hand up to his ear. A second later, he turned with an overjoyed glance to his companions, and whispering the word *Gemse* (chamois), made a sign to them to stoop down. He had heard in fact the peculiar sound made by the buck chamois in the ravine near to which they were walking. Immediately afterwards they caught sight of the animal going slowly down the ravine in front of them. At this sight, the Jäger gave his rifle to Musafir, and whispering "come quickly" bounded like a deer up the steep sides of a rock commanding the ravine. In a few seconds, Musafir was beside



him, Wild Hunter halting within twenty yards. All knelt. The chamois was within sight, slowly moving towards the rock, at a distance of about a hundred yards. Suddenly he stopped. "Fire" whispered the Jäger to Musafir, whose rifle was directed at the animal. Musafir pulled the trigger, but by a piece of almost unexampled ill-luck, the cap snapped. The rifle belonged to the Jäger, and it had been probably kept loaded for some days. Still the animal moved not. It was a beautiful sight to watch him with his head up in the air, as though distrustful, as though he had some warning of approaching danger. All this time Wild Hunter was taking a deliberate aim. It was curious that he who had toiled in this very mountain all the previous autumn and part of the winter, should thus have a chance offered him when least expected. At last he fired; the surrounding rocks re-echoed the sound. For a moment the chamois moved not, and then only slowly and hesitatingly, so much so that Wild Hunter, who believed he had hit him, made sure he must be wounded. For a few minutes the Jäger thought so too, and put on his dog. But some seconds after, the animal was seen bounding up the sides of the mountain, an almost certain indication that it was unhurt.

This adventure, exciting of its kind, served as a subject of discussion for the rest of their walk. The most cast down was the poor Jäger, who never ceased to lament over the misfortune of the cap. It so happened that this Jäger, though most daring and adventurous, was noted for his ill-luck. Something always happened at the critical moment to interfere with his success. He could not but be mortified then that such a slight mischance should have prevented the accomplishment of a feat, which, easy on many mountains, assumes on the Untersberg a more than ordinarily difficult character. Nor did he recover from his dejection all the morning.

The descent from the rock which our travellers had climbed to have a shot at the chamois was more difficult than they imagined. In the time of excitement men will go anywhere, but the cause of the excitement once passed, they often look at objects in a much more matter-of-fact light. Thus it was on the occasion of which we are writing. The descent chosen by the Jäger was not perhaps dangerous to life, but being down smooth ledges of rock, with no grateful *latschen* to clutch hold of, it was certainly very threatening to limb. To men unpractised in mountaineering, indeed, long and steep descents are much more fatiguing and wearisome than ascents of the same character. That this preference for ascents is due solely to inexperience, or to want of skill in the use of the Alpine stock, is clear from the

fact that, aided by this charmed supporter, the Jägers bound down very difficult places with apparent ease.

Our travellers, pursuing a slower pace, continued their steady descent till about 8 A.M., when they reached the village of Schellenberg, just in time to drink a cup of coffee before the *Eilwagen* (stage-coach) came up to give them a lift as far as Berchtesgaden. Thence they walked to their little inn, on arriving at which, a dip in the clear waters of the Alpe gave them renewed life.

It is scarcely necessary to enter further into the details of their life and residence at this very pretty spot. One entire day—and a most delightful one—was spent on the König's See itself, others in rambles over the country, or in the excursions we have indicated. At length the Musafirs determined to move on towards Munich, taking on their way the splendid Austrian town of Salzburg, and the retired Bavarian village of Traunstein. They bade adieu then to Wild Hunter and his wife, leaving them both under the care of the kind landlady of their little inn, and him with the conviction that he would yet capture more of the finny inhabitants of the Alpe, and with the determination not to allow another winter to pass by without possessing the long-coveted trophy, which those who have shot a chamois have alone the right to wear.\*

The distance from the little village of Unterstein to the town of Salzburg is about seventeen miles, the road interesting all the way, and the view approaching Salzburg extremely grand and picturesque. Salzburg itself is one of the most striking towns in Europe. In its centre rises a hill called the Monchsberg, on the top of one of the spurs of which is a magnificent castle, formerly the residence of the Prince-archbishops of Salzburg, but now dismantled. This castle is built in the old style, and gives to the town itself a most romantic appearance. Seen, indeed, from any approach, this picturesque building, loftily perched on a hill beautifully wooded, and rising apparently from the very centre of the town, cannot fail to arrest the attention and to charm the eye. Between this hill and the river Salzach, dark, muddy, and swiftly flowing, are the principal streets of the town; on the other side of the river a companion hill to the Monchsberg, the Capuzinerberg, rises to a height of 640 feet over the Salzach, and commands a most glorious view of the town and castle, with the dark Untersberg in the background,

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\* This is the hair on the back of the chamois, which, formed into a sort of tuft, is worn in their hats by all Austrians and Bavarians who have shot a chamois. We may here add that late in that autumn, Wild Hunter succeeded in shooting a chamois at Garmisch in Bavaria,

and the shining Watzmann in the distance. The summit of this hill, on which, by the way, is a very good little *auberge*, commands perhaps the best view of Salzburg itself, and of the mountains surrounding it.\* It is one of those views which, once seen, engraves itself for ever on the memory.

The best hotel in Salzburg in those days was the "*Drei Allirten*" kept by a Mr. Jung, a most attentive and excellent host. He speaks English, attends to his business himself, and will always go out of his way to oblige his guests. Do they want to do some sight seeing, to visit Berchtesgaden and the König's See, to make preparations for a walking tour, to change English or Bavarian money into Austrian, even to start on a fishing excursion, they have only to mention their wishes to Jung, and leave the rest to him. He will make every arrangement, and, what is often of no small importance and very rare, he will charge most moderately. Jung is not only civil and obliging himself, but he makes all his waiters the same. He keeps a capital cook, and his is the only hotel in Salzburg which is supplied with the famous *Kaltenhausen* ale, second to none in the world. Here also the traveller gets in perfection the red and white Vöslauer. The sparkling wine of that name is at least equal to Champagne and costs but one-half. In a word, our travellers found at the *Drei Allirten* all the attention of the smaller inns they had visited, combined with the luxuries incidental to a first-class town hotel.†

Our travellers stayed three days at Salzburg, making excursions to the various places of interest in the neighbourhood, and then started by rail to Traunstein, a little village across the Bavarian frontier, on the white Traun, of the fishing capabilities of which they had received marvellous accounts. In the same carriage with them there travelled a Prussian, native of Berlin, who lost no opportunity of hinting the low estimation in which he held every thing Austrian, and the infinite and overwhelming superiority of Prussia and the Prussians. He declared that with two shillings he could buy more in Berlin than with three gulden (six shillings) in Salzburg. A Bavarian in the carriage supported him in his hits against Austria, but when he too

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\* One of the best descriptions of Salzburg and of the pretty places in its vicinity, such as Aigen, the Gaisberg, and Hellbrunn, is to be found in Baroness Tautphæus' Novel of Cyrilla.

† Should any one be tempted by this description to place himself under the care of Mr. Jung, we deem it right to inform him that since the *Musafir* visited Salzburg, he has given up the *Drei Allirten*, and built a magnificent hotel of his own, near the railway terminus, called *Hotel de l'Europe*.

observed that they managed things differently in Bavaria, the Prussian quietly shrugged his shoulders, and made a grimace intimating more plainly than words could convey, that he held Bavaria in much the same esteem as Austria. He continued to hint this in various ways during the journey.

Traunstein, to which the train in about an hour's time brought the Musafirs, is a pretty and very clean village on the white Traun; it is surrounded by hills, none of them, however, very near, but looking grand in the distance. The country about is pretty and well wooded, and the place being famed for the salubrity of its climate, is resorted to in considerable numbers by the Bavarians. It has several excellent inns, and these, during the summer and autumn, are well filled. The charges in all are extremely moderate. The Musafirs put up in that to which they had been recommended, the *Hirsch*, and found themselves there most comfortable. Amongst other places of amusement, Traunstein, like all German towns at all frequented during the summer, boasts of a small theatre, to attend which it is not necessary to don evening dress. The performances begin about seven o'clock and are over by ten, a far more rational procedure than in the great cities of Europe. Here, as at Gratz, at Lintz, and other places in Southern Germany, ices are brought in during the intervals between the acts, and are freely partaken of.

In this little town our travellers remained six days, Musafir having capital sport in the way of fishing. It was generally arranged that he and his wife should go out for the day, making for a spot fixed upon near the banks of the river, at once pretty and commodious. This became the head-quarters for the day. Musafir then fished the river for an hour or two, his wife either looking on or picking the ferns and wild flowers with which the place abounded. After the box carried by the attendant porter had been pretty well filled,—and all fish under half a pound in weight were returned to the river,—they sauntered home by a fresh path, or wandered in search of other beauties of nature.

One day an excursion was made to the Chiem-See, the largest lake in Bavaria. Starting early in the morning, they drove ten miles to Seebuck at the head of the lake, and whence they commanded a good view of a great part of it. It is an enormous piece of water, quite open, presenting a grand appearance from its mere size. Contrasted with the pure green water of the König's See, the water of this lake is discoloured and dirty, and altogether it is not to be mentioned in the same list. Nevertheless it is far from being ugly. The hills on its southern and eastern

sides are picturesque and well wooded. Two pretty islands Frauenwörth and Herrenwörth deserve a visit, especially the first. It must nevertheless be admitted that to the traveller coming from the Austrian lakes and the König's See the effect of this lake is disappointing. He misses the points which make those lakes so enchanting—the overhanging mountains, the smiling foregrounds, the varying tints, the deep, clear water. The Chiemsee more resembles an inland sea than one of the gems which add so much to the beauty of mountain scenery.

Two days later the Musafirs went on by rail to Munich, and stayed there nearly a fortnight. We do not propose to follow them in their inspection of the many points of interest in a city so well known and so much visited. The famous guide books of Murray and Baedeker are open to every one, and point out clearly all that is worthy of inspection. The Musafirs, however, had always intended that Munich should form a point whence to plan fresh mountain excursions. It had been their idea to proceed in the direction of Innsbrück, taking on the way the beautiful lakes, Ammer See and Wurm See, then stopping at Ober Ammergau, the scene of the events described in Baroness Tautpheus' novel of "Quits," thence by the Walchen and Achen lakes to Zell in Zillerthal, and from that to Innsbrück. It would have been a charming trip, and Musafir was divided between that and Switzerland, when a letter from a friend decided him in favour of the latter.

This friend was a young Anglo-Indian, whom we will call Punjaabee, who had lately married, and who was then on his way with his bride to Lucerne with the intention of making thence, with her and some of the members of her family, excursions into the best appreciated parts of the country in the neighbourhood. Both Musafir and his wife jumped at the idea of a tour in such company, and the order of the day therefore was passed for Lucerne.

The direct route by the railway from Munich towards Lucerne takes the traveller to the ancient city of Augsburg, thence to Lake Constance, which is traversed from its eastern point at Lindau to its western at Schaffhausen, whence the railway takes him direct to Lucerne. The Musafirs could not pass so famous a city as Augsburg without paying it a visit, and the day they spent in it more than repaid them for the delay. It was interesting to notice the part of the town, which was still a flourishing city in the time of the glories of the old Roman Empire; to examine buildings bearing the date some of the 3rd, very many of the 10th, century; to enter the ancient

town-hall, of the latter period, interesting besides from its frescoed ceilings and the historical pictures which adorned its walls; the room, still a royal residence, in which Luther read out the Augsburg Confession to Charles V.; the cloister in which he lived for ten days, and the adjoining church in which he sometimes preached; to go over the houses of the Fugger family,—the Rothschilds of the seventeenth century; to see that mansion, from the window of which Philippina Welser, the fair maid of Augsburg, captivated the heart of the heir of the Holy Roman Empire; to examine the little chapel in the hotel "*Drei Mohren*," kept still in precisely the same condition as when the emperor Charles V. heard mass there; and the room, now sadly desecrated, in which the generous Fugger burned in a cinnamon fire, in the presence of the emperor, the bond given him by that prince for the heavy sums advanced by him for the expenses of the war against the Moors; to enjoy too the sight of water playing from fountains of ancient date and classic form. All these attractive objects—not to speak of others of more modern construction—constitute the charm of Augsburg, and make it, next to Nuremberg, which stands *facile princeps*, the most interesting of the old cities of Germany.

The railway journey from Augsburg to Lindau on Lake Constance took about six hours. Its weariness was broken by the peculiar conversation of an Englishman in the carriage, who, unable to speak German, and being somewhat overbearing in his manners, had been terribly fleeced in Austria and Hungary, and who favoured his fellow-travellers with his experiences. Suddenly and accidentally the conversation turned on the French emperor, and then the Englishman's excitement knew no bounds. He endorsed all Kinglake's attacks, and painted him in the most odious colours, with the manifest sympathy of the Germans in the carriage who understood him, and with whom Louis Napoléon was no favourite. But when the Englishman diverted his attacks to Germany, the smiles on the faces of his companions disappeared, and it was easy to see that the subject was unpalatable to them. With great good taste, however, they allowed him to rattle on. Lindau was reached that evening, and left on the following morning, our travellers embarking on board the steamer at 7 A.M. The day was lovely; the scenery, however, on the shores of Lake Constance is not very interesting. It is a small inland sea, some idea of the length of which may be obtained from the fact that to proceed from the most eastern point of Bregenz to the point beyond Constance where the Rhine is entered, a steamer requires seven hours. A distant view is obtained from the decks of the steamer of the giants of

Switzerland, but the German side of the lake is almost flat. After the Rhine is entered the scenery improves. On a prettily wooded height may be seen the castle of Arenenberg, the property of the emperor Napoléon, the scene in which he passed his infant years, from whence he undertook his Strasbourg expedition, and in which he closed his mother's eyes. Here apparently the feeling towards the former inmate of the castle is much more favourable than in Germany.

Schaffhausen reached about 4 P.M., our travellers started at once for a little inn called the Hotel Witzig, situated on the railway, and about a quarter of a mile from the falls. This hotel had been strongly recommended to them, and they found it most comfortable. Scarcely had they secured a room in it when they set out again to see the falls which make Schaffhausen famous. Most wonderful are they! Such a volume of water; such a breadth; such a mass of foam! As they stood underneath the fall, in a sort of arbour, just at the head of the Rhine, it was impossible for them, looking up, to see the summit of the crest; the waves seemed as though about to overwhelm and sweep them away. The sight of this mass of water, enjoyed from the particular point—and it is the tourist's point—was quite sufficient to extort the most unfeigned admiration. There are, nevertheless, mockers who deride it. More to be envied, we think, are those to whom is left the faculty of enjoyment, who are able to bear willing and heart-felt testimony to the wonders and glories of nature, who are neither too wrapt up in themselves, nor in their own fancied importance to be pleased!

From Schaffhausen the Musafirs proceeded next morning to Lucerne, arriving there about mid-day. We will not dwell upon the meeting with Punjaubec, or the introduction to his wife and her family. It will suffice to say that a very short time induced a feeling amongst all the members of the party that their acquaintance had been not for hours but for years. Shame on those Anglo-Indians who malign their countrymen by imputing to them unnatural coldness and reserve; never was there a more stupid calumny uttered. The fault is not in the English; the fault is with the Anglo-Indians who descending from a position of colonial importance to one of equality with their fellow-countrymen, cannot bring themselves to accept the reality of their new *status*, but sigh in vain for the adulation to which, as leaders of society, they have been accustomed in India! We have always regarded it as a strong mark of common sense the admission from a lady in India, more especially a lady in high position, that she prefers England to India. The temptation to a certain order of mind to prefer India

is so strong, that there are really many who are unable to resist it. Miss Edgeworth once wrote a very famous tale in which she pourtrayed the struggles of a tradesman's wife to migrate from the first position in Cranbourne Alley to the last in Bedford Row, and painted in glowing terms the misery of her position when she got there. There is a moral in the story, the application of which, taken either in its natural sense or inversely, commends itself to very many in India.

For our parts, and judging simply from the personal experience gained from two successive visits to the old country, we hesitate not to declare our conviction that the English people proper are the kindest, the most hospitable, the warmest hearted people in the world. They must know who you are before they will receive you into their houses; but, satisfied on that point, the Anglo-Indian may be sure that he will be received on his own merits and be judged accordingly. As a rule, in fact, the only disagreeable people we met in England were the Anglo-Indians settled there. Many of them were so wrapped up in themselves, and in the by-gone glories of their former days, so satisfied that every Englishman they met in the street knew they were Anglo-Indians, and therefore intended to slight them, that they really were quite intolerable. We write thus as much in warning as in sober earnest. We are jealous of the character of our Anglo-Indians. We are vexed that they should be regarded, that they should regard themselves, as a race apart, distinct from the great body of their countrymen. We are desirous, above all, that they should rid themselves of the foolish notion, in many of them quite rampant, that they are more learned and wise than the bulk of the Englishmen they are brought in contact with. We much fear that this feeling is one of the main causes of the line they take up. They are not appreciated according to their fancied merits; they seek for refuge, therefore, in the reminiscences of the past, and shut their eyes to the present.

But to return to the Musafirs. After many rambles with Punjaubee and his relations in the neighbourhood of Lucerne after ascending the Bürgenstock, "doing" Pilatus, and walking over the other hills which surround the glorious lake, it was determined to make an excursion to one of the snow mountains, thence to proceed to Interlaken, and from that place across the Wengern Alp to the glaciers of Grindelwald and Rosenlaui. The route is an oft-trodden one, but the adventurers met with by some of the party render it worthy of a notice in this faithful record of Captain Musafir's wanderings.

The snow mountain fixed upon was the Titlis, upwards of 11,000 feet high. To reach it from Lucerne the traveller had to



proceed to Stanzstadt at the other end of the lake, thence to the village Stanz, and from there to Engelberg. At Engelberg began the regular ascent, across the Joch Pass, to a little inn on the Engstlen Alp. From this the ascent of the Titlis was generally made.

As at that time of the year, the month of August, the Engstlen Alp inn was often crowded with tourists, it was deemed a wise and even a necessary precaution that the landlord of that inn should be written to, in order that rooms might be secured for the whole party. As, however, the necessity for such a step did not present itself until it was too late to receive an answer at Lucerne, the landlord was requested to direct his reply to the inn at Engelberg, in which, in case he should be full, the travellers hoped to find quarters for the night. All these arrangements having been completed, the party, consisting of Musafir and his wife, Punjaabee, his wife, her two sisters, and her brother, stepped on board a steamer at Lucerne. A merrier one never set out on any expedition. A French writer not long ago alluded to the charming and graceful facility with which English girls adapt themselves to all the circumstances of travel; how their gay and sprightly laughter quadruples the pleasure of climbing up the mountain side: how they may be seen adorning the loftiest peaks, how thus daring and enduring of fatigue in the mountains, they are, when met again in the drawing-room, as graceful and natural in another way; totally without affectation and without too great self-esteem; always anxious to please, yet never overstepping the bounds of true feminine reserve. After describing their charming manners, so happily adapted to all circumstances, in a vein of chivalrous enthusiasm, he gravely adds: "Some people complain of the English as being a nation of travellers; but "I would soberly enquire, what would those mountains be "without those charming, high-spirited girls, whose coloured "petticoats may be always seen in contrast, now to the green "mountain side, now to the snowy peak; who have a kind "word for every stranger who may speak to them; whose "merry laughter disperses the gloomiest atmosphere, and inspires "a whole company; who climb to delight themselves, and who "succeed in delighting all around them. Miserable would be "the man who having made one visit to the mountains in such "society, should go there a second time to find that they were "absent."

If the words we have quoted had not been written before the period of Musafir's visit, we should have believed that the chivalrous Frenchman must have belonged to one of the many

parties that interchanged civilities with the merry travellers whose short tour we are about to describe. Certainly in gay and airy spirits, in the enjoyment of the little difficulties which beset travellers, in thorough appreciation of lovely scenery, in sprightly humour, in amiability and kind-heartedness, and the most entire abnegation of self upon every occasion, these ladies realised the description we have quoted. Without such, a tour of this sort must be a blank, with them it is the most perfect enjoyment.

The travellers left Lucerne at eight o'clock in the morning in a steamer for the little village of Stanzstadt, where they hoped to find carriages to take them on. Here, however, they met with their first mishap, which led indirectly to all those that followed. Not a carriage was available. There had, they were informed, been a great rush that day to Engelberg, and every conveyance had been taken up. Still as it was only a distance of three miles to Stanz, which was a much larger place, it was easy to walk there. They started accordingly, their traps being conveyed in a sort of wheel-barrow. An hour took them to Stanz, but here too there were some difficulties about carriages, so to while away the time whilst these were being smoothed away, they rambled over the place, and looked at the church and other lions. At the end of about a couple of hours two carriages were produced, and in these they set out for Engelberg. The day was lovely though very hot indeed. As there was now no prospect of reaching Engelberg before five o'clock, and they had a foot journey of five hours to the Engstlen Alp after that, our travellers took the opportunity of arriving at a very pretty spot to dine *al fresco*. They then pushed on, but as from that point to Engelberg the ascent was rather steep, Musafir and Punjaabee's brother-in-law—whom we shall call Oxonian—walked it, and arrived at Engelberg nearly an hour before the carriages. In reply to their enquiries they found that every room in all the inns and *pensions* in Engelberg was occupied, that not a pony was to be had to take the ladies on to the Engstlen Alp, and that there were but two *chaises à porteur*, one of them broken, and which it would take an hour to repair. To compensate for this, however, a letter was found from the landlord of the Engstlen Alp inn to the address of Musafir, stating that he had secured rooms for his party.

It was now five o'clock, and as the carriages were believed to be close behind, an order was issued for the immediate repair of the second chair, and guides and porters were called out with the utmost despatch. Still it was six o'clock before the carriages arrived, and half-past that hour before the two *chais*

with the proper compliment of porters and luggage-bearers were ready to start. They had then, as we have said, a five hours' march before them, over very steep ground, as after passing a very high point in front of Engelberg, they had to descend to the Trüb See—a most dismal place—and from that to ascend the Joch Pass (6,890 feet), from the summit of which the Engstlen Alp was nearly four miles distant. However, the journey and its difficulties were made light of in anticipation, and at half-past six they started, the three gentlemen walking, and the four ladies using the chairs alternately.

It was a lovely evening, but unfortunately there was no moon. For half an hour the seven travellers pushed on rapidly, but then came the ascent of the steep point which separates Engelberg from the Joch Pass. Still, laughing, talking, stopping to gaze at the lovely scenery which makes Engelberg so popular, they trudged steadily on. But before that first ascent had been achieved, daylight had disappeared, and even the twilight was fast fading. Then came the descent to the Trüb See,—a flat sandy surface interspersed with water courses, which it was difficult in the dark to cross without getting wet. However, the various members of the party progressed somehow by the aid of mutual assistance, and all re-united at a chalet in the depths of the Trüb See. This chalet bore a striking contrast to the Alm-huts of Austria, being not only dirty itself, but apparently the cause of dirt in its inmates. Nevertheless hunger overpowered other considerations, and the seven did not scruple to partake of bread and milk albeit offered them by not the cleanest of hands, and charged for—again in contrast to Austria—exorbitantly. It was now close upon nine o'clock, and pitch dark. The lanterns were therefore lighted, and the travellers, refreshed, set out again for the ascent of the Joch Pass. They had not, however, gone very far before all the lights, except one tallow candle, went out, the guides lost their way, members of the party got separated, and confusion became worse confounded. There remained only to all the consciousness that there was a steep ascent before them, and that they had to climb it. How they wandered, and fell, and tumbled, how this one rolled down an incline, and the other scrambled amongst the rocks, boots not to describe; it was certainly rough work, but had it been ten times more so, he would have been worse than a heathen who had not enjoyed it, supported, as all were, by the imperturbable merriment and good humour of those brave English girls. What though they fell, they got up again with a jest; what though the ascent seemed never ending they were always to the fore; what though even the guides

murmured, they made light of every difficulty. It was really an inspiring sight to watch those girls, who in a drawing-room would have attracted all by their grace and elegance, meet thus lightly the difficulties of a night march in a region of snow-clad mountains, not knowing one inch of the way, and the guides floundering in darkness. Still on they went, merrily and cheerfully, until at last the summit of the Joch Pass was stumbled upon rather than reached. It was very cold, the snow lying within a few feet of them, albeit not directly on their path, and though now past midnight, they had yet four miles to traverse. Once on the summit, the track to the Engstlen Alp was soon found, and they pushed on merrily, descending in the four miles about a thousand feet. This distance was accomplished in something over the hour, and about half-past one o'clock they entered the little inn on the Engstlen Alp, having walked for seven hours since leaving Engelberg. But the catastrophe of their adventures was at hand. There was naturally no one at that hour waiting their arrival, but a light was burning in the kitchen, and to it they bent their steps, Musafir leading the way. On opening the door they encountered the landlord, rather a smart-looking man, ready dressed: the cook too was busy at the fire, and there were no signs of turning in. At their appearance the landlord appeared at first startled and surprised; but when Musafir, addressing him in German, told him that they formed the party regarding whom he had addressed a letter to the hotel at Engelberg, the form of his visage began strangely to alter. He did not speak, but an expression of sadness and self-reproach replaced that of astonishment. For some short time he did no more than stand still and wring his hands. By this time all the seven were assembled in the kitchen, curiously watching the apparently insane motions of the host. In vain did Musafir and Oxonian address him: he would not speak, but continued to hang out signal of distress with his hands. At last, the form of the question was varied, and Musafir asked him for their rooms. But this query seemed only to redouble his grief; at last, making a tremendous effort, he exclaimed: "I kept the rooms for you till ten o'clock; the influx of guests then was so great and your arrival was so uncertain, that I was forced then to give them up. Yes," added the poor fellow, "and I've given up my own room too,—this is the place where I have to sleep." With these words he opened a cupboard showing a mattress stretched on the floor. The feelings of our travellers on hearing these words found vent in a loud and prolonged and hearty laugh. There was something so novel in being in such a position after a seven hours' walk, something to them so enjoyable, that they sat

down on the bench in the kitchen and roared. The landlord at first could not believe his senses. He looked from one member of the party to the other as if he doubted whether their mirth was genuine; then at himself as if sceptical of his own existence. It was doubtless new to him to hear guests suddenly deprived of their rooms meet him, not with reproaches, but with merriment. At last he too was carried away, and added his own laughter to the others! When this outbreak had somewhat subsided, the idea began to steal over the intruding visitors that they were hungry. They, therefore, took the opportunity of restored quiet to ask the landlord whether he could give them something to eat. His face brightened up at the question as he replied looking towards the blazing fire: "Oh yes, what will 'you have?" Almost immediately afterwards however, his countenance fell, as he exclaimed; "but we've no room to serve it in." "Can't we have it in the *salle à manger*?" asked one of the party. "Well," said the host ruefully, "I have a *salle à manger*, but there are three Englishmen sleeping in it, and the door is 'locked.'" Our travellers, however, were not to be baulked of their meal by the idea of encountering three *Engländer*, as the host called them, and it was resolved that one of their party should accompany the latter to hold a parley with their countrymen. For this duty Oxonian was selected. The two set forth and knocked at the door of the room, but for some time knocked in vain. At last, however, the knocks became louder, and a movement was heard within. After some consultation the door was opened, the two ambassadors entered, when to his surprise Oxonian recognised in the three *Engländer* three relatives, one of them a young cousin whom we will designate as "Cantab." The parley at once assumed a pleasant aspect, and an agreement, fair to both, was soon entered into between the two high contracting parties. It was decided that one end of the room, which was a long one, should be kept in utter darkness, and that in this end the three gentlemen should continue to repose, that the other end should be brilliantly lighted up, and at this the ladies should sup. This arrangement entered into, the countenance of the landlord assumed a benignant hue, and he incited his cook to exert herself to the utmost. This she did, and in about half an hour a most excellent supper was served up, to which ample justice was rendered by the travellers, good digestion waiting on appetite, health on both, and, to borrow a simile from the immortal Dickens,—the smiling landlord upon all three. Certainly a merrier party never sat down anywhere to a meal.

With the discovery by Oxonian of his three relatives, the fortunes of our travellers appear to have taken a turn. For

no sooner was their jovial supper over, and the question had begun to be mooted as to what they should do next, than two Germans leaving one of the bedrooms, entered the *salle* bent upon ascending the Titlis. "At least the ladies can now be "provided for," whispered the landlord to Musafir, as he instantly gave orders for the room to be swept out, and the beds made ready. Of these there were but three and there were four ladies, but it was not difficult to arrange for the remainder of the night. The three gentlemen meanwhile made themselves comfortable on the floor.

The next day some of the inmates of the little inn went away and all our travellers were accommodated. The landlord, however, never forgot the good humour with which they had borne what he believed they would regard as a great disappointment. He treated them henceforth as his most honoured guests, and exhausted all his resources to make them feel perfectly at home. The kindness was appreciated although the exertions were scarcely needed, for with such a party and in such a lovely spot he would have been a yahoo indeed, who could have been in the least degree put out.

The Engstlen Alp is indeed one of Nature's favourite spots. About 5,700 feet above the level of the sea, it is surrounded by glorious mountains, some of them white masses of snow. Others again wore a grassy covering until just at the very summit. Close to the inn was a little lake formed of glacier water, which, though icy cold, was infinitely refreshing after a day's excursion. Between the inn and the mountains were smaller elevations, prettily wooded, and containing numberless species of wild flowers, whilst the road in the valley descending to Imhof followed the course of a most beautiful little river, running over rocks, and abounding in cascades and waterfalls, which appeared to the greater advantage from the luxuriant foliage on the other side.

The day after their arrival at the little inn was spent in wandering amongst these scenes, and most delightful it was to revel in the bright snow, and gaze as one could over many miles of mountains which had worn their dazzling peaks for centuries, then to descend into the valley and admire the charming contrast of wild and luxuriant foliage, to crown all by a plunge into the ice-cold lake. At about four o'clock, the Germans who had ascended the Titlis returned. They gave a most melancholy account of their trip, described it as not only difficult but dangerous, and they strongly advised our travellers not to think of attempting it, one of them showing the cuts and bruises he had received in a fall which, he seemed to think,

might have been fatal. This advice was entirely thrown away on the male portion of our travellers, but it had possibly some effect in deciding them not to allow the ladies to join the party,—a decision which was entirely opposed to their inclinations.

At one o'clock on the following morning, the four gentlemen, Oxonian, Cantab, Punjaubee, and Musafir, were roused from their slumbers, and partaking, after dressing, of a slight meal, started off to make the ascent of the Titlis. They again walked to the summit of the Joch Pass, then descending to the right, crossed a glacier at the foot of the Titlis, and then began the ascent. After climbing for about two hours they reached a point just below the level of the snow. Here they stopped and breakfasted. After a short rest they again started, and going as it were round the mountain under the snow level, reached the point from which they were again to mount. Here, as they were to enter the snow, they were roped together, thus: A guide first, then Punjaubee, Cantab, Oxonian, Musafir, guide. At first the snow was hard, but as the sun's power became stronger and stronger, it soon became so soft as to cause each climber to plunge in it above the knee. They passed several crevasses, seemingly without foundation of any sort, but their guides knew the road well, and steered them clear of them all. Ahead of them, at one time the distance of nearly an hour, was a party of foreigners also accompanied by two guides. On these our friends steadily gained, and when within two hundred yards of the summit, closed with them. A tremendous race now ensued, both parties walking their best. It ended, however, by a few seconds, in favour of the travellers whose adventures we are tracing.

The ascent achieved, all the pedestrians sat still to gaze at the glorious view which presented itself from the summit of the mountain. Some of the finest peaks in all Switzerland lay but a few hundred feet above their level; beneath them a sea of snow, broken up as it were into waves, so irregular were the formations; above them the clear blue heaven, its glory undiminished by a single cloud, and all around them the crisp fresh air, wonderfully exhilarating, and taking away all sense of fatigue. It was a most enjoyable half-hour, and if one thought did occur to affect it, it was that the ladies, who might easily, as it turned out, have made the ascent, were not there to partake of and to heighten their pleasure.

The descent of our friends was very rapid: the snow was melting more and more every minute, and they consequently made all haste to reach the point below it. Thence they went

on more leisurely, and meeting some of the ladies near the Joch Pass, they proceeded at an easy pace, reaching the Alp just eleven hours after they had left it. One or two of them felt rather tired, but a plunge into the glacier water of the lake took away every vestige of fatigue. Indeed, so little did two out of the four feel the ascent, that Punjatsbee declared that if he had been alone he could have done it in an hour less time, whilst Oxonian actually did climb again to the summit the following morning in company with some friends who unexpectedly arrived that evening.

The following morning, the whole party, now reduced to six by the defection of Oxonian, separated from their other friends and from their jovial host, and started for Brienz. The parting with the host was quite affecting so much had he been taken with our friends. He begged them to return, and promised that whatever might happen there should always be room for them. The walk from Engstlen to Imhof along the course of the little river before referred to, was most lovely, and many were the additions made to the collections of ferns and wild flowers. It was like strolling through a beautiful park, so soft was the turf, so beautiful the trees, and so enchanting the entire scenery. Indeed, what with the ferns and the wild strawberries, and halts in beautiful spots, our travellers delayed somewhat too long upon the road, so that by the time they reached Imhof, at a considerable lower elevation than Engstlen, the sun was shining with a power that made itself felt. Here too no carriages were available for sometime for a start to Brienz, and it was 7 p.m., before they could get away, ten o'clock before they reached their destination.

Brienz, a rather uninteresting town at the northernmost end of the lake which bears its name, is the point of embarkation for Interlaken, at the other end, to which place our travellers proceeded on the following morning, halting there a day, and making, amongst other excursions, a visit to the famous falls of Giesbach. These, though very beautiful, are not, according to Musafir, equal in interest to the waterfall of Golling, which the unexplored mystery of the imprisoned lake within the mountain invests with a kind of romance unattainable by any other fall. The following morning they all started for the Wengern Alp.

We will not attempt to follow our travellers in the further details of their tour. We leave them in ground well known to the tourists, and which the majority of our readers have probably explored for themselves. It will suffice to state that passing Lauterbrunnen and the famous fall, the Staubbach, they crossed the Wengern Alp, sat for some hours *vis-à-vis* to those



glories of Switzerland, the Jung-frau with her two horns, the Monch, and the Eiger, rising up to nearly 13,000 feet, listening to the descending avalanches, and watching the striking effect of the alternate sunshine and cloud on their hoary heads; then, passing over the lower Scheideck (6,482 feet) the weather bitterly cold, they descended in a storm of thunder and lightning to Grindelwald; that there they visited, the following day, its famous glacier, and walked on its sea of ice, being out all day on the trip, and returning wet through; that, the next day, they crossed the upper Scheideck (5,960), having previously done honour to a little grotto hewn out of pure ice on the upper glacier of Grindelwald; then descending to Rosenlaui, famous for its lovely ferns, they visited its glacier, and pushed on the same evening to Reichenbach. As the weather had now set in rainy they deemed it wise to curtail their expedition, and to return over the Brünig Pass,—an uninteresting route—to Lucerne,—the rain coming down in torrents all the way. It was a most enjoyable trip, without one drawback from its beginning to its close, except perhaps the wet weather after passing the Scheideck; but even the dismal state of the sky brought into more striking contrast the cheerfulness and gaiety of the companions of Musafir.

A few days later it cleared up again, and another trip was attempted. Of this too, equally enjoyable as the first, we shall merely give the outline. Starting early one morning they steamed to Fluelen, passing Tell's chapel *en route*, then drove to Amsteg, passing through the village of Altorf, the scene of many of the exploits of the far-famed patriot of Switzerland. Sleeping at Amsteg they started at four o'clock next morning for a walk up the Maderaner Thal to the Hüfi glacier at its further end. This walk is one of the most beautiful in Switzerland. The "Thal" or valley, runs up between two ranges of mountains, those on the one side covered with lovely foliage, those on the other, bare, grand, and imposing. The valley between these two is most beautiful, consisting of alternate mead and forest, with a picturesque brook below, crossed more than once by the most picturesque of bridges. All the members of the party were as usual in the highest spirits and eager for a climb. Breakfasting *en route*, the Hüfi glacier was reached about mid-day. It is a glorious glacier, full of crevasses, a glance down which shows one the ice clear and transparent to a very great depth. After disporting themselves on this glacier for some time, they all returned to Amsteg after a most enjoyable trip.

Next day starting in carriages they drove up the St. Gothard Pass as far as Hospenthal. It was a glorious drive; indeed

under no circumstances could it have been otherwise, but on this occasion the day was most favourable, and the mountain foliage, the rugged rocks, the winding turns, were seen to the very best advantage. The same evening they returned to Lucerne, and a few days later the Musafirs bade adieu to their friends and to Switzerland, carrying away with them an immense appreciation of the English as a people,—an appreciation which further experience in England tended only to confirm and to increase.

From Lucerne the Musafirs travelled direct *via* Strasbourg to the Black Forest, to enjoy in it a month's ramble. We shall not follow them so far, but part with them at Strasbourg, where Musafir, who even at the time of the imprisonment of the heir of the empire in Ham,—where he wrote these words: "With the name I bear there are only two destinies which are proper to me, a prison or a throne,"—had watched his career with intense interest, seized the opportunity of inspecting the spot where he made his abortive attempt in 1836. The place where Louis Napoléon was taken prisoner is a narrow piece of ground in front of the Infantry barrack, and between it and a wall. It was this narrowness of space that was fatal to him. At the head of the Artillery, who had pronounced for him at once, he had gone along a narrow street leading to the Infantry barracks, and, passing between these, had found himself in the narrow space above referred to, the mass of the Artillery remaining in the narrow street outside. When in the narrow space, the soldiers crowded out of the barracks to listen to the harangue addressed to them by Louis Napoléon. They were just about to declare for him when the Colonel of the Regiment, by name Tallandier, rushed forward, and said to his men—"You think you are going to declare for 'the heir of Napoléon; this is not he, this is an impostor, a son 'of Colonel Vaudry.'" This readiness on the part of Tallandier had the effect he wished for. The soldiers saw in the features of the young man before them no resemblance to the features of the first emperor. Colonel Tallandier's confidence of assertion added to their doubts, and they, who would have marched to Paris for the nephew of the emperor, declined to have aught to do with an impostor. There is no doubt in the present day that but for that speech of Tallandier the plot would have succeeded. Musafir was assured that all the regiments on the eastern frontier had been gained, and needed but the signal from Strasbourg to rally to the Napoléonic standard. It is perhaps better as it is. The emperor owes much to his six years of silence and meditation in the castle of Ham.

We have now brought to a conclusion the rough notes with which we have been entrusted by Captain Musafir. They tell but a plain and unvarnished story; but if the perusal of that story incite others to reserve themselves for the intense pleasure, whilst yet they are able to enjoy it, of European travel; if it induce them to shake off local prejudices and to conform as much as may be to the standard prevalent in Europe; if it persuade them to see and judge for themselves whether their countrymen in Europe are so cold and distant as they are sometimes represented to be by resident Anglo-Indians, we shall not regret the trouble of the compilation, for we shall then feel that we have accomplished a real success.

We will only add that Captain Musafir has promised to send us the notes he took of a pedestrian journey over his old haunts in the Salzkammergut and over the Tyrol in the year subsequent to the adventures we have recorded. Should they appear after examination to be of a nature to enlist the interest of the public, we shall endeavour to prepare them for a future number.

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ART. VII.—*The British Captives in Abyssinia.* By Charles T. Beke, PH. D., F.S.A. Fellow and Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society; Author of “*Origines Biblicæ*,” “*The Sources of the Nile*,” &c. Second Edition. London. Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer. 1867.

THERE are few Englishmen who, whatever their political prejudices may be, can feel insensible to the insults and sufferings heaped upon their fellow-countrymen at the Court of Theodore, the most Christian Emperor of Abyssinia. That these indignities should have been allowed to go so long unpunished, that this should now be the fourth year of the prisoners' captivity, that two successive representatives of Her Britannic Majesty should be treated with impunity in the manner in which Consul Cameron and Mr. Rassam have been treated, may well excite in the minds of some, like Dr. Beke, at once the keenest sympathy with the sufferers, and a righteous indignation against the inactivity of our Government. Before, however, considering the political aspect of the Abyssinian question, it may be well to place before our readers a brief *resumé* of the events which have brought about the present embarrassing complications in that unhappy country.

The kingdom of Abyssinia is a high table-land, lying between 9°—15° north latitude and 35°—40° east longitude, and separated from the coast of the Red Sea by a belt of low desert, very narrow at the north, and gradually widening towards the south. These lowlands, inhabited by Dankali tribes, have for many years been nominally subject to the Ottoman Porte, by which they were only last year transferred to the Pasha of Egypt. Abyssinia itself has long been divided into numerous provinces, always jealous of, and not unfrequently at war with, each other. For our present purpose, however, it will be sufficient to distinguish between the province of Tigre or Northern Abyssinia, Ambara or Central Abyssinia, (containing the capital Gondar), and Shoa or Southern Abyssinia. Our earliest relations with this country date, according to Dr. Beke, from the commencement of the

present century, when an alliance was formed with the ruler of Tigre; but on his defeat and execution by a usurper, Dedjatj Ubye of Semyen, we seem to have transferred our alliance to his rival Ras Ali, the virtual ruler of Central Abyssinia. It is to this attempt to establish relations at the capital of the titular Emperor, to the neglect of the more important, because more accessible, province of Tigre, that Dr. Beke attributes a great measure of our difficulties in that country.

When in 1853 the present Emperor, from being the petty chieftain of Kwara, rose to aspire to the sovereignty of the whole empire, and when, after successively defeating Ras Ali and Ubye, his aspirations seemed to be wellnigh realized, our Consul, Mr. Plowden, decided upon opening negotiations with him, which he did during a visit paid to the capital in 1855, and his proceedings met with the entire approval of the Foreign Office. At the commencement of 1860, Consul Plowden was attacked on the road to Massowah, (the only communication between which place and Gondar passes through the heart of Tigre,) by some of the relations of Ubye, who, supported, it is said, by the French, had raised the standard of revolt. Mr. Plowden was wounded and taken prisoner; and, though ransomed by the Emperor, died of his wounds shortly after. To revenge his death, Theodore, accompanied by Mr. Bell, a British adventurer in his army who was slain in the combat which ensued, marched against the insurgents, and compelling them to capitulate, mercilessly butchered in cold blood about 1,500 of them, as a holocaust to appease the manes of the unfortunate two Englishmen. "He did this, he said, to win the friendship of Her Majesty," but it may be questioned whether the massacre was not simply prompted by one of those savage outbursts of violence to which Theodore would appear to be subject.\*

Before proceeding with the history of our political relations with Abyssinia, it may be useful to explain the origin of those missions in the country, the unfortunate members of which are now in durance vile. The religion of the Abyssinians, as is well known, is a form of Christianity, to which they are said to have been converted in the reign of Constantine. The bishop is a Coptic priest, consecrated by the Patriarch of Alexandria. But

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\* We cannot help noticing here a somewhat unfair insinuation made by Dr. Beke at p. 61 of his work, where the reader is led to infer that Earl Russell *thanked* the Emperor in Her Majesty's name for this brutal massacre. As we read the despatch, the word "murdered" may be too strong an expression, but the Foreign Secretary of State simply thanks the Emperor for his letter.

the country would appear from all accounts to be a perfect nest of Jews, Turks, infidels, and heretics, and attempts at their regeneration have consequently been made by both the Protestant and the Romish Churches. The first mission was established in 1829 by Dr. Gobat, now Bishop of Jerusalem, under the auspices of the Church Missionary Society. On the assumption of the Government by Ubye, however, the English, who were proved to be secretly supporting his enemies, were expelled from the country, and the place of the mission was assumed by the Church of Rome under Padre de Jacobis. Identifying as he does the progress of French influence with the establishment of the Romish Faith, this expulsion of Bishop Gobat's mission is declared by Dr. Beke to be "the seed of all the troubles that have arisen." Padre de Jacobis however over-reached himself; for having raised the question of filling the vacant see of Abyssinia, the Abuna Salama was appointed precisely in consequence of his friendly views towards the Anglican Church; and though the Italian missionary succeeded for a time in establishing himself as a rival Romish Bishop, he was afterwards banished by Theodore, and subsequently thrown into prison for having allowed the escape of Captain de Russel's French mission to the insurgents in Tigre, where he died. Under the benignant sway of the Abuna Salama, three Protestant missions were soon established in Abyssinia. At Bishop Gobat's suggestion, we believe, a lay mission was organised in 1855 by Dr. Krapf, the members of which arrived in the following year and settled at Gallat, where they are known as the Emperor's European artisans, having long since abandoned all efforts at conversion. In 1860, a second mission was organized at Djenda by the Rev. H. A. Stern under the Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, and this had for its immediate object the conversion of the Falashas or native Israelites. A Scottish mission was subsequently established by the Rev. Messrs. Steiger and Brandeis.

How far the Emperor himself was really interested in the propagation of the Anglican faith, may be inferred from the *ruse* which he practised upon the Coptic Abuna to win him over to his side. There is reason, indeed, to believe that the most Christian Theodore, whose faith, to quote Consul Plowden's opinion, was so "signal," professes the doctrines of his religion only so far as they may forward his ambitious views. Bishop Gobat's *lay* mission has been spared the persecution and suffering inflicted on Messrs. Stern and Rosenthal, only because its members made themselves useful in the manufacture of firearms and the distillation of spirits. Even Theodore's fanatical

zeal against his Mahomedan subjects and neighbours would only seem to be the cloak with which he concealed his ambitious schemes of conquest. Both he and his unhappy country afford standing evidence, that a mere profession of Christianity has no power at all as a civilizing element.

It is important however, that the character of Theodore should be understood, and we, therefore, extract the following passages from the otherwise indiscriminate eulogy bestowed upon him by Mr. Plowden—a eulogy so fulsome that it might well be adopted as his epitaph. “The worst points in his character are his violent anger at times, his unyielding pride as regards his kingly and “divine right, and his fanatical religious zeal.” And these very points have since been so exaggerated that, in the opinion of all Englishmen at least, they have welnigh obliterated the recollection of those good qualities of which his early career gave promise. “He is peculiarly jealous, as may be expected, of “his sovereign rights and of anything that appears to trench on “them: he wishes in a short time to send embassies to the great “European powers to treat with them on equal terms. The most “difficult trait in his character is this jealousy and the pride “that, fed by ignorance, renders it impossible for him yet to “believe that so great a monarch as himself exists in the world.” Accordingly we find that in the negotiations for a treaty with Mr. Plowden, “he feared the clause conferring jurisdiction on “the Consul as trenching on his prerogative.” And hence his indignation with Captain Cameron, because his letter to Her Majesty had not been answered.

But we are anticipating the regular order of events. On the death of Mr. Plowden in 1860, Captain Cameron was appointed “Her Majesty’s Consul in Abyssinia,” and on February 9th, 1862, he arrived at Massowah, which he was told to consider “his head-quarters.” Anxious, however, to continue the negotiations in which Mr. Plowden had been engaged, Captain Cameron proceeded to the Emperor’s camp in Godjam, from whence the famous letter to the Queen was written proposing to send an embassy to England, and Consul Cameron then departed on a visit to the outlying provinces of Bogos.

As between Russia and Turkey, so between Egypt and Abyssinia lie certain frontier districts which are in a manner debatable ground. Originally, no doubt, they formed a portion of the kingdom of Abyssinia, though in the unhappy wars by which that kingdom has been rent asunder, the power of the central authority was so weakened as to be unable to check the greed of Turco-Egyptian Governors. Accordingly some of these

districts, like Taka, have already been annexed and incorporated with Egyptian territory ; while others like Bogos, Senhait, and Bidjûk are continually invaded by bands of free-booting marauders, who carry off the Christian inhabitants into hopeless slavery. The melancholy and inhuman details of a Turkish raid have been but too vividly portrayed by the pen of Sir Samuel Baker and every other traveller who has visited these parts ; and it is not surprising, therefore, when we find our Government through the Consul-General remonstrating with the Egyptian Government in this matter. Following the same policy, Mr. Plowden, apparently with the approval of his Government, had interfered in 1854 to protect the Christian Abyssinians of these districts, and it was for the same purpose that Captain Cameron now directed his course towards Bogos. His proceedings however were disapproved by the Egyptian authorities and at their instigation he was ordered to return to Massowah.

While still in Bogos, the Consul seems to have received instructions from the Foreign Office to make enquiries regarding Ethiopian cotton, and Captain Cameron accordingly passed on into Matamma, finding his way back to Gondar in June, 1863. We now quote from Dr. Beke. " In the following month, July, " the Emperor himself came to Gondar, and it was under the " outward circumstances which have just been described, that " the British Consul met the Emperor of Abyssinia face to face. " At his first audience that monarch put to him a series of point-blank questions, to which he was required to give straightforward and unequivocal answers. They were to this effect :— " ' Where have you been since you parted from Samuel in Bogos ? ' " ' Into the frontier provinces of Soudan.' ' What for ? ' " ' To see about cotton and trade and so forth.' ' Who told " ' you to go there ? ' ' The British Government.' ' Have " ' you brought me an answer from the Queen of England ? ' " ' No.' ' Why not ? ' ' Because I have not received any " ' communication from the Government on the subject.' ' Why " ' then do you come to me now ? ' ' To request permission to " ' return to Massowah.' ' What for ? ' ' Because I have been " ' ordered by the Government to go there.' ' So,' exclaimed " ' the exasperated monarch, ' your Queen can give you orders to " ' go and visit my enemies, the Turks, and then to return to " ' Massowah ; but she cannot send a civil answer to my letter " ' to her. You shall not leave me till that answer comes.' " And verily he kept his word.

Now without in the least approving of Captain Cameron's very undiplomatical conduct in thus blurting out the altered policy of his Government, we think that the simple facts of



the case afforded to Theodore the very strongest grounds of suspicion. Here was our Consul, originally posted to Abyssinia, after being employed in the Egyptian provinces of Soudan, virtually withdrawn to Massowah, and the Emperor's letter to the Queen written in the previous year not even answered. Add to this that Theodore had already received intelligence that the English had withdrawn their protection from the Abyssinians at Jerusalem in favour of the Turks who claimed sovereignty over them as a nation, and that the Governor of Bombay, acting of course under instructions from England, had refused to despatch a mission to his Court. We quote again from Dr. Beke. "The breach between them could not but be widened when Consul Cameron gave the Emperor to understand, as he would have felt himself bound to do, that the oppressed Christian inhabitants of Bogos were to be left to the tender mercies of the Turks; for it would naturally have served to confirm Theodore's belief that Captain Cameron, when absent in Soudan, had been intriguing with his Mahomedan enemies; whilst his knowledge of the friendly terms on which the French and English Consuls were together, and of the enormous commercial transactions between Egypt and England, would have led him to the not unreasonable conclusion that, for the sake of Egypt and apparently at the instigation of France, he and the Christians of Abyssinia were being betrayed and abandoned by the British Government and their representatives. And he could only regard the refusal of the Government of Bombay to treat him as they had formerly treated the king of Shoa, now become his vassal, as an additional proof of this change of feeling and conduct towards him."

From this date, July 1863, Consul Cameron was in disgrace, being virtually detained as a hostage for the apparent breach of faith which we had committed with Theodore. In the following September, M. Lejean arrived with a reply from the French Minister to the letter which Theodore had addressed to Napoleon in the year before. This reply was unsatisfactory, if not threatening, in its tone, and the French mission was expelled from the country in disgrace. The next important event occurred on the 15th October, when Mr. Stern, who was already on his way to England, happened to come across the Emperor's camp, and, as in duty bound, stopped to pay his respects. Let us hear Mr. Stern's own account of the interview. "After waiting about two hours, His Majesty came into the open air. Myself and attendants immediately made a most humble obeisance. There was a frown on the king's countenance, which augured nothing auspicious.

“ Between the first question and the death of my two servants, the hand of time could not have advanced ten minutes. The gloom of the approaching night, the rattling of the sticks, and my own doubtful fate prompted me to put my hand mechanically to my lips, or, as it was said, to put a finger into my mouth. This was construed into a crime, and in less time than these words take to pen, I was stript, beaten, and lay almost lifeless on the ground. Wounded, bruised, and bleeding, my executioners dragged or rather carried me down the hill, where my swollen wrist was fastened by a hoop and chain to the arm of a soldier.” From that day Mr. Stern was a prisoner. Orders had been sent that I should have foot and hand fetters, but as my ankles were too much inflamed for the hoops, the guards transgressed the royal command; and only tied my left hand to my right ankle.”

The cause of this outrage has not been satisfactorily explained. Captain Cameron’s despatches had been seized the same day, and Dr. Beke conjectures that despatches from England forbidding the Consul to meddle further in the affairs of Abyssinia, must also have been intercepted about this time. This is not improbable. It should further be mentioned that there was now in the Emperor’s camp a Frenchman, M. Bardel, who having originally come to Abyssinia as Secretary to the English Consul, had been sent to Paris with the Emperor’s letter, and had just returned with the reply. This man is said to have been promised a Vice-Consulship if he could succeed in overthrowing the Protestant Missions, and in establishing the Papal supremacy in their place; and it is certain that it was M. Bardel who subsequently examined the missionaries’ papers, and furnished the Emperor with his charges against them.

On the 13th of November, 1863, all the missionaries were seized at Djenda and brought to Gondar, where Mr. Rosenthal was also bound. All the Europeans in the country, including Consul Cameron, were then seized, but the members of the lay and Scottish missions were subsequently released. On the 20th, Stern, Rosenthal, and Mrs. Flad (the wife of a third missionary) were tried in open court, for having written disrespectfully of the Emperor. They were found guilty. Mrs. Flad was pardoned for her husband’s sake, but the other two were kept in close confinement.

On the 22nd, despatches were brought from the Foreign Office by one Kerans, and their unfavourable tenor, coupled with the absence of any reply from the Queen, still further exasperated Theodore. “ The Consul had previously had his hands only half-bound; they were now bound altogether.” On the 1st December,

Stern and Rosenthal were summoned again before the Emperor, when, after being grossly abused, they were stript of their clothing. "Miserable, wretched; with a mere rag round the waist, we were conducted back to our prison." In the following month however, brighter hopes seemed in store for them, on condition that Stern would supply "Mr. Flad, who was going to Europe, with letters to procure machines and one or two gunpowder-makers." "We were again," writes Stern, "allowed to have a servant and also clothing, which consisted of shifts from Mrs. Rosenthal's and Mrs. Flad's rifled wardrobes."

But these hopes were soon dashed to the ground. On the 4th of January, 1864, Captain Cameron having presumed to ask leave to return to Massowah, the Emperor's indignation was again roused, and the Consul, his attendants, and the missionaries were put in fetters and confined in one common prison. Mr. Steiger, one of the unfortunates, attributes this incarceration, and not without reason, in a great measure to the arrival at Gondar of the head of the Abyssinian convent at Jerusalem, and the intelligence he brought of British policy there. Thus, however, they remained till May 12th, when after an exciting conference in full assembly, the prisoners had again been driven into their tent for the night. Suddenly broke on their ears the passionate voice of Theodore: "Dog, Falasha, scoundrel, tell me the name of the man who reviled my ancestors, or I'll tear the secret out of your heart." Let us hear Mr. Stern's description of the scene which ensued. "Ere I could finish a sentence, I was blinded with bullets, whilst at the same time several fellows violently seized me by the hand and began to twist round my arms hard coarse ropes, formed of the fibres of the Doloussa tree. Rosenthal, simultaneously with myself, experienced a similar treatment." The Consul and the other prisoners were thrown on the ground and pinioned. "Writhing and quivering in every nerve, we lay in contortious heavings on the hard bare ground." "Samuel every few minutes made his appearance and enquired whether I would confess, and not receiving a satisfactory reply, whispered to the guards, 'give him another rope round the chest!' Three times he repeated his visits, and three times a couple of soldiers jumped on me and with ardent delight, as if they felt pleasure in torturing a white man, executed the royal behest. To contract the dry ropes, the black fiends now and then poured a profusion of cold water down our insensible backs." The same torture was repeated the following night, and all this because of some quarrel between Theodore and the Abuna, who was supposed to favour the Protestant missionaries. At the end of the same year, the prisoners

were all removed to their dungeon at Magdala. "To reach that fortress," writes Dr. Beke, "which was destined to be their prison for so many months, they were dragged two and two, chained together, across the country on mules, every moment in danger of pulling one another off their animals and breaking their necks; and on arriving there they were huddled together with about two hundred persons of various ranks, ages, and sexes, charged with real or supposed crimes, and variously chained, and crammed into a place about sixty feet in diameter."

On 1st July, 1865, in consequence of a revolt in Shoa the prisoners, who had up to this time had their feet only shackled, now had hand-chains fastened to the fetters on their ankles, their bodies being by this means bent double. And thus they continued till the 25th February, 1866, when orders arrived for their liberation, in consequence of Mr. Rassam's arrival at the Emperor's camp. Mr. Rassam had at last arrived with an answer from Her Majesty, and after some protracted negotiations the prisoners were released, and a promise was held out of their being speedily allowed to depart. But when everything was ready, and they had been directed to cross the lake Tsana to take leave of the Emperor, Mr. Rassam again exasperated this proud and jealous potentate by sending on the Europeans towards Matamma, and going himself to meet the king alone. They were in consequence all arrested on July 13th, and thrown again into chains. Dr. Beke states that they still, however, might have been allowed to depart, had Mr. Rassam himself been willing to remain alone, but this that gentleman declined to do. Mr. Flad then, his wife and children being left behind as hostages, was sent to England in August last, and has since returned to Gondar. The captives have been sent back to Magdala, where according to the *Friend*, they were well but still in confinement on the 15th February last, and with no brighter prospects of ultimate liberation.

Such is the history of the captivity up to the present. Dr. Beke has fully proved the cause to have been the change in British policy towards that country in 1862. As we are not in the secrets of the Foreign Office, we are not in a position to refute that charge, neither are we prepared to adopt all Dr. Beke's *ideas* on the Abyssinian question. It is quite possible that Theodore at that time expected, if he does not still expect, much greater aid from England than we could ever afford consistently with our other relations. It is well known that the Emperor entertains the most bitter hostility towards the Mahomedan inhabitants of Abyssinia, and has even expressed his

intention of invading Egyptian territory. In his very letter to the Queen he writes—"For the Turks, I have told them to leave the land of my ancestors. They refuse. I am now going to wrestle with them." And his letter concludes with this pregnant sentence: "See how the Islam oppress the Christian." So long as this was the language held by Theodore, it was no wonder that the Egyptian authorities should be upon their guard, or that complaints should be made to our Government, when they heard of Consul Cameron's visit to Bogos in company with the Emperor's emissaries. But while in simple fairness we were unable to give Theodore that active support which he expected, and which our previous policy, perhaps, led him to expect, there would seem to be no sufficient reason why we should suddenly rush into the opposite extreme, withdraw our protection and our Consul, and allow the Abyssinians to be delivered over as a nation into the merciless hands of the Turks. Having once recognised the independence of Abyssinia, it was not necessary, because we could not assist her Emperor in his schemes of conquest, that we should, therefore, abandon the country to the almost certain fate of falling a prey to Egyptian greed. But not only has our Government acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith, but scarcely perhaps in accordance with our own interests in those quarters. Seeing the extent to which the prosperity of Great Britain is now connected with the welfare of India, it behoves us to regard with the utmost jealousy any circumstance which may tend to threaten the safety of speedy intercourse between the two countries, and we should, therefore, be on our guard against offering opportunities to our rivals, which may some day enable them to wound us in a vulnerable part. There is quite sufficient evidence in Dr. Beke's book to show that the French are fully alive to the importance of establishing themselves in the Red Sea, and they have already acquired a base of operations at Obokh. We may perhaps not see, like Dr. Beke, French influence backing the insidious policy of the Roman Catholic missionaries; but it cannot be denied by any one who has read Dr. Beke's work, that the emissaries of France have done their very best to thwart us in Abyssinia. French influence is already sufficiently alarming in Egypt, without its being increased by any acts or omissions of ours. But of late it would seem as though we had been acting on the *laissez faire* principle, simply drifting with the stream,—as though the Abyssinian question had been characterised by that "masterly inactivity," for which we are becoming so famous, and which may some day cost us so dear.

The fact is that in the present case, as in some others we have had a double policy to pursue, according as the interests of India or England were affected, and when these different lines of policy come into contact, the Indian Foreign Office must of course give way to the Home Government. Our readers will recollect an instance of this assertion which occurred in 1839, when the Indian Government was constrained to refrain from checking the excesses of the Wahabees, because the Home Government wanted the Wahabees to make a successful opposition to the Pasha of Egypt. Since then our policy would appear to have undergone an entire change. We have again chastised the Wahabees, and we make no objection to any extension of the Pasha's dominions. Nay, we have actually been parties to the transfer of the west coast of the Red Sea, and are now prepared to allow Egypt to absorb the empire of Abyssinia. We have every confidence in the Egyptian Government of to-day, but how long such confidence may last, or how soon a future Pasha may forfeit it, is not for us to predict. But if that day should ever dawn, it would not be congratulatory to find that we had put our whole trust in a broken reed. In the present condition of European politics, the consideration of this question is not inappropriate. There is no doubt that in the main, the foreign policy of India must be made to bend itself to the requirements of the mother-country, but at the same time England's prestige is now so intimately interwoven with her Indian administration, that it seems to us the height of folly to overlook for merely European considerations the effect of English policy upon the stability of our rule in India.

Regarding our further relations with Abyssinia, there seems to us to be only one course now left open. Mr. Flad's mission, it is understood, has failed; and even had it succeeded, we can scarcely see how, after what has occurred, we could ever revert to our former policy. And yet had Mr. Talbot and his six English artisans taken the place of the present captives, we should have been bound to extend to them British protection, and if that means anything, it means also protection of Theodore. We could not again have occupied a neutral ground in Abyssinia; we could not with impunity and without dishonour have allowed that unhappy country to be made the sport of other Governments, and in course of time to have been devoured by Egypt. The cause of the Emperor's quarrel with us now is our profession of neutrality, and he certainly would not have been appeased, unless the grounds of his discontent had been removed. As it is, however, a sterner course of action is forced upon us, and it is to be hoped that a bold and decisive stroke will settle

this vexed question for ever. There is insult and disgrace to be wiped out—there are not only British subjects, but two representatives of Her Majesty to be released, or their death to be avenged, and there is a lesson to be read to the proud and insolent ruler of Abyssinia, which may not be easily effaced from his memory. In other words it is only left us to undertake an expedition against Theodore for the purpose of compelling the liberation of the captives, and such an expedition we trust to see shortly organized. Whether the business is conducted by the Home Government, or by the Resident at Aden, acting under the orders of the Government of India, matters little, so that decision and energy are infused into it. The Indian Foreign Office, from its experience in expeditions of this kind, and from the special interests which it has at stake, would probably conduct the business to a satisfactory conclusion. And to those in whose minds the religion of the Abyssinians would excite sympathy, and who would dread to see “the Islam oppressing the Christian,” we would say that the religion of Abyssinia is a mere profession, and that a policy of peace and war is not a matter of mere sentiment. There is to our own mind a stronger objection to decisive measures in the consideration that Theodore’s conduct has, to a great extent, been the natural consequence of the false game we have played with him, and that our own Government is far from being entirely free from blame. But it must be remembered that the most decisive is in the end the most merciful policy. We seek not vengeance; we covet no territory; it is doubtful whether we should even feel justified in inflicting chastisement. But we must liberate the captives at any cost, and it rests with Theodore to decide how far justice may then be tempered with mercy.

It is time, however, that we should notice Dr. Beke’s work, from which we have gathered so much of our information, and in doing so our space compels us to be very brief. Dr. Beke, it is well known, has long been connected with Abyssinia. He visited the country in 1840, and on two subsequent occasions he barely escaped the honour of being our representative there. Last year too he was selected by those interested to convey to Theodore the petition from the relatives of the captives, though on hearing of their being released to Mr. Rassam, he proceeded no further than Halai. There can be no doubt, therefore, of his entire competency for the task which he undertook. That task was to lay before the British public a full statement of all the circumstances connected with the Abyssinian question, to enlist its sympathies in favour of our captive and insulted countrymen, and to point out what the

author considers to have been inconsistent and impolitic in our conduct towards the Emperor Theodore. In the next discussion of this subject in Parliament, Dr. Beke's book will no doubt be found serviceable. But, professing as it does to be in a great measure a party pamphlet, it cannot be denied that this very circumstance detracts from its value to the general reader. Its style is argumentative throughout. The course of the narrative is repeatedly interrupted by long political discussions, which the majority of readers, we imagine, will be inclined to omit. Nevertheless, the book is most interesting, and the tale which it relates is one of the most tragic and pitiful, which has been told since the time of Stoddart and Conolly. No one, we are convinced, can read Dr. Beke's work and straightway forget that pathetic story. Rather would we venture to believe that greater fervour and earnestness will henceforth be breathed in that Litañy to the Eternal "King of kings," that it may please Him "to show His pity upon all prisoners and captives."



## SHORT NOTICES.

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1. *Descriptive Catalogue of Vernacular Books and Pamphlets, forwarded by the Government of India to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867*, compiled by the Rev. J. Long, Church Missionary, Calcutta. To which is added a list of Vernacular Works sent from the Agra Presidency, and a list of the Vernacular Works published in 1865 in the N. W. P. Calcutta. 1867.
2. *Act XXV of 1867 of the Legislative Council of India.*
3. *Discours de M. Garcin de Tassy, Membre de l'Institut, à l'ouverture de son cours d'Hindoustani à l'Ecole Impériale et spéciale des langues orientales vivantes, le 3 Décembre, 1866.* Paris.

THE Paris Exhibition of the present year will be the means of affording a treat amongst others to distinguished French *savans* like M. Garcin de Tassy, who take an interest in the current indigenous literature of this country. A most interesting collection of Vernacular Books and Pamphlets, brought together by the exertions of the Rev. J. Long and others, has been forwarded from this Presidency, having been accompanied moreover by a descriptive catalogue which cannot fail to prove of considerable utility and importance. The difficulties in the way of forming such a collection, in the absence of any system of registration of publications, are fully explained by Mr. Long in his Preface; and the catalogue does not, therefore, pretend to be exhaustive, even as regards the publications for the year 1865. Measures, however, have been taken during the present session of the Legislative Council to obviate these difficulties in future, and to ensure complete and accurate returns of all Books and Pamphlets printed in India. The subject was first forced upon the attention of Government in 1863 by the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, and

in the following year, the Government of Bengal proposed the enactment of a law requiring that two copies of every work published in India should be delivered to Government, one copy for the purpose of being transmitted to England, and the other to be deposited in a public library in this country. The Government of India preferred to adopt an experimental scheme of Mr. Talboys Wheeler, substituting a voluntary system of registration based upon the inducement of gratuitous advertisement. The scheme, however, was not successful and by Act XXV. of 1867 the registration of all Books and Pamphlets published on or after the 1st July next has been made compulsory.

There is probably no European in India who is better acquainted with Bengali literature than Mr. Long. Twice previously has he been selected by Government to compile statistics on this subject, and the two volumes which contain the results of his labours are among the most interesting of the Records of the Bengal Government. Considering, however, that the present catalogue is primarily intended for the use of European students, we could have wished that somewhat greater uniformity, if not greater accuracy, had been preserved in the transliteration of vernacular titles. To take a single instance, we find the *Shúlá-i-Tár* of Cawnpore described in p. 34 as *Skalic-Toor*, and in p. 37 as *Sholutoor*.

The vernacular literature of Bengal still continues to increase, and also, we may trust, to improve in taste and character. In 1820, thirty books only were published in the vernacular; in 1857, this number had expanded to 322; in 1865, we find that from as many as seventy native presses in Calcutta alone, no less than 114 vernacular works issued, besides 51 which are returned as having been published at Serampore, Cuttack, and Rungpore. Of those published in Calcutta, 290 works were in the Bengalee or Sanscrit language; 22 were in Hindi, 65 in what Mr. Long calls Musulman-Bengali, 20 in Urdu, 13 in Persian, and 4 in Arabic (including a copy of the Koran published under the patronage of a khansamah.) For the North-West Provinces a list is given of 334 works issued from the native presses during the same year. Of these, 138 were written in Urdu, 97 in Hindi, 40 in Sanscrit, 30 in Persian, 18 in Arabic, 3 in English, one in English and Urdu, 3 in Persian and Urdu, 2 in Hindi and Urdu, and 2 in Arabic and Persian.

According to the Administration Report of the Bengal Presidency for 1865-66, the number of vernacular newspapers published in Calcutta is twenty, of which sixteen are written in Bengali, three in Persian, and one in Urdu—the whole having a circulation of about 5,643 copies. In the North-West

Provinces there would appear to have been published in 1866 twenty-two vernacular periodicals, with a circulation of 12,365 copies. It must be borne in mind however, that these figures refer exclusively to the Regulation Provinces, without taking into account the rich crop of indigenous literature which has lately sprung up in the Punjab and Oude.

We have to acknowledge the pleasure with which we have perused the annual address in which M. Garcin de Tassy continues his very excellent practice of reviewing the current Hindustani literature of the preceding year. He commences the opening lecture of the 3rd December last by announcing the addition of no less than twenty-six Hindustani journals during the year to the periodical literature of the day. If, however, the means of attaining accurate information on this subject are beset with difficulties in this country, they must be so even to a greater degree in Europe, and we accordingly think we can detect some errors in the statements of M. Garcin de Tassy. One of the newly announced Hindustani journals looks very like our Bengali *Som Prakash*, which has now been in existence nearly ten years. After briefly noticing the more important publications which issued from the native press last year, the French Professor introduces his audience to those discussions which have been carried on of late regarding the relative importance of a polished Urdu style, and the more homely Hindi. In this discussion, confessedly of small importance, M. Garcin de Tassy very properly ranges himself on the side of Urdu, not only, as he says, because so far from being a distinct language, it is really but a more finished dialect of the same language, but for reasons more weighty than those which are based on philology merely. "Hindi," says he, "represents Hinduism, polytheism with all its unhappy consequences; whilst Urdu represents Islamism, Semiticism, monotheism, and consequently European and Christian civilization." To our own mind there can be no doubt whatever that Urdu is the dialect which is destined ere long to be the *lingua franca* of northern India, and that it should be cultivated with that object—however desirable it may be for the present to encourage literature in Hindī and the other vernaculars of the masses. It might indeed as well be said, that the early English writers should have discarded foreign elements, and confined themselves to the use of pure Anglo-Saxon, as that Indian authors should abstain from Persian and Arabic words in the composition of Urdu.

M. Garcin de Tassy next proceeds to notice those scientific and literary institutions, which the increased intellectual activity of the age, prompted by the zeal of some of our own

countrymen, has lately brought into existence. First, amongst these comes the Oriental University of Lahore, a brief account of which naturally leads the lecturer to notice the successful attempts which have been made in the Punjab to excite amongst the natives an interest in the spread of education. The Lahore Association for the diffusion of science, the Delhi Society, and the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta are then successively mentioned. In praising our system of religious toleration, the Professor informs us that Islamism is daily gaining ground, a single Musulman having lately made no less than 200,000 converts among the Hindus of the Punjab; and in the obituary with which he concludes his address, our late good Bishop is eulogized in the following words:—"Le respectable défunct se distinguait par des connaissances profondes et variées à la fois et par une active charité. Il était non seulement zélé pour la conversion des indigènes, mais aussi pour leur instruction littéraire et scientifique. Il voulait par là, comme l'illustre Reginald Heber, un de ses prédécesseurs, éloigner d'eux les préjugés et les convertir ainsi plus aisément à la foi chrétienne. De même que le Dr. Hartman, il était habile en hindoustani, et je vous avais cité de lui l'an passé plusieurs allocutions faites en cette langue. Il était le sixième évêque de Calcutta, immense diocèse qui comprend outre le Bengale, les provinces nord-ouest, l'Oude, le Penjab, l'Assam, l'Arracan, le Tenasserim, et ce qu'on appelle *Strait Settlements*."\*

2. *Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs, from 1859 to 1866.* By Algernon West, Deputy Director of Indian Military Funds, and lately Private Secretary to the Right Honourable Sir Charles Wood, Bart., M.P., G.C.B., and the Earl de Grey and Ripon. London. Smith Elder and Co. 1867.

A WRITER in the January Number of the *Edinburgh Review* had either the ignorance or the audacity to describe his subject as

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\* The following note is interesting as being the French explanation of a story which has gone the round of most of the Anglo-Indian papers. "Ce qui choque surtout les Musulmans ce sont les signes extérieurs du culte. C'est pour écarter ce motif de répugnance que l'évêque de Bombay n'a jamais voulu qu'on suivit pour sa cathédrale l'usage adopté dans beaucoup d'églises Anglaises d'orner l'autel d'une croix entourée de chandeliers et de fleurs. Ainsi le jour de Noël dernier, ayant su qu'on avait décoré l'autel de cette manière il refusa d'entrer dans l'église tant qu'on n'aurait pas dépouillé l'autel de ces ornements : en quoi il a été fortement blâmé par les organes de la haute Eglise. (*Colonial Church Chronicle*. March 1, 1866.)

the Foreign Policy of *Sir John Lawrence*, and to attribute to our present Viceroy that policy of "masterly inactivity," the wisdom of which seems to many people to be so very questionable. Fortunately we know better now. Mr. Algernon West has enlightened us and told us all about it. Sir John Lawrence is not the author of that policy at all. It was no less a person than Sir Charles Wood, who "set an example of non-interference with foreign politics which has of late years been happily followed in this country (England)." Indeed, those who have hitherto believed in the power and importance of the Government of India, may now see the demonstration of their folly, and learn (if for the first time) from the pen of Sir Charles Wood's own private Secretary (and who should know better?) that there is not a shadow of authority any longer left to that Government. The power of centralization can go no further. The entire management of this vast empire is concentrated in a single individual—the Maharaja of Victoria Street. Ever since the transfer of India from the Company to the Crown, the Viceroy has been a mere puppet in the hands of another; he has been reduced to the level of one of those pageant princes, who are so ornamental in this country, but so expensive. Not a single measure of importance is now-a-days introduced into the empire, which is not directly due to the Home Government. The blunders and mistakes may perhaps be put down to the Governor-General, but certainly all measures of a beneficial tendency must go to swell the credit side of the Secretary of State's account with the British Parliament.

Such at least is the picture which Mr. Algernon West would have us accept of Sir Charles Wood's administration, and which will probably find acceptance in England, however false it may seem to us in this country who know better. If it is the fact that India is ruled in every matter, as Mr. West says it is ruled, directly from England, why not abolish the Governor-General and Council at once and so effect an enormous saving? For the first time we begin to understand why it was that the Secretary of State allowed those annual flittings to Simla. The Government of India may go to Hongkong or anywhere else that it likes, if the business of the Government is really conducted in England.

Mr. West has written his book, however, with a single purpose, and that purpose is the glorification of his relative and patron, Viscount Halifax. The book is styled by the *Saturday Review* "a catalogue of the official acts of Sir Charles Wood with commendatory notes," and this title would be tolerably correct, if it

was added that a large proportion of the "official acts," which are put down to Sir Charles Wood, were never his acts at all. It is indeed a laudatory sketch of the chief measures of Indian administration from 1859 to 1866, in which with admirable *sansfroid* they are all attributed to the author's patron, no matter by whom they were originated or by whom carried out. We have not heard Sir John Lawrence's opinion of Mr. West's "catalogue," but to our mind it seems a great pity that an attempt so uncalled for should have been sanctioned to bring the Government of India into greater contempt with the natives.

It cannot be denied that there has been very much in the administration of India, for which the country and the natives especially ought to be deeply indebted to Sir Charles Wood. He was, during his tenure of office, an industrious and conscientious public servant, ever working for the welfare of this vast empire. Everybody knows and admits the fact, and it was not necessary, therefore, for Mr. West to trumpet it forth again. But at the same time it must be admitted that Sir Charles Wood made mistakes, and that he was guilty of much unnecessary and mischievous interference. It is perhaps a moral impossibility for any Secretary of State to rule this vast empire without committing some mistakes, and Sir Charles Wood was certainly no exception to the rule. But none of these mistakes find a place, as such, in Mr. West's *brochure*. According to him, everything that was done during the period under review was done by Sir Charles Wood, and nothing that he did could have been done better.

We are not disposed to quarrel with Mr. West's first two chapters, relating, as they do, entirely to the Home Government. It may be conceded that in re-organizing the Indian Council, Sir Charles Wood had a most difficult task to perform, and that the manner in which he performed it exhibited great tact and firmness. But no sooner do we come to any mention of the authorities in India, than we meet with a *st.* of apologetic preface, disarming those who might be inclined to give some portion of credit to them, and insinuating that whatever praise they earned is solely due to the Home Government for its discriminating patronage. Thus in the chapter on "Law and Justice" we might have expected perhaps that the merit of its measures would have been reserved to the Legislative Council; but no, they had always been "previously discussed and "in a great measure determined on in private communication" between Sir Charles Wood and Messrs. Maine and Hawkins. Yet the only measure which the only legal commission appointed by Sir Charles Wood has sent out to us from England, is the

Indian Succession Act, and that Act has been declared inapplicable the two great sections of Indian society. Similarly in matters of finance, "Mr. Wilson had to learn Sir Charles Wood's views, "and before he left England, he received clear and explicit "instructions as to what was to be done." Even Sir John Lawrence's inquiry into tenant-right in Oude would only prove successful, we are told, "if conducted with the calm discretion "and care impressed upon him by Sir Charles Wood."

We do not propose to discuss again the Indigo Blue Book, and the expediency or otherwise of a Criminal Contract Law. There is a great deal to be said on both sides of the question, but Mr. West's statements, as usual, are entirely *ex parte*. Why the planters *should* "be prepared to yield without a "struggle, the profits" from the cultivation in which their all was embarked, or why they should *not* "avail themselves of "their position as lessees or owners of the land" to raise the rents of their tenants, Mr. West has not condescended to inform us. There are still people who think that the existing law is not strong enough to give proper support to the planter when in the right, and Mr. West should remember that he himself designates this law as "a mere rule of thumb."

The chapter on *Finance* ought to be one of the most interesting in the Work, but unfortunately it is one of the most disappointing. In his appointment of a financial member of Council, and in disallowing the proposed export duties on certain articles of Indian produce, the Ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer is doubtless entitled to no small meed of praise. But at the same time his quarrel with Mr. Laing, resulting in the loss to India of one of her best financiers, and the appointment of Sir Charles Trevelyan as his successor, were acts of which no statesman need be proud. The former is entirely ignored by Mr. West. The latter would seem to be represented as a sort of atonement made by Sir Charles Wood to his friend for having recalled him from the Government of Madras. "It may be safely asserted," writes our author, "that "the financial measures of Sir Charles Wood's administration have "been numerous and successful beyond all reasonable expectation, "and that his comprehensive knowledge and great capacity in "dealing with all matters relating to finance, have been of the "greatest value in retrieving the Indian Exchequer from the "disastrous state into which it had fallen"—praise however which is shared this time with a Mr. Seccombe, a gentleman unknown to Indian fame. If the present state of the Financial Department may be taken as the index of the success of Sir Charles Wood's reforms, we can only say that that

Department, is, apparently with some reason, one of the best-abused in India. The smallest outlay cannot be sanctioned under a delay of from four to six months, while local Governments are "wiggled," if they venture to approve of urgent expenditure in anticipation of such sanction. Not even a subordinate post can be created without the previous sanction of the Home Government. Mr. Massey's last Budget Statement shows in what delightful confusion and uncertainty the accounts still are, notwithstanding the expensive commission of Messrs. Whiffin and Foster. Indeed, many of the reforms proposed by these gentlemen have since, we believe, had to be abandoned. Sir Charles Wood's re-organization of the Department has been as unsuccessful as it was unjust. In the endeavour to abolish the exclusive character and to introduce a special knowledge of accounts, the Civil Service and therewith all local experience and knowledge of the country have been in turn excluded, while the "new blood" imported from England, we understand, only arrives in this country to find itself disgusted with its position, and anxious to return. That a capacity for dealing with figures is not wanting in the Civil Service is proved by such men as the Harrisons and Mr. Sandeman. But these men are leaving India one by one, and we are not acquainted with a single junior Civilian in the Department.

On the Currency question we are not disposed to enter at present, but we may assert that, Mr. West's eulogy notwithstanding, the action of the Government hitherto has been only characterised by gross bungling and consequent failure. Sir Charles Wood's unfair treatment of the Military and Medical Services is too well known to call for recapitulation here. And although great praise is undoubtedly due to him for pushing on the construction of public works, yet it must not be forgotten that he was decidedly opposed to the principle of loans for this purpose. The official papers which have been lately published on the subject show that, ever since the famine of 1860-61, the Government of India has been urging the extension of irrigation works in this country, but its proposals were persistently vetoed so long as Sir Charles Wood was in office. Though willing to risk the unpopularity of an income tax to swell the surplus revenue available for such works, he would have no works executed which could not be paid for out of such surplus.

On the whole then, Mr. West's book would appear to be very unsatisfactory, and the history of Sir Charles Wood's administration has yet to be written. The result will ultimately be by no means discreditable to Viscount Halifax, and Mr. West would, therefore, have done better to have left the composition



of his fulsome periods to the British and Indian Association, as he styles it.

3. *The History of India from the Earliest Ages.* By J. Talboys Wheeler, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Secretary to the Indian Record Commission, Author of the "Geography of Herodotus," &c. &c. Vol. I. The Vedic Period and the Mahá Bhárata. London. Trübner and Co. 1867.

WE have to thank Mr. Wheeler for the first volume of what promises to be at once the most interesting, the most truthful, and the most scientific History of India which has yet been produced. Its perusal has afforded us the most unqualified pleasure, and though at the very moment of going to press, we dare not venture upon a detailed criticism of its contents, we hasten to announce its publication, reserving a fuller notice for a future number.

It must be well known to many of our readers that some years ago Mr. Talboys Wheeler entertained the idea of compiling a complete history of this country, and that for many years he has been actively engaged in collecting materials for this purpose. With this object in view he has laboured day after day over the translations of the ancient Sanscrit literature, so that his manuscript extracts alone form a small library in themselves. The volume before us however treats only of the Mahá Bhárata, one of the two great Hindu Epics. The other, the Ramáyana, will be similarly treated in the second volume, and the third will include the results of both, as well as those which are to be drawn from the more salient points of other Sanscrit and Mussulman literature. These three volumes will thus complete the first or Hindu period of the History.

The method which has been pursued by Mr. Wheeler in the treatment of his subject, is one of which the most impartial reader must cordially approve. Instead of occupying a lifetime in the acquisition of a knowledge of the great Sanscrit originals or the discussion of mere philological details, he has been content to utilise the knowledge of others by a judicious selection of the translations which have, from time to time, been made by the most eminent oriental scholars. By following out this scheme of a division of labour, Mr. Wheeler has been enabled to extend his researches over a much wider area than would have been possible, had he obliged himself to use of the originals themselves. He does not write as a philologist, but as a historian. His business has been to sift and analyse what others have

prepared for him; to separate the wheat from the chaff, truth from falsehood, history from myth and fable. He has in fact sought to apply to Sanscrit literature those modern rules of criticism, which have done so much of late years towards a right appreciation of Greek and Roman history. And he has exhibited in the task an ingenuity, a fine discrimination, and a good taste, which cannot fail to recommend the present volume to all who are interested in the early condition of India.

In attempting to trace the rudimentary civilization and institutions of the primitive Hindus, Mr. Wheeler has, we think, found the right key in the analysis of the ancient traditions which lie at the root of the great national epics. However exaggerated and disfigured they may be by later Brahmanical interpolations and additions, the main incidents of the story are doubtless founded upon truth, and refer to a period long anterior to that in which the oldest of the Sanscrit writings were composed. The conquest and subjugation of the aboriginal tribes by the Aryan invaders afforded themes for song and recitation, which would scrupulously be handed down from father to son, and which, however they might be exaggerated in each successive recital, would never be allowed to lose one iota of their pristine significance. To ascertain these fundamental traditions and divest them of all subsequent elaboration, as well as to trace the institutions and the rude manner of life which underlie and are implied in the legends themselves, has been the very difficult task which Mr. Wheeler set before him. He has doubtless been assisted by his intimate knowledge of the country and its people, among the great body of whom the national epics still exert no inconsiderable influence. In fact, we might safely venture to assert, that, so intimately in India are the ideas, the religion, and the inevitable customs of the present associated with the memory and traditions of the past, no writer could hope to succeed in realizing Hindu antiquity who has not a personal and close acquaintance with the Hindus of to-day. Mr. Talboys Wheeler is almost the only historian of India, who possesses this first qualification, and we sincerely trust that he will be both encouraged and spared to continue and complete the original scheme of his comprehensive work.

4. *The Káshmir Hand-book, A Guide for Visitors, with three Maps.* By John Ince, M.D., M.R.C.S., S.G.A.S. Bengal Medical Service. Calcutta. Wyman Bros. 1867.

DR. INCE has conferred upon his fellow-exiles a most appreciable service. He has written a model hand-book for the most

beautiful of all the mountain ranges of India. Under no circumstances is it easy to write a hand-book. The experience of travellers in Europe is decisive on this point, and it is a curious fact that the most practical guide books for travellers on the continent have been written not by Englishmen but by Germans. Yet Dr. Ince has contrived to write a book on Cashmere, which not merely the ordinary traveller, but the man of science, the sportsman, even the lover of piscatory pursuits, will find eminently useful. It is not every one who possesses the time or the taste to exhaust the long list of works which have undergone examination at the hands of the author of this Manual. Yet we know for a fact that the want of some authoritative guide as to the peculiarities of the country, the best mode of travelling, the places to stop at, the servants and supplies to take, have been not the least of the difficulties that have beset the intending traveller into Cashmere. In this little book all this information is contained, and much more besides. And what, too, is of scarcely less importance, the information is arranged in the most practical manner, and is made accessible to the dullest comprehension. We will only add that the three excellent maps attached to the work, the useful appendices, and the admirable index, combine to render it an indispensable companion to the intending tourist in Cashmere.

5. *Yesterday and To-day in India*. By Sidney Laman Blanchard. London. W. H. Allen & Co. 1867.

"*YESTERDAY and To-day in India*" is a republication of a series of papers upon Indian subjects, which have appeared from time to time in *All the Year Round* and *Temple Bar*. It is essentially of the lightest of literature,—so light indeed that it seems almost incongruous to attempt to apply to it the canons of grave criticism. But so far as these papers have tended to enlighten the gross darkness which prevails in England on things Indian, and to give our mothers and sisters a somewhat clearer idea of our manner of life out here, the Anglo-Indian public should be grateful to their author. There are of course numerous petty errors of which a writer with greater experience would not have been guilty; but for a passing traveller we must say that Mr. Blanchard's statements are, on the whole, unusually fair and authentic. We give one or two instances however of our assertion. In speaking of the newly constituted High Courts of Judicature, the following sentence occurs:—"The Queen's Judges and the Company's Judges (*natives among the latter*)

"will henceforth sit upon the same bench, and administer the same law." The old Sudder Court is similarly called the *native* Court of Appeal, the writer evidently being under the impression that native Judges sat in it. He does not seem to be aware that the native element in the highest Courts of Appeal was first introduced, when all the Judges became the Queen's Judges. On the Currency question, Mr. Blanchard asserts that "the Home Government, for some mysterious reason, will not allow it to be extended to the whole of India, but has ordered that it be confined to Bengal." We certainly never heard of these orders, and the fact is that the Currency was introduced into all the Presidencies from the first. The writer would appear to have misunderstood the whole gist of the discussions on the subject. And what will the fair sex think of this? "Ladies in India pride themselves upon the delicate paleness of their complexions, and have established such a standard of beauty in this respect as to vote the roses of Britain, brought out upon the cheeks of its daughters, rather a vulgar exhibition, to be toned down as soon as possible,—a refinement very soon effected in either (are their only two?) of the Presidency Towns." Whether this be the case or not, England's daughters may be consoled by hearing that the gentlemen have not yet passed any such sweeping condemnation, and their opinion considering the subject is perhaps as important as that of the other sex. A writer of Mr. Blanchard's reputation ought not to have made the mistake of calling the Asiatic Society of Bengal a branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. The latter Society was founded by Colebrooke after his retirement from this country, where for many years he had adorned the President's chair in the Asiatic Society of Bengal. But we are growing hyper-critical, a position which we thought we had abnegated at least in regard to the present book. In conclusion then we recommend to our readers the persual of "Mrs. Dulcimer's Shipwreck"—perhaps the most interesting and the best written of the fourteen papers in the book.

6. *An Antidote to Brahmoism*, in four lectures, by the Rev. Lal Behari Day, Pastor of the Free Mission Church, Cornwallis Square, Calcutta. G. C. Hay & Co. 1867.

THE sudden revulsion from the most debasing superstition in the world to the purer light of reason and of faith, and the natural attempt to reconcile that purer light with the dearest associations of the past, have created in India, as is well known, a powerful religious sect who call themselves Brahmoists.

Founded originally by the great Rammohun Roy in 1828, this sect has gone on advancing in influence and enlightenment to the present day, when its tenets find expression and elaboration in the rhetorical periods of Babu Kesub Chander Sen. Rammohun Roy's great discovery was the unity of God, and so sublime were his views on this subject, that some people, even in England, have not hesitated to attribute to him a *Christian* faith. Anxious to preserve the sacred character of his ancient literature, he based the principles of the new sect upon the supposed monotheistic revelation of the Vedas. In 1839, these novel doctrines were strengthened by the establishment of the *Tattwabodhini Sabhā* under Dwarkanath Tagore, and, since his death, Debendronath Tagore. But doubts having arisen as to the correct interpretation of the standard of faith, a deputation of pundits was sent to Benares, and the result was the rejection of revelation altogether, and the substitution of a system of Natural Religion founded on reason or intuition.

To prove the insufficiency of such a religious belief to satisfy the spiritual necessities of mankind, the Rev. Lal Behari Day, whose earnestness and eloquence have already gained for him among his countrymen the *sobriquet* of the Indian Spurgeon, has delivered certain lectures from time to time which have lately been re-published in the volume before us. Apparently not intended originally for publication either separately or as a course, the reader must expect to find in these lectures much that will not strike him as new, and perhaps some repetition. The lectures in fact, though spirited and admirably adapted for oral declamation, do not come up to the modern standard of soberly written arguments of faith. But we are not going to quarrel with the author on this account. As lectures, they probably served their purpose, and are by no means without value. It is by such men as Mr. Day, we believe, that the work of evangelization and regeneration will be most successfully carried on among his countrymen, and we heartily wish him and his fellow-labourers, God-speed in their good work. That Christian must care little indeed for the principles of his own faith, who does not watch with anxious interest the efforts of our small native missionary band to dissipate the darkness of blind superstition, and spread the light of Gospel truth.

7. *Sitana, a Mountain Campaign on the Borders of Afghanistan in 1863*, by Colonel John Adye, c.B. Royal Artillery.

THAT an officer of such high military attainments as Colonel Adye should come forward to present to the public a detailed

account of the mountain campaign of 1863, at the close of which he was present, is a matter of congratulation to military men. Few are better qualified for the task. Colonel Adye happens to combine in his own person to a very remarkable extent the qualifications of the scientific and the practical soldier. It sometimes happens that the study in the closet has the effect of making the soldier pedantic, and the slave of theory in the field. But Colonel Adye has shown throughout a distinguished career in the Crimea and in India that few men are less slaves to theory than himself, that none have more bent the science of the military art to aid in the development of real and practical military reform.

The proof of the broadness and sincerity of Colonel Adye's opinions has not to be sought very far in the pages of this volume. An officer of the old royal Artillery, opposed by instinct as well as by conviction, to the anomaly of maintaining a local field force under a local Government to defend our most vulnerable frontier, Colonel Adye loses not one opportunity of doing full and ample justice to the merits of the old officers of the Company, and especially to the officers of that force the separate existence of which he, in our opinion, justly condemns. Thus in introducing to his readers the illustrious commander of that independent force he writes thus:—"Considering the  
 "hasty manner in which the expedition was organised, the very  
 "difficult country to be operated in, and the powerful combination which the force had to fight against, the Government were  
 "most fortunate in their selection of the officer appointed to the  
 "command. Sir Neville Chamberlain's great name, his long  
 "experience, and his well known brave and chivalrous character,  
 "were indeed sufficient guarantees of the ultimate success of our  
 "arms; and it is a happy circumstance that in the serious  
 "complications and hard battles which ensued, a man of such rare  
 "energy and never-failing courage should have been at the head  
 "of affairs; and although he was struck down by a severe  
 "wound before the operations were quite at an end, it may be  
 "admitted, without disparagement to his successor, that the  
 "neck of the confederacy had already in great measure been  
 "broken by the vigorous blows struck by General Chamberlain,  
 "and that the tribes were sick at heart and almost weary of the  
 "contest." A little further on Colonel Adye writes thus, most truly, of the same officer:—"His whole career, indeed, affords a  
 "bright example of true devotion and of modest courage."  
 Of the Punjab Field Force as a body he thus writes:—"As a  
 "fighting body, its deeds have ever shown it to be thoroughly  
 "well manned and admirably led." Again, "The officers are

"carefully selected, and the whole force is full of martial spirit." Throughout the work, indeed, not a single occasion' *and* bringing to the notice of the world the gallantry and fidelity of the native soldiers of the force, when engaged in fighting against their own kith and kin, and the excellence of its officers.

Still there can be little doubt that the anomaly, condemned by Colonel Adye, of maintaining a local force to guard our frontier, independent of the Commander-in-chief, and subordinate to a civil local Government, was very nearly the cause of a great disaster. In the first place, it is clearly proved, that had the management of the campaign rested with the Commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Rose, a large reserve force would have occupied Eusofzye, and the six week's defensive struggle which cost Sir Neville Chamberlain so many lives and exposed him to such serious straits would have been exchanged for the triumphant march of General Garvoek. In a word, the force on the 24th October would have moved as it did move on the 15th December. But Sir Hugh Rose's advice was disregarded, and no reserves were sent. Our prestige was even in greater peril when, after the terrible combats which ended in the recovery of the Crag by the gallantry of Colonel Hope and his Highland and Goorkha following, it was seriously proposed by the local Government of Lahore, and, according to Colonel Adye, deliberately agreed to by the Supreme Government of Calcutta, to withdraw our force from the mountains in the face of the unsubdued enemy. At that time the tribes were sick of the contest and desirous to give in, but, "could they," writes Colonel Adye, "have divined the moral effect which they had already produced at Lahore, it is probable they would have been tempted to strike hard once more for victory." A second time did Sir Hugh Rose strenuously urge the adoption of the only safe, the only possible course, contributing thereto all that lay in his power by pushing on reserves as fast as possible. It is probable, however, that even his urgent advice would have been unheeded but for the opportune arrival of Sir William Denison in Calcutta. Though only acting as Governor-General, Sir William saw at once the magnitude of the interests at stake, felt how they would be imperilled by withdrawal, and persuaded his Council to adopt the policy recommended no less by Sir Neville Chamberlain than Sir Hugh Rose, and to carry to a triumphant conclusion the expedition, which, whether wisely or unwisely, the Government of India had undertaken.

For the manner in which this story is told, we refer our readers to the book itself. It is well worthy of their perusal. The style is clear and forcible, simple and manly. When the author does



express his own opinions as to the mode in which our relations with the natives ought to be conducted in contradistinction to the opinion of the officials whose names appear in the work, it is impossible for the candid reader to withhold his adhesion. The opinions of Colonel Adye on this point are the opinions likewise of one who has earned the highest title to the respect of the public,—Sir Bartle Frere. Let us hope that no long time will elapse before they become universal. We may add that Colonel Adye appears to share the general opinion that, had Colonel James been the political officer at Peshawar, the war would never have attained the magnitude it did.

## TO THE EDITOR OF THE "CALCUTTA REVIEW."

SIR,

The article in No. 87 of the *Calcutta Review*, styled "Orissa Past and Present," contains so many inaccuracies, and such calumnious representations of the character of the Oorias, that, in fairness to the people, they should not be allowed to pass without contradiction.

At page 5 I find—"Indeed as regards want of manliness, what the Bengalees are to the inhabitants of the Upper Provinces, the Oorias are to the Bengalees. Deficient both in spirit and intelligence, they may well be denominated the Bœotians of Bengal."

"The circumstance of all the public offices being held by Bengalees affords conclusive evidence of their intellectual inferiority."

At page 37 of Stirling's account of Orissa, published between forty and fifty years ago, I find—"They are extremely deficient in manly spirit. They are moreover equally ignorant and stupid. Orissa might be termed the Bœotia of India with reference to the intellectual dulness of its inhabitants as compared with the people of any other Province. A striking proof of the estimation in which their capacity has been ever held is one fact, that in all ages, and under all Governments since the downfall of the Orissan monarchy, the principal official employments throughout the Province have been engrossed by Foreigners,—by Bengalees, north, Telingas, south, of the Chilka Lake." The author of the article has copied from Stirling's old book, and taken it for granted that what he wrote was correct, and that things have remained unchanged;



whereas Stirling greatly exaggerated the faults of the race, and the complete change that has taken place in all the public offices has shown that the opportunity only was wanting—ability and aptness for administration were by no means rare.

In the earlier years of possession by the English, want of spirit and manliness of character were not charged against them; on the contrary, they resisted and resented mismanagement and oppression in a manner which secured a different treatment. Stirling in careful language says—"much suffering was long experienced in particular quarters from injudicious measures." In truth the misrule was intolerable. Twice the people rose in insurrection, and though, of course, they could do but little against the power of the English Government, all and more than all they sought was obtained. The treatment was changed, and for many years those European officers only were sent into the Province who were known to be by natural disposition inclined to treat our native subjects with forbearance and consideration. The manliness they showed bears fruit, which their children and their grand-children are gathering to this day.

It is true that when Stirling wrote, and for some years after, the principal official employments were engrossed by Foreigners. The person to whom the honour is due of first giving the Oorias opportunity of showing their fitness for public employ, was William Wilkinson, Collector of Pooree and Khoordah. Mr. Mills and I followed his example, and in a few years nearly all administrative offices in the Province were held by Oorias. All the details of the settlement of the Province were conducted by Ooria Deputy Collectors: and it is not too much to say, that their excellent conduct, the efficiency and the honesty which trust and sympathy produced, had a beneficial effect on the fortunes of their fellow-countrymen, far beyond the Province of Cuttack. Many of the Deputy Collectors were employed on duties which had always been regarded as calling for the rarest and nicest discrimination, such as the decision of boundary disputes. The manner in which they acquitted themselves; called for the warmest encomiums of the superior authorities, repeated again and again. Doubts, which up to that time had prevailed with so many, gradually began to give way—the employment of natives in offices of responsibility ceased to be regarded as wild imprudence.\* *The prospects of legitimate and honourable ambition were no longer closed against them, and in proportion as we have trusted them we have found them as trustworthy*

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\* Marshman's History of India.

*as their local knowledge has made them efficient. During the last few years great progress has been made, alike in Revenue and in Civil and Criminal Administration—to be attributed more to the greater extent to which we have associated the natives of the country with us in that administration, than to any other cause whatever.\** I repeat, it is not too much to say that this great change, and all the many advantages connected with it, may be traced to the unqualified success which attended the extensive employment of Oorias in the administration of Orissa.

The Reviewer says the people rank very low in the moral and social scale, equally wanting in spirit, intelligence, and enterprise. Again, following Stirling almost word for word, who writes—"In justice, however, to the bulk of the agricultural population it must be said that they are extremely industrious though they work with but little spirit or intelligence." Truly this is but scant justice to a race which furnishes those who do the hardest work performed by our native subjects in any part of our empire, and also those who for honesty and fidelity are more generally trusted by Englishmen, than any other class between Comorin and Lahore.

If there is hard work anywhere on earth, it is carrying a palankeen about the streets of Calcutta, with the thermometer standing at 130; and this work is performed, almost entirely, by Oorias. If there is irksome, tiresome, wearying work on earth, it is pulling a punkah, hour after hour, all through the reeking day, all through the steamy night; and this work is performed by thousands and thousands of Oorias, who leave their houses, and pull the punkahs over sleepers, wearied Englishmen, all over Bengal. Are they unmindful of kindness? Are they ungrateful? Let those who think so, go to Pooree and mention the name of William Wilkinson. He left them full thirty years ago, and the respect, the love for his memory, which they cherish, could not be felt by a people not endowed with some of the most attractive qualities with which human nature is adorned.

And then for fidelity and honesty! It is no exaggeration whatever, to say, they stand in a position far above any other class of our native subjects. The proof undeniable of this is the prevailing practice—go to the house of the Collector of Meerut; who has the keys? the Ooriah Sirdar: go to the house of the Judge of Mymensingh; who brings you your cigar and a pair of slippers? the Ooriah Sirdar; you meet the children of the Magistrate of Chittagong on the road; who

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\* *Spectator*, February 16th, 1867.

pulls the little carriage? who holds the chattah? who carries the baby when the Ayah is tired? the Ooriah Bearer; faithful, honest, patient, grateful, one word of kindness will atone for many words of another description; they will do their duty by the child, though the parents may not always display the kindness and forbearance which devotion and good service call for.

Doubtless there are instances of breach of trust on the part of Oorias; when you show me the race, or the class on earth, among whom no faithless are to be found, I will admit that the Oorias can only hold the second place on the list of trustworthy servants.

There are many other parts of the article connected with the settlement, which I should like to discuss with the author, but I cannot ask you to allow me more space. I do ask you, in fairness to a calumniated people, to print this in your next number, and to attach it to the article, should a second edition of the *Review* be called for. I lived among the Oorias for twelve years; one of the most pleasing recollections of my life is the treatment I received at their hands; and I must not allow such attacks to pass unnoticed, as that which No. 87 contains.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

HENRY RICKETTS,

*Sometime Commissioner in Cuttack.*

(We willingly give insertion to the above letter from Sir Henry Ricketts on the subject of an article which appeared in the 87th Number of our *Review*, entitled "Orissa Past and Present." It is not given to every one to possess the intimate personal acquaintance with the inhabitants of Orissa enjoyed by Sir H. Ricketts, and we think that our contributor, the writer of the article, can scarcely be blamed, if, in the absence of that personal acquaintance, writing of Orissa at a period when information regarding the province was sorely needed by the public, he should have taken his estimate of the character of her people from Stirling. In one point we think that Sir Henry himself is mistaken. Ooriah sirdars and Ooriah bearers are certainly not common out of Bengal. We are strongly of opinion that the household keys of the Collector of Meerut are carried, not by an Ooriah, but by an up-country Kahar; and we know for a fact that, by the majority of those who have tried both classes of servants, the Ooriah and the up-country Kahar, the latter is preferred alike on the ground of cleanliness, capacity for work, and of honesty.—*Ed. C. R.*)









